USCA1 Opinion
[Not For Publication]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1814
GEORGE F. REIDY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Frederick T. Golder, with whom Bernstein, Golder & Miller, P.A. ___________________ _________________________________
was on brief for appellants.
Jay M. Presser, with whom Jeffrey C. Hummel and Skoler, Abbott & ______________ _________________ ________________
Presser, P.C. were on brief for appellee. _____________
____________________
February 13, 1997
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Per Curiam. George Reidy challenges a summary judgment Per Curiam. __________
ruling dismissing his wrongful discharge claims against The
Travelers Insurance Company ("Travelers") for whom Reidy worked
for over twenty years. Although Travelers contends that Reidy
proved incapable of performing his work as a claims representa-
tive despite a reasonable accommodation of his stress-related
"disability," Reidy asserts that Travelers' justification was
pretextual. We affirm the district court judgment.
The four-count complaint alleged (i) breach of the
employment contract; (ii) employment discrimination based on age;
(iii) and on handicap; and (iv) claims for loss of consortium and
nurture by his spouse and children.1 As concerns the claim for
breach of contract, Reidy appears to have believed that his long
tenure as an employee-at-will protected him from arbitrary
termination, but he adduced no competent evidence, see Fed. R. ___
Civ. P. 56(e), that Travelers gave him any such assurance.
Instead, Reidy principally contends that the written employee
manual constituted a binding employment "contract" barring
arbitrary discharge even though it unambiguously provided that
Travelers was "free to terminate your employment at any time, for __ ___ ____
any or for no reason, and with or without advance notice," and ___ __ ______
that "no Travelers' manager or other person at the company has
the authority to make a commitment of guaranteed or continuing __________
employment." (Emphasis added.) Nor does Reidy cite any other
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1We review the summary judgment ruling de novo, viewing all 1 __ ____
evidence in the light most favorable to Reidy. Byrd v. Ronayne, ____ _______
61 F.3d 1026, 1030 (1st Cir. 1995).
2
provision (e.g., minimum term of employment) which assured him ____
protection from unilateral, unconditional termination. See, ___
e.g., Pearson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 254, ____ _______ ________________________________
256-57 (1st Cir. 1992).
The age and handicap discrimination claims fare no
better. Massachusetts courts have no jurisdiction over employ- ____________
ment-discrimination claims unless the plaintiff-employee has
filed a formal complaint with the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination ("MCAD") within six months of the alleged
discriminatory act. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1.B), ___
4(16), 5, 9; Clarke v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of Calif., Inc., 57 ______ ______________________________________
F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1995); Andrews v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., _______ ________________________
673 N.E.2d 40, 41 (Mass. 1996). Reidy contends that his counsel
mailed a formal complaint to the MCAD on August 30, 1991, but
there is no evidence to confirm its receipt by the MCAD. The
official MCAD record itself reflects no formal complaint.
Moreover, on September 20, the MCAD compliance officer wrote
Reidy and confirmed the receipt of his letter describing _____
Travelers' alleged discriminatory conduct, but advised that a _
formal complaint would still be necessary to initiate MCAD ______ _________
action. A copy of the MCAD letter was provided to Reidy's
counsel as well.
Although the MCAD letter plainly placed both Reidy and
counsel on notice that the MCAD had received a letter from Reidy, ______ ____ _____
rather than any August 30 letter from Reidy's counsel enclosing a
formal MCAD complaint, neither Reidy nor counsel followed up on
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this obvious discrepancy or on the formal advice contained in the
letter from the MCAD compliance officer.2 Accordingly, the
district court lacked jurisdiction and the employment-based
discrimination claims were properly dismissed.3
Affirmed. Affirmed. ________
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2Thus, Reidy's insistence that the summary judgment ruling 2
penalized him for MCAD's administrative incompetence lacks record ____
support. Of course, if cognizable, such unsubstantiated "defens-
es" would all but eviscerate the exhaustion requirement.
3Since Reidy no longer holds actionable employment discrimi- 3
nation claims against Travelers, the district court properly
dismissed the related claims by the spouse and children as well.
See Tauriac v. Polaroid Corp., 716 F. Supp. 672, 673 (D. Mass. ___ _______ ______________
1989) (citing Mouradian v. General Elec. Co., 503 N.E.2d 1318, _________ _________________
1321 (Mass. App. Ct.) (dismissing wife's consortium claim
because husband had no viable employment discrimination claim),
review denied, 507 N.E.2d 1056 (1987)); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ______ ______ ___ ____
ch. 152, 24 (1990) (workers' compensation statute preempts
consortium claims of spouse, children and parents); Hamilton v. ________
Baystate Med. Educ. & Research Found., 866 F. Supp. 51, 57 (D. ______________________________________
Mass. 1994), aff'd, 66 F.3d 306 (1st Cir. 1995); St. Germaine v. _____ ____________
Pendergast, 584 N.E.2d 611, 617-18 (Mass. 1992). __________
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