USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-2201
BETTY LORD, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
TOWN OF LINCOLNVILLE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
David M. Glasser on brief for appellants. ________________
Edward R. Benjamin, Jr., Elizabeth A. Campbell and Preti, __________________________ _______________________ ______
Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, L.L.C. on brief for appellee Town of _____________________________________
Lincolnville.
____________________
April 25, 1997
____________________
Per Curiam. On October 2, 1993, Roderick Lord was __________
severely injured in an automobile collision that occurred at
an intersection within the geographical boundaries of the
Town of Lincolnville, Maine. Contending that the
intersection is inherently dangerous and that the Town is
responsible, Lord's legal guardians brought suit against the
Town under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This appeal
followed.
The sole issue on appeal is whether a claim under
the Due Process Clause lies in this case. We think not. As
the Supreme Court made clear in Collins v. City of Harker _______ _______________
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126-27 & n.9 (1992), the Federal _______
Constitution is not a guarantee of certain minimal levels of
safety and security. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County ________ ________ ________________
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-97 (1989) (holding _______________________
that a State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence generally does not constitute a violation of
the Due Process Clause, because the Clause imposes no duty on
the State to provide members of the general public with
adequate protective services). Nor may the Due Process
Clause be used to supplant state tort law claims. Collins, _______
503 U.S. at 128; see also Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 F.3d ________ _____________ _______
62, 63-64 (1st Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs' attempt to
clothe malpractice claim in civil rights language).
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Appellants' various attempts to distinguish Collins and _______
DeShaney fail. ________
First, contrary to appellants' suggestion, a
decision whether or not to purchase and install four-way stop
signs involves the allocation of financial resources and
requires the decision-maker to balance competing social
needs. Such decisions are best made by locally elected
representatives "rather than by federal judges interpreting
the basic charter of Government for the entire country."
Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29; see also Lewellen v. _______ _________ ________
Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 34 F.3d ___________________________________________________
345, 351 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Collins), cert. _______ _____
denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995). ______
Second, we reject appellants' suggestion that Lord
was in the functional custody of the Town of Lincolnville.
Lord voluntarily chose to drive his car on Ducktrap Extension
Road. Cf. Searles v. Southeastern Penn. Trans. Auth., 990 ___ _______ ________________________________
F.2d 789, 792 (3d Cir. 1993) (observing that plaintiff was
not deprived of his liberty when he voluntarily chose to ride
elevated train). Moreover, an individual is not deprived of
his liberty by virtue of being subject to laws.
Finally, we do not think appellants' can rely on a
state-created danger theory. Cf. Searles, 990 F.2d at 793 ___ _______
(rejecting attempt to distinguish Collins where plaintiff _______
alleged that municipal transit authority created a danger by
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failing to maintain railcars in safe operating condition).
To the extent that the Town can be held responsible, Lord's
injuries resulted from the Town's failure to act (namely, a
failure to remove visual impediments and a failure to alert
drivers to the danger). The case simply does not involve
"injury directly caused by a state actor's affirmative act in
the traditional sense." Id. ___
Affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. ________ ___
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