USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 96-2270
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
MARIANO MIER TOUS,
Defendant, Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
____________________
Before
Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
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Luis Rafael Rivera on brief for appellant.
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant
United States Attorney, Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco , Chief, Criminal Division,
and Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, on brief for
appellee.
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July 29, 1997
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Per Curiam . For the reasons stated by the district court
in its order dated September 19, 1996, we reject defendant's
contention that the government breached the plea agreement.
The facts in United States v. Velez Carrero , 77 F.3d 11, 11-12
(1st Cir. 1996), are distinguishable.
Further, based upon the reasons stated by the district
court in its orders dated September 19 and October 16, 1996, we
conclude that the district court's refusal to depart downward
is not subject to review here.
As to a departure for aberrant behavior, there is no
indication that the district court misapprehended the
applicable guidelines or its authority to depart, and we will
not disturb its plausible interpretation of the facts regarding
defendant's planning of and gain from the fraudulent
transactions. See United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555,
560 (1st Cir. 1996).
As to a departure for reduced mental capacity, the record
shows that defendant did not request such a departure at
sentencing, and so he may be deemed to have waived the issue.
Our reading of the transcript of the sentencing hearing
persuades us that the issue of such a departure was not raised
at that time by the district court or either party. To the
contrary, the district court only mentioned defendant's mental
state in the context of considering the "thoughtlessness"
factor of a departure for aberrant behavior. Defendant's
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subsequent Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) motion was not an appropriate
means of raising such a request, see United States v. Abreu-
Cabrera, 64 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1995), and so we will not
consider it now. In all events, the case for such a departure
seems quite weak, and it appears altogether unlikely that the
district court, had the point been squarely raised, would have
departed.
The sentence is affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.
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