Rogers v. Management Technolog

USCA1 Opinion












UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 96-1960

FRANCES A. ROGERS,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY, INC., ET AL.

Defendants, Appellees,

____________________

RICHARD CAVALLARO,

Defendant, Appellant.

____________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, District Judge] ______________
____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________

Jennifer H. Zacks, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney _________________ _______________
General, Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Barbara L. _______________ __________
Herwig, Attorney, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, were on ______
brief for appellant, Richard Cavallaro.
Paul A. Manoff for appellee Frances A. Rogers. ______________
____________________

August 12, 1997
____________________















CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. The United States ____________________

and its employee, Richard Cavallaro, appeal from the district

court's order remanding a slander action brought against

Cavallaro back to the Massachusetts state court. The slander

action had earlier been removed to the federal court pursuant

to the Attorney General's Westfall Act certification, which

stated that Cavallaro had been acting within the scope of his

federal employment at the time of the alleged slander

incident. Appellants now complain that the district court,

ignoring the Attorney General's certification, wrongly placed

upon them the burden of establishing that Cavallaro was

acting within the scope of his federal employment when

committing the alleged tort. Appellants further complain of

the absence of any express determination by the district

court that Cavallaro had in fact been acting beyond the scope

of his federal employment. We vacate and remand.

I. Factual Background ______________________

The plaintiff, Frances A. Rogers, was employed by

Management Technology Inc., a government contractor, until

August 1993. At that time, Rogers was fired, allegedly for

falsifying the records of the hours she had worked as a data

entry help desk coordinator at Hanscom Air Force Base.

Rogers then filed a state action in the Massachusetts

superior court against, among others, Richard Cavallaro, a

civil service employee of the United States Air Force. She



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asserted that following a dispute she had had with Cavallaro

over a parking space, he had defamed her wrongfully

telling her superiors that she had falsified her time cards

causing the loss of her job.

The United States Attorney, acting under the

Westfall Act, certified that Cavallaro had been "acting

within the scope of his office or employment at the time of

the incident out of which the claim arose."1 28 U.S.C.

2679(d)(1). The government then removed the case to the

federal district court and moved that the United States be

substituted for Cavallaro as the party defendant, and that

Cavallaro be dismissed, under 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2) and

(b)(1).

At the same time, the government also moved

separately for summary judgment, arguing that since the

Westfall Act provides that a plaintiff's sole remedy against

a federal employee for "injury or loss of property, or

personal injury or death arising or resulting from the

negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office or

employment," 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1), is a suit against the

United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and since


____________________

1. Although the statute designates the Attorney General as
the person who makes the scope decision, the Attorney General
has delegated this authority to the United States Attorneys.
See 28 C.F.R. 15.3(a). ___

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the Federal Tort Claims Act provides no waiver of sovereign

immunity for the types of claims asserted by Rogers, see 28 ___

U.S.C. 2680(h), Rogers had no remedy.

The case was assigned initially to United States

District Judge Harrington. On April 29, 1994, Judge

Harrington ordered both parties to submit affidavits

"delineating the duties and responsibilities of their

employment . . . ." Whether because it was never received,

as the government now contends, or for some other reason,

neither party filed affidavits in compliance with this

order.2

On May 16, 1994, the case was reassigned to United

States District Judge Gertner. On September 16, 1994, Judge

Gertner held a hearing on the government's motions for

substitution of the United States as party defendant and

dismissal of Cavallaro and for summary judgment against

Rogers in her defamation action. On May 30, 1996, Judge

Gertner denied all the government's motions, citing

Cavallaro's failure to file an affidavit in compliance with

the April 29, 1994 order and a lack of basis for concluding

that Cavallaro was acting within the scope of his employment.


____________________

2. Rogers submitted an affidavit on May 2, 1994 that did not
address the "duties and responsibilities" of either her
employment or Cavallaro's. Rogers says she filed this
affidavit in support of her opposition to the government's
summary judgment motion, and not in response to Judge
Harrington's order.

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Judge Gertner then remanded the case back to the

Massachusetts state court. Without moving for

reconsideration, the government filed this appeal.3

II. Review of the Scope Certification ______________________________________

The Westfall Act states that the scope

certification by the Attorney General that a federal

employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment

when committing the alleged tort from which the claim arose

"shall conclusively establish scope of office or

employment for purposes of removal." 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2) _______________________

(emphasis added). In Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 _____________________ _______

S. Ct. 2227 (1995), the Supreme Court construed the Act so as

to allow district courts to review the Attorney General's

scope certificate relative to the matter of substitution of

the United States as a party defendant. The Court wrote:

Congress spoke in discrete sentences in
2679(d)(2) first of removal, then of
substitution. Next, Congress made the

____________________

3. The government says that it did not file a motion for
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 because it "did not
become aware of the district court's orders denying the
United States' motion for substitution and remanding the case
to state court until a few days before the deadline for
filing a notice of appeal . . . ." Given the government's
complaint that it was not notified of Judge Harrington's
order to file affidavits, it would have been sensible to
bring this matter to the district court's attention. The
government's excuse that it did not learn of Judge Gertner's
order rejecting its motion until shortly before the
expiration of the time to appeal is not persuasive. It could
have filed its notice of appeal first and then asked the
district court to reconsider its order. See Puerto Rico v. ___ ___________
The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 601 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1979). ______________________

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Attorney General's certificate conclusive
solely for purposes of removal, and
notably not for purposes of substitution.
It follows . . . that the scope-of-
employment judgment determinative of
substitution can and properly should be
checked by the court, i.e., the Attorney ____
General's scarcely disinterested
certification on that matter is by
statute made the first, but not the final
word.

Id. at 2235. ___

Gutierrez did not speak to the question of who has _________

the burden of proof on the scope issue, but our language in

Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1990), indicates ______ ________

clearly that in situations such as this one, where a

plaintiff asserts that a defendant acted outside the scope of

his or her employment despite the Attorney General's

certification to the contrary, the burden of proof is on the

plaintiff. We wrote:

The Attorney General can see to it, by
making the certification, that the
federal defendant's scope status is
resolved by a federal, not a state
tribunal; employee immunity will thus be
protected, in keeping with the Westfall
Act's purpose, except where the plaintiff __________________________
can convince a federal court that the _______________________________
government employee was acting outside
the scope of his employment and,
therefore, by definition, was not
entitled to immunity from personal
liability.

Id. at 813 n.16 (emphasis added). See also Aversa v. United ___ ________ ______ ______

States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209 (1st Cir. 1996). ______





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Neither the Supreme Court nor our own en banc court

has said anything to undermine the panel's conclusion in

Nasuti that the plaintiff has the burden of proof in respect ______

to overturning the Attorney General's scope certification.

The holding therefore remains binding in this circuit. See ___

Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, _________________ ________________________

493 n.8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, No. 96-1698, 1997 WL 219862 ____________

(U.S. June 27, 1997); Williams v. Ashland Engineering Co., ________ _________________________

Inc., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. ____ ____________

51 (1995). Here, the district court explained its

reasons for overturning the scope certification, rejecting

the government's motions, and remanding to the state court,

solely as follows:

On April 29, 1994, this court issued an
order requiring defendant Cavallaro to
submit an affidavit delineating his
duties and responsibilities with the Air
Force. No such affidavit was received.
This Court therefore has no basis for
concluding that Cavallaro was acting
within the scope of his employment when
he made the allegedly defamatory remarks.

The district court's language that without the

government's affidavit it had no basis for concluding that

Cavallaro was acting within the scope of his employment

ignored the Attorney General's existing scope certification

and improperly placed upon the defendant the burden of

establishing anew that he had acted within the scope of his

federal employment.



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In Nasuti, as the government points out, this court ______

further held that it is illegal for the district court, when _______

confronted with an outstanding scope certification, to remand

to the state court unless it makes "an express determination

of its own that defendant, when he allegedly injured

plaintiff, was acting beyond the scope of his federal

employment." Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 808. The district court ______

made no such express scope determination here, pointing

instead merely to Cavallaro's failure to have produced an

affidavit delineating his Air Force duties and

responsibilities. It is far from clear that such an

affidavit would have resolved the scope issue as framed by

Rogers, namely, that Cavallaro was motivated by personal

animosity stemming from a parking space dispute when he told

Plaintiff's superiors that she had falsified her time

records. In any case, the district court's reference to the

missing affidavit delineating duties and responsibilities

fell short of Nasuti's requirement that the court ______

affirmatively make an express determination of its own that

Defendant was acting beyond the scope of his employment when

he injured the plaintiff.

We do not say, of course, that the express

determination of scope called for in Nasuti may not be made ______

in the context of a summary judgment type proceeding,

assuming there is no issue of disputed fact requiring an



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evidentiary hearing. But Rogers never moved for summary

judgment on the scope issue. Nor did the district court ever

determine on the basis of uncontested facts in the record

that Cavallaro had acted outside the scope of his federal

employment.

This is not a situation where it might be thought

that the district court had validly granted summary judgment

to a non-requesting party. See National Expositions, Inc. v. ___ __________________________

Crowley Maritime Corp., 824 F.2d 131, 133 (1st Cir. 1987) ______________________

("[A] district court has the legal power to render 'summary

judgment . . . in favor' of the party opposing a summary

judgment motion 'even though he has made no formal cross-

motion under rule 56.'") (quoting 10A C. Wright, A. Miller &

M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 2720, at 29-30 (1st ______________________________

ed. 1983)). The major limitation on this rule is that "'the

losing party' must be 'on notice that she had to come forward

with all of her evidence.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. ___ ______________

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). In order to be "on notice," _______

the original movant must have "'had an adequate opportunity ________________________

to show that there is a genuine issue and that his opponent

is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. ___

(quoting 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, 2720, _____

at 34) (emphasis added by cited case).

Here it cannot be said that Cavallaro understood he

was on notice that he had to produce all his scope evidence



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or else face summary judgment against him. It is true that

he was ordered by Judge Harrington to produce affidavits

delineating his duties and responsibilities. But even had

Cavallaro complied, such an affidavit would not have

addressed Rogers' argument that Cavallaro's conduct was

outside the scope of his federal duties because it was based

on personal spite. Rogers herself, in her opposition to the

government's summary judgment motion, stated, "There is

insufficient evidence in the record presently, for the court

to make [the scope] determination." Rogers argued that she

needed to take three depositions before enough evidence would

exist. In these confusing circumstances, we do not believe

the defendants were on notice they had to come forward with

all their evidence on scope, on peril of suffering summary

judgment on that issue in favor of the non-moving plaintiff.

Indeed, although we need not decide the point, it

seems unclear whether the facts stated in Cavallaro's

affidavit (treating them, arguendo, as uncontested) provided

a sufficient basis for a scope determination under

Massachusetts law against Cavallaro and the government. See ___

Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 ________________________ __________________________

N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Mass. 1986) ("The fact that the

predominant motive of the agent is to benefit himself does

not prevent the act from coming within the scope of





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employment as long as the act is otherwise within the purview

of his authority.").

We hold, therefore, that the district court lacked

an adequate basis in the present record and on the procedures

conducted to date for awarding a judgment on the scope issue

in Plaintiff's favor.

Nor can the district court's ruling be upheld as

tantamount to the entry of a default judgment against

Cavallaro and the government designed to discipline them for

their failure to file the affidavit ordered by Judge

Harrington. The court's order denying the government's

motions for dismissal of Cavallaro as a party defendant and

for substitution of the United States, and for summary

judgment, does not contain either the word "default" or a

citation to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, which sets forth the

procedure for issuing a judgment by default.4 Nor was that

procedure followed. Rogers did not move for a default

judgment; written notice of an application for default

judgment was not served; and no hearing was held on the

matter of a default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). ___


____________________

4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) states, in relevant part:

[T]he party entitled to a judgment by default shall
apply to the court therefor . . . . If the party
against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared
in the action, the party . . . shall be served with
written notice of the application for judgment at least
3 days prior to the hearing on such application.

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Rogers argues that we lack jurisdiction to review

the district court's remand order through a writ of mandamus.

Just as in Nasuti, however, the district court's failure to ______

make an express finding that Cavallaro was acting outside the

scope of his employment left the Attorney General's scope

certification intact. As we wrote:

[S]o long as the Attorney General's
certificate is validly in effect, [the
defendant] must be deemed conclusively,
for removal purposes, to have been acting
within the scope of his employment, and ___
is thus absolutely immune from any civil _________________________________________
action or proceeding for money damages. ________________________________________
The district court's current order
remanding to the state court is,
therefore, totally unauthorized, being
contrary to Congress's mandate that the
Attorney General's scope certification be
conclusive.

Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 809-10 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, ______

mandamus is appropriate in this case as it was in Nasuti. ______

"At least where, as here, remand was on grounds inextricably

mixed with the scope of employment issue, and was plainly

barred by the scope certification, we believe mandamus is

appropriate . . . ." Id. at 812 n.15.5 ___




____________________

5. The district court's order may also be reviewable on
direct appeal. See Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812 n.15; Flohr v. ___ ______ _____
Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 389 (11th Cir. 1996); Kimbro v. _________ ______
Velten, 30 F.3d 1501, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ______ ____________
115 S. Ct. 2584 (1995); Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 233 _______ _____
(4th cir. 1994); Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1353 (3d ______ ______
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 817 (1993); Mitchell v. ____________ ________
Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1990). _______

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We therefore vacate the district court's order

denying the government's motions for substitution and summary

judgment and remanding the case to state court. We remand to

the district court for an express determination as to whether

Cavallaro was acting within the scope of his duties when he

allegedly injured Rogers. Just as in Nasuti, "As we are ______

confident that the district court and the parties will comply

with our orders in this regard, we see no need to issue an

actual writ of mandamus at this time." Id. at 814. ___

Vacated and remanded. ____________________

































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