FILED: November 12, 1996
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-4003
GREGORY WARREN BEAVER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
J. D. NETHERLAND, WARDEN,
Respondent - Appellee.
AMENDED ORDER
We have before us a motion for a stay of the execution of
Beaver which has been set for December 3, 1996, and as well a
motion to extend our previously entered stay of our mandate.
It is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the previously ordered stay of
our mandate be extended until November 29, 1996, on which date our
mandate will issue.
It is further ORDERED that the motion to stay the execution of
Beaver, which has been set for December 3, 1996, shall be, and the
same hereby is, denied.
Judge Widener concurs in all of the foregoing order. Judge
Hall agrees to the extension of the issuance of our mandate, but
dissents from the denial of the stay of execution. Judge Luttig
concurs in the denial of the stay of execution, but dissents from
the stay of our mandate.
The opinion of the panel is delivered by Judge Widener; Judge
Hall filed a concurring the dissenting opinion; and Judge Luttig
filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. All of those opinions
follow.
______________________________
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
For the Court
WIDENER, Circuit Judge:
On September 30, 1996, we stayed our mandate in this case for
a period of 30 days, to expire on October 30, 1996, "in order that
. . . [Beaver] may file his petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court."
I refer to Fed. R. App. P. 41(b), which limits the usual stay
of mandates to 30 days in such circumstances.
Beaver, on October 30, 1996, filed a motion to extend the stay
of the mandate and for a stay of execution.
In Netherland v. Tuggle, 64 U.S.L.W. 3182 (1996), the Court
required that in granting a stay of execution, we "undertake the
three-part inquiry required by . . . [its] decision in Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-896 . . . (1983)." The Court also cited
us to Maggio v. Williams, 464 U. S. 46, 48 (1983) and Autry v.
Estelle, 464 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1983). The Court stated that "there is
no hint that the court [of appeals] found that 'four Members of
this Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently
meritorious for the grant of certiorari' or that 'a significant
possibility of reversal existed,'" citing Barefoot, at 895.
The three-part inquiry referred to in Barefoot is that "there
must be a reasonable probability that four Members of the Court
would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for
the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction;
there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower
court’s decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable
harm will result if that decision is not stayed." Barefoot, at
895. (italics added)
The initial part of the rule with respect to four Justices
grew from the practice of the Court in a Circuit Justice’s in-
chambers review of stay applications. See Graves v. Barrens, 405
U.S. 1201 (1972) (Justice Powell, Circuit Justice). It is there
phrased as requiring that "there being a reasonable probability
that four Members of the Court will consider the issue sufficiently
meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction."
Graves, at 1203. The opinion referred to that principle as the
"threshold consideration," and Justice Powell recited that he had
utilized the practice of other Justices in passing on applications
raising serious constitutional questions of "consulting with each
of my Brethren who was available." He recited that all the
Justices except two were available and that all who were available
would have denied the application for a stay.
The second requirement of Barefoot is that "there must be a
significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision,"
Barefoot, at p. 895, and the third requirement of Barefoot is that
"there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if
that decision is not stayed," Barefoot, at p. 895.
In cases involving the death penalty when an execution date
has been set, as here, it is a certainty that irreparable harm will
result if the court of appeals’ decision is not stayed.
The rule, as stated in Barefoot is that four Members of the
Court must consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious
for the grant of certiorari and that a significant possibility of
reversal exists. Until Tuggle, we were of opinion that the three-
part Barefoot rule did not apply to courts of appeal considering
whether or not to stay their own orders or to stay executions
pursuant to their orders, but that the rule with respect to four
Justices thinking a case was worthy of certiorari was only applied
in the Supreme Court in its own consideration of applications for
a stay. That is illustrated by Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1
(1983), which significantly was an opinion of the Court and not of
a single Justice, and which opinion stated that
Had applicant convinced four Members of the [Supreme]
Court that certiorari would be granted on any of his
claims, a stay would issue. But this is not the case;
fewer than four Justices would grant certiorari.
Applicant thus fails to satisfy one of the basic
requirements for the issuance of a stay.
Autry at p. 2.
Of considerable significance is that in Tuggle, a significant
possibility of reversal is not added to the fact that four Members
of the Supreme Court should consider the underlying issue
sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari, rather the
opinion states that "or that 'a significant possibility of a
reversal' existed." (italics added) We do not believe that the
change from the serial requirement of Barefoot to the alternative
requirement of Tuggle is inadvertent. Courts of appeal have no way
of knowing or intelligently ascertaining the individual opinions of
the Members of the Supreme Court, and I am not aware that this
court, at least, has engaged in that speculation.
This leaves the question of whether there is a significant
possibility of reversal. If there is, a stay should issue. If
there is not, a stay should not issue.
The dissenting panel opinion of Judge Hall correctly describes
the heart of the case as the relationship between Beaver’s attorney
and his client.
Beaver's attorney was a part-time attorney for the
Commonwealth in a neighboring county. He argues that there should
be a per se rule forbidding an attorney from representing a
criminal defendant in one county if the attorney is a part-time
attorney for the Commonwealth in a neighboring county. No actual
conflict of interest was shown. As the dissent stated: "the dual
nature of Rainey’s [the attorney's] representation is the only
'historical fact' of which we need take note." If the per se rule
espoused by the dissent is the correct rule, then Beaver may be due
a new trial. If not, his execution should proceed.
To this I would add that in the case of Angelone v. Bennett,
No. A-303, on November 4, 1996, the Court vacated our stay of
execution in that case, which is our case No. 95-4004 styled
Bennett v. Angelone. In that order, the Court made it clear that
it did not approve of what had been a routine practice of this
court to extend in death penalty cases the time to file petitions
for certiorari the same as in other cases.
On the off-chance that something we have done might hinder
Beaver's filing of a petition for certiorari, we further extend the
stay of the mandate in this case until November 29, 1996, but deny
the motion for a stay of execution. Beaver's attorney forthwith
should file his petition for certiorari and motion for a stay of
execution and our mandate, any or all of them.
I cannot say that I believe there is a significant possibility
that the Supreme Court will adopt the per se rule espoused by the
dissent.
HALL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join in the court's decision to extend the stay of our
mandate though November 29, 1996, although I believe that our doing
so is of little consequence. The district court's order denying
the petitioner habeas relief remains in effect, even without our
imprimatur; thus, there is currently no legal impediment to the
Commonwealth's impending execution of the petitioner.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's denial of
the petitioner's motion to stay his execution pending his
application for a writ of certiorari. As one may easily discern
from reading the published opinions concerning the underlying
matter, my views regarding the rule announced in Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), stand in stark contrast to those of
the majority. I conclude that a reasonable probability exists that
at least four Justices would vote to grant certiorari, inasmuch as
the Court may be persuaded that, by agreeing to consider the merits
of the petitioner's claim, it would have the opportunity to clarify
its existing precedent.
And the merits of the petitioner's claim are substantial,
perhaps even unusually so. There is, in my view, a significant
possibility that Court will reverse our judgment in this case.
Finally, there is no disputing the irreparable harm that will be
done to the petitioner should his execution not be stayed. Because
I believe that the three criteria of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 895 (1983), have been met in this case, I would grant the
petitioner's motion to stay his execution.
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the judgment that a stay of Beaver's scheduled
execution is, under applicable Supreme Court caselaw, unauthorized.
Were we to grant the stay of execution here, I believe that we
would, alternatively, court summary reversal or affirmatively
mislead the Supreme Court into concluding that we believe that the
underlying issue in this case is certworthy when we do not so
believe. I dissent from the court's further extension of our stay
of mandate, however, because I believe that that extension is
unauthorized as well.
In Netherland v. Tuggle, 116 S. Ct. 4 (1995) ("Tuggle I"), the
Supreme Court summarily reversed our court's stays of execution and
mandate which were entered pursuant to what had been our routine
practice of granting such stays to unsuccessful capital
petitioners, without regard to the requirements of Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), while those petitioners sought
certiorari review from the Supreme Court.1 The Court admonished us
for granting such stays "by summary order without opinion or
discussion," observing that "[n]othing indicates that the Court of
Appeals even attempted to undertake [the] three-part inquiry
required by our decision in Barefoot v. Estelle." Tuggle I, 116 S.
Ct. at 5. The Court reminded us, in language whose import is
unmistakable, that it had, in Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1, 2-3
1
Three weeks earlier, without discussion or citation to
authority, we had instructed the Attorney General of Virginia not
to "seek the setting of an execution date until the Supreme Court
has ruled on the petition for writ of certiorari in the initial
habeas corpus proceeding." Stockton v. Murray, No. 94-4000 (Aug.
21, 1995).
(1983), and Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 48 (1983), rejected
the view that "a capital defendant as a matter of right [is]
entitled to a stay of execution until he has filed a petition for
certiorari in due course." Tuggle I, 116 S. Ct. at 5.
With few, if any, exceptions, our court has continued
routinely to grant stays in disregard of the Supreme Court's
instruction in Tuggle I. Initially, after our resort to the stay
of execution was limited by that case, we did so through the
vehicle of a stay of mandate. Thus, in Tuggle v. Netherland, 94-
4005 ("Tuggle II"), we summarily granted the defendant a stay of
mandate, stating, in reasoning identical to that employed to
justify our earlier stays of mandate and execution which were
vacated, that our stay of mandate "serve[d] to stay Tuggle's
execution until the final disposition of any timely-filed petition
for certiorari in the Supreme Court." (Likewise, in O'Dell v.
Netherland, 94-4013(L), "by summary order without opinion or
discussion," see Tuggle I, 116 S. Ct. at 5, we stayed our mandate
in order to allow time for the filing of a petition for
certiorari.) When the Supreme Court finally corrected our mistaken
belief that a stay of mandate operated as the functional equivalent
of a stay of execution, see Netherland v. Tuggle, 116 S. Ct. 1821
(1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., Circuit Justice) ("Tuggle III"), we simply
returned to our pre-Tuggle I practice of routinely granting stays
of mandate and execution without analysis, having specially
apprised counsel in numerous pending capital cases of their need to
file motions for stay of execution separate from motions for stay
of mandate.2 Indeed, the very next day after Tuggle III was
decided, we granted Tuggle himself a stay of execution without a
single word of discussion or analysis of the Barefoot standards --
precisely what the Supreme Court held in Tuggle I that we could not
do. See Tuggle v. Netherland, 94-4005 ("Tuggle IV").
Our court's confusion, and consequent failure to abide by
Supreme Court precedent regarding the proper standards governing
stays of execution, persists to this day. In his separate opinion,
Judge Widener contends, notwithstanding the reaffirmation of
Barefoot in Tuggle I, that Tuggle I itself modified Barefoot sub
silentio so as to render Barefoot's three-part test disjunctive.
And, significantly, in a separate opinion entered today on the
Supreme Court's remand following summary vacatur of our stay of
execution in Bennett v. Angelone, a panel adopts Judge Widener's
"revised" standard as binding precedent for our entire court. See
Bennett v. Angelone, 95-4004 slip op. at * (Nov. 8, 1996).
Tuggle I, of course, did not modify Barefoot, nor did it
purport to do so. In Tuggle I, the Supreme Court made the simple
point that our court had not "even attempted to undertake the
three-part inquiry required by . . . Barefoot v. Estelle." 116 S.
Ct. at 5. It then went on, in the very next sentence, to observe
that "[t]here is no hint" that our court found either that four
Members of the Supreme Court would grant certiorari or that a
2
See Letter of Oct. 14, 1996 from the Clerk to Counsel in
Nos. 95-4003, Beaver v. Thompson; 95-4016, Payne v. Netherland; 95-
4004, Bennett v. Angelone; 94-4013, O'Dell v. Netherland; 94-4005,
Tuggle v. Netherland; 96-6, Stewart v. Angelone; 96-5, Matthews v.
Evatt.
significant possibility of reversal existed. The full passage
reads as follows:
Nothing indicates that the Court of Appeals even
attempted to undertake the three-part inquiry required by
our decision in Barefoot v. Estelle. There is no hint
that the court found that "four Members of this Court
would consider the underlying issue sufficiently
meritorious for the grant of certiorari" or that "a
significant possibility of reversal" existed.
116 S. Ct. at 5 (citations omitted). From the Court's use of the
term "or," instead of "and," Judge Widener in this case and the
full panel in Bennett reason that Barefoot has been modified.
Quite obviously, the Court was not, by its passing observation,
summarily modifying its seminal opinion in Barefoot. It was, by
way of explanation, merely emphasizing that we had analyzed neither
of the two requirements of Barefoot there in issue. It could have
been clearer, I suppose; however, there was no reason to be so. It
would never have occurred to the Court that its passage would be
misread as it has been today.
The confusion that will be generated by today's panel opinion
in Bennett v. Angelone is compounded by the fact that the panel
itself does not even apply the standard it adopts. If, as the
panel opinion holds, the Barefoot standard is indeed a disjunctive
one, then the panel incorrectly confines its inquiry to whether
there exists a significant possibility of reversal; as well, the
panel should have considered whether, despite the unlikelihood of
reversal, four Members of the Supreme Court would nonetheless vote
to grant certiorari. (The panel's contention notwithstanding, we
are in no better position to "know[] or intelligently ascertain[]
the individual opinions of the Members of the Supreme Court," ante
at 5, as to whether they might reverse our opinion, than we are to
know or ascertain whether four of the Court's Members would vote to
grant certiorari.) Indeed, if the panel were correct, and the test
now truly is disjunctive, then a stay would enter in every single
capital case because Barefoot's first requirement of "irreparable
harm" would always be met.
Here, Beaver asks us to stay both our mandate and his
execution, as we have routinely done in the past for others
similarly situated. Despite what has been our general confusion,
the court is entirely correct to deny the latter as unauthorized by
Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, were we to grant the requested
stay of execution, this case would be indistinguishable from the
stay of execution entered by our court in Bennett v. Angelone, 95-
4004, the case here relied upon by Beaver, which was summarily
vacated by the Supreme Court only a few days ago on the authority
of Tuggle I. See Angelone v. Bennett, 1996 WL 635020. Like the
order of stay in Bennett, Beaver's requested stay of execution in
the instant case is, simply, insupportable under Tuggle I.
Now eleven years ago, Gregory Warren Beaver was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death for the murder of Virginia
State Trooper Leo Whitt. On August 22, 1996, we upheld Beaver's
capital murder conviction and death sentence. Beaver v. Thompson,
93 F.3d 1186, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996). Not one member of the court
requested a poll of the court on whether to rehear the case en
banc, and, consequently, on September 19, 1996, Beaver's petition
for rehearing and his petition for rehearing en banc were denied.
Beaver thereafter petitioned the court for a stay of mandate for 90
days "in order to prepare a meaningful Petition" for certiorari.
Without any discussion or explanation, we granted Beaver's
requested stay of mandate for 30 days under F.R.A.P. 41(b), and the
Commonwealth of Virginia subsequently scheduled Beaver's execution
for December 3, 1996 -- over 100 days after we upheld Beaver's
conviction and sentence. Not until the late afternoon of October
30, the date that our mandate was to have issued under the extended
deadline, did Beaver approach this court with this successive
motion for further delay of mandate and a new motion for stay of
execution.
The Supreme Court's cases "make clear that a Court of Appeals
should grant a stay [of execution] (to permit application for a
writ of certiorari) only in a special case -- a case presenting a
significant likelihood of [a] grant [of certiorari]." Angelone v.
Bennett, 1996 WL 635020 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Tuggle I,
116 S. Ct. 4). Obviously, this is not such an extraordinary case.
The Court is all but certain to deny certiorari on Beaver's
legal claim that our interpretation of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335 (1980), is in error. The Supreme Court held in Cuyler that,
[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial
must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance.
446 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added). In our opinion that Beaver
proposes to challenge, we interpret this plain language to require
that Beaver show an "actual conflict" and an "adverse affect."
Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1192. Although the dissenting opinion is
susceptible to different interpretations, even the dissent appears
to agree that this is the proper standard; as it says, Beaver "need
only `establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance.'" 93 F.3d at 1198 (quoting
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350).
To the extent that Beaver argues (and the dissent intended to
suggest) that no adverse effect on the lawyer's performance need be
shown, that argument is possible only through a selective quotation
from the Court's opinion in Cuyler on which the dissent purported
to rely. The dissent and Beaver quote the Court in Cuyler as
follows:
Glasser [v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)]
established that unconstitutional multiple representation
is never harmless error. Once the Court concluded that
Glasser's lawyer had an actual conflict of interest, it
refused "to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount
of prejudice" attributable to the conflict. The conflict
itself demonstrated a denial of the "right to have the
effective assistance of counsel."
93 F.3d at 1198 (citation omitted). The very next sentence in the
Supreme Court's opinion, which both the dissent and Beaver omit,
however, reads:
Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest
actually affected the adequacy of his representation need
not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50. From this omitted sentence, it is
plain that the Court was not relieving a petitioner of his burden
of showing that a conflict adversely affected his lawyer's
performance in some way, see, e.g., 446 U.S. at 349 ("Since Dukes
did not identify an actual lapse in representation, we affirmed the
denial of habeas corpus relief."), but only of any burden of
showing that prejudice resulted from that effected performance.
In short, Beaver's argument, which quite obviously conflates
the "adverse effect" and "prejudice" prongs of the inquiry under
Cuyler, cannot be reconciled with either the express language of
Cuyler or the Court's other Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance
of counsel authorities. Contrary to Judge Hall's suggestion, no
"clarification" of Cuyler is needed.
The subsidiary question of whether Beaver's counsel's
performance was in fact affected by any conflict is, of course, a
routine, highly fact-specific inquiry, and here, at any rate, there
is no evidence at all that counsel's performance was in any way
adversely affected. Thus, this question is likewise unworthy (as
a predictive matter) of Supreme Court review, its resolution
ultimately having little or no impact beyond the facts of this
particular case.
For these reasons, I concur in the court's denial of Beaver's
motion for stay of execution.
Even though, as Judge Hall notes, it is "of little
consequence," I would also deny the motion for an extension of the
stay of our mandate. Only several weeks ago, we denied Beaver's
motion for a stay of mandate beyond the 30 days contemplated by
F.R.A.P. 41(b), which provides that a "stay [of mandate] cannot
exceed 30 days unless the period is extended for cause shown."
Absolutely nothing has changed in the intervening weeks since we
denied that motion. There was no "cause" for staying our mandate
for the requested time period then, and there is none today.
It seems clear to me that, when all is said and done, Beaver's
counsel is engaged in the rather transparent and oft-repeated
effort to delay Beaver's execution as long as possible through
seriatim motions -- without regard to the processes of either this
court or the Supreme Court.