IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10427
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
TELASA CLARK, III
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:01-CR-177-5-A
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December 30, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Telasa Clark , III (“Clark”), appeals the sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to one count of bank robbery and two
counts of using and carrying a firearm during the commission of a
crime of violence. The district court departed upward from the
sentencing range calculated under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines to impose an aggregate 600-month sentence for the
offenses of conviction.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-10427
-2-
Clark has failed to establish that the aggravated robbery
for which he was convicted in state court and the offenses of
conviction were part of a “common scheme or plan” within the
meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1); he therefore has shown no
error in the use of the state conviction in his criminal history
score. See United States v. Garcia, 962 F.2d 479, 482 (5th Cir.
1992), abrogated in part, on different grounds, by Buford v.
United States, 532 U.S. 59, 64-66 (2001); United States v. Ford,
996 F.2d 83, 86 (5th Cir. 1993).
Clark has failed to show that the district court clearly
erred in adding three levels to the offense level because the
court determined that one of the robbery victims sustained more
than bodily injury but less than severe bodily injury. See
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(D); United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d 30,
37 (5th Cir. 1993).
Finally, Clark has failed to show plain error in the
district court’s decision to depart upward in light of Clark’s
admitted extensive history of armed robbery; such a departure is
authorized by U.S.C.G. § 4A1.3(e), the district court explained
its reasons for departure, and Clark has not shown that the
extent of the departure was unreasonable. See United States v.
Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 807 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); United
States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994)(en
banc).
AFFIRMED.