UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4026
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DWIGHT LEANDER SOLOMON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:11-cr-00032-NCT-1)
Submitted: July 12, 2012 Decided: August 16, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Clark Fischer, RANDOLPH & FISCHER, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Sandra J. Hairston, Deputy Chief, Criminal Division, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dwight Leander Solomon entered a conditional guilty
plea to possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, reserving
the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress. On appeal, Solomon challenges the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress fruits of a
warrant-based search of his residence, arguing that the warrant
was fatally defective. We affirm.
In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, we review legal conclusions de novo and factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d
243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). Even assuming, without deciding, that
Solomon is correct in asserting the warrant lacked sufficient
basis to support the magistrate’s probable cause determination,
the district court alternatively held that the evidence obtained
during the warrant’s execution need not be suppressed under the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Because Solomon
does not challenge this alternative conclusion on appeal, we
conclude that he has waived appellate review of that issue. See
United States v. Winfield, 665 F.3d 107, 111 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating that argument not raised in opening brief is considered
waived); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). In any event, even
considering this issue on its merits, we conclude without
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difficulty that the district court’s finding that Leon’s
good-faith exception applied to the facts presented was
well-supported. Thus, Solomon cannot demonstrate that the
district court erred by denying the motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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