IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10556
Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JULIAN ANDREW DIAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:01-CR-62-ALL-C
--------------------
December 12, 2002
Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Julian Andrew Diaz appeals his sentence following a guilty-
plea conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
922(g)(1). Diaz argues that the district court erred in
increasing his base offense level by four levels pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-10556
-2-
Section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides for a four-level sentencing
increase “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” Relying
on United States v. Mitchell, 166 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 1999), and
cases from other circuits, Diaz asserts that because the firearms
and drugs were not found in close physical proximity, the
Government was required to produce additional corroborating facts
to prove that the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement was
warranted.
Mitchell did not involve U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), but
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1), which applies when “the defendant used or
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with the
commission or attempted commission of another offense.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(emphasis added). We held the Government to a
higher burden in Mitchell because of this additional language.
See 166 F.3d at 756.
Although the firearms and the drugs were located in
different rooms of Diaz’s residence, the firearms were “readily
available” to Diaz and “were possessed and could have been used
to facilitate” his drug-related activities. See United States v.
Armstead, 114 F.3d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1200 (5th Cir. 1994). The firearms thus
were possessed “in connection with” Diaz’s drug possession within
the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Accordingly, the district
court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.