UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4353
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LEVON BELLAMY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:02-cr-00581-TLW-1)
Submitted: November 8, 2012 Decided: November 16, 2012
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day II, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2003, Levon Bellamy pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and possession of a
firearm after sustaining a prior conviction for an offense
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and the district
court sentenced him to 144 months of imprisonment, followed by
five years of supervised release. On the Government’s motion,
the court subsequently reduced Bellamy’s sentence to ninety-six
months of imprisonment. Bellamy later admitted to violating the
terms of his supervised release, and the court sentenced him to
a total of eighteen months of imprisonment. Bellamy now appeals
from the revocation of his supervised release. Appellate
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the sentence was plainly
unreasonable. Bellamy was informed of his right to file a pro
se supplemental brief but has not done so. Finding no error, we
affirm.
This court reviews a sentence imposed as a result of a
supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence
was plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). The first step in this analysis is a
determination of whether the sentence was unreasonable. Id. at
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438. This court, in determining reasonableness, follows
generally the procedural and substantive considerations employed
in reviewing original sentences. Id. On review, we will assume
a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and
the exercise of discretion. Id. at 439.
Although a district court must consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along
with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), “‘the court ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.’” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a sentence
imposed after a revocation is not unreasonable, we will not
proceed to the second prong of the analysis — whether the
sentence was plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the
sentence imposed by the district court is reasonable. We
therefore need not determine whether the revocation sentence was
plainly unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Bellamy, in
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writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Bellamy requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Bellamy. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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