UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4521
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN GUY DAVIS, IV,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00360-CCE-2)
Submitted: February 25, 2015 Decided: March 3, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Seth Neyhart, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Guy Davis, IV, pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846 (2012), and was sentenced
to twenty-nine months in prison. Davis’s attorney has filed a
brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal,
but questioning whether Davis’s plea was knowing and voluntary
and his sentence reasonable. Davis has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief despite receiving notice of his right to do
so, and the Government has declined to file a responsive brief.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Because Davis did not move in the district court to
withdraw his plea, we review the guilty plea hearing for plain
error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
2002). To establish plain error, Davis must show: (1) there
was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected
his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1121, 1126-27 (2013); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993). In the guilty plea context, a defendant meets this
burden by “show[ing] a reasonable probability that, but for the
error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v.
Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed Davis’s Fed. R.
2
Crim. P. 11 hearing transcript and conclude that the district
court complied with Rule 11, that Davis’s guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary, and that there was a factual basis for
the plea. Accordingly, we affirm Davis’s conviction.
We review Davis’s sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. We first assess
whether the district court properly calculated the advisory
Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012), analyzed any arguments presented by the
parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.
at 49–51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th
Cir. 2010). If we find no procedural error, we review the
sentence for substantive reasonableness, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances[.]” United States v. Mendoza–
Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). “Any sentence that
is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
presumptively [substantively] reasonable” and “[s]uch a
presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
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We conclude that Davis’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. The district court correctly
calculated Davis’s Guidelines range, granted Davis’s motion for
a downward variance, and adequately explained its reasons for
imposing the twenty-nine-month variant sentence. Thus, we
affirm Davis’s sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires counsel to inform Davis, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Davis requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
on Davis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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