UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4367
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES J’MORI JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00198-WO-1)
Submitted: February 25, 2015 Decided: March 3, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greg Davis, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, T. Nick
Matkins, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted James J’mori Jones of possessing a
firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). On appeal, Jones raises two
claims: (1) there is insufficient evidence in the record to
support his conviction; and (2) his sentence is unreasonable.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
During a police search of a home belonging to a friend
of Jones, officers found a shotgun in the kitchen closet. Jones
was present at the time of the search. When the shotgun was
discovered, Jones stated that the gun was his. Officers never
had the gun checked for fingerprints or tested for DNA. At
trial, Jones testified that he lied to police when saying the
gun was his because he did not want his friend to get in
trouble.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de
novo. United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2010).
“The standard for reversing a jury verdict of guilty is a high
one: the Court does so only where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 175 (4th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, __ S.
Ct. __, 2015 WL 133401 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015). “The jury’s
verdict must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial
evidence in the record to support it, where substantial evidence
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is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). In assessing evidentiary sufficiency, the evidence
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the
light most favorable to the Government. Id. We do not reassess
the jury’s determinations of witness credibility. United States
v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007).
Jones conceded at trial that he told police the gun
was his, which was supported by the officer’s testimony. 1
Additionally, the officer testified that Jones later endorsed
his admission at the sheriff’s office. In reaching its verdict,
the jury made a credibility determination as to the
inconsistency between Jones’s statement to police and his trial
testimony, a determination that is not subject to our review.
Therefore, Jones has not established that the evidence was
insufficient.
We next turn to Jones’s challenge that his within-
Guidelines sentence of fifty-four months is substantively
1
The parties disputed whether Jones saw the gun before
claiming it was his. The officer testified that Jones was not
in a position to see the gun yet accurately described it, but
Jones testified that he saw the gun before his comment to
police.
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unreasonable. 2 We review the reasonableness of a sentence for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Heath, 559 F.3d 263, 266
(4th Cir. 2009). In reviewing for substantive unreasonableness,
we “examine[] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010). [D]istrict courts have extremely broad
discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679
(4th Cir. 2011). Therefore, we “must defer to the trial court
and can reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable,” even if
the sentence imposed would not have been our choice. United
States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis
omitted). We presume that Jones’s within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable, a presumption that “can only be
2
Jones argues that this sentence is greater than necessary
to accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). Although
he identifies this as a “procedural sentencing error,” Jones’s
argument focuses on the court’s failure to adequately weigh the
§ 3553(a) factors in fashioning his sentence, which is a
substantive reasonableness challenge. Cf. United States v.
Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014) (“A district court
commits procedural error when, for example, it fails to
calculate (or improperly calculates) the Guidelines range, fails
to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or selects a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts.”). Absent a procedural error
argument, this Court limits its review only to substantive
reasonableness. Id.
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rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
Jones fails to meet this burden. Jones identifies
various mitigating factors that he asserts mandated a more
lenient sentence, including his cooperation with police, his
family and employment circumstances, and that he poses no danger
to the community. However, the record demonstrates that the
court considered these arguments in conducting its
individualized assessment of Jones under § 3553(a), but
ultimately determined that these considerations were outweighed
by Jones’s criminal history and the nature and circumstances of
the instant offense. Jones’s sentence is not unreasonable
simply because the district court could have assigned different
weight to these considerations in conducting its sentencing
calculus under § 3553(a). United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278,
290 (4th Cir. 2012). Viewing the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that the § 3553(a) factors justified the
sentence it imposed.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
5
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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