UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4667
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES LEE JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00477-JAB-1)
Submitted: February 11, 2015 Decided: March 3, 2015
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Lee Jackson pled guilty to interference with
commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012).
The district court calculated Jackson’s Guidelines range under
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2013) at 84 to 105
months’ imprisonment and sentenced him to 94 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Jackson challenges this sentence.
We affirm.
We review Jackson’s sentence for reasonableness “under
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). This review entails
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining
procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district
court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines
range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an
appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–51.
“When rendering a sentence, the district court must make an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented,” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted), and must “adequately
explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate
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review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 50. “When imposing a sentence within the
Guidelines, however, the [district court’s] explanation need not
be elaborate or lengthy because [G]uidelines sentences
themselves are in many ways tailored to the individual and
reflect approximately two decades of close attention to federal
sentencing policy.” United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267,
271 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If the sentence is free of “significant procedural
error,” we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51. If the sentence is within or below the properly
calculated Guidelines range, we apply a presumption on appeal
that the sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
421 (2014). Such a presumption is rebutted only if the
defendant shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Jackson argues that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to address his
arguments for an 84-month sentence. Upon review of the record,
we conclude that this contention is without merit. At
sentencing, Jackson advanced his substance abuse history, the
nature of his offense conduct, his acceptance of responsibility,
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the cost of his criminal conduct, and the summary assertions
both that imprisonment was “not the answer” and that an 84-month
sentence would serve the objectives of sentencing without
explaining why these factors merited an 84-month sentence.
Accordingly, the district court’s failure here to address
factors other than Jackson’s substance abuse and its
contribution to his criminal behavior does not amount to
reversible procedural error. Cf. Carter, 564 F.3d at 328
(“Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous
reasons for imposing a different sentence than that set forth in
the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should address the
party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected those
arguments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Jackson also argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the
goals of sentencing. We reject this argument because it
essentially asks this court to substitute its judgment for that
of the district court. While this court may have weighed the
§ 3553(a) factors differently had it imposed sentence in the
first instance, we defer to the district court’s decision that a
94-month sentence achieved the purposes of sentencing in
Jackson’s case. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (explaining that
appellate courts “must give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,
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justify” the sentence imposed); United States v. Rivera-Santana,
668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating it was within district
court’s discretion to accord more weight to a host of
aggravating factors in defendant’s case and decide that the
sentence imposed would serve the § 3553 factors on the whole).
In light of the “extremely broad” discretion afforded to a
district court in determining the weight to be given each of the
§ 3553(a) factors in imposing sentence, United States v.
Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011), Jackson fails to
overcome the presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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