RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Arrow v. Federal Reserve No. 03-5270
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0048P (6th Cir.) Bank of St. Louis
File Name: 04a0048p.06
_________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
_________________
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________ BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Mary Arrow
appeals from the order of the district court granting the
MARY ARROW, X Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s motion to dismiss her
Plaintiff-Appellant, - complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule
- of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The parties have agreed to waive
- No. 03-5270 oral argument, and upon examination, this panel unanimously
v. - agrees that oral argument is not needed. FED . R. APP . P.
> 34(a).
,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF -
ST . LOUIS, On October 1, 2002, Arrow filed a complaint in the
-
Defendant-Appellee. - Jefferson Circuit Court in Louisville, Kentucky, against her
employer, the Louisville Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank
-
of St. Louis. The complaint alleged that the Bank had
N
engaged in gender and disability discrimination and that it
Appeal from the United States District Court had retaliated against Arrow for filing a disability benefits
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville. claim in violation of Kentucky law. For her injuries, Arrow
No. 02-00662—John G. Heyburn, II, Chief District Judge. sought monetary damages, declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief. The Bank removed the case to the district
Submitted: December 4, 2003 court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and section 25B of the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 632. Upon
Decided and Filed: February 13, 2004 removal, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Before: KENNEDY, MARTIN, and MOORE, Circuit The district court granted the Bank’s motion. This timely
Judges. appeal followed.
_________________ This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
COUNSEL 12(b)(6). Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998);
Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.
ON BRIEF: Scott C. Wilhoit, CLARK & WARD, 1996). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s
Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas C. Fenton, complaint must allege facts, which if proved, would entitle
MORGAN & POTTINGER, Louisville, Kentucky, for the claimant to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
Appellee. (1957); Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d
1
No. 03-5270 Arrow v. Federal Reserve 3 4 Arrow v. Federal Reserve No. 03-5270
Bank of St. Louis Bank of St. Louis
434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). The reviewing court must construe Federal Reserve Bank, her rights under Kentucky state law
the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept were preempted by federal law.
all of the factual allegations as true and determine whether the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that Additionally, our decision today is supported by our
would entitle him to relief. Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 197. decision in Wiskotoni v. Michigan National Bank-West, 716
F.2d 378, 387 (6th Cir. 1983), where we noted our inclination
Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly to find that the virtually identical language of the National
dismissed Arrow’s complaint because the Federal Reserve Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. § 24, preempted state
Act preempts her state law claims. Federal Reserve Banks employment rights. In doing so, this Court observed: “As the
were created pursuant to Section 4 of the Federal Reserve Bank noted, § 24 (Fifth) has consistently been construed by
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 341. The Act grants the power: both federal and state courts as preempting state law
governing employment relations between a national bank and
To appoint by its board of directors a president, vice its officers and depriving a national bank of the power to
presidents, and such officers and employees as are not employ its officers other than at pleasure.” Id. See also
otherwise provided for in this chapter, to define their Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, 998 F.2d 214,
duties, require bonds for them and fix the penalty thereof, 220 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that the similar “at pleasure”
and to dismiss at pleasure such officers or employees. language contained in the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1432(a), indicated that “Congress intended for
12 U.S.C. § 341, Fifth (emphasis added). We conclude that federal law to define the discretion which the Bank may
this language applies to preempt state employment rights. exercise in the discharge of employees”); Bollow v. Fed.
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th
Our conclusion is controlled by our decision in Ana Leon Cir. 1981) (“Assuming that Bollow would indeed have been
T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 823 F.2d 928 (6th entitled to certain process rights under California law, such
Cir. 1987). In Leon, a Columbian employee of the Federal law when applied to reserve bank employees conflicts with
Reserve Bank of Chicago brought a lawsuit alleging [the federal statute]. In such circumstances, the federal statute
violations of Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act. Id. must control.”).
Leon alleged that her dismissal was discriminatory on the
basis of national origin. Id. With respect to Leon’s claim Thus, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
under the Elliott-Larsen Act, this Court held that the “at Arrow’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
pleasure” clause in the Federal Reserve Act preempted Procedure 12(b)(6) because her state employment law claims
employment rights created by state law. Id. at 931. There are preempted and as such she cannot prove any set of facts
being no principled basis on which to distinguish Leon, we that would entitle her to legal relief.
are obliged to follow its holding. See Sixth Circuit Rule
206(c) ( “Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published
opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc consideration is
required to overrule a published opinion of the court.”). Thus,
we hold that inasmuch as Arrow was an employee of a