NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0163n.06
Filed: March 3, 2005
No. 04-5236
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ANNABELLE L. REEDY, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
ODOM’S TENNESSEE PRIDE SAUSAGE, ) MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
INC., )
)
Defendant-Appellee )
)
)
BEFORE: MERRITT and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; and HOOD,* District Judge
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, Anabelle L. Reedy, sued the defendant, Odom’s
Tennessee Pride Sausage, Inc. (“Odom’s”), for wrongful discharge under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. She was discharged after eight months as a production “coordinator” with
Odom’s. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant on each of the four claims
made by plaintiff. The parties have waived oral argument. For the reasons set forth in the
memorandum by the District Court, we affirm its judgment.
Plaintiff’s claims are described as follows on page 8 of her appellate brief:
*
The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by
designation.
No. 04-5236
Reedy v. Odom’s TN Pride
On July 22, 2002, Stonehocker [executive vice-president of Odom’s] told Moorer
[his assistant for human resources] that “Reedy was killing [the] business and we
should let her go.” Later that same day, Reedy met with Moorer to make a formal
complaint against Kling regarding the [poor] performance appraisal Kling had given
her. Reedy told Moorer that she had problems communicating with Kling and that
Kling would get angry at her. She also stated that Kling’s critical appraisal was in
retaliation for her getting involved in a trucking matter outside of her job
responsibilities and for the instructions that she e-mailed to a cold storage
warehouse, both of which occurred when Kling was on vacation. She also stated that
there was a “diversity issue here and a potential sexual harassment issue at stake.”
Reedy asserted that Kling mentioned to her that her job is “primarily a man’s role
and that [Reedy] need [sic] to be more, you know.” Reedy also believed that there
was a difference in the way Kling treated Eddie Carroll [another employee].
The four claims are (1) she was sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor, Steve Kling; (2) she
was discharged because she is of Hispanic origin; (3) she was discharged because she is a woman;
and (4) she was discharged in retaliation for complaining to Odom’s management about Kling’s
treatment of her. We review the summary judgment de novo. We agree with the District Court that
the material facts of the instant case are not in dispute.
There is no claim by plaintiff that her supervisor, Kling, made sexual advances toward her.
Her claim is that he would on occasion hitch or pull up or “bunch” his pants in an unusual way in
front of her and other female workers. Plaintiff did not complain to anyone in management about
such sexual harassment until a week before her discharge, after she learned that Kling had given
management a report that her job performance was very poor. Plaintiff has not described the sexual
harassment conduct in her brief on appeal, and she did not allege or describe the offensive conduct
in her complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We, therefore, agree with the
District Court that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies before the EEOC on this
claim and is foreclosed from raising this claim in federal court. See Jones v. Truck Drivers Local
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No. 04-5236
Reedy v. Odom’s TN Pride
Union No. 299, 748 F.2d 1083, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Filing an EEOC charge against a party is a
necessary prerequisite to suit.”). Even had plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, based
on our review of the record we do not find any merit in this claim.
We have looked in vain in plaintiff’s brief on appeal, and in the record below, for any
statement of facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on her Hispanic background.
No facts are recited that would create a dispute concerning racial or national origin discrimination;
and, therefore, no factual basis has been stated that could support a verdict in plaintiff’s favor on this
theory. The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim.
The brief summarizing plaintiff’s theory of the case states that Moorer conducted an
investigation after his instructions from Stonehocker on July 22 and that Moorer interviewed a large
number of employees, several of whom said that “Kling was often rude . . . and had an explosive
temper in his interactions with employees generally, male and female.” According to plaintiff’s
brief, these employees advised management that “Reedy wasted a lot of time,” and “was having
problems” with customers. The company also found out as part of the investigation “that she had
17 e-mails regarding a private real estate transaction” on the company computer. Furthermore,
according to plaintiff’s brief, the investigation revealed that “while at times her supervisor, Steve
Kling, was confrontational and offensive, there was no proof of harassment, diversity prejudice or
retaliation.” According to plaintiff’s brief, a week after the investigation began, “Moorer told Reedy
that she was being terminated because (1) her performance was below standards, (2) she engaged
in personal use of the computer at work, and (3) her [sic] problems with customers, specifically
Americold.”
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No. 04-5236
Reedy v. Odom’s TN Pride
After reciting these facts in her brief as reasons given by Odom’s for discharging her after
the investigation, plaintiff recites no material facts that indicate that the reasons given were
pretextual. We, therefore, find no basis in the record or the arguments of plaintiff on appeal to
reverse the District Court’s conclusion that “the record is that Reedy was fired only after Moorer’s
investigation confirmed Reedy’s poor work performance . . . .”
We have summarized the essential facts described by plaintiff that would give rise to her
claim that a material dispute of fact exists concerning her discharge. Like the District Court, we find
no material dispute of fact that would justify a jury trial on these issues. We, therefore, can find no
factual or legal basis for reversing the summary judgment granted by the District Court.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
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