File Name: 05a0184n.06
Filed: March 15, 2005
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
No. 03-2135
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
HENRY H. WEST, SR., )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
) EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
v. )
)
ADECCO EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
______________________________________________________________________________
BEFORE: NORRIS and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM: Pro se Plaintiff Henry H. West, Sr. (“West” or “Appellant”) appeals from
a district court order dismissing his complaint without prejudice for failing to specify the basis for
the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand.
I. FACTS
West filed a pro se complaint in the Eastern District of Michigan against his former
employer, Adecco Employment Agency (“AEA” or “Appellee”), alleging: (1) intentional
discrimination; (2) age and race discrimination; (3) retaliation; (4) unfair employment practice; and
(5) job discrimination. West attached a copy of a “Notice of Right to Sue” letter he received from
*
The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to his complaint. The complaint did
not specify whether the causes of action he alleged were state or federal law claims, and did not
explicitly state any basis for the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
District Judge Paul V. Gadola ordered West to show cause why his case should not be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and instructed West to specify the basis of the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Unsatisfied by the response, Judge Gadola dismissed the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. West filed the instant appeal.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
District courts have power to dismiss cases sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
E.g., Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Assocs., Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 1998). A district court’s
legal determination in dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de
novo. E.g., Michigan Ass’n of Indep. Clinical Labs v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 1340, 1346 (6th Cir. 1994).
B. Pro Se Complaints
Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the Supreme Court has “never
suggested procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). Indeed,
a pro se litigant “must conduct enough investigation to draft pleadings that meet the requirements
of the federal rules.” Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984).
Courts have refused to excuse pro se litigants who failed to follow basic procedural
requirements such as meeting “readily comprehended” court filing deadlines. E.g., Jourdan v. Jabe,
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951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991); Eglinton v. Loyer, 340 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2003). Likewise,
courts have also refused to grant special or preferential treatment to pro se parties in responding to
summary judgment motions. Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988). However,
the courts have utilized a less stringent standard in construing the pleadings of a pro se litigant. This
approach is consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), which provides that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice.”
This court has stated:
the allegations of a complaint drafted by a pro se litigant are held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers in the sense
that a pro se complaint will be liberally construed in determining whether
it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 , 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 , 92 S. Ct. 594
(1972). The drafting of a formal pleading presupposes some degree of
legal training or, at least, familiarity with applicable legal principles, and
pro se litigants should not be precluded from resorting to the courts
merely for want of sophistication.
Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 110 (6th Cir. 1991). In the instant case, West attached a copy of his EEOC
right-to-sue letter to his complaint. The letter references a right to file a “lawsuit under Title VII or
the ADA” in federal or state court. While West did not specify a federal or state law in his written
complaint, the EEOC right-to-sue letter is sufficient to indicate that at the very least, West intended
to sue under Title VII and/or the ADA, which are federal employment laws over which the district
courts have federal question jurisdiction. Under the less stringent pleading rules for pro se litigants,
the court finds that West’s complaint sufficiently states the grounds for subject matter jurisdiction
of the district court.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the decision of the district court and REMAND this case back
to that court to reinstate the case upon its docket, for the reasons discussed above.
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