NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0335n.06
Filed: April 29, 2005
No. 03-4321
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
TEHIRZA DIZDARIC; ANTONIO ARMAS; )
DIEGO ANTONIO ARMAS DIZDARIC; )
AARON ARMAS DIZDARIC; KEVIN )
LEANDRO ARMAS DIZDARIC, )
) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM A
Petitioners, ) FINAL ORDER OF THE BOARD OF
) IMMIGRATION APPEALS
v. )
)
ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General,
Respondent.
Before: MARTIN, COOK, and LAY*, Circuit Judges.
COOK, Circuit Judge. Petitioners—Tehirza Dizdaric, Antonio Armas, and their three
children—seek review of a final order of removal. For the following reasons, we deny their petition
for review.
I
Dizdaric is a Muslim and native and citizen of Bosnia. Armas is a Catholic and native and
citizen of Peru, where he once served in an anti-terrorist police force. Dizdaric left Bosnia at the
*
The Honorable Donald P. Lay, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
No. 03-4321
Dizdaric v. Gonzales
outbreak of the recent war there, and went to Germany, where she lived for nine years and met
Armas. While living in Germany, the two entered into a common-law marriage and had three
children.
The family’s attempts to gain legal status in Germany failed, and they came to the United
States. Because they entered without valid travel documents, the INS began removal proceedings
against them. Before an Immigration Judge, they conceded their removability, but sought asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ found them
ineligible for such relief and ordered Dizdaric deported to Bosnia or Germany and the rest of the
family deported to Peru or Germany. The BIA affirmed without opinion.
Petitioners now challenge the IJ’s findings that they suffered no past persecution, had no
well-founded fear of future persecution, and had “firmly resettled” in Germany before entering the
United States. They also argue the BIA improperly affirmed the IJ without opinion. For the reasons
that follow, their arguments fail.
II
We note initially that the BIA did not err in affirming the IJ without opinion. See Denko v.
INS, 351 F.3d 717, 731-32 (6th Cir. 2003) (BIA summary affirmance appropriate in the absence of
novel facts or substantial factual or legal issues). Because the BIA affirmed the IJ without opinion,
we review the IJ’s decision directly. Id. at 730. We must uphold the IJ’s factual findings unless
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Dizdaric v. Gonzales
“any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B).
A. Past Persecution
Dizdaric claims the IJ erred in finding she had not suffered past persecution in Bosnia. The
record, however, supports the IJ’s conclusion. Dizdaric testified that when Bosnia’s war began, she
became frightened by “everything,” mostly “the Serbs, . . . the tanks, [and] what would have
happened to [her] as a young lady if [she] had been caught by the Serbian soldiers.” Such general
fears, however, are insufficient to establish past persecution. See Bevc v. INS, 47 F.3d 907, 910 (7th
Cir. 1995) (having been a non-Serbian at a time when “ethnic cleansing” was occurring in Serbia
insufficient to establish past persecution, absent a basis for fearing petitioner would be singled out).
She belonged to no organizations, was never jailed, and was never beaten except, she claims, by her
family. She thus fails to establish past persecution.
Armas claims he suffered past persecution in Peru, but the IJ reasonably concluded
otherwise. Armas was part of an anti-terrorist police force in Peru before his 1989 retirement from
police work. During that time, he received four anonymous threatening phone calls. He reported
the calls to his police superiors, who acknowledged that all of the anti-terrorist police faced threats,
and told him that they protected their unit but were there “to protect people’s lives” and “couldn’t
guarantee or do anything for [him].” This does not suffice to establish past persecution. True,
persecutors may include private parties the government is “unable or unwilling to control.” See
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Dizdaric v. Gonzales
Emelkin v. Ashcroft, 97 Fed. Appx. 27, 29 (6th Cir. 2004). But that does not help Armas. Here, the
government actively fought the terrorists, and Armas was part of that fight. Of course he faced
threats from terrorists—but only as part of the job he had chosen, not as part of any government-
sanctioned persecution. We need not delineate here the circumstances under which we would
consider a government “unable to control” a wrongdoer—but certainly no government is expected
to offer its people, let alone its police officers, complete safety. Thus the IJ reasonably concluded
Armas had not suffered past persecution.
B. Future Persecution
Having failed to establish past persecution, the petitioners bore the burden of proving their
alleged fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13. A fear of future persecution in one’s country
of nationality requires (1) a fear that one will be persecuted “on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”; (2) a “reasonable possibility” of such
persecution if one were to return; and (3) an unwillingness to return or avail oneself of the protection
of that country because of that fear. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2).
The IJ properly concluded Dizdaric failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution
in Bosnia. Dizdaric testified she would be persecuted if she returned to Bosnia because she is a
Muslim married to a Catholic, and the “general public” would kill her for that. She based her belief
on something she saw “on the TV” about “people that were ordered to go back to Bosnia in a similar
situation.” Rather than rely upon Dizdaric’s television-based impressions, the IJ looked to a State
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Dizdaric v. Gonzales
Department report indicating that Bosnia’s constitution protects religious freedom, and that
individuals enjoyed the right in “ethnically mixed” areas. The IJ thus reasonably concluded
Dizdaric was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal based on a fear of future persecution,
because she could avoid future persecution by relocation to an ethnically mixed area of Bosnia. See
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii) (“An applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the
applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of
nationality. . . .”).
The IJ also properly concluded Armas lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution. The
record contains no evidence of a reasonable possibility that Armas would be persecuted by terrorists
in Peru. Given terrorism’s substantial decline in Peru (e.g., only thirty-one terrorist killings were
reported there in 2000), and the large number of other, more likely potential targets (e.g., current
police officers), the likelihood of Armas being singled out seems minuscule, especially in light of
his retirement from police work sixteen years ago and long absence from the country.
Because the IJ properly concluded the petitioners suffered no past persecution, and had no
well-founded fear of future persecution, we need not address its alternative holding, also challenged
here, that the petitioners were ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because they had
“firmly resettled” in Germany before coming to the United States.
We thus deny the petition for review.
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