NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0221n.06
Filed: March 29, 2006
No. 04-6388
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff - Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CORWIN PRYOR, )
)
Defendant - Appellant. )
Before: GIBBONS, GRIFFIN, and BRIGHT*, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Corwin Pryor conditionally pled guilty to the charge of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Thereafter, the district court entered a
judgment of conviction and sentenced Pryor to fifteen years imprisonment plus a supervised release
period of three years. Pryor appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm that police
found in a search of his vehicle. The gun was in the trunk of Pryor's car. He reserved this search
and seizure issue in his plea of guilty. After reviewing the record, we affirm the conviction.
BACKGROUND
Pryor argues that the police officers' decisions to arrest him or search his car were not
supported by probable cause. He further argues that the search of the car did not fit into the
*
The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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Page 2
inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment, either because it was parked in a parking
space and not blocking traffic, or because the car keys could have been turned over to Pryor's wife.
We turn to the facts in the record. On April 9, 2002, an anonymous caller made three phone
calls to the Memphis 911 center, requesting the police to come immediately to the Ridgemont
Apartments and indicating there was a man driving around the apartment complex and firing shots
into the ground. The caller said the shooter was a black male about 5'6", with a short, "fade" haircut,
wearing a red and gray shirt with blue jeans, and driving a red, or possibly maroon, Cadillac.1
Dennis Manning was one of two police officers dispatched to the apartment complex. The
police dispatcher advised Officer Manning that "a male black [sic] was firing shots into the ground
from a maroon or red Cadillac," and further described the man, including that he was "intoxicated
[and] wearing a red and gray shirt and jeans."
Looking for a moving vehicle, Officer Manning initially passed by Pryor. On his second
time through the complex, however, he noticed Pryor, a black man with relatively long hair, standing
by a maroon Cadillac. Although Pryor did not precisely match the description the dispatcher had
given, Officer Manning nonetheless approached him and asked if he owned the Cadillac and if he
had a firearm.
Officer Manning testified that, at this point, he determined Pryor was intoxicated based on
"his speech, the smell of alcohol, [and] the stumbling." He then placed Pryor under arrest for public
intoxication. Once Pryor had been placed under arrest, he grew violent and kicked the squad car
1
Pryor asserts that the 911 call, saying the Cadillac was maroon, was not made until after
he had been arrested, suggesting that the caller was watching the arrest take place.
No. 04-6388
United States v. Pryor
Page 3
doors and windows to such a degree that the door almost separated from the car's frame. (Pryor was
ultimately charged with vandalism as well as public intoxication and unlawful possession of a
weapon.)
After Officer Manning and his partner had arrested Pryor, the officers decided that, pursuant
to the Memphis Police Department's Tow-In Policy, they would have to impound Pryor's car because
it was parked on private property and the property owner was not present to give permission to let
the vehicle remain, and because there were no third parties present who could take the car and park
it in a legal location. After making the decision to impound the car, Officer Manning conducted an
inventory search. He found a gun hidden in the trunk.
After Officer Manning arrested Pryor, searched his car, and found his gun, Twana Pryor,
Pryor's wife, arrived at the scene. Twana Pryor asked the police officers for possession of the car
so that she could remove her house keys, but the officers denied her request. She later testified that
the car had not been driveable for several weeks.
DISCUSSION
Pryor first argues that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him because his haircut
and the color of his Cadillac did not match the description the 911 caller had given. When reviewing
a denial of a motion to suppress, the appellate court reviews the district court's conclusions of law
de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765, 770 (6th
Cir. 2003). "A finding of fact will be deemed clearly erroneous when, although there may be some
evidence to support the finding, the appellate court, upon review of the entire record, is left with the
No. 04-6388
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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d
751, 756 (6th Cir. 2000).
The district court determined that "Officer Manning had probable cause to arrest Mr. Pryor
based on his public intoxication," not that there was probable cause for the police to believe Pryor
was the man firing gunshots in the Ridgemont Apartments. The magistrate and district court judges
believed Officer Manning's testimony regarding Pryor's intoxicated behavior to be more credible
than his wife's and stepson's assertions to the contrary. The district court noted that Pryor's violent
reaction to being placed in the patrol car, kicking the walls and door of the vehicle until the door
came partially off its hinges, provides further confirmation that he was indeed intoxicated. Probable
cause exists when police officers possess reasonably trustworthy knowledge that the suspect is
committing or has committed a crime. United States v. Dotson, 49 F.3d 227, 230 (6th Cir. 1995).
The district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, see Hurst, 228 F.3d at 756, and it
correctly determined that there was probable cause to arrest Pryor for public intoxication, see
Dotson, 49 F.3d at 230.
Pryor also argues the police did not have probable cause to search his car. The district court
correctly determined that the police did not need probable cause to search Pryor's car, because the
search was an inventory search incident to impoundment, and the vehicle was impounded pursuant
to the Memphis Police Department's Tow-In Policy. Vehicle inventory searches are an exception
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
They are valid if conducted in accordance with standard police procedure. Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1, 5 (1990).
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Pryor next argues that the inventory search is invalid because it was not conducted in
accordance with standard procedure. Specifically, Pryor asserts that the car could have been left
where it was parked or turned over to Twana Pryor, and that the police should have given him the
opportunity to choose either of these options.
The Memphis Police Department's Tow-In Policy states,
When an officer arrests a defendant and the defendant's vehicle is not needed as
evidence, the officer is required . . . to allow the defendant to leave the vehicle at the
scene of arrest if the defendant so desires and it is legally parked. The defendant
cannot, however, park a vehicle on private property without the consent of the
property owner/management. The defendant may authorize a third party at the scene
who is not under arrest to legally park the vehicle. . . .
If a vehicle cannot be legally parked, left on private property, or released to a third
party, then the vehicle should be towed to Vehicle Storage.
J.A. at 89-90.
Pryor's car was parked on private property at the Ridgemont Apartments. Pryor did not live
at the apartment complex, and he could not obtain permission from the property owner because the
Ridgemont property manager's office was closed at the time of the arrest. Under the Memphis
Police Department's Tow-In Policy, he therefore did not have the option of leaving the car where
it was parked. Nor did he have the option of turning the keys over to Twana Pryor, first, because
she did not appear at the scene until after the police had concluded the inventory search, and, second,
because the car was not driveable. The district court correctly determined that the inventory search
of Pryor's car was valid because it complied with standard police procedure.
Accordingly, we reject Pryor's appeal of the order denying suppression of the gun as
evidence in this case and AFFIRM the conviction.