NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0489n.06
Filed: July 13, 2006
Case No. 04-2437
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
AGNES I. SWARTZ, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
_______________________________________ )
BEFORE: KEITH and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; OBERDORFER*, District Judge.
OBERDORFER, District Judge. Plaintiff-appellant, Agnes I. Swartz, is a 66-year old
woman with significant physical and mental impairments. The present appeal concerns her
application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits for the period from September1992,
when she was last employed, through December 31, 1997, when her “insured status” expired.1
An administrative law judge ruled that she was not entitled to any benefits because during that
time she had the “residual functional capacity” to perform a significant number of jobs in the
*
The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Judge for the District of
Columbia, sitting by designation.
1
On December 1, 2001, Swartz began receiving Supplemental Security Income disability
benefits, a benefit that is not dependent on proof of “insured status.”
national economy. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Administrative Law Judge’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We REVERSE and REMAND for further
proceedings in accordance with the following opinion.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
In order to qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, Swartz must have
been “disabled” during the period of her disability insurance coverage. In this context, a
disability is defined as “an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or
that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Federal regulations establish a five-part sequential evaluation process for
determining when a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). As soon as a
determination of disabled or not disabled can be made, the evaluation process ends. Id. In order,
the five steps are: (1) if the claimant is “doing substantial gainful activity,” he or she is “not
disabled”; (2) if the claimant does “not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . or a combination of impairments that is
severe and meets the duration requirement,” the claimant is “not disabled”; (3) if the claimant
has a severe impairment and the “medical severity” of the claimant’s impairment(s) “meets or
equals” a listed impairment, the claimant is “disabled”; (4) if the “medical severity” does not
meet or equal a listed impairment, the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” is assessed and if
the claimant can do his or her “past relevant work,” the claimant is “not disabled”; and (5) if the
claimant cannot do his or her “past relevant work,” but has the residual functional capacity,
taking into account the claimant’s “age, education, and work experience” to “make an
2
adjustment to other work,” the claimant is “not disabled.” Id. “Residual functional capacity” is
defined as “the most that [an individual] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545.
II. FACTS
Agnes Swartz was born in 1940. According to her sister, Eunice Good, Swartz suffered
from childhood encephalitis. As a result, Good says, Swartz has “always had difficulty with
learning new skills and problem solving,” “has difficulty retaining information and cannot
follow through on more complex instructions,” and “is easily confused and frustrated with many
domestic tasks,” “can do housecleaning, but cannot cook and plan a meal,” “requires some level
of support in her home environment,” and “[o]utside of her home environment she is easily
overwhelmed.” AR 251.
Swartz graduated from high school, but with a very mediocre academic record. She then
worked for a number of years as a nurse’s aide for various employers. During her entire
adulthood, Swartz never lived alone, residing with either her parents, now deceased, and/or one
or more of her sisters.
In June 1992, Swartz started work as a nurse’s aide at a long-term care facility. After a
90-day probationary period, she received performance evaluations from her direct supervisor and
from the director of nursing at the facility, Jane Henderson. AR 405-07. Her direct supervisor
rated her performance on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being outstanding, 2 being very good, 3 being
satisfactory, 4 being needs improvement, and 5 being unsatisfactory) as follows:
Job Knowledge 3
Productivity 4
Quality 3
Relationships with Others 5
3
Dependability 3
Work Habits 4
Initiative 4
Acceptance of Supervision and Directions 4
She also commented that Swartz “[n]eeds lots of improvement – needs to communicate” in her
relationships to others and rated Swartz’s overall performance as “needs improvement,”
especially Swartz’s ability to communicate with families and associates and to complete tasks in
a timely manner. AR 406.
Henderson’s evaluation similarly stated that Swartz’s work performance “need[ed]
improvement,” identifying the “primary areas requiring improvement” as Swartz’s “ability to
communicate satisfactorily with residents, families and other staff members,” her “ability to
complete [her] assigned responsibilities in a more timely manner,” and her “limited availability
for work” as a part-time employee. AR 407. Henderson recommended an additional 60-day
probationary period for Swartz. Instead of consenting to an extension of her probationary
period, Swartz quit. She has not worked since.
According to Swartz, she has always had problems keeping up with the work at her jobs,
although she would often “work extra” to get it all done. AR 37-38. And according to Dolores
Swartz, Swartz’s sister-in-law and a nurse, who both knows Swartz personally and has
occasionally worked with her, Swartz “tried very hard, did very good work but it was slow
work.” AR 43.
Between the time she ceased working and December 31, 1997, the end of the insured
period, Swartz never saw a psychiatrist or sought any other form of mental health treatment.
However, she did have significant contact during that time with her family physician, Dr.
Michael Wagner, who subsequently offered his perspective on “some of Agnes’
4
emotional/cognitive problems” prior to December 31, 1997. In Dr. Wagner’s opinion, Swartz
had suffered from a number of mental health problems for her entire life. In a written statement,
dated December 3, 2002, Dr. Wagner explained:
In the office I have been treating her for nine years now, she always presented
with a flat affect. She typically comes in with a relative to the appointments.
When she was living with her sister Leona, she would accompany her during the
examination. This is so her sister would have a handle on what advice I have
given to Agnes due to the problems that Agnes has understanding what I have
told her. Agnes has always been slow to respond to questions. She needs to think
about the question before she responds. She appears to have low self-esteem.
She can become easily upset.
From a mental/cognitive standpoint, she just appears like she is not up to
speed. By analogy, if she were in school, she would probably need to be in a
Special Education class.
...
. . . Based upon treating Agnes since 1993, the problems that I have
described appear to be something that she has had all her life.
AR 408 (emphasis added).
In July 2001, Dr. George Pestrue, from the Michigan Disability Determination Service,
began his evaluation of Swartz’s mental health. Based on a face-to-face evaluation and other
testing information, Dr. Pestrue preliminarily concluded that Swartz “appeared to have
significant cognitive deficits.” AR 243-250. Dr. Pestrue then conducted further face-to-face
testing, testing her IQ at 72, her reading level at 5th grade, her spelling ability at 6th grade, her
math skills at 4th grade and her overall mental age at 11 years, 9 months. Describing “her
combined cognitive/verbal and visual-motor skills” as “in the borderline defective range, he
diagnosed Swartz as having “Borderline Intellectual Functioning.” AR 267-28. After further
face-to-face testing, Dr. Pestrue concluded that Swartz’s “memory skills varied from the
5
defective range to the normal range,” with “most of her combined memory skills” falling “in the
borderline range.” AR 284-86. As a result, he added “Borderline Memory Functioning” and
“Dependent Personality Disorder” to his diagnosis of Swartz’s conditions. In summary, Dr.
Pestrue explained his diagnoses as follows:
This examiner has seen this client on three occasions. He saw her for a complete
mental status examination on 25 July 2001, for intelligence testing on 12
September 2001 and for this memory examination. It has become apparent that
she is suffering from a severe dependent personality disorder which was not noted
by this examiner in previous reports. It has become more apparent recently
because her sister with whom she has been living is getting married and will leave
the home. This means that the client will be left alone in the home. This is
causing her a great amount of stress. She is uncertain how she will exist without
her sister to rely on. This diagnoses is now being included along with the
previous diagnoses of major depression and borderline intellectual functioning.
All of these problems appear to be long standing. All of them have been present
since her childhood.
Id. (emphasis added).
In November 2002, Dr. Pestrue completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity
Assessment of Swartz. AR 409-410 (Nov. 25, 2002). He assessed her as “markedly limited” in
her “ability to understand and remember detailed instructions,” her “ability to carry out detailed
instructions,” her “ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods,” her
“ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual
within customary tolerances,” her “ability to interact appropriately with the general public,” her
“ability to ask simple questions or request assistance,” her “ability to set realistic goals or make
plans independently of others,”and her “ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately
to criticism from supervisors.” AR 409-10. He assessed her as “moderately limited” in her
“ability to remember locations and work-like procedures,” her “ability to sustain an ordinary
routine without supervision,” her “ability to make simple work-related decisions,” her “ability to
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respond appropriately to change in the work setting,” and her “ability to be aware of normal
hazards and take appropriate precautions. Id. Finally, he assessed her as “not significantly
limited” in her “ability to carry out simple, one or two-step instructions,” and in her “ability to
work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them.” Id.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Swartz had Social Security Disability Insurance coverage from the time she ceased
working in 1992 until December 31, 1997. She has filed two applications seeking benefits under
that coverage. Her first application, filed on November 8, 1994 (the “1994 application”), was
denied on January 4, 1995. Swartz, who was not represented by counsel at the time, did not
appeal. She filed a second application on April 17, 2001 (the “2001 application”), claiming that
she was disabled from September 1992 through December 31,1997 due to certain mental
disabilities.”2 Because the denial of the 1994 application barred her from recovering benefits for
the earlier part of the insured period, Swartz also sought to reopen her 1994 application.
On December 3, 2002, an Administrative Law Judge held a hearing at which Swartz
testified and presented other evidence in support of her application. In addition to the evidence
previously described, the record includes the opinions of two non-treating physicians, Dr. Arthur
Dundon and Dr. Robert L. Newhouse, each of whom reviewed Swartz’s file and completed a
Psychiatric Review and a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, and the testimony
of a vocational expert.
2
Swartz also claimed to have been disabled by physical health problems and depression.
However, the ALJ concluded that neither rendered Swartz disabled prior to December 31, 1997,
and Swartz did not appeal that aspect of the ALJ’s decision.
7
Dr. Dundon reviewed Swartz’s file and prepared his reports in August and October of
2001. He concluded that Swartz suffered from “borderline intellectual functioning,” a
“medically determinable impairment,” but not an impairment that satisfied the diagnostic criteria
for an “Organic Mental Disorder.” AR 253-266. In his Psychiatric Review, on a scale of none
to extreme, he rated as “moderate” Swartz’s “degree of limitation” for “difficulties in
maintaining social functioning” and for “difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or
pace.” Id. In his Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, he rated Swartz as
“moderately limited” in “the ability to understand and remember very short and simple
instructions,” “the ability to carry out detailed instructions,” the ability to sustain an ordinary
routine without special supervision,” “the ability to interact appropriately with the general
public,” and “the ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or
exhibiting behavioral extremes,” but markedly limited in nothing. AR 269-72. He found that
Swartz “could not understand/remember/carry out complex technical instructions on a sustained
basis,” “would have some problems maintaining attention and concentration on a sustained
basis,” and “would not work well in large groups or with public,” but his ultimate conclusion
was that Swartz “could adapt,” and “retains ability to do simple tasks on a sustained basis.” Id.
Dr. Newhouse completed his “Psychiatric Review” and “Mental Residual Functional
Capacity Assessment” in March 2002. He diagnosed Swartz as suffering from an “Organic
Mental Disorder,” a “listed” impairment, AR 385, and a “Personality Disorder,” another “listed”
impairment, AR 391. In his opinion, Swartz had a “marked” degree of limitation in
“Restrictions of Activities of Daily Living,” and a “moderate” degree of limitation in
“Difficulties in Maintaining Social Functioning” and “Difficulties in Maintaining Concentration,
8
Persistence, or Pace.” AR 394. He also found her “markedly limited” in her “ability to maintain
attention and concentration for extended periods,” and her “ability to complete a normal
workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to
perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods,” and
“moderately limited” in her “ability to understand and remember detailed instructions,” her
“ability to carry out detailed instructions,” her “ability to perform activities within a schedule,
maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances,” and her “ability to
work in coordination or proximity to others without being distracted by them.” AR 398-99.
The vocational expert, Judith Findora, testified that an hypothetical individual “with the
same age and educational background” as Swartz and with “non-exertional limitations of no
acute vision required, no complex tasks, define that as one and two step only, simple, rote tasks,”
“[n]o hourly quotas, as in [an] assembly line type job,” and “[n]o dealing with the general public,
minimal work activity interaction with coworkers, minimal supervision” would not be able to do
Swartz’s past work as a nurse’s aide, but that there would be jobs in the region compatible with
these limitations, including in the medium exertion category the job of janitor and in the light
exertion category the job of housekeeper. However, she testified, if that same hypothetical
individual also had either “[n]o useful ability to complete a normal work load within the
prescribed daily schedule,” “[n]o ability to deal with supervision,” an “inability to follow
directions,” “an inability to relate to coworkers or supervisors, problems that would arise at the
work place,” or was unable to “meet acceptable productivity,” that individual would not be able
to obtain “competitive employment.” AR 53-57.
9
On February 12, 2003, the administrative law judge issued a written opinion denying
Swartz’s 2001 application. Applying the five-step test, the ALJ concluded (1) that Swartz was
not performing substantial gainful work; (2) that Swartz had a severe impairment of “organic
mental disorder”; (3) that Swartz would not be presumed disabled because her “organic mental
disorder” did not meet or equal a listed impairment; (4) that Swartz’s impairments would have
prevented her from doing her past relevant work (as a nurse’s aide); but (5) that Swartz retained
the residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy.
Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Swartz, during the insured period:
retained the residual functional capacity to perform work that did not require
acute vision, complex tasks involving more than 1 or 2 step tasks, hourly quotas
in assembly line type work, dealing with the general public, more than minimal
supervision, and more than minimal work interaction with co-workers
AR 22. Taking into consideration Swartz’s age, education, and past relevant work experience,
the ALJ then concluded that even though Swartz could not perform her past relevant work as a
nurse’s aide and “ha[d] no transferable skills,” there were a “significant number of jobs in the
national economy that she could perform,” such as work as a janitor or housekeeper.
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded, Swartz was “not disabled” during the relevant time period and
not entitled to benefits. AR 21, 23.
The ALJ also ruled that Swartz was not entitled to have her earlier case reopened
because:
[she] was able to pursue an appeal but failed to do so. Her new application was
not filed until April 17, 2001, which is more than 4 years after the date of the
prior unfavorable decision. Thus, the prior decision is beyond the period during
which it could be reopened for good cause, such as new and material evidence.
There is no exception in this case to allow reopening after 4 years.
AR 15.
10
Swartz timely sought review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council for the Social
Security Administration on the ground that “the decision is against the weight of the evidence.”
On April 14, 2003, the Appeals Council summarily denied Swartz’s request for review,
rendering the ALJ’s decision the “final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security” in the
case. AR 6.
On July 1, 2003, Swartz filed a complaint in federal district court against the
Commissioner of Social Security, challenging the Social Security Administration’s denial of her
2001 application for disability insurance benefits and refusal to reopen her 1994 application.
The Commissioner filed a motion for summary judgment; Swartz filed a motion to remand for
reconsideration. The district court referred both motions to a magistrate for a report and
recommendation. On June 21, 2004, the magistrate recommended that the district court deny
Swartz’s motion to remand and grant the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.
Overruling Swartz’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate’s report and
recommendation. Swartz then filed the present appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Swartz challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that she was not disabled during the
relevant time period and his refusal to reopen her 1994 application.
A. Standard of Review
The court applies a substantial evidence standard in reviewing the administrative denial
of Social Security disability benefits. See Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 25
F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir.1994). “Substantial evidence is that which is greater than a scintilla but
less than a preponderance. In essence, substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a
11
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Walker v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1066, 1070 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
B. ALJ’s Ruling that Swartz was “Not Disabled”
Swartz argues that the ALJ’s ruling that she was not disabled before December 31, 1997
is not supported by substantial evidence because: (1) in determining whether Swartz suffered
from any severe impairments (step two of the analysis), the ALJ erroneously identified Swartz’s
only severe impairment as “Organic Mental Disorder,” instead of also including her “Borderline
Intellectual Functioning” and “Dependent Personality Disorder”; and (2) in assessing Swartz’s
“residual functional capacity” (step five of the analysis), the ALJ ignored Swartz’s 1992 negative
work performance evaluation, mistakenly believing that it had been completed post-1997, and
otherwise failed to account for evidence that she would have been unable to keep up with the
pace at any job, not merely a job with hourly quotas.
Even assuming that the ALJ erred by not including “Borderline Intellectual Functioning”
and “Dependent Personality Disorder” as additional severe impairments in step two of its
analysis, the error is harmless as long as the ALJ found at least one severe impairment and
continued the sequential analysis and ultimately addressed all of the claimant’s impairments in
determining her residual functional capacity. See Maziarz v. Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987). Thus, the critical issue on appeal is simply whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Swartz, during the insured period,
retained the residual functional capacity to perform 1-2 step jobs not involving interaction with
12
the public, more than minimal supervision, more than minimal interaction with co-workers, or
hourly quotas.
In determining Swartz’s “residual functional capacity,” the ALJ analyzed the evidence as
follows:
The claimant testified that she was unable to work during the period at issue due
to . . . and other mental problems. However, the medical reports and other
evidence fail to demonstrate disabling . . . mental problems on or before the date
last insured of December 31, 1997.
...
. . . On December 4, 1997, the only complaint [in a visit to her primary treating
physician, Dr. Wagner] was of sinus problems. Thus, at a treatment visit shortly
before the date last insured of December 31, 1997, the claimant was not reporting
any . . . mental problems.
...
The evidence of record also demonstrates that the claimant did not report severe
mental problems until 2001, well after the date last insured. The claimant
underwent a psychological evaluation at the expense of the Social Security
Administration on July 25, 2001. This is the first time she was diagnosed to have
major depression. . . .
. . . Regarding other mental problems, IQ testing on September 12, 2001 showed
a verbal IQ of 73, a performance IQ of 76, and a full scale IQ of 72. These scores
are indicative of intelligence in the borderline range. Memory testing . . . in
January 2002 showed the claimant’s memory was also in the range of borderline
impairment. Dr. Wagner stated in a report dated December 3, 2002, that he has
treated the claimant for 9 years and has noticed indications of mental slowness
during that time. There is, however, no IQ testing or evidence showing a
diagnosis of an organic mental disorder prior to the recent testing. The claimant
was able to obtain a high school degree and was not in special education. She
was able to work at a semi-skilled job as a nurse’s aide for many years.
Dr. Wagner also stated that, during the 9 years he has treated the claimant, she has
been able to handle performing normal daily activities. . . .
Opinions of record concerning the claimant’s capacity to work have been
considered in making this determination . . . . This includes consideration of
13
opinions from non-examining sources from the State Agency, who reviewed the
evidence in connection with prior decisions on this case. No medical opinion can
be given controlling weight unless it is supported by the medical evidence and
consistent with other evidence of record.
....
Regarding her mental capacity, Jane Henderson, RN submitted a report that the
claimant has significant work-related limitations, including a slow pace and poor
communication skills. However, this report is based on observations for the
period of May 11, 1992 through September 1, 1992. Thus, it pertains to a period
well after the date last insured and after the claimant’s severe depression began in
2001. Therefore, this opinion is not entitled to significant weight regarding an
assessment of the claimant’s condition on or before December 31, 1997.
A treating physician, Dr. Pestrue, submitted a mental residual functional capacity
assessment indicating that the claimant has marked limitations on her ability to
work. However, the report was completed in November 2002 and is based on
treatment dating back only to September 2001. Again, such an opinion cannot be
given significant weight regarding the period on or before the date last insured of
December 31, 1997.
A psychiatrist from the State Agency [Dr. Dundon] reviewed the evidence of
record from October 2001 and found the claimant able to do simple job tasks. . . .
It was only on March 15, 2002, when [the more recent psychological] records
were in the file that a psychiatrist from the State Agency [Dr. Newhouse] found
the claimant unable to perform even simple job tasks. The undersigned is in
agreement with the State Agency psychiatrists in finding the claimant able to
perform simple job tasks, prior to the beginning of her severe depression in 2001.
. . . All of the evidence regarding mental conditions dates from 3 to 4 years after
the date last insured
AR 17-20 (emphasis added).
The ALJ’s analysis includes one clear (and conceded) error: he dismissed as irrelevant
Swartz’s negative work performance evaluations from September 1992 on the ground that they
were completed “well after the date last insured and after the claimant’s severe depression began
in 2001.” Swartz contends that the 1992 work performance evaluations are significant because
they corroborate the more recent opinions of her treating physicians, Dr. Pestrue and Dr.
14
Wagner, and one of the non-treating physicians, Dr. Newhouse, that notwithstanding more recent
mental health issues, e.g. depression, she has suffered from other disabling mental health
problems her entire life. Thus, Swartz argues, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
determination that during the insured period she had the residual functional capacity to perform
simple one to two step jobs as long as there were no hourly quotas; rather, the evidence shows
that she would have had difficulty keeping up with the work pace at any job.
Although the “substantial evidence” test is not overly demanding, we conclude that
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Swartz retained the residual
functional capacity to perform simple one to two step jobs as long as there were no hourly
quotas. The ALJ’s analysis reflects one clear error – the ALJ’s belief that the 1992 evaluations
dated from after the insured period – and fails to explain why no weight is given to the several
medical opinions that Swartz’s problems are life-long conditions. In essence, the ALJ accepts
the opinion of one non-treating physician (Dr. Dundon) over the opinions of two treating
physicians (one of whom had Swartz as a patient during the insured period, Dr. Wagner, and one
of whom treated her mental health issues, Dr. Pestrue) and one other non-treating physician (Dr.
Newhouse). The ALJ discounted Dr. Pestrue’s opinion because he only began treating Swartz in
2001, and he discounted Dr. Newhouse’s opinion because he reviewed Swartz’s file only after
Dr. Pestrue’s diagnoses had been added to it, but he never acknowledges Dr. Pestrue’s opinion
that all of the conditions he identified were likely to have been life-long problems. The ALJ’s
analysis also relies in part on the fact that Swartz did not seek any mental health help when she
visited Dr. Wagner in December 1997, without explaining why she would have sought such help
15
from her family physician. The ALJ’s analysis also completely ignores Dr. Wagner’s, Swartz’s
sister’s and Swartz’s sister-in-law’s shared opinion that Swartz has always been slow.
Without deciding whether Swartz would have had difficulty keeping up with the work
pace at any job, as she contends, we hold that the ALJ’s assessment of Swartz’s residual
functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence because it ignores, without any
persuasive justification, all of the evidence in the record that Swartz’s organic mental disorder,
borderline intellectual functioning, and severe personality disorder were lifelong conditions,
arguably requiring a greater pace limitation in Swartz’s residual functional capacity. We will
remand in order to permit the ALJ in the first instance to decide whether an error-free assessment
of the evidence alters his residual functional capacity assessment and, if so, to reassess whether
with that additional limitation Swartz would have been able to perform any job during the
insured period.
C. Denial of Motion to Reopen
Swartz contends that the ALJ erred in refusing to reopen her 1994 application.
Generally, federal courts lack jurisdiction to review an administrative decision not to reopen a
previous claim for benefits. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-09 (1977). The only
exception to this rule is “where the Secretary’s denial of a petition to reopen is challenged on
constitutional grounds.” Id. at 109. Here, Swartz raises a constitutional issue, contending that
the denial of her motion to reopen her 1994 application deprives her of due process because at
the time her 1994 application was denied, in 1995, her mental disabilities prevented her from
understanding and pursuing her administrative remedies. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction
to consider whether the ALJ properly denied Swartz’s motion to reopen.
16
The ALJ denied the motion to reopen on the ground that it was out of time and that “the
medical reports and other evidence fail to demonstrate . . . mental problems on or before the date
last insured of December 31, 1997” that rendered Swartz unable to file a timely appeal. The
question on appeal is whether the ALJ’s finding that Swartz had the capacity to file a timely
appeal is supported by substantial evidence. Again, the ALJ’s error in ignoring the 1992 work
evaluations coupled with the failure to account for the medical opinions that many of Swartz’s
mental problems were lifelong conditions lead us to conclude that the finding is not supported by
substantial evidence and that a remand for further consideration is required. Thus, we will
remand in order to permit the ALJ in the first instance to decide whether an error-free assessment
of the evidence supports reopening. If the ALJ so concludes, then the fact that Swartz did not
seek this relief within four years of the initial denial will not matter. See Social Security Rule
95-1 (a request to extend the time for seeking review will be granted where the claimant has
“establishe[d] that he or she lacked the mental capacity to understand the procedures for
requesting review.”)
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the decision of the district court granting
summary judgment to the defendant-appellee and denying the plaintiff-appellant’s motion to
remand is REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to
remand to the Social Security Administration to reconsider its denial of Swartz’s 2001
application for benefits and motion to reopen her 1994 application for benefits.
17