NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0205n.06
Filed: March 20, 2007
Nos. 06-3135, 06-3136, 06-3137, 06-3138, 06-3139
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MARK C. HOLLENBAUGH, )
Administrator of the Estate of Joel )
Hollenbaugh, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
THOMAS G. MAURER, ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
)
Defendant, )
)
SCOTT ROTOLO, )
)
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
and )
)
LOUIS JOHNS, DOUG JOHNSON, )
NANCY OTT, and MIKE BUTLER, )
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
____________________________________
Before: MERRITT, DAUGHTREY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Mark C. Hollenbaugh, administrator of the estate of Joel Hollenbaugh, brought this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wooster Police Officer Scott Rotolo and Thomas G.
Maurer, Sheriff of Wayne County, Ohio, and some of his officers for events relating to Joel
Hollenbaugh’s death. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated Joel Hollenbaugh’s Fifth, Eighth,
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and Fourteenth Amendment rights by their deliberate indifference in failing to provide the necessary
medical care during Hollenbaugh’s arrest and detention on May 27, 2003. Plaintiff further asserted
various state law claims. On November 10, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants with regard to Hollenbaugh’s § 1983 claims against Wayne County, Ohio, all
defendants in their official capacities, and defendant Schuler in her individual capacity. The district
court denied defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding Hollenbaugh’s § 1983 individual
capacity claims against defendants Rotolo, Ott, Butler, Johns, and Johnson. These defendants have
timely appealed.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
At approximately 5:08 p.m. on May 27, 2003, Joel Hollenbaugh and Sharon Brewer were
involved in a minor traffic accident in Wooster, Ohio.1 Defendant police officer Scott Rotolo arrived
on the scene at 5:16 p.m. Rotolo observed Brewer in the driver-seat and Hollenbaugh in the
passenger-seat of the U-Haul vehicle that they were driving, although the driver of the other vehicle
involved in the accident told Rotolo that she believed that Hollenbaugh had been driving the U-Haul
at the time of the accident and thereafter the two switched seats. During her description of the
accident, Brewer maintained that she had been driving. Rotolo suspected that he smelled alcohol
in the truck, but was not sure because there was an overbearing smell of body odor. Rotolo was
1
The facts in this case are disputed. In this interlocutory appeal, we are obligated to
construe the facts in the light most favorable to Hollenbaugh. We set forth the record
accordingly. Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 618 (6th Cir. 2006).
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unsure about the source of the odors, and he allowed Hollenbaugh and Brewer to leave the scene.
Approximately one hour later, Officer Rotolo visited Brewer’s residence to continue his
investigation. According to Rotolo, after Brewer confirmed that Hollenbaugh was the driver of the
vehicle, he asked to locate Hollenbaugh and was told that he was “indisposed.” He and another
officer went upstairs to the bathroom. Hollenbaugh was there and told Rotolo that “he was sick and
had diarrhea.” According to Crystal Brewer, the daughter of Sharon Brewer who was present in the
apartment, Hollenbaugh could be clearly heard vomiting prior to his exiting the bathroom and, upon
his exit, was sweating badly and “very pale in the face.”
Rotolo brought Hollenbaugh outside of the building where Hollenbaugh informed Rotolo that
“he didn’t feel good and he had the flu” and again said that he had diarrhea. According to Crystal
Brewer, Hollenbaugh grabbed his chest and stated that his chest hurt while breathing deeply. Rotolo
performed several field sobriety tests on Hollenbaugh. Hollenbaugh allegedly stated that he had
consumed a couple of beers, and he appeared to be swaying and could not keep his balance.
According to Rotolo, Hollenbaugh did not fall, but at one point needed to “sit down as he had
diarrhea,” stated that his “head was pounding,” and that he was sick. Rotolo admitted that
Hollenbaugh stated “three or four times” that he was ill.
Rotolo then arrested Hollenbaugh and transported him to the Wayne County Jail. According
to Rotolo, Hollenbaugh rested across the rear seat of the cruiser, leaning against the door during
transport. Upon arriving at the jail at approximately 6:30 p.m., Rotolo and another Officer, “Goon,”
escorted Hollenbaugh to the booking counter. According to defendants, approximately twenty
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minutes passed between the time that Rotolo first escorted Hollenbaugh to the booking counter and
the time that he was eventually carried to the jail’s blood alcohol testing room (“BAC room”).
Deputy Patricia Schluer was behind the booking counter when Hollenbaugh arrived with Rotolo.
Schuler proceeded to ask Hollenbaugh the standard booking questions. Schuler had no further
contact with Hollenbaugh. Captain Douglas Johnson, the jail administrator, had limited contact with
Hollenbaugh at this time. Johnson stopped by the jail around 6:15 p.m. to wish defendant Nancy Ott
a happy retirement and left at approximately 6:45 p.m.
Deputy Schuler and defendants Johnson, Ott, and Butler were all at the booking counter when
Rotolo brought Hollenbaugh in. According to Butler, when Butler patted Hollenbaugh down,
Hollenbaugh again stated that he had the flu, was going to be sick, and wanted to go to the hospital,
and he had slurred speech. Johnson also recalled Hollenbaugh stating that he had the flu and was
going to be sick. Kelsey Amos, who was detained in the jail holding cell during these events, claims
that when Hollenbaugh was first brought in, Hollenbaugh was having trouble standing and that
Rotolo was supporting him. Amos also stated that Hollenbaugh passed out or slumped down a
couple of times, and Rotolo and two other sheriff’s deputies supported him at different times by
holding his arms. Butler stated that Hollenbaugh asked to sit down and that Butler assisted him to
prevent him from falling. At some point, Ott brought out a waste can and placed it before
Hollenbaugh. Butler relayed Hollenbaugh’s answers to the booking questions to Schuler.
Defendants claim that Hollenbaugh did not respond to the majority of the questions, including those
relating to his medical history.
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While Schuler questioned Hollenbaugh, two events occurred: (1) defendant Louis Johns
entered the room, and (2) Ott left to check the women’s shower room. Upon returning to the
booking room, Ott observed Hollenbaugh lying flat on his back on the floor and heard him state that
“[m]y chest hurts.” Ott then attempted to take Hollenbaugh’s blood pressure three times using a
blood-pressure cuff. Defendants claim that each time, Hollenbaugh thwarted the blood-pressure
reading by flailing his arm and rolling over, thus causing an “error” reading. Ott gave conflicting
testimony as to whether Hollenbaugh’s eyes were open or closed. On the third attempt at a blood-
pressure reading, Johns helped keep Hollenbaugh steady on the ground so that he could not roll over,
but for unknown reasons, the machine again read error. At this point, Ott contends that Hollenbaugh
was awake but incoherent. Following this failed third attempt, Butler attempted to obtain
Hollenbaugh’s pulse manually by placing two fingers on Hollenbaugh’s carotid artery. Butler
claimed that Hollenbaugh kept pinching his neck down to interrupt the process, but that he
“guesstimate[d]” that he obtained a pulse for about five seconds.
According to defendants, Butler and Johns then carried Hollenbaugh into the BAC room so
that Officers Rotolo and Goon could administer a breath test. Detainee Amos alleges that the
officers dragged Hollenbaugh, feet dangling, past his cell. Rotolo stated that “two male deputies
. . . lift[ed] him off the ground and carr[ied] him.” Defendants placed Hollenbaugh in a chair in the
BAC room. According to Butler, Hollenbaugh slumped down with his head on his hand.
Eventually, he slumped down with his feet on Goon’s chair. Goon knocked his feet off, and
Hollenbaugh fell to the floor, hitting his head on the wall. In his deposition, Rotolo gave conflicting
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testimony with regard to whether Hollenbaugh remained conscious. However, in his initial report,
Rotolo described Hollenbaugh as “going in and out of consciousness.” Butler stated that
Hollenbaugh’s eyes were intermittently closed. According to Rotolo, Hollenbaugh did not respond
to the breath test instructions, and the officers recorded this as a refusal to submit to the test.
At approximately 6:50 p.m., Butler and Johns carried Hollenbaugh to holding cell 1-A.
Rotolo and Goon departed; neither they nor Johnson had further contact with Hollenbaugh. Prior
to leaving, Johnson recommended that Hollenbaugh be placed on a fifteen-minute observation
schedule. There were only a few more interactions with Hollenbaugh. First, according to Butler,
three to five minutes after placing him in the holding cell, Butler and Johns decided to attempt to test
Hollenbaugh’s blood pressure once more. Butler claims, however, that upon entering the cell,
Hollenbaugh smiled at him, and he decided not to attempt the test. Johns apparently did not have
any further contact with Hollenbaugh, but Butler claims to have checked on him three more times.
At approximately 10:00 p.m., Butler claims to have entered the cell and witnessed Hollenbaugh
sitting up on the middle bunk. According to Butler, Hollenbaugh told him that he thought he had
food poisoning; Butler advised him that he believed Hollenbaugh was intoxicated. Twice more
between 10:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m., Butler saw Hollenbaugh when Butler brought inmates to the
cell. Both times, Hollenbaugh was lying on his back.
Ott also testified that she observed Hollenbaugh three times after he was put in the holding
cell. At 7:15 p.m., she saw Hollenbaugh lying on his side. Sometime between 8:00 and 9:15 p.m.,
she entered the cell to give Hollenbaugh his citations. Ott stated that he was lying on his back with
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his arm over his eyes. Then, at some point between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m., Ott heard someone vomiting
in the cell and calling. When she entered, she found Hollenbaugh seated in front of the toilet.
Hollenbaugh stated that he thought he had food poisoning and needed to go to the hospital. Ott
replied that he most likely had alcohol poisoning, but claims that she meant it facetiously. She then
left and had no further contact with Hollenbaugh.
The inmates in the cell with Hollenbaugh testified that he vomited, including blood,
throughout the evening, and that they unsuccessfully tried to get the officers’ attention by banging
for periods of time on the cell bars. Detainee Amos testified further that Hollenbaugh said that his
shoulder hurt, though there is no evidence that Amos reported this to any of defendants. Amos
testified that he attempted to get attention for Hollenbaugh and told certain unnamed officers that
Hollenbaugh was sick and needed help. According to Amos, when the officers entered, they laughed
and eventually lowered the blinds over the window to the cell.
The following morning, one of the Wayne County Jail personnel discovered that Hollenbaugh
was dead. The coroner’s report states that Hollenbaugh died sometime between 11:30 p.m. and
12:00 a.m. from cardiac arrest caused by coronary artery disease.
Mark Hollenbaugh brought this § 1983 action on behalf of Joel Hollenbaugh’s estate,
alleging that if defendants had sought medical treatment for Hollenbaugh, he would not have died.
He also claims that defendants violated Hollenbaugh’s constitutional rights by acting with deliberate
indifference in their failure to seek such care. Thirteen defendants were identified in Hollenbaugh’s
initial complaint, and of these, six defendants were sued in their individual and official capacities.
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In November 2005, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wayne County, Ohio,
the named defendants in their official capacities, and defendant Schuler in her official capacity. The
district court denied the motion with regard to defendants Rotolo, Ott, Butler, Johns, and Johnson
in their individual capacities, holding that Hollenbaugh submitted sufficient facts to overcome
defendants’ asserted defense of qualified immunity, at least for purposes of summary judgment.
Whether defendants Rotolo, Ott, Butler, Johns, and Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity are
the only issues appealed.
II.
“A district court’s denial of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, but only ‘to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.’” Estate of Carter v. City of
Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)).
“[T]his court can consider whether ‘the undisputed facts or the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff fail to establish a prima facie violation of clear constitutional law.’”
Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998)).
In order to prevail in an action brought pursuant to § 1983, a “plaintiff must prove that some
conduct by a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff (or decedent) of a right
secured by the Constitution or other federal laws.” Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227, 229 (6th Cir.
1995). The qualified immunity doctrine provides that “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability from civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
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person would have known.” Walsh v. Cuyahoga Cty., 424 F.3d 510, 513 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). This immunity shields officials so “long as their
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have
violated.” Myers v. Potter, 422 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 638 (1987)), cert. denied sub nom Hutchins v. Myers, – U.S. –, 126 S. Ct. 300 (2006).
In this case, there is no question that defendants acted under color of state law. The question
is whether Hollenbaugh has submitted “facts which, when taken in the light most favorable to h[im],
show that the [officers’] conduct violated a constitutionally protected right.” Comstock v. McCrary,
273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02 (2001)). The district
court correctly cited the tripartite test we utilize in assessing claims of qualified immunity. “First,
we determine whether a constitutional violation occurred; second, we determine whether the right
that was violated was a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known;
finally, we determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, and supported the allegations
by sufficient evidence, to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable
in light of the clearly established constitutional rights.” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1996)). We
have since compressed the test into two parts in application. See Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 310
n.2 (noting that if a right is “clearly established” it often sufficiently implies that its violation is
objectively unreasonable, thereby necessitating only a two-part test); Garretson v. City of Madison
Hts., 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005). First, we determine whether plaintiff has documented facts
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which, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the alleged conduct violated
a constitutionally protected right. Garretson, 407 F.3d at 796 (citing Comstock, 273 F.3d at 702. “If
this threshold question is answered affirmatively, we then address whether such right was clearly
established at the time of the violation.” Id.
A. Constitutionally protected right.
The district court correctly determined that Hollenbaugh’s claims of improper denial of
medical care fell under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).2
Thus, plaintiff alleged that individual officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by
exhibiting a deliberate indifference to Hollenbaugh’s medical needs while he was detained pre-trial
in the Wayne County jail.
A claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs has both objective and subjective
components. Garretson, 407 F.3d at 797 (citing Napier v. Madison Cty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir.
2001)). “The objective component requires a showing that the alleged deprivation is sufficiently
serious – that [he] was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.
(internal quotation and citations omitted). Here, Hollenbaugh’s death was the serious harm resulting
from defendants’ alleged deprivation. See Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 311-12 (quoting Blackmore
v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is sufficient to show that
2
Although plaintiff originally asserted claims under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, the district court held that, because Hollenbaugh was a pre-trial detainee, the
claims were properly analyzed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff has not
challenged this determination on appeal.
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[Hollenbaugh] actually experienced the need for medical treatment, and that the need was not
addressed within a reasonable time frame.”))
Then, plaintiff “must also show that the officers subjectively had ‘a sufficiently culpable
state of mind in denying [Hollenbaugh] medical care.’” Garretson, 407 F.3d at 797 (quoting
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895). Deliberate indifference exceeds the showing for mere negligence,
requiring that the officers “knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to
[Hollenbaugh’s] health and safety.” Garretson, 407 F.3d at 797 (quoting Watkins v. City of Battle
Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001)). “The official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In short, plaintiff must allege facts to
support a finding that the officers knew that Hollenbaugh had a serious medical condition. See
Watkins, 273 F.3d at 686.
The subjective component of the analysis must be addressed for each officer individually.
Garretson, 407 F.3d at 797. Plaintiff contends that defendants – Rotolo, Johns, Johnson, Butler, and
Ott – each had sufficient indication of Hollenbaugh’s serious medical condition that their failure to
obtain medical treatment for him constituted deliberate indifference. See Taylor v. Franklin Cty.,
Ky., 104 F. App’x 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Plaintiff set forth sufficient facts from which a trier of
fact could conclude that there was objective awareness as to the seriousness of Plaintiff's ailment,
and a sufficient factual dispute as to whether Defendants . . . had the subjective knowledge that their
acts or omissions amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.”)
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As a group, defendants make the common argument that Hollenbaugh never stated that he
had a heart condition, and, without this information, they could not have made the requisite
connection that Hollenbaugh’s condition posed a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court
addressed defendants as a group, but clearly gave each individual consideration, as it separated out
Officer Schuler (the booking agent), holding that she was entitled to qualified immunity based on
her limited contact with Hollenbaugh. We will address each remaining defendant in turn.
1. Scott Rotolo.
The district court concluded, and we agree, that plaintiff submitted sufficient facts to
overcome Rotolo’s qualified immunity defense at the summary judgment stage. First, Rotolo
noticed an overbearing smell of body odor coming from the U-Haul at the initial stop. When he later
approached Hollenbaugh in the bathroom, Hollenbaugh stated that he did not feel well and had the
flu. Rotolo, accompanying Hollenbaugh outside, again smelled the body odor and noticed that
Hollenbaugh was swaying. Several times during the field sobriety test, Hollenbaugh informed
Rotolo that “he didn’t feel good and he had the flu” and again said that he had diarrhea. According
to Crystal Brewer, Hollenbaugh grabbed his chest and stated that his chest hurt while breathing
deeply. According to Rotolo, Hollenbaugh did not fall, but at one point needed to “sit down as he
had diarrhea,” stated that his “head was pounding,” and stated that he was sick. Rotolo admitted that
Hollenbaugh stated “three or four times” that he was sick.
During the transport to the jail, Rotolo stated that Hollenbaugh rested across the rear seat of
the cruiser, leaning against the door during transport. Kelsey Amos claims that Hollenbaugh was
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having trouble standing, and Rotolo was supporting him during the booking. Amos also stated that
Hollenbaugh passed out or slumped down a couple of times and that Rotolo and two other sheriff’s
deputies supported him at different times by holding his arms. Although Rotolo contends in his brief
that he was unaware of Hollenbaugh’s interactions with other officers because he was completing
paperwork, his testimony arguably belies this assertion, as he was aware of the garbage can, the
attempts to take a blood pressure reading, and Hollenbaugh’s slumping and fall from the chair.
Rotolo knew that Hollenbaugh was dragged and/or carried to the BAC room, stating that “two male
deputies . . . lift[ed] him off the ground and carr[ied] him.” Butler’s testimony places Rotolo in the
small BAC room with Hollenbaugh when he slumped down with his head on his hand and,
ultimately, fell to the floor, hitting his head on the wall. In his deposition, Rotolo gave conflicting
testimony as to whether Hollenbaugh remained conscious, but described him as “going in and out
of consciousness” in his initial report. According to Rotolo, Hollenbaugh did not respond to the
breath test instructions, and the officers recorded this as a refusal to submit to the test.
Rotolo asserts in his brief that the “lack of proof of knowledge level of Rotolo” requires this
court to conclude that the district court erred. Rotolo is mistaken. “In most cases in which the
defendant is alleged to have failed to provide treatment, there is no testimony about what inferences
the defendant in fact drew. Nonetheless, in those cases, a genuine issue of material fact as to
deliberate indifference can be based on a strong showing on the objective component.” Estate of
Carter, 408 F.3d at 313 (holding officer not entitled to qualified immunity when directly informed
by decedent that she was in distress and later informed by another officer that decedent was
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experiencing chest pains, had not taken her “heart” medication, and needed to go to the hospital).
We agree with the district court that, based on the proffered evidence, and viewing these facts
and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Hollenbaugh, plaintiff has established a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Rotolo was aware of his serious medical condition.
See Garretson, 407 F.3d at 798.
2. Nancy Ott.
Captain Johnson and Deputies Ott and Butler were at the booking counter when Rotolo
brought Hollenbaugh in. According to Butler, when Butler patted Hollenbaugh down, Hollenbaugh
again stated that he had the flu, was going to be sick, wanted to go to the hospital, and had slurred
speech. Plaintiff proffered testimony that, at this time, Hollenbaugh was having trouble standing and
needed support, repeatedly stating that he had the flu and was going to be sick, passed out or
slumped down a couple of times, and that Rotolo and two other sheriff’s deputies supported him at
different times by holding his arms.
When Ott returned to the booking room after checking the women’s shower, she observed
Hollenbaugh lying flat on his back on the floor and heard him state that “[m]y chest hurts.” Ott then
attempted to take Hollenbaugh’s blood pressure three times using a blood-pressure cuff. Ott gave
conflicting testimony as to whether Hollenbaugh’s eyes were open or closed. On the third attempt
at a blood-pressure reading, Johns helped keep Hollenbaugh steady on the floor so that he could not
roll over, but for unknown reasons, the machine again read “error.” At this point, Ott contends
Hollenbaugh was awake but incoherent.
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Ott also testified that she observed Hollenbaugh three times after he was put in the holding
cell. At 7:15 p.m., she saw Hollenbaugh lying on his side. Sometime between 8:00 and 9:15 p.m.,
she entered the cell to give Hollenbaugh his citations. Ott stated that he was lying on his back with
his arm over his eyes. Then, at some point between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m., Ott heard someone vomiting
in the cell and calling. When she entered, she found Hollenbaugh seated in front of the toilet.
Hollenbaugh stated that he thought he had food poisoning and he needed to go to the hospital. Ott
admitted that she replied that he most likely had alcohol poisoning, but claims she meant it
facetiously. Further, plaintiff proffered testimony that Hollenbaugh vomited, including blood,
throughout the evening, and his fellow inmates unsuccessfully tried to get the officers’ attention by
banging for periods of time in the cell, telling certain unnamed officers that Hollenbaugh was sick
and needed help. According to Amos, when the officers did enter, they laughed and eventually
lowered the blinds over the window to the cell.
As with defendant Rotolo, we agree with the district court that, based on the proffered
evidence, and viewing these facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
Hollenbaugh, plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ott was
aware of a serious medical condition. See Garretson, 407 F.3d at 798.
3. Mike Butler
In addition to the incident at the booking counter, Butler assisted with Ott’s attempt to take
a blood pressure reading of Hollenbaugh. Following the failed third attempt, Butler attempted to
obtain Hollenbaugh’s pulse manually by placing two fingers on Hollenbaugh’s carotid artery. Butler
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claimed that Hollenbaugh kept pinching his neck down to interrupt the process, but that he
“guesstimate[d]” that he obtained a pulse for about five seconds.
Butler admits that he and Johns then carried Hollenbaugh into the BAC room so that Officers
Rotolo and Goon could administer a breath test, and plaintiff proffered testimony that the officers
dragged Hollenbaugh, feet dangling. Once in the BAC room, Butler testified that Hollenbaugh
slumped down with his head on his hand, eventually slumping down with his feet on Goon’s chair.
Butler further witnessed Hollenbaugh falling and hitting his head and stated that his eyes were
intermittently closed.
At approximately 6:50 p.m., Butler and Johns carried Hollenbaugh to holding cell 1-A.
According to Butler, three to five minutes after placing him in the holding cell, Butler and Johns
decided to attempt to test Hollenbaugh’s blood pressure once more but never did so. At
approximately 10:00 p.m., Butler claims to have entered the cell and witnessed Hollenbaugh sitting
up on the middle bunk. According to Butler, Hollenbaugh told him that he thought he had food
poisoning; Butler advised him that he believed he was intoxicated. Twice more between 10:00 p.m.
and 12:00 a.m., Butler saw Hollenbaugh when he brought two more inmates to the cell. Both times,
Hollenbaugh was lying on his back. Finally, as recounted above, plaintiff proffered testimony that
Hollenbaugh’s fellow inmates communicated some degree of alarm to the officers and were not
heeded.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that, based on the proffered evidence and
viewing these facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Hollenbaugh, plaintiff
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has established a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Butler was aware of a serious
medical condition.
4. Louis Johns.
Plaintiff’s allegations and supporting testimony likewise place Johns in the booking room
while Hollenbaugh was being questioned, assisting in the attempt to obtain a blood pressure reading,
supporting Hollenbaugh in the BAC room, carrying Hollenbaugh to the holding cell, and re-entering
Hollenbaugh’s cell with the intent of testing his blood pressure. For the reasons stated above,
viewing these facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Hollenbaugh, plaintiff
has established a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Johns was aware of a serious
medical condition.
5. Doug Johnson.
Plaintiff’s allegations and supporting testimony place Johnson, the captain and jail
administrator, at the booking counter during Hollenbaugh’s arrival, and leaving at approximately
6:45 p.m. He observed Hollenbaugh enter the booking room and characterized his behavior as
“lethargic” and “stumbling.” He heard Hollenbaugh talk and was present during the booking
process, and, according to testimony proffered by plaintiff, would have witnessed Hollenbaugh being
supported by the other officers and the blood pressure incident. Johnson recalled Hollenbaugh
stating that he had the flu and was going to be sick, and the placement of the waste basket in front
of Hollenbaugh. Prior to leaving, Johnson recommended that the other defendants put Hollenbaugh
on a fifteen-minute observation schedule.
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Case Nos. 06-3135, 06-3136, 06-3137, 06-3138, 06-3139
Hollenbaugh v. Maurer, et al.
Undoubtedly, Johnson observed less than any of the other defendants did. Nevertheless, we
conclude that “plaintiff set forth sufficient facts from which a trier of fact could conclude that there
was objective awareness as to the seriousness of [Hollenbaugh]’s ailment, and a sufficient factual
dispute as to whether [Johnson, the captain of the jail] . . . had the subjective knowledge that [his]
acts or omissions amounted to deliberate indifference to [Hollenbaugh]’s serious medical needs.”
Taylor, 104 F. App’x at 543.
Although Johnson contends that his recommendation to place Hollenbaugh on a fifteen-
minute observation schedule should not evidence anything more than a need for observation, the
district court held, and we agree, that it did provide some evidence that Johnson drew an inference
that a serious medical condition was present. “In most cases in which the defendant is alleged to
have failed to provide treatment, there is no testimony about what inferences the defendant in fact
drew. Nonetheless, in those cases, a genuine issue of material fact as to deliberate indifference can
be based on a strong showing on the objective component.” Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 313
(holding that a jury would be entitled to draw the inference that the officer was aware of medical
need based on officer’s claims that he gave instruction that decedent was to go to the hospital).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s disposition with respect to Captain Johnson.
B. Clearly Established Law.
Having determined that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding the violation of
Hollenbaugh’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by defendants, we must next determine whether the
constitutional right that was violated was clearly established. “Whether an official protected by
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Case Nos. 06-3135, 06-3136, 06-3137, 06-3138, 06-3139
Hollenbaugh v. Maurer, et al.
qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally
turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that
were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Rich v. City of Mayfield Hts., 955 F.2d 1092, 1094
(6th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In the context of deliberate indifference, we have held that “where the circumstances are
clearly sufficient to indicate the need of medical attention for injury or illness, the denial of such aid
constitutes the deprivation of constitutional due process.” Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 313 (quoting
Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972)). In 1992, we specifically stated “that a
pretrial detainee’s right to medical treatment for a serious medical need has been established since
at least 1987.” Id. (quoting Heflin v. Stewart Cty., 958 F.2d 709, 717 (6th Cir. 1992)). Thus, the
right of Hollenbaugh not to be deprived of needed medical care because of deliberate indifference
was clearly established.
III.
For the reasons stated above, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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