NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 08a0401n.06
Filed: July 2, 2008
Case No. 07-5317
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
STEPHEN EARL EDMONDSON, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
_______________________________________ )
BEFORE: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and MCKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Earl Edmondson
(“Edmondson”) was convicted of being a felon in possession of three firearms in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. On appeal Edmondson makes two
arguments: (1) that the jury had insufficient evidence with which to convict him; and (2) that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable. Finding no merit in either of these contentions, we
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
On the evening of July 25, 2005, police and emergency medical technicians arrived at
Edmondson’s house, responding to a call regarding a male subject who was believed to have
overdosed on drugs. Police Officer Alan Bolan (“Bolan”) arrived first, followed by EMTs Ronnie
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Nanney (“Nanney”) and Tonya Patterson. Bolan and Nanney found Edmondson lying on the front
porch, incoherent and unresponsive. Seeking to treat Edmondson effectively, Nanney asked Bolan
to search the house for any drugs or medications on which Edmondson might have overdosed.
Upon entering the house, Bolan immediately saw a 12-gauge shotgun leaning against the
television. Bolan was familiar with Edmondson and knew that he was a convicted felon1, and he
therefore seized the shotgun. Officer Siler, who by this time had arrived on the scene, searched the
bedroom at the rear of Edmondson’s house for medications and drugs and found two more firearms
— another shotgun and a .22-caliber revolver — wedged between the mattress and box springs.
Officer Siler also found ammunition for the firearms.2 About one-half hour after arriving, the EMTs
loaded Edmondson into an ambulance and took him to the hospital. The police officers left the home
shortly thereafter. Later that evening, Bolan was visiting his father at the hospital and happened
upon Edmondson, who confronted Bolan and asked when he could get his guns back.
Edmondson was indicted on a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and a jury convicted him on that charge. The Presentence Investigation
Report calculated Edmondson’s offense level at 22, with a Criminal History Category of III,
corresponding to a Guidelines range of 51-63 months. Edmondson conceded that the Guidelines
were properly calculated but argued for a variance below the Guidelines range. At sentencing the
district court considered the Guidelines range, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and the relevant
information particular to Edmondson. Ultimately, the district court settled on a sentence it
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In 2003 Edomondson pleaded guilty to arson for attempting to burn down his house and collect the insurance
proceeds.
2
It is undisputed that all three firearms seized from Edmondson’s house were manufactured outside of
Tennessee.
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concluded was sufficient but not greater than necessary to punish the crime — 51 months’
imprisonment, the low end of the Guidelines range, with two years of supervised release. The
district court imposed that sentence even though it thought Edmondson’s criminal history might
support a higher sentence. Edmondson timely appealed both his conviction and sentence.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Edmondson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction and the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We address them in turn, beginning with the conviction.
A. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict Edmondson.
Edmondson first argues that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to prove all the
elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial does “not weigh the evidence presented, consider the
credibility of the witnesses, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury.” United States v.
Gonzalez, 512 F.3d 285, 293 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552, 558 (6th
Cir. 1999)). We will uphold a conviction so long as the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, could justify a rational trier of fact in finding the elements of the crime
charged proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 293-94 (internal citations omitted). Moreover,
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to sustain a conviction and the evidence presented
at trial need not exclude every reasonable explanation save that of guilt. Id. at 294 (citing United
States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 265 (6th Cir. 1998)).
In order to obtain a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year — a felony; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed the
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firearm(s) specified in the indictment; and (3) the firearm(s) traveled in or affected interstate
commerce. United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 560 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir. 1998)). Edmondson does not challenge the evidence that he
has a previous felony conviction for arson or that the three firearms specified in the indictment
traveled in or affected interstate commerce. He argues only that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he knowingly possessed the firearms.
Both actual and constructive possession are sufficient to give rise to criminal liability under
§ 922(g). United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1207 (6th Cir. 1997). The government does not
argue that Edmondson actually possessed the firearms — that is, that they were in his immediate
control — on the night in question, but that he constructively possessed them.
One has constructive possession over an object when he has “the power and intention at a
given time to exercise dominion and control” over the object. Id. at 1208 (quoting United States v.
Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973)); see also United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713
(6th Cir. 2007) (“[C]onstructive possession exits when a person . . . knowingly has the power and
the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object.”). Proof that
Edmondson had dominion over the premises where the firearms were located is sufficient to
establish that he constructively possessed the firearms. Id. (quoting United States v. Kincaide, 145
F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998)). But possession of a residence alone — without more — is not
sufficient to establish constructive possession of all the contents therein. United States v. Craven,
478 F.2d 1239, 1233 (6th Cir. 1973). Dominion over the contents inside a residence contemplates
something more than merely owning the residence.
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The evidence in this case showed that Edmondson had substantial dominion or control over
the firearms that Officers Bolan and Siler found in his house. Two of the guns were found in
Edmondson’s bedroom, wedged between the mattress and box springs of his bed, along with a bag
of ammunition; Edmondson specifically asked Bolan when he, Edmondson, could get “his guns”
back; and in rebuttal to Edmondson’s mother’s testimony that the guns were hers and that she had
taken them to her son’s home to prevent her visiting granddaughter from having access to them,
Bolan testified at trial that Edmondson’s mother had initially queried Bolan as to why he took “her
son’s guns.” What Edmondson is really asking this court to do is assess the credibility of the
witnesses. That is, he argues that we should accept the version of events to which his mother
testified over the version of events to which Bolan testified. But it was the jury’s province to
determine whose testimony was more credible, and they chose Bolan’s. “We do not weigh the
evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury.”
United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Gonzalez, 512 F.3d at 293.
Finally, Edmondson claims that the evidence is insufficient because the jury had to make
inferences. But we “cannot overturn the jury’s decision merely because it had to draw reasonable
inferences to find” Edmondson guilty. United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 2007)
(en banc). It is within the jury’s province to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented,
and whatever inferences the jury drew in this case, it apparently drew against Edmondson.
Consequently, we hold that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Edmondson knowingly possessed the three firearms specified in the indictment.
B. The sentence imposed by the district court was substantively reasonable.
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Edmondson next argues that his 51-month sentence of imprisonment is substantively
unreasonable. We review for abuse of discretion every sentence that is free of significant procedural
error. United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 509 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)). Edmondson does not claim that the district court committed any significant
procedural errors, and our review has revealed none.
The question before us, then, is whether the district court “abused [its] discretion in
determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported” the 51-month sentence imposed. Gall, 128 S. Ct.
at 600. A district court abuses its sentencing discretion when it “select[s] a sentence arbitrarily,
bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or
giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” Vowell, 516 F.3d at 510
(citations omitted). “On abuse of discretion review, we will give ‘due deference to the [d]istrict
[c]ourt’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the
sentence,’” id. at 513 (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602), because the sentencing judge is in the best
position “to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case,” Gall, 128 S.
Ct. at 597.
The district court did not sentence Edmondson arbitrarily, base its sentence on impermissible
factors, fail to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or give an unreasonable amount of weight to any factor.
Rather, after detailing its consideration of those factors, the district court imposed the lowest
sentence in the applicable Guidelines range of 51-63 months — a sentence that the court explained
was “sufficient to punish [Edmondson] but not more than is necessary.” Because this sentence is
within the properly calculated Guidelines range, we credit it with a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness, United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 371 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
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Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); and because our review convinces us that the sentence
is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of § 3553(a), United
States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2006), we conclude that Edmondson has failed to
rebut that presumption. We find no abuse of discretion here.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Edmondson’s conviction and sentence.
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