NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 08a0572n.06
Filed: September 23, 2008
No. 07-3997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MARK C. SHAW, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
) DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
RICHARD C. PFEIFFER, JR. et al., ) DISTRICT OF OHIO
)
Defendants-Appellants. ) OPINION
)
)
Before: DAUGHTREY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; and MILLS, District Judge.*
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Mark C. Shaw was fired from his position as a
Criminalist for the City of Columbus Division of Police and prosecuted for dereliction of duty. After
the criminal charges against him were dismissed, he sued the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
naming two city employees in their official capacities only. The City filed a motion for summary
judgment after the deadline for completion of discovery had passed. Shaw then moved for leave to file
an amended complaint that named the defendants in their individual capacities. The district court denied
Shaw’s motion for leave to amend and granted summary judgment in favor of the City.
*
The Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by
designation .
No. 07-3997
Shaw v. Pfeiffer
This court’s decision in Lovelace v. O’Hara, 985 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1993), controls the
disposition of Shaw’s motion for leave to amend. Because the statute of limitations on § 1983 claims
had already passed before Shaw attempted to name the defendants in their individual capacities, the
amendment would have been permissible only if it “related back” to the date of the original complaint.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The amendment did not relate back because the original complaint expressly
named the defendants in their official capacities only, and therefore did not place them on notice of
possible individual liability. See Lovelace, 985 F.2d at 850 (denying leave to amend under virtually
identical circumstances).
Turning now to the City’s summary-judgment motion, Shaw was required to identify a policy
of the City that allegedly violated his constitutional rights and to connect that policy with the injury
suffered in order to state a cause of action. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978);
Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2008). Shaw never identified any such
policy, nor conducted any discovery on that or any other issue. His attempted amendment following the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment simply asserted that an offending policy existed, without
further explanation. The district court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
After carefully considering the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law,
we agree with the district court’s denial of Shaw’s motion for leave to amend and its grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City of Columbus. Because the reasoning that supports the judgment for the
City has been clearly articulated by the district court in a thorough and comprehensive opinion, the
issuance of a detailed appellate opinion would be unduly duplicative. The judgment rendered by the
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No. 07-3997
Shaw v. Pfeiffer
Honorable George C. Smith, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, is accordingly affirmed on the basis of the reasoning detailed in his Opinion and Order filed
on September 7, 2006.
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