NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0263n.06
No. 10-6216
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOHN JONES, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) FILED
) Apr 25, 2011
v. ) LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
)
EDWARD YANCY, Officer, Individually and as an )
Officer of the City of Memphis Police Department; )
JERRY WALKER, Officer, Individually and as an )
Officer of the City of Memphis Police Department, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Defendants-Appellants, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
and ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
LARRY A. GODWIN, Individually and in his )
capacity as Police Director for the City of )
Memphis Police Department; CITY OF MEMPHIS, )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
BEFORE: COLE and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; ZATKOFF, District Judge.*
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Defendants-Appellants Officers Edward Yancy and
Jerry Walker appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on claims that
they used excessive force in arresting Plaintiff-Appellee John Jones. Because the question of
qualified immunity presented by the officers’ interlocutory appeal depends entirely on a disputed
version of the facts, we have no jurisdiction to entertain it. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.
*
The Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
No. 10-6216
Jones v. Yancy, et al.
BACKGROUND
On the evening of April 8, 2006, John Jones was involved in a motor vehicle accident in
Memphis, Tennessee. While Jones was driving on Prescott Street, another vehicle made a wide turn
into his lane, forcing him to run off the roadway and strike a utility pole. Jones did not remain at the
scene of the accident. Darron Easley, a nearby resident who heard the crash, gave Jones a ride to
Jones’ home so that he could call his brother (the owner of the vehicle Jones was driving) and get
money to have the vehicle towed. Jones did not report the accident to the Memphis Police
Department. By the time Jones returned to the scene of the accident, however, a police service
technician had arrived. The technician asked Jones for his driver’s license, which Jones could not
locate.
The parties vigorously dispute what happened next. Jones testified in a deposition that
shortly after he returned to the scene of the accident, Officers Yancy and Walker arrived and asked
him for his driver’s license. After Jones unsuccessfully searched the vehicle for the license and
informed the officers of his inability to locate it, the officers placed Jones in handcuffs. Jones
testified that he did not resist arrest at any time. Nonetheless, Jones claims that the officers “pepper
sprayed” and repeatedly beat him across the head and back. R92-10 at 36–37, 44. He also testified
that the officers “r[ode] [him] down to the ground” on his knees, despite being told that Jones could
not get down on his knees due to a preexisting injury. R92-10 at 96–97. Jones was then placed in
the back of a police car and taken away. He claims to have suffered multiple injuries from the
incident, including a broken finger and a broken rib.
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Jones v. Yancy, et al.
Easley, who witnessed the incident, offered deposition testimony largely supporting Jones’
version of events. He testified that Jones “wasn’t disorderly,” R104-2 at 17, that he never saw Jones
try to strike the police officers, and that the police “[s]lammed him down” on the trunk of the police
car and “was very abusive,” R104-2 at 38–39. An affidavit executed by Easley shortly after the
incident specifically alleged that he saw one of the officers “slam[] him down” on the trunk of the
police car “about two times” and hold “Jones’ arm or hand in a position where [Easley] believed they
were going to break it.” R86-6 at 2.
The officers tell a different story. They claim that Jones refused to sign a traffic ticket,
requiring them to place him under arrest. Yancy testified that Jones told them “f--- you, I ain’t got
to give you s---.” R92-11 at 70. As they attempted to arrest Jones, the officers claim that Jones
resisted, “trying to pull away” and “get away.” R92-12 at 62. Yancy testified that Jones “pulled
loose [and] took a swing at Officer Walker” and that they all “start[ed] fighting” as the officers tried
to get Jones in the police car. R92-11 at 70. After being unable to subdue him, Officer Walker used
pepper spray on Jones. Both officers testified that the pepper spray was used before Jones was
handcuffed. Although Walker claimed that they never used physical force on Jones, and disputed
the allegation that they slammed Jones on the back of the police car, Yancy seemingly acknowledged
slamming Jones on the trunk of the car in order to get him handcuffed.
On April 3, 2007, Jones filed this suit in the Western District of Tennessee, asserting a
number of claims relating to the incident. As relevant here, Jones brought a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Officers Yancy and Walker, alleging that they used excessive force against him in
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No. 10-6216
Jones v. Yancy, et al.
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for summary judgment on February 1,
2010, claiming entitlement to qualified immunity. On August 27, the district court granted the
officers’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The court granted the officers’
motion as to Jones’ claims that the officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights and lacked
probable cause to arrest him. The court, however, denied the officers’ motion as to Jones’ excessive-
force claim, citing case law establishing that the unnecessary use of force on a non-resisting
individual, particularly pepper spray, violates the Fourth Amendment. The court summarized the
“diametrically opposed versions of what occurred on April 8, 2006,” R118 at 16, and concluded that,
“taking the view of the facts most favorable to the Plaintiff, Jones was the victim of an unprovoked
attack that resulted in his being pepper sprayed and slammed into the patrol car well after he was in
handcuffs,” R118 at 18. In light of this factual dispute, the court held that the officers were not
entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
On September 23, the officers filed this timely interlocutory appeal.
ANALYSIS
We begin—and end—our analysis by considering whether we have jurisdiction to entertain
this appeal. The jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 generally extends only to “appeals
from . . . final decisions of the district courts.” Consequently, interlocutory orders denying summary
judgment usually do not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. Ortiz v. Jordan, -- U.S. --, 131 S.
Ct. 884, 891 (2011).
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No. 10-6216
Jones v. Yancy, et al.
A “limited exception” exists, however, for certain denials of summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985)). As the Supreme
Court explained in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), we have jurisdiction over appeals from
denials of qualified immunity to the extent they raise “purely legal issue[s],” such as what law was
“clearly established” at the time the defendant allegedly acted. Id. at 313. We lack jurisdiction,
however, to consider “a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines
whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 319. “Under
Johnson, therefore, a determination that a given set of facts violates clearly established law is
reviewable, while a determination that an issue of fact is ‘genuine’ is unreviewable.” See v. City of
Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2007).
As Jones correctly points out, the officers’ appeal presents no pure legal issue for review.
The officers do not argue that the facts as alleged by Jones fail to establish a violation of clearly
established constitutional law. Instead, the officers’ appeal is based entirely on their argument that
“the district court should have accepted the Officers’ version of the events and granted their Motion
for Summary Judgment.” Appellants’ Br. at 8–9. This is precisely the type of interlocutory
appeal—challenging the factual basis for the district court’s finding of a genuine issue of material
fact—over which we have no jurisdiction under Johnson.
The officers contend that the Supreme Court’s post-Johnson decision in Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372 (2007), grants us jurisdiction to consider this appeal. In Scott, the Supreme Court held that
a district court should not view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party for
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No. 10-6216
Jones v. Yancy, et al.
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment if that party’s version of events is “blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” Id. at 380. The Supreme
Court concluded that the district court erred in that case by adopting the plaintiff’s version of events
because it was “quite clearly contradict[ed]” and “utterly discredited” by a videotape of the incident.
Id. at 378, 380.
Although we have interpreted Scott to permit us to exercise jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals from denials of summary judgment in those “rare” cases where the district court makes a
“blatan[t] and demonstrabl[e] error” in finding an issue of material fact, Wysong v. City of Heath,
260 F. App’x 848, 853–54 (6th Cir. 2008), the present case falls well short of satisfying this narrow
exception.
The officers argue that the district court committed “blatan[t] and demonstrabl[e] error”
because “Jones failed to offer any significant, probative evidence to support the allegation that he
was pepper sprayed after he was handcuffed and compliant.” Appellants’ Br. at 11. We are not
persuaded. Jones repeatedly testified that the officers pepper sprayed and beat him despite the fact
that he put up no physical resistance to arrest. Much of Jones’ testimony was corroborated by
Easley, an unrelated witness, who testified that, although Jones “wasn’t disorderly,” R104-2 at 17,
and never tried to strike the police officers, the officers “[s]lammed him down” on the trunk of the
police car and were “very abusive,” R104-2 at 37–39. Furthermore, Jones specifically testified that
he “believe[d]” the officers placed him in handcuffs before spraying him with pepper spray. R92-10
at 36. And while Jones acknowledged that he was “not sure” about the timing of the handcuffing,
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Jones v. Yancy, et al.
R92-10 at 36, that acknowledgment hardly establishes that the district court committed a “blatan[t]
and demonstrabl[e] error” in finding an issue of material fact as to whether the officers acted with
excessive force, particularly given the other testimony indicating that Jones was compliant at the
time of the officers’ alleged actions. “Absent such error, this court may not revisit the factual basis
behind a denial of summary judgment.” Landis v. Phalen, 297 F. App’x 400, 404 (6th Cir. 2008).
The disputed issues of material fact in this case are for a jury to decide, not for a court.
CONCLUSION
On this record, the question of qualified immunity depends entirely on the district court’s
determination that the record sets forth a genuine issue of material fact. Because we lack jurisdiction
to review that factual determination, we DISMISS the appeal.
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