NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0758n.06
No. 10-3324 FILED
Nov 09, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
EUGENE L. COLLINS, ) OHIO
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
Before: MARTIN and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; STEEH, District Judge.*
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Eugene L. Collins appeals the district court’s order
denying his motions to suppress certain evidence.
In 2009, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Collins with being a felon
in possession of a firearm in violation 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). After the district court denied Collins’s motions to suppress
evidence obtained when officers stopped his vehicle and arrested him, Collins pleaded guilty to
being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The district
court sentenced Collins to concurrent terms of 120 months in prison.
On appeal, Collins argues that the district court erred by denying his motions to suppress
because the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop his vehicle. When
*
The Honorable George C. Steeh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
No. 10-3324
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reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we examine the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 173 (6th Cir. 2011).
We review the evidence in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision. Id.
“[A] moving vehicle may be stopped to investigate an officer’s reasonable and articulable
suspicion that its occupants had engaged, were engaging, or were about to engage in criminal
activity.” United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 2006). We consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining “whether law enforcement had an objective and particularized basis
for suspecting criminal wrongdoing.” Id. at 371. Testimony at the suppression hearing established
that, before the officers stopped Collins’s vehicle, they were aware that he had been involved in
drug-related activity in the past. Further, an identified citizen had been submitting weekly
complaints to law enforcement that numerous individuals would visit Collins’s home for a short
time, often carrying bags in and out of the residence. Investigating officers surveilled Collins’s home
and verified that the suspicious activity was taking place. When Collins left his home on the day of
his arrest, he was seen carrying a small bag. Given those facts, the district court properly concluded
that, when the officers initially attempted to stop Collins’s vehicle, they had an objective and
particularized basis for suspecting criminal activity. Before stopping his car in his driveway, Collins
ignored the officers’ lights and sirens, increased his speed, turned without signaling, and ran a stop
sign, giving the officers probable cause to stop and arrest him for willful flight. See Nelson v. Riddle,
217 F. App’x 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Collins’s motions to suppress.