NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0715n.06
Case No. 11-3113 FILED
Jul 03, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
HARVEST INSTITUTE FREEDMAN )
FEDERATION, LLC; LEATRICE )
TANNER-BROWN, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
) DISTRICT OF OHIO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE )
HONORABLE KEN SALAZAR, SECRETARY )
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR OF THE )
UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
_______________________________________ )
BEFORE: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge; QUIST, District
Judge.*
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Chief Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Harvest Institute
Freedman Federation and Leatrice Tanner-Brown want the federal courts to hold that the Claims
Resolution Act, No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064 (2010) (“the Act”), is unconstitutional because it
perpetuates racial discrimination against former slaves—known as the Freedmen—of certain Native
American tribes. Congress enacted the Act to implement the settlement between the parties in
Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96CV01285-JR (D.D.C.), which was a class-action lawsuit brought by a
number of individual Native Americans against the Secretaries of the Departments of the Interior and
*
The Honorable Gordon Jay Quist, United States District Judge for the W estern District of Michigan, sitting
by designation.
No. 11-3113, Harvest Institute, et al. v. United States, et al.
of the Treasury. The class in Cobell claimed that the United States had breached its fiduciary duty
to administer properly the Individual Indian Money (IIM) Accounts held on the behalf of certain
Native Americans.
The Harvest plaintiffs claim that the Freedmen were wrongfully excluded from ownership
of the IIM Accounts due to racism, and that it perpetuates racial discrimination for Congress to not
address their claims at the same time that it addresses the claims of the Cobell class. Along with
their Complaint, the Harvest plaintiffs moved the district court for a temporary restraining order; the
United States responded by filing Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, respectively.
The district court dismissed the case, holding that the Harvest plaintiffs did not have standing
because any injury to them is not fairly traceable to the United States and because the injury will not
be redressed by a favorable decision. The Harvest plaintiffs timely appealed.
After carefully reviewing the district court’s opinion, the briefs, and the record in this case,
we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the case. As the district court correctly
set out the applicable law and correctly applied that law to the undisputed material facts contained
in the record, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would serve no jurisprudential purpose.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the district court’s well-reasoned opinion, we AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court.
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