NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0304n.06
No. 12-3478
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
BRADLEY WATSON, ) Mar 26, 2013
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
CITY OF MARYSVILLE, et al., ) OHIO
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
)
)
Before: SILER, SUTTON, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Bradley Watson, while walking through a residential
neighborhood, was stopped and questioned by police because he matched the description of an armed
suspect in the area. He was carrying a black computer bag, which police believed might contain a
weapon, and he was told not to touch the bag during his questioning. Despite repeated warnings,
Watson reached into his bag. Officers immediately tased him and then arrested him for obstruction
of official business. He was convicted of this charge in state court and subsequently asserted 18
causes of action in federal court against the City of Marysville, Ohio (the “City”); Police Chief Floyd
Golden; Assistant Police Chief Glenn Nicol; Officer Christopher Diehl; and Sergeant Ronald Nicol.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Watson’s
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claims were barred by qualified immunity and his state court conviction for obstruction of official
business. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I.
In June 2008, the Marysville Police Department received a phone call regarding a suspicious
male walking in a residential neighborhood and carrying an assault rifle. Officer Diehl responded
to the call and was dispatched to the neighborhood where he observed Watson sitting on a bench
near the suspect’s reported location. Watson matched some of the suspect’s physical characteristics
and was carrying a shoulder bag.
Upon seeing Diehl’s police cruiser approach, Watson rose from the bench, grabbed his bag,
and began crossing the street in the direction away from Diehl. Diehl called out to Watson and
requested that he come speak with him. Although Watson halted, he refused to cross the street in
Diehl’s direction. Diehl crossed the street, approached Watson, and requested several times that he
set down his bag and sit on the curb of the road. Visibly upset, Watson threw his bag into the air,
allowing it to fall onto the concrete pavement, and stated that it contained a computer worth $4,000.
Diehl proceeded to question Watson, who appeared agitated and belligerent, waving his arms in the
air as he spoke. Diehl and Sergeant Nicol, who had just arrived as back-up on the scene, instructed
Watson several times to stay away from his bag and remain seated on the ground while they
conferred with one another. While the officers discussed the situation nearby, Watson reached for
his bag and unzipped it. Diehl and Sergeant Nicol warned Watson that he would be tased if he
reached inside of his bag and that he should refrain from touching it. Watson, however, disregarded
the officers’ commands and reached into the bag, at which point Sergeant Nicol immediately tased,
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handcuffed, and arrested Watson for obstructing official business. After Watson was taken into
custody, officers confirmed that he was carrying a computer in his bag and that the armed suspect
they were looking for was another man located a short distance from the scene of Watson’s arrest.
Watson was convicted in state court of obstructing official business. Following his
unsuccessful motion for a new trial, he filed his complaint in this case, alleging that Diehl, Sergeant
Nicol, and other officers lacked probable cause to search and arrest him and violated his
Constitutional rights by doing so. He also alleged state law claims of assault and battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, respondeat superior (against the City), negligence, negligent hiring,
malicious abuse of process, false arrest, and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendants.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Sullivan v. Oregon Ford,
Inc., 559 F.3d 594, 594 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact [such that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A. Heck v. Humphrey.
We are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), from collaterally attacking a
state court conviction. Under Heck, a § 1983 suit is not cognizable if it would necessarily invalidate
a plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff can show the conviction or sentence has been
set aside. Sanders v. Detroit Police Dep’t, Nos. 09-2102, 09-2155, 2012 WL 3140232, at *2 (6th
Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Additionally, “[t]he existence of probable cause
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for an arrest totally precludes any section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or
malicious prosecution . . . .” Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985).
In the underlying state court proceedings, Watson was charged with obstructing official
business, which required finding that he purposely prevented, obstructed, or delayed a public official
while the official was “acting in the performance of a lawful duty . . . .” State v. Watson, No. 14-09-
01, 2009 WL 4894663, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2009). He filed a motion to suppress all
statements taken from him and made by him, as well as all physical evidence relating to the incident,
on the basis that his detention was unlawful. Id. at 3. That motion was denied, as the state court
found reasonable suspicion for Watson’s detention and probable cause for his arrest. Id. Watson
was found guilty of obstructing official business and appealed, specifically challenging his
conviction and the finding of reasonable suspicion for his detention. Id. at * 3, 6. The Ohio Court
of Appeals affirmed, finding reasonable suspicion for Watson’s investigatory detention based upon
his physical characteristics, which closely matched those of the suspect, his abrupt attempted
departure upon sight of Diehl, and his subsequent belligerent demeanor. Id. at *5. It also affirmed
the trial court’s finding that Watson’s conviction was supported by the evidence presented against
him. Id. at *8.
Because the state court found that Watson’s detention was supported by reasonable suspicion,
allowing his unlawful detention claim to proceed would directly contradict the finding below.
Similarly, Watson cannot pursue his unlawful arrest claim because doing so would directly
contradict his conviction for obstruction of official business. If Watson were permitted to proceed
with his unlawful arrest claim, and he ultimately succeeded, his judgment would necessarily imply
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that his conviction for obstruction of official business was premised upon an unlawful arrest. Since
he presented this argument in state court, and it was explicitly rejected, he is barred from pursuing
it via a new cause of action in federal court.
B. Excessive Force.
Watson’s remaining Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force is barred by qualified
immunity. “Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Estate of Carter v. City of
Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
The question presented here is whether it was clearly established in June 2008 that using a
taser on a suspect disobeying repeated orders amounted to excessive force. It is clearly established
that suspects have the right to be free from tasing where they are fully compliant with officers’
orders, not resisting arrest, or immobilized and posing no threat of danger. Hagans v. Franklin Cnty.
Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2012). Although the case at bar does not present facts
which fall neatly into this category, cases of like circumstances have found no clearly established
right of a suspect to be free from tasing where he or she disobeys police orders and may be in
possession of a weapon. See McGee v. City of Cincinnati Police Dep’t, No. 1:06-CV-726, 2007 WL
1169374, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2007).
Watson offers no sustained argument regarding the defense of qualified immunity. He fails
to identify any case factually similar to this one, where a police officer has been denied qualified
immunity on a charge of excessive force, based upon the tasing of a suspect who disregards repeated
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commands and is believed to be armed. Therefore, Diehl and Sergeant Nicol are entitled to qualified
immunity on the excessive force claim.
C. Supervisory and Municipal Liabilities.
To prove a claim for supervisory liability against Police Chief Golden and Assistant Police
Chief Nicol, Watson must show, at a minimum, “that the [supervisors] at least implicitly authorized,
approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460,470 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). To prove his claim of municipal liability against the City, Watson must show that
its failure to train officers on the proper use of tasers “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989). Thus, a prerequisite to both of these claims is that a constitutional violation has occurred.
See Hagans, 695 F.3d at 511 (quoting Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir.
2007) (en banc)) (A municipality “cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate indifference
to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly established.”); McQueen, 433 F.3d
at 470 (“[A] prerequisite of supervisory liability under § 1983 is unconstitutional conduct . . . .”).
Because Watson cannot show either a clearly established right or a violation thereof, his derivative
claims for municipal liability and supervisory liability were also properly dismissed.
D. Civil Conspiracy.
Count V of the complaint alleges Defendants conspired to violate Watson’s civil rights.
Because Watson cannot establish that a violation has occurred, the civil conspiracy claim was
properly dismissed. See Umani v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 432 F. App’x 453, 462 (6th Cir. 2011)
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(“Since we have concluded that [Plaintiff] has failed to allege facts or to provide evidence sufficient
to establish that a . . . violation was committed by the defendants, his conspiracy claims under §
1985(3) also fails.”).
AFFIRMED.
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