NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0613n.06
No. 12-3929
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Jun 28, 2013
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
DONALD JAMES ANSON, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
AMERICA, et al., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: GUY, DAUGHTREY, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Donald James Anson, a pro se federal prisoner proceeding in forma
pauperis, appeals a district court order dismissing his civil complaint that the court
construed as filed pursuant to the doctrine announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This case has been referred
to a panel of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2)(C). Upon
examination, we agree that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking monetary relief, Anson sued the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),
unnamed CCA owners, and “named and unnamed staff” of CCA’s Northeast Ohio
Correctional Center, claiming that the defendants violated his First Amendment right of
access to the courts during his incarceration at the correctional facility from March 2006
No. 12-3929
Anson v. Corrections Corporation of America
through July 2006. Specifically, Anson alleged that he had filed a prior civil complaint,
Anson v. Bailey, No. 1:06 CV 394 (W.D.N.Y. 2009), which the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York purportedly dismissed due to a “filing error.” In his
current complaint, Anson alleged that he would not have made the filing error in the prior
complaint had the defendants’ not denied him reasonable access to the law library by
limiting his use to one hour per week; by failing to provide such materials as federal
reporters, civil rules, and legal dictionaries; and by failing to maintain functioning
computers. Anson filed his current action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania. A magistrate judge there noted that the complaint was
filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and recommended that it be transferred to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, because Anson had not alleged that
the action arose in the Western District of Pennsylvania or that any of the defendants
resided in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The district court adopted the report and
transferred the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
Following the transfer, the district court construed Anson’s complaint as filed
pursuant to Bivens, rather than § 1983, and dismissed it sua sponte, concluding (1) that
Anson could not pursue a Bivens action against the CCA, a private corporation, because
a Bivens complaint is properly brought only against individual federal officers; (2) that the
claim was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations; and (3) that Anson’s prior
lawsuit was not dismissed based on a filing error but on the merits of his claim, making the
current action subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On appeal, Anson argues
-2-
No. 12-3929
Anson v. Corrections Corporation of America
that the district court erred in treating the complaint as a Bivens action, and he contests the
court’s finding that the complaint was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. We need
not reach either question, however, because we agree that the action was properly
dismissed under § 1915(e).
“We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a prisoner’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th
Cir. 2010). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) authorizes dismissal if the action fails to state a plausible
claim for relief or is frivolous. Moreover, “[a] complaint can be frivolous either factually or
legally.” Id. (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (holding that courts may
dismiss a complaint not only when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory”
but also when the “factual contentions [on which it relies] are clearly baseless”)). “Whether
a complaint is factually frivolous . . . is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim
for relief.” Id. at 471. Under § 1915(e), courts may dismiss a complaint not only when it is
“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” but also when the “factual contentions [on
which it relies] are clearly baseless.” Neitze, 490 U.S. at 327.
As noted, Anson claims that the defendants’ denial of access to an adequate law
library resulted in the dismissal of his previous complaint because it caused him to make
unspecified “filing errors.” However, as the district court observed, Anson’s earlier
complaint was not dismissed because of filing errors. Instead, it was dismissed for lack of
-3-
No. 12-3929
Anson v. Corrections Corporation of America
subject-matter jurisdiction and because the court found that Anson had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies.
Because Anson’s assertion that his ability to file a legal claim was hindered by the
CCA is predicated upon a “clearly baseless” factual contention, the complaint is frivolous.
As a result, the district court properly concluded that the complaint must be dismissed
pursuant to § 1915(e).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
-4-