In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13‐3454
FEDELL CAFFEY,
Petitioner‐Appellant,
v.
KIM BUTLER, Warden,
Respondent‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 C 5458 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED OCTOBER 29, 2014 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 22, 2015
____________________
Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. Fedell Caffey is serving a life sen‐
tence in Illinois on triple‐murder and aggravated kidnap‐
ping convictions. Caffey maintains he is innocent. He peti‐
tioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
that his trial and post‐conviction proceedings in state court
were marred by numerous violations of his constitutional
rights. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, thor‐
oughly reviewed the record, and issued a detailed opinion
2 No. 13‐3454
denying Caffey’s petition. We affirm the district court’s deni‐
al of Caffey’s habeas corpus petition.
I. BACKGROUND
On the night of November 16, 1995, Debra Evans was fa‐
tally shot and stabbed in her apartment in Addison, Illinois.
She was nine months pregnant. The assailants cut open her
womb and removed the unborn baby inside, whom Debra
had named Elijah. Debra also had three older children—
Samantha (age 10), Joshua (age 7), and Jordan (age 2). Sa‐
mantha was killed in the apartment along with her mother.
Elijah and Joshua were taken from the scene. Two‐year‐old
Jordan was left behind, alive, with his dead mother and sis‐
ter. The next day, police found Joshua’s lifeless body in an
alley in Maywood, Illinois.
Police arrested Debra’s former boyfriend Laverne Ward,
who was the father of Jordan and Elijah—the only children
who survived. Police also arrested Ward’s cousin Jacqueline
Annette Williams and her live‐in boyfriend Fedell Caffey, the
defendant‐petitioner in this case. A grand jury indicted
Ward, Williams, and Caffey on multiple counts of first‐
degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. Each defendant
was tried separately.
In 1999, a jury found Caffey guilty of the first‐degree
murder of Debra, Samantha, and Joshua, as well as the ag‐
gravated kidnapping of Joshua. Caffey received a sentence
of death on the murder convictions and a consecutive thirty‐
year prison term on the aggravated kidnapping conviction.
In 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted Caffey’s
death sentence to life without parole.
No. 13‐3454 3
Caffey claims in this appeal that his trial was fundamen‐
tally unfair because certain evidence was excluded or other‐
wise not presented to the jury. In order to assess his claims,
we first have to take stock of the evidence that was present‐
ed—a lengthy endeavor given the voluminous trial record.
In doing so, we walk on well‐trodden ground: the state court
decisions under review and the district court decision below
already provide detailed summaries of the evidence. We as‐
sume familiarity with those opinions and highlight only the
most relevant facts here. We presume that the state courts’
account of the facts is accurate, unless the petitioner rebuts
this presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Etherly v. Davis, 619 F.3d 654, 660
(7th Cir. 2010).
A. The Case against Caffey
The State’s theory at trial was that Williams faked a preg‐
nancy with Caffey’s knowledge, and that Williams, Caffey,
and Ward planned to kill Debra Evans, steal her unborn
child, and pass the child off as Williams and Caffey’s. Wil‐
liams and Caffey were unable to conceive their own child
naturally because Williams had had tubal ligation years ear‐
lier in connection with a caesarian birth. And Ward was
driven to act, according to the State, because he was angry at
Debra for preventing him from seeing his son Jordan.
The State’s evidence at trial tended to show the following.
James Edwards, who lived with Debra and her children in
Addison, left for work around 5:30 p.m. on November 16.
When he returned at 2:30 a.m. the next morning, two‐year‐
old Jordan greeted him at the door. Edwards found Debra’s
and Samantha’s bodies and immediately called 911. Several
4 No. 13‐3454
items were missing from the apartment, including Edwards’s
Grambling State University Tigers Starter jacket.
1. The Testimony of Scott and Pruitt
Williams’s friend Patrice Scott and her boyfriend Dwight
Pruitt testified that Williams showed up at their apartment
in Villa Park, Illinois, around 1 a.m. on November 17 accom‐
panied by a young boy, who turned out to be Joshua Evans.
Williams was wearing a Starter jacket and a white sweater
spotted with blood. Joshua was wearing a T‐shirt, coat, and
boots, but no pants or socks. Scott noticed a gray car parked
outside. Williams told Scott that the boy’s mother had been
shot and asked whether he could spend the night at Scott
and Pruitt’s home. Scott agreed. Williams said she would
pick Joshua up in the morning. She also claimed to have just
given birth to a baby. (A month earlier, she had told Scott she
was pregnant.)
Scott heard Joshua crying during the night. Joshua was
still crying in the early morning, when he told Scott that he
needed to go home because his younger brother Jordan was
there alone, and because Edwards would not know where he
(Joshua) was. Joshua explained that four burglars had en‐
tered his home and cut his mother and sister. Scott asked
who they were, and Joshua answered: “Annette, Levern, and
Fedell,” and someone Joshua called “Boo Boo.” Joshua re‐
peated this statement more than three times. He explained
that he was hiding but came out as the burglars left, ran out‐
side, and then bumped into Williams.
Pruitt overheard Joshua’s comments from the bedroom,
where Pruitt was watching television with the volume low‐
ered. He testified that Joshua said: “Annette”; “Vern”; a
No. 13‐3454 5
name that sounded like “Vedelle”, “Adelle”, or “Ladelle”;
and a fourth name Pruitt could not make out.
Around 9 a.m. on November 17, Williams returned, driv‐
ing the same gray car that Scott had seen the night before.
Scott told Williams what Joshua had said. Williams became
angry, cursed at Joshua, and accused him of lying. Joshua
insisted he was telling the truth. Williams told Joshua to take
his medicine, but he said he did not take any medicine. Wil‐
liams led him to the kitchen; the boy soon emerged gagging,
went to the bathroom, and vomited. Police later found an
empty iodine bottle in the kitchen garbage can.
Williams asked Scott to accompany her to the townhouse
where Williams and Caffey lived in Schaumburg, Illinois.
Williams explained that she wanted to check on her new‐
born baby, and that she also had some gifts for Scott’s infant
daughter Alexis. Scott agreed to go along. She, Williams, and
Joshua left the apartment. Scott asked Pruitt to watch Alexis,
but he refused, so Scott brought Alexis with her.
While they were gone, Pruitt saw a television report on
the Evans murders and recognized Joshua’s picture. Pruitt
left the apartment looking for a telephone but could not find
one that worked. Unsuccessful, he returned home.
When Scott arrived at Williams and Caffey’s home, she
went upstairs with Williams while Joshua watched Alexis in
the living room. Scott testified that she saw Caffey lying on a
bed with a “really pale” baby who had “tape across his na‐
vel.” Scott went back downstairs to feed Alexis. Later, Wil‐
liams called Scott down to the lower level, where the garage
and laundry room were located. Williams asked Scott to
bring Joshua downstairs, which she did.
6 No. 13‐3454
Waiting in the lower‐level laundry room were Caffey,
Williams, and an unidentified man, who soon left. Scott testi‐
fied that she heard Caffey ask Williams why she had not
taken Joshua “to the projects” as he instructed. Williams ex‐
plained that Joshua “talked too much” and knew their
names. Caffey and Williams then began to strangle Joshua
with a white cord. Scott screamed and pushed Williams,
forcing her to release her end of the cord. Williams left and
returned with a knife. Scott screamed again and asked Wil‐
liams to take them home. Scott took Joshua upstairs and
tried to leave, but the door was locked. Scott went back
down to the laundry room with Joshua and Alexis. Caffey
warned Scott not to say anything or else he would “get me
and my daughters.”
Caffey then instructed Williams to take Scott home. They
all went to the garage and got into the gray car. Scott was in
the front passenger seat with Alexis. Joshua was behind her
in the back seat, and Caffey was sitting next to him. Williams
was standing along the driver’s side and appeared to be
holding Joshua. Scott testified that she saw Caffey repeated‐
ly stab Joshua, causing him to gasp and kick the front seat.
Williams then climbed into the driver’s seat and drove to
Maywood, where she and Caffey took Joshua out of the car,
took him to the back of a building, and then returned with‐
out him. Williams left Caffey in Maywood and took Scott
back to her apartment. They arrived around 12:15 p.m. At
Williams’s request, Scott gave her cleaning supplies.
Pruitt observed that Scott seemed to be “trying to get rid
of [Williams].” Pruitt told Scott to lock the door while he
went to call the police. On his way out, he saw Williams
cleaning her car. Pruitt called the police from a nearby hair
No. 13‐3454 7
salon. Scott subsequently led them to the location in May‐
wood where Williams and Caffey had taken Joshua. Police
recovered Joshua’s dead body in a nearby alley. They then
drove to Williams and Caffey’s home and arrested them. At
the time of arrest, Williams was carrying Elijah, who had a
bloody piece of gauze taped over his navel. Caffey was
wearing Edwards’s Starter jacket, which had blood stains on
the right cuff.
2. Physical and Forensic Evidence
The State presented the following physical and forensic
evidence. In the Evans apartment, investigators found Wil‐
liams’s bloody fingerprint on a piece of paper. On the side‐
walk in front of the apartment, they found a pair of poultry
shears covered with Samantha’s blood. Police did not find
Caffey’s fingerprints or DNA in the Evans apartment.
Police searched Williams and Caffey’s house. In a gar‐
bage bag in the garage, they found a white coaxial cable with
Joshua’s blood on it; Scott identified it as the cable used to
strangle Joshua. In the dishwasher, police recovered a butch‐
er knife, which Scott identified as the knife that Caffey used
to stab Joshua. On the kitchen counter were two counterfeit
birth certificates stating that Williams gave birth to a baby,
fathered by Caffey, on November 16, 1995. The certificates
had been prepared on a typewriter belonging to a woman
named Vikki Iacullo. In Williams and Caffey’s closet, police
found a bedsheet and pillowcase that matched the blood‐
stained sheet discovered seven blocks from Joshua’s body.
(The blood was Joshua’s.) On the backseat carpet in Williams
and Caffey’s car, police found Joshua’s blood, which had
been treated with cleaner.
8 No. 13‐3454
Iacullo and Dorothy Hale later directed police to a lake in
Wheaton, where they found the gun used to shoot Debra
Evans. Iacullo invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege and
refused to testify. She was later charged with obstruction of
justice.
Several doctors testified about the forensic evidence. Ac‐
cording to them, the main cause of Debra Evans’s death was
a gunshot wound to the head. She also had multiple stab
wounds, including a thirteen‐inch jagged incision across her
abdomen consistent with poultry shears. Based on blood
spatters around Debra’s body and the fact that her baby (Eli‐
jah) survived, Debra’s obstetrician opined that she was still
alive when Elijah was cut from her womb. The doctor
opined further that two or three sets of hands would have
been necessary to perform such a procedure.
Samantha had defensive wounds on her arms and inci‐
sions on her neck, which were also consistent with poultry
shears. Joshua’s neck bore ligature marks consistent with
strangulation and stab wounds consistent with a butcher
knife. Joshua’s right lung was aspirated, meaning he inhaled
his own vomit, causing damage consistent with the ingestion
of iodine. His wounds and the lack of defensive marks sug‐
gested that he may have been restrained.
3. Other Witnesses’ Testimony
Other witnesses provided additional details about the de‐
fendants’ activities leading up to and on the night of the
murders. Dawn Killeen knew Williams and Caffey because
she was their neighbor, and because her husband dealt
drugs with Caffey and Ward. Killeen testified that she went
to Williams and Caffey’s house in May 1995 to borrow a
No. 13‐3454 9
vacuum cleaner. Ward stormed in “yelling and screaming
that Debbie [Evans] wasn’t allowing him to see Jordan.”
Ward “said he was tired of her shit and he wanted to … . kill
the bitch.” He punched a hole in the wall. Caffey asked
Ward whether he wanted a gun or a knife. Vikki Iacullo was
also there. Killeen overheard them talking about a baby.
Williams’s cousin John Pettaway saw Williams, Caffey,
and Ward together on the day of the murders. Pettaway and
Ward were together that afternoon, smoking crack cocaine
and driving around Wheaton. They twice encountered
Caffey and Williams, and on each occasion Ward got out of
the car to speak with them for 15 minutes or so. Ward told
Pettaway several times that he (Ward) needed to find Caffey.
Kassandra Turner, Williams’s friend, testified that Caffey
called her on the evening of November 16 to tell her that he
and Williams were going to have the baby. Williams had told
Turner months earlier that she was pregnant. The following
day, Caffey reported to Turner that Williams had given birth
to a “real light skinned” baby boy.
Jacci Sullivan and Tennie Clay lived in Evans’s apartment
complex. Sullivan testified that she heard a shot between
8:30 and 9:30 p.m. on November 16. Clay said she heard
voices outside around 9:15 p.m., looked out her window, and
saw four people talking on a sidewalk. She believed three
were African‐American and the other was a light‐skinned
Hispanic. One of them was wearing a dark Starter jacket.
Joy Wilson, age 15, and her aunt Tiffany Wilson, age 16,
were babysitting at Tiffany’s house on the night of Novem‐
ber 16. Tiffany was Ward’s and Williams’s cousin. Joy and
Tiffany testified that Ward entered the house that night car‐
10 No. 13‐3454
rying a plastic bag stuffed full of what looked like clothing.
Joy said she noticed a hole in Ward’s pants and blood on his
clothes. Ward went to the bathroom and emerged wearing
different clothes; the grocery bag appeared fuller. Joy was
frightened by the family dog and ran outside. There, she saw
a gray car with three people inside: two men in the front and
a woman in the back. She later identified two of them as
Caffey and Williams. They were honking and calling for
Ward. Ward got in the car and they drove off.
Mohammid Siddiqui, a clerk at 7‐Eleven in Schaumburg,
testified that Caffey and a woman matching Williams’s de‐
scription entered his store on November 17 between 1:30 and
2:00 in the morning. Caffey bought baby wipes and candy.
The store register recorded a sale at 1:49 a.m. for one item at
$1.99, which is the cost of baby wipes, and one item at $0.99.
Williams called her sister, Tina Martin, around 3:30 a.m.
on November 17 and told her the baby had arrived. Tina and
her mother drove to Iacullo’s house, where they saw Wil‐
liams, Iacullo, Caffey, and the baby. The baby’s complexion
was so light that neither Martin nor her mother believed it
really was Williams and Caffey’s. Tina and her mother left
after just a few minutes.
B. Caffey’s Defense
Caffey maintained (and still maintains) his innocence.
The defense’s theory of the case was that Williams was pos‐
sessive and jealous, so she planned to trap Caffey by faking a
pregnancy, stealing Elijah Evans, and then passing him off as
their child. Williams allegedly conspired with Ward and
Iacullo to pull off her plan.
No. 13‐3454 11
The defense introduced evidence of Williams’s jealousy.
She had good reason to be jealous: Caffey began dating Wil‐
liams in 1994 but continued to have sexual relationships
with other women, including his former girlfriend, Katrina
Montgomery, with whom he had a child. Williams did not
like Caffey’s relationship with Katrina, and the two women
had physical and verbal altercations from 1994 through 1995.
Williams also had a history of feigning pregnancies, accord‐
ing to Caffey and another witness.
In February 1995, Williams told Caffey she was pregnant.
Caffey testified that he did not know about Williams’s tubal
ligation or her inability to conceive any more children. Wil‐
liams first told him the baby was due in August but then
changed the date to mid‐October. When that date passed,
Caffey stopped believing she was pregnant.
Caffey testified that he was at home in Schaumburg with
Williams’s children on the night of the murders. Williams
went out around 7:15 p.m. on November 16. Shortly after
that, Joyce Hotz came over and bought drugs from Caffey.
Then Caffey watched New York Undercover with Williams’s
daughter Christina from 8 until 9 p.m., when the girl went to
bed. At 1:30 a.m., Williams still had not come home. Caffey
grew worried and went to the nearby 7‐Eleven to use a pay
phone. He called Martin and asked her to page Williams.
Caffey denied buying baby wipes at that time.
Caffey admitted calling Turner earlier that evening but
denied telling her that he and Williams were going to have a
baby. According to Caffey, Turner had bought drugs from
him the previous day, and he was calling to inform her that
her check had bounced. Caffey also admitted to meeting
12 No. 13‐3454
with Ward earlier in the day, but only to sell drugs—not to
plan any murders.
Caffey testified that he saw Iacullo’s car pull into his
driveway around 2:30 a.m. Caffey went outside and saw
Williams in the car with a baby. Back inside the house,
Iacullo explained that Williams had gone into labor at
Iacullo’s house. They went to a hospital, where Williams
gave birth, but they had to leave because Williams did not
have insurance. Caffey was initially skeptical of their story
but seeing the baby’s umbilical cord bleeding somehow con‐
vinced him it was true. They all went to Iacullo’s house to get
Williams’s car. While there, Williams called Martin and gave
her the news.
Caffey testified that he and Williams then left Iacullo’s
house and returned to the 7‐Eleven a little before 5 a.m. It
was at that time, according to Caffey, that he bought baby
wipes. The store register recorded a purchase of an item for
$1.99, the cost of baby wipes, at 4:49 a.m. They returned
home, and Caffey fell asleep next to the baby. He stayed
there most of the day. That night, Caffey, Williams, and the
baby went to Iacullo’s house, where Iacullo gave Caffey a
Grambling Starter jacket as a “Daddy’s Day present.” When
Williams and Caffey returned home, they were arrested.
In addition to presenting Caffey’s version of events, the
defense attacked the credibility of the State’s witnesses and
drew out inconsistencies in their testimony. Patrice Scott
admitted on cross‐examination that she did not contact the
police, despite Joshua’s naming of the four burglars, Wil‐
liams’s administration of Joshua’s “medicine,” and other
suspicious behavior. Moreover, Scott did not tell any of the
investigating officers who initially interviewed her that
No. 13‐3454 13
Joshua had named Caffey as one of the burglars. Scott ex‐
plained that she was afraid to name Caffey because he had
threatened to hurt her and her family.
Pruitt admitted that he was serving a prison sentence for
a weapons charge, was a gang member, and had prior con‐
victions. He conceded that he did not initially call the police.
And when he did eventually call the police, he did not tell
them about the names Joshua had mentioned. Nor did he
report that information to the investigating officers who ini‐
tially interviewed him. Pruitt explained, however, that he
was not formally interviewed on those occasions.
The defense theorized that Pruitt and Scott were falsely
implicating Caffey in the murders, perhaps to minimize their
own culpability. Another possible reason was that Scott
feared Bo Wilson, who may have been the fourth burglar, the
one Joshua called “Boo Boo.” Wilson may also have been the
unidentified man who was in the laundry room at Williams
and Caffey’s house. Scott denied that the man was Wilson.
But a detective testified that about a month‐and‐a‐half later,
Scott told him Wilson was the man in the laundry room.
The defense elicited testimony to impeach other witness‐
es too. For example, Kassandra Turner, who testified that
Caffey called her on November 16 to say that he and Wil‐
liams were going to have a baby, did not relay that infor‐
mation to police until more than two months after the
crimes. Joy Wilson did not initially tell police that she had
seen any specific people in the gray car outside Tiffany’s
house. And Mohammid Siddiqui, the 7‐Eleven clerk, recalled
seeing Caffey in the store only after police showed him a
photograph.
14 No. 13‐3454
Finally, the defense called witnesses whose testimony
tended to show that Iacullo supplied the gun for the mur‐
ders and disposed of it afterward by throwing it in a pond.
She burned several documents in one witness’s kitchen but
saved a birth certificate with Caffey’s name on it. The wit‐
nesses also implicated Dorothy Hale in these acts.
After deliberating, the jury found Caffey guilty of the
first‐degree murder of Evans, Samantha, and Joshua, as well
as the aggravated kidnapping of Joshua.
C. Post‐Conviction Procedural History
In February 2000, Caffey appealed his conviction and
sentence to the Illinois Supreme Court. He raised numerous
arguments, including that: (1) the trial court improperly ex‐
cluded hearsay statements made by Ward, Williams, and
Iacullo, and thereby deprived Caffey of the ability to mount
an effective defense; (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to introduce statements by Iacullo and
Hale that the trial court had ruled admissible; and (3) the tri‐
al court improperly admitted Joshua’s hearsay statements
naming Caffey as one of the assailants. The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a detailed opin‐
ion. People v. Caffey, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. 2001) (“Caffey I”).
The U.S. Supreme Court denied Caffey’s petition for a writ
of certiorari. Caffey v. Illinois, 536 U.S. 944 (2002).
In April 2000, while his direct appeal was pending,
Caffey filed a petition for post‐conviction relief in the Circuit
Court of DuPage County. Because Caffey was under a sen‐
tence of death, the court appointed counsel to represent him
in the post‐conviction proceedings. The case was then re‐
peatedly continued. Meanwhile, Caffey served subpoenas,
No. 13‐3454 15
deposed Pruitt, and gathered other evidence. In 2004, Caffey
amended his post‐conviction petition. He alleged, among
other things, that the State violated its obligations under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose
that: (1) Pruitt received special benefits because he knew
about drug sales to one of the prosecuting attorneys, Assis‐
tant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) Jeffrey Kendall; (2) ASA Thom‐
as Epach interceded to prevent Cook County from prosecut‐
ing Scott for Joshua’s murder; and (3) Cara Walker told po‐
lice that Iacullo sold drugs to Kendall and said that she
would reveal this information if charged for the Evans mur‐
ders. The trial court dismissed Caffey’s petition for post‐
conviction relief. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, Peo‐
ple v. Caffey, No. 2–05–0787, slip op. (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 7,
2008) (“Caffey II”), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied
Caffey’s petition for leave to appeal, People v. Caffey, 897
N.E.2d 256 (Ill. 2008).
In September 2009, Caffey filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Northern District of Illinois. He re‐
newed the arguments enumerated above from his direct ap‐
peal and his post‐conviction petition in Illinois. The district
court granted an evidentiary hearing to further develop the
factual basis for Caffey’s Brady claims relating to Scott and
Iacullo. Caffey v. Atchison, No. 09 C 5458, 2012 WL 5230298
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2012) (“Caffey III”). After discovery, Caffey
dropped the Brady claim concerning Scott, leaving only the
claims concerning Pruitt and Iacullo.
On October 7, 2013, the district court denied Caffey’s ha‐
beas petition on the merits. Caffey v. Harrington, No. 09 C
5458, 2013 WL 5529760 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2013) (“Caffey IV”).
The court acknowledged, however, that its ruling was “fairly
16 No. 13‐3454
debatable,” so it granted a certificate of appealability. Id. at
*34.
This appeal followed. Caffey renews all of his arguments
below, except for the portion of his ineffective‐assistance
claim concerning Dorothy Hale and his challenge to the ad‐
mission of Joshua Evans’s hearsay statements.
II. ANALYSIS
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas
corpus petition. Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir.
2010). A state prisoner is entitled to seek habeas relief on the
ground that he is being held in violation of federal law or the
U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). But if a state court has
already adjudicated the petitioner’s claim on the merits, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)
precludes habeas relief unless the state court’s decision “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su‐
preme Court of the United States” or “was based on an un‐
reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“Clearly established Federal law” refers to the holdings
of the Supreme Court that existed at the time of the relevant
state court adjudication on the merits. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.
Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A
decision is “contrary to” federal law if the state court applied
an incorrect rule—i.e., one that “contradicts the governing
law” established by the Supreme Court—or reached an out‐
come different from the Supreme Court’s conclusion in a
case with “materially indistinguishable” facts. Williams, 529
U.S. at 405–06. A state court unreasonably applies federal
No. 13‐3454 17
law when it “identifies the appropriate standard but applies
it to the facts in a manner with which a reasonable court
would disagree.” Etherly v. Davis, 619 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, and Williams v. Thur‐
mer, 561 F.3d 740, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). Mere
error is not enough to overcome AEDPA deference; instead,
the state court’s decision must be objectively unreasonable,
Etherly, 619 F.3d at 660, meaning it is “beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement,” Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d
838, 844 (2012) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103
(2011)).
Where a state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal
law, or where no state court adjudicated the particular claim
on the merits in the first place, AEDPA deference does not
apply. See Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014);
Mosley, 689 F.3d at 844. In that event, we review the petition‐
er’s claim under the pre‐AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243
and dispose of the matter “as law and justice require,” which
is essentially de novo review. Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d
660, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d
588, 599 (7th Cir. 2011)).
With those principles in mind, we turn to the issues on
appeal.
A. Exclusion of Hearsay Statements
Caffey contends, first, that the trial court improperly ex‐
cluded several hearsay statements by Iacullo, Ward, and Wil‐
liams. According to Caffey, the Constitution guaranteed him
the right to present those statements to the jury. We disagree.
18 No. 13‐3454
1. The Right to Present a Defense
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right, ground‐
ed in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to “a meaning‐
ful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Ken‐
tucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). That includes the right to present relevant
evidence. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). Of
course, that right is not unfettered but is instead subject to
the states’ “broad latitude … to establish rules excluding ev‐
idence from criminal trials.” Id. In some instances, however,
strict application of a state evidentiary rule must yield to the
defendant’s constitutional rights.
The leading example is Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973), where the Supreme Court vindicated a defend‐
ant’s right to present reliable, critical evidence that would
otherwise have been excluded by a state hearsay rule. Leon
Chambers was convicted of murdering a police officer dur‐
ing a melee in a local bar. One witness testified that he saw
Chambers shoot the officer. 410 U.S. at 286. But another man
named McDonald had confessed to the murder on several
occasions, including in a sworn statement to Chambers’s
counsel. McDonald was arrested but later repudiated his
confession. Id. at 287–88.
Chambers called McDonald as a witness at trial. The
court admitted McDonald’s written confession into evidence,
but McDonald again repudiated it. The court prevented
Chambers from cross‐examining McDonald and challenging
his repudiation based on the common‐law “voucher rule”
that a party may not impeach his own witness. Id. at 295.
Chambers then sought to introduce the testimony of three
witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted he was the
No. 13‐3454 19
shooter. The trial court excluded their testimony as hearsay.
Id. at 298.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. It held
that the prohibition on cross‐examination of McDonald plus
the exclusion of his hearsay confessions violated Chambers’s
constitutional right to present a defense. Id. at 302. The con‐
fessions, although hearsay, bore “considerable assurance of
their reliability.” Id. at 300. Specifically, the statements were:
(1) made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after
the shooting; (2) corroborated by other evidence, including
McDonald’s written confession and the testimony of an
eyewitness; and (3) “self‐incriminatory and unquestionably
against interest,” which made the statements more reliable
and brought them “well within the basic rationale of the
[hearsay] exception for declarations against interest.” Id. at
300–02. Moreover, (4) McDonald was present in the court‐
room and under oath, so he could have been cross‐examined
by the prosecution. Id. at 301. The Court emphasized that
this final factor “significantly distinguish[ed]” Chambers
from cases where the declarant was unavailable at trial. Id.
The Court also found that the excluded testimony was
“critical to Chambers’ defense.” Id. at 302. The proof at trial
excluded the possibility that there was more than one shoot‐
er, so McDonald’s incriminating confession also tended to
exculpate Chambers. Id. at 297. In these circumstances, the
Court held, “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanis‐
tically to defeat the ends of justice.” Id. at 302.
Chambers is one case in a line of Supreme Court decisions
considering constitutional challenges to state evidentiary
rules. Sometimes the rule has had to yield. See, e.g., Washing‐
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (rejecting rule that accom‐
20 No. 13‐3454
plices may testify for prosecution but not for defense); Green
v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam) (rejecting exclu‐
sion of hearsay confession); see also Kubsch v. Neal, No. 14‐
1898, 2015 WL 4747942, *10 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 2015) (collect‐
ing cases). But those instances are “rare[].” Nevada v. Jackson,
133 S.Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (per curiam).
The general standard is that rules of evidence restricting
the ability to present a defense cannot be “arbitrary” or
“disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. The exclusion of hearsay
transgresses that standard only where the excluded state‐
ments: (1) bear “considerable assurance of their reliability,”
sufficient to compensate for not being subject to cross‐
examination or given under oath; and (2) are “critical” to the
defense. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299–300, 302.
The Chambers Court identified four factors to help assess
reliability, although that list is not exhaustive. Sharlow v. Isra‐
el, 767 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1985). We already discussed
those four factors above. The Court also clarified what it
means by “critical” evidence in United States v. Valenzuela‐
Bernal: evidence is critical if it is “favorable and material,” in
the sense that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the tes‐
timony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.”
458 U.S. 858, 872–74 (1982); see also Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 1264
(stating that exclusion of evidence is unconstitutional “only
where is has infringed upon a weighty interest of the ac‐
cused”); Green, 442 U.S. at 97 (finding constitutional viola‐
tion where excluded hearsay was “highly relevant to a criti‐
cal issue”); Washington, 388 U.S. at 16 (finding violation
where evidentiary rule excluded testimony that was “rele‐
vant,” “material,” and “vital” to defense); Sharlow, 767 F.2d
No. 13‐3454 21
at 377–78 (recognizing that Valenzuela‐Bernal standard de‐
fines “critical” for purposes of Chambers analysis). The
Chambers “critical” standard is thus the same as the material‐
ity requirement employed in the Brady line of cases, as we
recognized in Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 627–28 (7th
Cir. 2012).
Deciding whether excluded hearsay is sufficiently relia‐
ble and material to trigger a Chambers violation in a given
case is a fact‐intensive inquiry. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.
37, 52 (1996) (reading Chambers as “an exercise in highly
case‐specific error correction”). It requires balancing the
state’s legitimate interests against the hearsay statement’s
trustworthiness and importance to the defendant See Shar‐
low, 767 F.2d at 377 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302).
2. Iacullo’s Statements to the Police
After the police arrested Williams and Caffey, they ques‐
tioned Vikki Iacullo on November 18, 1995, and several
times thereafter. Iacullo gave the following account to the
police: Williams arrived at Iacullo’s house early on Novem‐
ber 17 with a baby. The baby’s umbilical cord was bleeding,
so Iacullo supplied gauze and tape. Williams had a cut on
her hand and blood on her shirt. Iacullo drove Williams
home and, once there, presented the baby to Caffey, saying,
“Surprise, Baby Fedell Jr.” Williams gave Iacullo Edwards’s
Grambling Tigers Starter jacket and told her to present it to
Caffey as a “new daddy present,” which Iacullo did. Also, at
Williams’s behest, Iacullo prepared a false birth certificate
and gave it to Williams outside of Caffey’s presence. See
Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1192.
22 No. 13‐3454
The State charged Iacullo with obstruction of justice for
her role in these crimes. She invoked the Fifth Amendment
and refused to testify on Caffey’s behalf. Defense counsel
then sought to introduce Iacullo’s out‐of‐court statements to
the police, but the trial court excluded them as inadmissible
hearsay under Illinois law.
On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
their exclusion. Id. at 1198. The court acknowledged that
state hearsay rules must sometimes yield to a defendant’s
constitutional right to present a defense under Chambers. But
the court found that Iacullo’s hearsay statements lacked suf‐
ficient indicia of reliability: three of the four reliability fac‐
tors identified in Chambers were missing. Id. at 1192–95. In
particular, the court found that Iacullo’s statements were not
self‐incriminating because “[t]here is no crime in: allowing
into one’s home a friend who claims to have just given birth;
helping to bandage a baby; driving that friend to her home
and presenting the baby to the alleged father; or giving
someone a jacket.” Id. at 1194. The court did find the state‐
ment regarding the false birth certificate to be “somewhat
self‐incriminating” but insufficient to satisfy Chambers. Id.
The district court below disagreed. It concluded that the
Illinois Supreme Court unreasonably applied Chambers and
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), which teaches
that “whether a statement is self‐inculpatory or not can only
be determined by viewing it in context.” Caffey IV, 2013 WL
5529760, at *17–18. The district court therefore assessed the
issue de novo and concluded that Iacullo’s statements “bore
considerable assurances of trustworthiness when assessed in
the way that Williamson requires.” Id. Nevertheless, the dis‐
trict court found the statements immaterial because there
No. 13‐3454 23
was no reasonable likelihood that they could have affected
the jury’s verdict. Id. at *18–19. Therefore, the district court
ultimately found no Chambers violation. Id. at *19.
a) Reliability
Unlike the district court, we think the Illinois Supreme
Court reasonably applied Chambers in finding the excluded
statements unreliable, although it is close question. We con‐
sider the four Chambers factors in turn. The first was missing:
these were not spontaneous statements to a close acquaint‐
ance, but rather answers given during interrogation by the
police.
The second factor, corroboration, was present. Caffey tes‐
tified that he first encountered the baby when Iacullo pre‐
sented it to him at 2:30 a.m., and that Iacullo gave him the
Starter jacket as a gift. This is some corroboration of Iacullo’s
statements but not much. Compare Chambers, where there
was a sworn confession, eyewitness testimony, and other ev‐
idence to corroborate McDonald’s three hearsay confessions.
410 U.S. at 300. See also Kubsch, 2015 WL 4747942, at *13
(holding that exclusion of hearsay was constitutional where,
among other reasons, there was only “minimal corrobora‐
tion” for excluded statement).
The third factor—whether Iacullo’s statements were self‐
incriminating—is disputed. We agree with the district court
that Iacullo’s statements were at least somewhat against her
penal interest. There was evidence linking Iacullo to the
murders—e.g., showing that she provided and then disposed
of the gun used to kill Debra Evans. The police had already
arrested Williams and Caffey, and by the time they were
questioning Iacullo, it was apparent they suspected she too
24 No. 13‐3454
was involved. Viewed in this context, Iacullo’s statements
that she presented the baby to Caffey and gave him the jack‐
et tend somewhat to implicate her, at least in the kidnapping
of Elijah Evans, if not in the larger conspiracy.
On the other hand, the statements did not implicate
Iacullo in the murders themselves; in that way, they are con‐
siderably less self‐incriminating than the confessions at issue
in Chambers. See 410 U.S. at 300–01. Moreover, Iacullo was in
custody when she made the statements and likely knew she
was a suspect. She may therefore have had a motive to falsi‐
fy or embellish her testimony to curry favor or gain leverage
with the police. Her statements could also be interpreted as a
form of damage‐control, a way of downplaying her actual
role in the crimes, which may have been greater, by admit‐
ting to a lesser role. Caffey argues that if Iacullo had really
wanted to gain leverage she would have implicated him in
the crimes to take the heat off herself. Not necessarily. Per‐
haps, for example, Iacullo did not want to turn Caffey
against her for fear that he would reveal information about
her involvement. The fact that she did not implicate him
does not bolster the veracity of Iacullo’s statements.
Turning to the fourth factor, it is undisputed that Iacullo,
having invoked the Fifth Amendment, was unavailable for
cross‐examination at Caffey’s trial. “The availability of cross‐
examination was … central to Chambers.” Kubsch, 2015 WL
4747942, at *14. But here, that “powerful assurance of relia‐
bility,” id., was missing.
In these circumstances, we think it is a close question
whether Iacullo’s hearsay statements were sufficiently relia‐
ble to trigger a Chambers violation. But for that very reason,
No. 13‐3454 25
we cannot say that the state court’s conclusion on this point
was objectively unreasonable.
b) Materiality
Additionally, we agree with the district court that
Iacullo’s statements were not sufficiently material to Caffey’s
defense to trigger a Chambers violation. Because the state su‐
preme court rested its holding on its finding of unreliability,
it did not consider the statements’ materiality. We therefore
review that issue de novo.
As a threshold matter, Caffey contends that he does not
have to show that Iacullo’s statements were material, but only
that their exclusion had a “substantial and injurious effect”
on the jury’s verdict. Federal courts generally employ the lat‐
ter standard, taken from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993), to determine whether a constitutional error is harm‐
less or prejudicial in habeas corpus cases under § 2254. Fry v.
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121–221 (2007). The materiality require‐
ment of Chambers, however, is not the same as harmless‐
error analysis. Caffey’s argument wrongly substitutes the
latter for the former. Chambers materiality sets a higher bar
than Brecht: Caffey must show a reasonable likelihood that
the excluded evidence could have affected the verdict. Valen‐
zuela‐Bernal, 458 U.S. at 874.1
1 That is why “Chambers error is by nature prejudicial.” Fry, 551 U.S. at
124 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). An eviden‐
tiary ruling that unconstitutionally excludes critical evidence under
Chambers is necessarily harmful under Brecht. Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 435–36 (1995) (making the same observation about Bagley error).
26 No. 13‐3454
Caffey contends that Iacullo’s statements constituted the
only corroboration for his version events. It is true that her
statements, if accepted by the jury, would have supported
his explanation of why he was wearing the blood‐stained
Starter jacket taken from the Evans apartment on the night of
the murders—which was one important piece of physical
evidence against him. Iacullo’s statements also would have
corroborated Caffey’s story that Williams and Iacullo pre‐
sented the baby to him at 2:30 a.m., which would tend to
support Caffey’s claim that he did not know about the baby
before then.
Iacullo’s statements would not, however, have corrobo‐
rated the rest of Caffey’s story. Nor, crucially, would they
have undermined the other powerful evidence against him,
including:
Patrice Scott and Dwight Pruitt’s testimony that
Joshua identified Caffey as one of the burglars who
cut his mother and sister;
Scott’s eyewitness testimony that Caffey strangled
and stabbed Joshua, then took him to the alley in
Maywood where his body was eventually found;
The testimony of the 7‐Eleven clerk that Caffey and
Williams entered his store around 1:30 a.m. and
bought baby wipes—an hour before Caffey claims
he even knew about the baby’s arrival;
Dawn Killeen’s testimony that months before the
murders she heard Caffey (perhaps in jest) ask
Ward whether he wanted a gun or a knife to kill
Debra Evans, and then overhead Caffey, Williams,
Ward, and Iacullo talking about a baby;
No. 13‐3454 27
John Pettaway’s testimony that he saw Caffey with
Williams and Ward on the day of the murders, and
that Ward said he needed to find Caffey;
Kassandra Turner’s testimony that Caffey called
her on the evening of the murders to say that the
baby was on its way;
Tennie Clay’s sighting of a light‐skinned individual
matching Caffey’s complexion with three other Af‐
rican‐Americans, one of whom had a Starter jacket,
on the sidewalk outside the Evans apartment on
the night of the murders;
Joy Wilson’s testimony that she saw Caffey in the
gray car with Williams and Ward, who had blood
on his clothes, on the night of the murders; and
The implausibility of certain parts of Caffey’s tes‐
timony—for example, his claim that he did not
know about Williams’s tubal ligation despite dating
her for roughly a year, and his claim that he be‐
lieved Elijah was his child despite his initial skepti‐
cism and even though others who saw the baby
thought he was too light‐skinned to belong to Wil‐
liams and Caffey.
Caffey points to weaknesses in the State’s case—e.g., prior
inconsistent statements by witnesses, possible biases, and
motives they may have had to lie. In particular, neither Scott
nor Pruitt told the officers who originally questioned them
that Joshua had identified Caffey as one of the assailants.
The problem with Caffey’s argument is that the jury heard
all of this impeachment evidence yet still found Caffey guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Caffey does not claim that the
28 No. 13‐3454
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Moreo‐
ver, he has given us no reason to think that the admission of
Iacullo’s excluded hearsay statements would have changed
the jury’s evaluation of the evidence or the witnesses, or that
it might have tipped the balance in Caffey’s favor. In short,
there is no reasonable probability that the excluded state‐
ments would have altered the outcome of Caffey’s trial—we
are confident he still would have been convicted.
The fact that the prosecution in its closing argument em‐
phasized the lack of corroboration for Caffey’s story does not
change our analysis. The State also argued that the evidence
of Caffey’s guilt was overwhelming. As we read the record,
the jury did not merely opt for the State’s theory of the case
because Caffey’s theory lacked corroboration. No; the prose‐
cution prevailed because it presented strong, positive proof
of Caffey’s participation in the crimes.2
In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court did not “mechanisti‐
cally” apply its hearsay rule to exclude Iacullo’s statements
to the police. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Those statements
bore insufficient indicia of reliability and lacked the exculpa‐
tory significance necessary to support a constitutional claim
under Chambers. We therefore affirm the denial of habeas re‐
lief on this claim. We now turn to Caffey’s other Chambers
arguments, which we can dispose of more quickly.
2 Nor are we troubled by the isolated reference in the State’s closing ar‐
gument to Iacullo’s race (white), for the reasons given by the Illinois Su‐
preme Court. See Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1197.
No. 13‐3454 29
3. Ward’s and Williams’s Statements
The trial court excluded (1) John Pettaway’s testimony
that on the afternoon of the murders Ward said he needed to
find Caffey to buy drugs from him; and (2) the testimony of
Williams’s friend Kimberly Young that Williams said she
would fake a pregnancy to keep a man. Caffey contends the
first statement supports his claim that he and Ward met only
to sell drugs, not to plan murders. Caffey contends the sec‐
ond statement corroborates his testimony that Williams
duped him into believing she was pregnant.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of
both statements. Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1188–92. It held that
no state law hearsay exception applied, and it found further
that any error was harmless because the statements were
merely cumulative of other evidence. Although the court an‐
alyzed the issues under state law rather than Chambers, its
harmless‐error analysis was essentially the same as the
Chambers materiality inquiry. So the state supreme court’s
conclusion still deserves AEDPA deference. See Gilbert v.
Merchant, 488 F.3d 780, 793 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
state court need not cite federal cases so long as its analysis
is consistent with Supreme Court precedent).
The district court thought the state court’s ruling was a
reasonable application of federal law. We do too. The jury
heard testimony from Pettaway that he and Ward smoked
crack together and that Ward bought drugs from Caffey.
Caffey also testified that he sold drugs to Ward. Thus, there
was already ample evidence from which the jury could draw
the inference that Caffey’s meetings with Ward concerned
drugs. Ward’s excluded hearsay statements would not have
added anything material to that evidence. Nor would the
30 No. 13‐3454
fact that Ward and Caffey’s meetings concerned drugs ex‐
clude the possibility that they also concerned the Evans
murders.
As for Williams’s excluded statement, Caffey presented
evidence at trial of Williams’s jealousy, and Caffey and other
witnesses testified that she had faked pregnancies before. So
the jury was already aware of the possibility that Williams
would use a sham pregnancy to trap Caffey. The jury simply
did not believe that story in light of all the evidence. Wil‐
liams’s hearsay statement would have added nothing mate‐
rial to the defense’s argument. There is no reasonable proba‐
bility that Williams’s excluded statement would have
changed the verdict.
For these reasons, we find no Chambers violation in the
trial court’s exclusion of Ward’s and Williams’s hearsay
statements.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Before trial Caffey’s counsel sought admission, under ex‐
ceptions to the hearsay rule, of several out‐of‐court state‐
ments that Iacullo made to friends. Ryan Berger would have
testified that a few hours before Debra Evans’s murder,
Iacullo asked him how to clean fingerprints off a gun; and
between midnight and 4 a.m. the next day, she asked him
how to clean powder burns off her hand.
Patricia Mitchell stated that Iacullo said she found a gun
under the front seat of her car and was concerned her fin‐
gerprints might be on it.
Dorothy Hale stated that Iacullo told her to get cleaner to
wipe fingerprints off a gun, bullets, and a magazine.
No. 13‐3454 31
David Drenk stated that in the early fall of 1995, Iacullo
asked to borrow a gun. A week before the murders, she
asked him whether he could obtain a false birth certificate;
he said no. On the day of the murders, November 16, 1995,
he saw Williams at Iacullo’s apartment. On November 17,
Iacullo asked Drenk for help getting a birth certificate; the
next day she told him how she would go about falsifying a
birth certificate herself. A few days later, Iacullo told Drenk
she was going to throw the gun into the Fox River.
The trial court ruled that these statements were admissi‐
ble, but defense counsel did not present them to the jury.
Caffey argues that this was an error and that it deprived him
of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
We assess ineffective‐assistance claims by asking (1) whether
counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable
standard; and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washing‐
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). By “reasonable probability” we
mean “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Caffey’s claim for
failure to meet the second prong. Caffey I, 792 N.E.2d at 1198.
The district court below agreed with that conclusion. Caffey
IV, 2013 WL 5529760, at *20. We afford AEDPA deference to
the state court’s ruling regarding Strickland prejudice, but not
regarding the first prong, which the state court did not ad‐
dress.
We do not know why trial counsel decided (assuming it
was a decision and not an oversight) not to present Iacullo’s
statements to the jury. Neither side has identified a strategic
32 No. 13‐3454
reason or given any other explanation. It seems a questiona‐
ble move, particularly after counsel went to the trouble of
obtaining the right to admit the statements into evidence.
Counsel might have used Iacullo’s statements, for instance,
to argue that she was present in the apartment during the
murders, which might have cast some doubt on the accuracy
of Joshua’s statement identifying the four “burglars,” be‐
cause Iacullo was not one of people he named. But even if
counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable (which we
do not decide), we find no error in the state court’s holding
that Caffey suffered no Strickland prejudice.
Iacullo’s statements tend to show her involvement in the
crimes, specifically in obtaining and disposing of the gun
and in fabricating birth certificates, though evidence to that
effect was already presented at trial. Iacullo’s statements
could also be interpreted to show that she participated in the
planning of the murders, or perhaps even that she fired the
gun. In short, the statements tend to inculpate Iacullo. But
they do not tend to exculpate Caffey, which is what matters
here. This is not a case like Chambers, where the evidence
pointed to only a single participant in the shooting, so that
hearsay statements tending to implicate another shooter
necessarily also tended to exculpate the defendant. 410 U.S.
at 297. The evidence here shows that several people partici‐
pated in the Evans murders, the planning, and the cover‐up.
The fact that Iacullo may have been one of them does not ex‐
clude Caffey as another participant—and there was ample
evidence that he was. In these circumstances, the state court
reasonably applied Strickland in finding no prejudice. There‐
fore, Caffey’s ineffective‐assistance claim fails.
No. 13‐3454 33
C. Caffey’s Brady Claims
Caffey next argues that the State wrongfully withheld ev‐
idence relating to Dwight Pruitt and Vikki Iacullo. The Su‐
preme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
that due process requires the prosecution to disclose evi‐
dence favorable to the defense. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
432–33 (1995). Both exculpatory and impeachment evidence
qualify as “favorable.” Id. at 433. Suppression of such evi‐
dence violates Brady, however, only where the evidence is
material, meaning “there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). A “reasona‐
ble probability” exists where suppression of the evidence
“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at
434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
1. Benefits Received by Pruitt
In his petition for post‐conviction relief in Illinois, Caffey
alleged that the State suppressed evidence of two benefits it
had given to Dwight Pruitt: favorable treatment in the Du‐
Page County Jail and non‐prosecution for his involvement in
drug sales to ASA Kendall, one of Caffey’s prosecutors.
Caffey claims he could have used this evidence at trial to
impeach Pruitt’s credibility, establish his bias in favor of the
prosecution, and show that he may have falsified or embel‐
lished his testimony in exchange for the benefits he received.
The state trial court allowed Caffey to develop his claim
by taking Pruitt’s deposition. Pruitt testified, in relevant part,
as follows. Years before Caffey’s trial, Pruitt twice drove a
man he knew as “Black” to a meeting point to sell cocaine to
34 No. 13‐3454
a buyer who Pruitt later learned was ASA Kendall. Pruitt
saw Black and Kendall meet but did not witness hand‐to‐
hand drug transactions. Pruitt later told one of the State’s at‐
torneys what he had seen, but the attorney told him “not to
worry about it” and to discuss the matter no more. Pruitt
was never prosecuted for his role in the drug transactions.
Pruitt further testified that at the time of Caffey’s trial,
Pruitt was incarcerated on a gun charge in the DuPage
County Jail. While there, he believed he received better
treatment than the other prisoners. He was allowed to take
“off the deck” showers three or four times; he ate “restaurant
food” while in the courthouse being interviewed or prepar‐
ing for trial; he was permitted to smoke and make telephone
calls; and he was allowed a personal visit with Scott and his
daughter in the courthouse with an attorney for the State
present. When Pruitt was involved in an altercation with a
correctional officer, he received no formal discipline, though
he was placed in segregation. One of the State’s attorneys
told Pruitt that he was “getting the VIP treatment.”
Pruitt insisted that his testimony at Caffey’s trial was
“strictly the truth.” He said no one in the prosecutor’s office
ever asked him to lie or promised him anything in exchange
for his testimony: “They never asked me to lie. They never
told me to make up nothing … . I wasn’t paid or nothing.”
After reviewing the evidence, the state trial court dis‐
missed Caffey’s petition on the merits. The Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed, concluding that the undisclosed evidence
was immaterial under Brady. Caffey II, slip. op. at 41–52. Giv‐
ing AEDPA deference to that conclusion, the district court
held that it represented a reasonable application of federal
law. Caffey IV, 2013 WL 5529760, at *33–34. We agree.
No. 13‐3454 35
To be sure, Pruitt’s testimony was important to the prose‐
cution’s case. He and Scott were the only witnesses who tes‐
tified to Joshua Evans’s identification of Caffey as one of the
assailants who killed Debra and Samantha. But for several
reasons, we do not think it reasonably probable that the un‐
disclosed evidence about the benefits Pruitt received would
have affected the jury’s verdict.
In the first place, Pruitt had only minimal personal
knowledge about the drug transactions involving Kendall—
he never saw drugs or money change hands. Similarly,
Pruitt’s benefits in jail were relatively minor. A few good
showers, decent food when in court, smoking privileges, tel‐
ephone calls, one family visit, and reduced discipline—we
do not think these are powerful enough incentives to have
convinced a jury that Pruitt falsified his testimony, at least
not without evidence of some kind of quid pro quo.
There was no such evidence. On the contrary, Pruitt testi‐
fied that he had no deal or understanding with prosecutors
to testify in a particular way at Caffey’s trial. Pruitt said he
testified truthfully. To back up that claim, there was the tes‐
timony Pruitt gave during a pretrial hearing on the admissi‐
bility of Joshua Evans’s hearsay statements. That hearing
took place before Pruitt’s stint in DuPage County Jail and be‐
fore Pruitt realized that ASA Kendall was the man involved
in the drug transactions—that is, before he received or had
reason to expect any benefits from the State. Yet, Pruitt’s pre‐
trial testimony was consistent with his later testimony at
Caffey’s trial. Additionally, Pruitt’s testimony was corrobo‐
rated by Patrice Scott.
Considering all these circumstances together, we con‐
clude that the state court reasonably found the undisclosed
36 No. 13‐3454
evidence concerning Pruitt to be immaterial. Therefore,
Caffey’s Brady claim regarding Pruitt fails.
2. Iacullo’s Statements to Cara Walker
Finally, Caffey argues that the State violated Brady by not
disclosing statements that Vikki Iacullo made to Cara Walk‐
er, the mother of Iacullo’s daughter’s friend. On the weekend
of November 18, 1995, Iacullo asked Walker to watch her
daughters for a few days. Iacullo explained that she was in a
bit of trouble. Walker agreed. During the girls’ stay, Walker
stopped by Iacullo’s home to get them some clothes. While
there, Walker spoke with Iacullo. Walker later (but before
Caffey’s trial) reported to the police what Iacullo had said.
According to Walker, Iacullo claimed knowledge of and pos‐
sibly involvement in the Evans murders. Furthermore,
Iacullo said that if she were arrested or charged, she would
reveal that she had knowledge of illegal drug use by DuPage
County prosecutors, including Kendall.3
Iacullo’s statements to Walker were never disclosed to
Caffey before or during his trial. He claims that he was enti‐
tled to them under Brady and that they were material to his
defense because they would have bolstered his case for the
admission of Iacullo’s statements to the police (discussed in
section II.A.2 above). The state court did not address this
claim on the merits but instead dismissed it on procedural
3 At the hearing before the district court, Kendall testified that he never
bought drugs from Iacullo or Pruitt but asserted his privilege against
self‐incrimination regarding his prior drug use generally. See Caffey IV,
2013 WL 5529760, at *30.
No. 13‐3454 37
grounds.4 The district court therefore reviewed the issue de
novo, held an evidentiary hearing, heard from multiple wit‐
nesses, and made factual findings. The district court ulti‐
mately rejected Caffey’s claim because it regarded the state‐
ments at issue as immaterial. Caffey IV, 2013 WL 5529760, at
*31–32.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion and analy‐
sis. Iacullo’s statements to Walker would have added little to
the reliability analysis under Chambers and nothing to the
materiality analysis. So Iacullo’s statements to the police still
would have been inadmissible. But Caffey argues that the
statements somehow show foul play by the prosecution.
Caffey’s argument is sketchy, but he seems to suggest that
the prosecution procured Iacullo’s unavailability at trial, and
ensured her silence about Kendall’s drug use, in exchange
for an agreement not to charge her with murder.
As the district court found, there is no evidence of any
such agreement. Nor do the facts plausibly suggest the exist‐
ence of a tacit agreement or understanding. There is nothing
untoward about Iacullo’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment
privilege; she was, after all, charged with obstruction of jus‐
tice and may have been guilty of worse. And there is nothing
suspicious about the fact that Iacullo was not charged with
murder. One of the prosecutors testified before the district
4 The State argues that the state law procedural grounds supply an inde‐
pendent and adequate basis for us to reject Caffey’s claim here without
even reaching the Brady issue. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
729–30 (1991). The district court disagreed. Caffey III, 2012 WL 5230298, at
*12–13. We need not decide this issue because we hold that Caffey’s
Brady claim fails on the merits in any event.
38 No. 13‐3454
court that the State considered bringing such charges but de‐
cided not to because it could not place Iacullo at the murder
scenes.
We agree with the district court that Iacullo’s statements
to Walker were immaterial, so we reject Caffey’s Brady claim
regarding Iacullo.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the denial of
Caffey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.