NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0633n.06
No. 15-5172
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Sep 10, 2015
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
RONALD CORY DEAN, ) TENNESSEE
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
BEFORE: BOGGS, SUTTON, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Ronald Cory Dean challenges the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of his 300-month sentence for child-pornography offenses. We affirm.
Dean pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a), two counts of distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2), and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
These charges arose from Dean’s use of a file-sharing program to distribute image and video
files of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and his production of a video of himself
engaged in sexually explicit conduct with a prepubescent boy. According to the presentence
report, Dean possessed at least 1207 image files and 1337 video files depicting sexually explicit
conduct involving minors. The presentence report included the victim-impact statements
submitted by or on behalf of victims identified in those image and video files.
No. 15-5172
United States v. Dean
At sentencing, the district court calculated a guidelines range of 324 to 405 months of
imprisonment based on a total offense level of 41 and a criminal history category of I. Dean
requested a downward variance from that range to the fifteen-year statutory mandatory minimum
sentence. After considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court
varied downward from the guidelines range and sentenced Dean to 300 months of imprisonment.
In this timely appeal, Dean contends that his sentence is (1) procedurally unreasonable
because the district court failed to adequately explain the chosen sentence and (2) substantively
unreasonable because the district court gave an unreasonable amount of weight to certain
sentencing factors based on the “gratuitous” victim-impact statements included in his
presentence report. We review Dean’s sentence for reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Dean asserts that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation for rejecting
his request for a downward variance to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum. When a defendant
“presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence,” the sentencing judge should
consider the defendant’s arguments and “explain why he has rejected those arguments.” Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). The district court is not, however, required to “give the
reasons for rejecting any and all arguments by the parties for alternative sentences.” United
States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Ultimately, to impose a
procedurally reasonable sentence, “[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Because Dean failed
to object to the adequacy of the district court’s explanation when given the opportunity to do so
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No. 15-5172
United States v. Dean
at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, we review for plain error. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 385-
86.
The district court did not err, let alone plainly err. The district court acknowledged
Dean’s cooperation with authorities, his confession to his conduct with the prepubescent boy, his
lack of criminal history, and his post-arrest efforts at rehabilitation, including his pre-enrollment
in the sex-offender treatment program. The district court went on to emphasize that Dean’s
offense was “extremely serious” given that, in addition to possessing and distributing child
pornography, he “actively became involved with a minor and abused and molested that minor.”
(RE 60, Page ID # 168-69). While rejecting Dean’s request for a fifteen-year sentence, the
district court agreed that a “slight” downward variance was appropriate based on some of the
mitigation arguments raised, including his young age (twenty-one years old), his youth when he
began engaging in this conduct, his own sexual abuse as a child, and the lack of treatment for his
mental-health issues. (Id. Page ID # 171). Although the district court did not expressly address
Dean’s arguments that the child-pornography guidelines are flawed, those arguments have been
rejected by this court. United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d 778, 783-87 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2913 (2015); United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 732-33 (6th Cir. 2012); see
United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 361 (6th Cir. 2009). The district court adequately
explained Dean’s 300-month sentence.
In support of his challenge to his sentence’s substantive reasonableness, Dean argues that
the district court gave an unreasonable amount of weight to promoting respect for the law and
affording adequate deterrence based on the “gratuitous” victim-impact statements included in his
presentence report. “The essence of a substantive-reasonableness claim is whether the length of
the sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C.
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No. 15-5172
United States v. Dean
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2010). Given
“that a sentence within the applicable guidelines range is presumptively reasonable . . . [,] a
defendant attacking the substantive reasonableness of a below-guidelines sentence has an even
heavier burden to overcome.” United States v. Elmore, 743 F.3d 1068, 1076 (6th Cir. 2014); see
United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 2013).
Dean has not overcome that burden. Dean contends that the presentence report included
not only the victim-impact statements of four victims whose images were found on his storage
devices but also numerous other irrelevant victim-impact statements from victims whose images
the government never claimed to have found on his devices. Dean misreads the presentence
report, which states:
Upon analyzing the images and videos possessed by Dean in this offense, agents
were able to identify several of the victims depicted therein. The government
furnished victim impact statements submitted by or on behalf of those individuals,
and the statements will be set forth immediately below. . . . Restitution requests
were submitted by or on behalf of a few identified victims . . . .
(Presentence Report 10). All of the victim-impact statements included in the presentence report
were submitted by or on behalf of victims identified from the images and videos possessed by
Dean; four of those victims requested restitution. All of those victims had a right to be heard.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). Overruling Dean’s objection to the inclusion of the victim-impact
statements in the presentence report, the district court concluded that the statements were
properly considered in conjunction with the § 3553(a) factors, but stated that the number of
statements did not have “any bearing on the Court’s ultimate determination.” (RE 60, Page ID
# 120). Dean has failed to show that the district court placed undue weight on the victim-impact
statements or on any sentencing factor.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Dean’s sentence.
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