IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1070
Filed September 23, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF D.L.-T.,
Minor Child,
T.T., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Julie A.
Schumacher, District Associate Judge.
The father appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to
his child D.L.-T. AFFIRMED.
John Moeller of John S. Moeller, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney
General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Dewey P. Sloan, Assistant
County Attorney.
Joseph W. Kertels of Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins, and Bower, JJ.
2
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
The father appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to
his child, D.L.-T. He asserts the State failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his rights should be terminated pursuant to Iowa Code sections
232.116(1)(d) and (f) (2013).
We review termination proceedings de novo. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d
100, 110 (Iowa 2014). The three-step statutory framework governing the
termination of parental rights is well established and need not be repeated here.
See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). Since the father has challenged
only the first step (grounds for termination) we will limit our review to an analysis
of the first step.
When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
statutory ground, we may affirm the order on any ground we find supported by
the record. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). To terminate the
father’s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f), the State must prove:
(1) the child is four years of age or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a
child in need of assistance (CINA); (3) the child has been removed from the
physical custody of the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen
months, or for the last twelve consecutive months; and (4) there is clear and
convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the
custody the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102. The first three
elements are not in dispute. The father’s claim on appeal implicates the fourth
element.
3
D.L.-T. and his half-siblings were removed from parental custody in
October 2013, due to physical abuse inflicted on D.L.-T. by his mother and
stepfather. D.L.-T. was subsequently adjudicated a child in need of assistance
(CINA). The facts leading up to the removal are set forth in our opinion, In re
N.L.-S., No. 14-2045, 2015 WL 576572, at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015),
and need not be repeated here. The mother’s parental rights to D.L.-T. were
terminated in December 2014, and the termination of parental rights was affirmed
by this court.1 Id. at *6. At that time, the juvenile court concluded “that while [the
father] may not be equipped to parent [D.L.-T.] independently, termination of his
[parental rights] at this time would not be in [D.L.-T.’s] best interests.” The court
ordered the father be granted an additional six months to work toward
reunification efforts pursuant to section 232.104.
A second hearing on the State’s petition for termination of the father’s
parental rights was held in June 2015. The juvenile court issued a thorough and
well-reasoned order terminating the father’s parental rights, and we adopt the
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the juvenile court’s order as our own.
Although replicating the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions here would
serve no useful purpose, we observe the juvenile court specifically found in part:
Since the initiation of this case, [the father] has received
services through Siouxland Mental Health, attended parenting
classes, and participated in a substance abuse evaluation due to
the history of usage. [The father] continues to struggle with mental
health. He has poor memory and does not have the skills
necessary at this time to be a parent for [D.L.-T.]. He has never
parented [D.L.-T.] in the six years of his [child’s] life.
....
1
The mother’s and the biological father’s parental rights to D.L.-T’s five half-siblings
were also terminated.
4
[A psychological] evaluation set forth that the primary issue
for [the father] would be his ability to provide consistently for the
needs of a young child, given [the father’s] limitations and problems
with emotional stability. That report indicated that significant
outside resources for support would be necessary in order for the
father to parent.
....
[The father] has significant intellectual deficiencies and
mental health issues which he is unable to manage on a consistent
basis, despite the additional time afforded to the father. [The
father] continued to use alcohol as recent[ly] as January 2015.
[The father’s] attendance and participation in services has been
mostly inconsistent and appears to become consistent only right
before court hearings. [D.L.-T.] also has significant behavioral and
mental health issues. Given [the father’s] deficiencies and [D.L.-
T.’s] needs, the court does not believe any additional time would
correct the current circumstances. Further, any additional time
would be to the detriment of the child. [D.L.-T.] could not be safely
returned to [the] father’s care without suffering ongoing and harmful
effects of being a child in need of assistance. [D.L.-T.] has
expressed [a desire] to be adopted. It is reported that at the age of
only six years old, [D.L.-T.] cries when discussing [D.L.-T.’s] future
with the case manager. [D.L.-T.] is in need of immediate
permanency.
The juvenile court concluded the State presented clear and convincing evidence
to terminate the father’s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f). Upon
our de novo review, we agree.
The juvenile court found, “The addition of six months has not resulted in
[the father] being put in a position to be able to parent [the] child. [D.L.-T.] could
not be in [the] father’s custody now or at any time in the foreseeable future.” The
father has significant intellectual deficiencies and mental health issues that he is
unable to manage on a consistent basis. This did not change during the
additional six months the father was granted. He was not able to move past
supervised visits with D.L.-T. Any additional time in limbo would not be in D.L.-
T.’s interest.
5
As we have stated numerous times, children are not equipped with pause
buttons. “The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents
experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d
609, 613 (Iowa 1987). While the law requires a “full measure of patience with
troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience
has been built into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. See In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). Our supreme court has explained that “the
legislature, in cases meeting the conditions of [the Iowa Code], has made a
categorical determination that the needs of a child are promoted by termination of
parental rights.” In re M.W., 458 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990) (discussing then
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e)). Consequently, “[t]ime is a critical element,”
and parents simply “cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory
time periods for reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in
parenting.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495. At some point, as is the case here, the
rights and needs of the child must rise above the rights and needs of the parent.
See In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). The public policy of
the state having been legislatively set, we are obligated to heed the statutory
time periods for reunification. We agree with the juvenile court that additional
time would not correct the situation.
We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.