UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4066
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NAEEM DEONTE JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-4079
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEMONTE DENZEL MEADOWS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00249-WO-2; 1:14-cr-00249-
WO-1)
Submitted: August 27, 2015 Decided: September 23, 2015
Before DUNCAN, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven III, Durham, North Carolina; H.A. Carpenter IV,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellants. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Kyle D. Pousson, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Naeem Deonte Jones and Demonte Denzel Meadows pled guilty
to a Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)
(2012) (Count 1), and brandishing a firearm during the
commission of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (Count 2). Jones was sentenced to 125
months and Meadows to 121 months of imprisonment. Both Jones
and Meadows timely appeal, raising the following issues,
whether: (1) the district court erred by applying to both
Appellants a four-level enhancement for abduction pursuant to
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B3.1(B)(4)(A) (2014), and
(2) the district court erred by counting Jones’ juvenile
adjudications in calculating his criminal history.
Alternatively, Jones argues that his criminal history category
III over-represents his criminal history. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
Appellants raise only sentencing issues which we generally
review for reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46
(2007); United States v. Rivera–Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 100 (4th
Cir. 2012). Appellants primarily rely on United States v.
Osborne, 514 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008), for their argument that
their USSG § 2B3.1(B)(4)(A) enhancement was erroneous. Rather,
they argue, they should have only received a two-level
3
enhancement for restraining the victims. The undisputed facts
reveal that Jones and Meadows forced the victims of their store
robbery through a door and into a backroom at gunpoint and bound
them.
A victim is “abducted” if he is “forced to accompany an
offender to a different location.” USSG § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(A).
We have held that “movement within the confines of a single
building can constitute movement to a different location.”
Osborne, 514 F.3d at 389-90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even a temporary abduction can constitute an abduction for
purposes of the Guidelines. United States v. Nale, 101 F.3d
1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1996). We have adopted a “flexible, case
by case approach to determining when movement to a different
location has occurred.” Osborne, 514 F.3d at 390. (internal
quotation marks omitted). We find no reversible error in the
abduction enhancements.
Next, Jones alleges that the district court should not have
counted two cases in which he was “adjudicated delinquent” at
age 15 in calculating his criminal history category as III.
Jones concedes, however, that we review this issue for plain
error only, as it is raised for the first time on appeal and
that, even if the district court did not count these two
juvenile adjudications, he would still have enough criminal
history points to fall within a criminal history category III.
4
Thus, even if Jones’ arguments were meritorious, he cannot show
plain error because his criminal history category would remain
the same. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32
(1993) (providing plain error test). Accordingly, this argument
fails.
Alternatively, Jones contends that his criminal history
category over-represents his criminal past in light of the use
of juvenile adjudications and argues against use of the juvenile
conduct against criminal defendants. As argued by the
Government, however, USSG § 4A1.2(d) expressly permits
sentencing courts to consider juvenile adjudications, with some
restrictions not applicable here. We have rejected a due
process challenge to § 4A1.2(d) in United States v. Daniels, 929
F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant cannot
raise due process challenge to use of juvenile adjudications for
offenses committed after effective date of Guidelines).
Accordingly, we find this argument lacks merit.
Thus, we affirm both Jones’ and Meadows’ sentences. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5