IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2015
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2015-SC-000005-WC
CENTRAL BAPTIST HOSPITAL APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. CASE NO. 2014-CA-001228-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 12-73151
MARTY MAY;
HONORABLE WILLIAM J. RUDLOFF,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Central Baptist Hospital, argues in this workers'
compensation appeal that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by not
enforcing a settlement agreement entered into between itself and Appellee,
Marty May, and that proof should have been reopened. For the below stated
reasons, we affirm.
May suffered a work-related injury while employed by Central Baptist as
a registered nurse in the Neo-Intensive Care unit. She filed for workers'
compensation and a benefit review conference ("BRC") was scheduled. A week
before the BRC, May submitted the reports of two physicians. Central Baptist
was unable to depose those physicians before the final hearing was held.
However, after the BRC, the ALJ granted both parties thirty days to complete
additional proof. Neither party submitted additional proof during this period.
Central Baptist purportedly decided not to depose the physicians because it
entered into settlement negotiations with May.
Central Baptist sent May's attorney, Don Todd, a Form 110. May
rejected, the initial settlement offer because she objected to certain language in
the Form 110 and wanted to be paid a longer period of temporary total
disability ("TTD") benefits. A revised Form 110 was sent to May in which
Central Baptist would pay all reasonable, necessary, and related medical
expenses and a longer period of TTD benefits. However, the revised Form 110
was sent to Todd's office while he was hospitalized.
On September 11, 2013, the ALJ entered an opinion and order which
awarded May permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits based upon an 8%
impairment rating. The ALJ enhanced May's award by applying the three
multiplier pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1). TTD benefits were also awarded.
The ALJ's opinion and order provided May with a greater award than what was
proposed in the revised Form 110.
One day after the ALJ entered the opinion and order, on September 12,
2013, May signed the revised Form 110, albeit in the wrong spot. The next
day, on September 13, 2013, May returned to Todd's office and re-signed the
revised Form 110 in the correct spot. May did not discuss the revised Form
110 with Todd before signing it due to his hospitalization. The ALJ approved
the settlement agreement on September 16, 2013. May did not know about the
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ALJ's opinion and order when she signed, and re-signed, the revised Form 110
because of Todd's hospitalization. She only learned of the ALJ's opinion and
order after Todd was released from the hospital. Upon hearing the details of
the ALJ's opinion and order, May determined that she wanted to "accept" it and
reject the settlement agreement.
Central Baptist subsequently filed a motion and affidavit to set aside the
ALJ's opinion and order and to enforce the settlement agreement. Central
Baptist also filed a petition for reconsideration arguing that the ALJ did not
make sufficient findings of fact regarding the application of the three
multiplier' and that it should be granted additional proof time to depose the
two doctors May used to support her case.
The ALJ held a hearing in which May and Todd testified. Todd testified
that the revised Form 110 contained all of the requested revisions, but also
stated that May was unaware the AI,J rendered an opinion and award before
signing the agreement. When asked why she signed the revised Form 110 if
she did not agree with its terms, May implied she wanted the matter finalized
and then stated, "I rejected the agreement because - how do I put this, because
I agreed with the Judge's award . . . which was more money."
After the hearing, on January 30, 2014, the ALI issued an opinion and
order finding that there was no meeting of the minds as to the terms of the
settlement agreement. The AL I found:
1 This issue has not been appealed to this Court and is not before us.
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Based upon the sworn testimony of Mr. Todd, [May's] attorney, and
also the plaintiff Mrs. May at the special hearing on December 18,
2013, I make the factual determination that it is uncontradicted
that my Opinion and Order dated September 11, 2013 was
rendered and served upon both attorneys before the plaintiff Mrs.
May had the opportunity to discuss with her attorney, Mr. Todd,
the revised Form 110 prepared by [Central Baptist's] attorney. The
revised Form 110 was forwarded by [Central Baptist's] attorney to
Mr. Todd's office during the time he was confined to the hospital
for surgery. I make the factual determination that Mrs. May went
to Mr. Todd's office on September 12, 2013 and signed the
proposed settlement agreement on the wrong line. I make the
factual determination that while Mr. Todd was confined to the
hospital his office called Mrs. May to come back in and she
returned to Mr. Todd's office on September 13, 2013 and signed
the proposed agreement on the correct line, and I make the factual
determination that when Mr. Todd was discharged from the
hospital he contacted Mrs. May and she came back to his office on
September 15, 2013, at which time they discussed the case in
detail. Mrs. May told Mr. Todd that she did not accept the revised
Form 110. Taking all of the evidence into consideration, I make
the factual determination that there was no meeting of the minds
as to the terms of the revised Form 110 and there was, therefore,
no settlement agreement. In making the determination, I rely upon
the above sworn testimony, the decision of Kentucky's highest
court in Skaggs v. Wood Mosaic Corporation, 428 S.W.2d 617 (Ky.
1968), the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Commercial Drywall v. Wells, 860 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. App. 1993) . . .
Accordingly, on January 30, 2014, the ALJ denied Central Baptist's motion to
set aside his original opinion and order of September 11, 2013 and denied the
petition for reconsideration. Central Baptist then filed a petition for
reconsideration of the January 30, 2014 opinion and order. This petition was
denied. Central Baptist appealed to the Board which affirmed. The Court of
Appeals also affirmed in a two-to-one opinion, with Judge Kramer dissenting
without opinion. This appeal followed.
The Board's review in this matter was limited to determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ's findings, or if the evidence compels a
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different result. W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1992).
Further, the function of the Court of Appeals is to "correct the Board only
where the Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice." Id. at 687-88. Finally, review
by this Court "is to address new or novel questions of statutory construction,
or to reconsider precedent when such appears necessary, or to review a
question of constitutional magnitude." Id. For the below stated reasons, we
affirm the Court of Appeals.
I. THE ALJ WAS WITHIN HIS DISCRETION TO NOT ENFORCE THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Central Baptist's first argument is that the ALJ erred by refusing to
enforce the settlement agreement signed by May. KRS 342.265 states in
pertinent part:
(1) If the employee and employer and special fund or any of them
reach an agreement conforming to the provisions of this chapter in
regard to compensation, a memorandum of the agreement signed
by the parties or their representatives shall be filed with the
commissioner, and, if approved by an [A14, shall be enforceable
pursuant to KRS 342.305.
This statute gives the ALJ an opportunity to review the terms of a settlement
agreement with the purpose of protecting the interests of the worker. Skaggs,
428 S.W.2d at 619. Further, an ALJ . "may look behind the settlement when an
agreement appears not to be in the best interest of the worker, provided there
is cause to do so." Commercial Drywall, 860 S.W.2d at 302. "To constitute
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such a contract there must, of course, be a mutual assent by the parties - a
meeting of the minds - and also an intentional manifestation of such assent."
Furtula v. University of Kentucky, 438 S.W.3d 303 (Ky. 2014) (citing Kellum v.
Browning's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459, 463 (1929)).
In this matter, the ALJ's determination that the settlement agreement
was not the product of a meeting of the minds is not unreasonable. May
signed the revised Form 110 without knowledge of the ALJ's opinion and order
and without the full counsel of Todd, who was hospitalized. After learning of
the ALJ's opinion and order, May changed her mind on acceptance of the
agreement. While under traditional contract law May is likely bound to her
decision, the goal of workers' compensation is to fully redress a worker's injury.
Additionally, as stated above, the ALJ may "look behind" a settlement if in the
best interest of the worker. Thus, the ALJ was not unreasonable in finding
that, based on May's lack of knowledge, there was not a full meeting of the
minds and that she should not be bound by the settlement agreement. The
ALJ's findings are not unsupported by the record and we decline to disturb his
conclusions. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984).
The AU' was within his discretion to exercise his authority under KRS 342.285.
Square D Co. v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1993).
II. CENTRAL BAPTIST WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL PROOF TIME
Central Baptist's other argument is that once the settlement agreement
was rejected by the ALJ, additional proof time should have been provided.
Central Baptist argues that it was prejudiced by not being able to take the
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depositions of May's evaluating physicians. Central Baptist says that the
award the Al,,J rendered in this matter is unfair because it is based on the
physician's testimony without cross examination. The physicians' depositions
were cancelled once Central Baptist entered into settlement negotiations. We
disagree.
The AI,J, as fact finder, has the authority to control the taking and
presentation of proof in a workers' compensation claim to ensure a speedy and
thorough resolution of the claim. Dravo Lime Co., Inc. v. Eakins, 156 S.W.3d
283 (Ky. 2005). Here, the ALJ gave Central Baptist until July 25, 2013, to
complete its proof. Central Baptist instead chose to voluntarily cancel the
depositions with the physicians upon their belief that May would enter into a
settlement. Central Baptist was not compelled to cancel the depositions, and
the Al.,J did not abuse his discretion in denying additional proof-taking.
For the above stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
CENTRAL BAPTIST HOSPITAL:
Guillermo Alfredo Carlos
James Burke Cooper
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
MARTY MAY:
Donald Richard Todd
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