NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 6, 20091
Decided May 7, 2009
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
No. 08‐2498
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.
v. No. 3:05‐cr‐30072
ADAM G. TOWNSEND, Jeanne E. Scott,
Defendant‐Appellant. Judge.
O R D E R
Invoking amendments to the sentencing guidelines that lowered the offense levels
for some crack‐cocaine offenses, Adams Townsend seeks a sentence reduction. Townsend
had pleaded guilty to counts of distributing crack cocaine and being a felon in possession of
a firearm. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 922(g). The district court found that Townsend
1
After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2).
No. 08‐2498 Page 2
was a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(A), and calculated his guidelines range for the
cocaine count as 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The court then sentenced Townsend to
262 months’ imprisonment on the drug count, to be served concurrently with a 120‐month
sentence for the firearm charge. After the Sentencing Commission amended the guidelines,
Townsend sought to have his sentence lowered. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The district court
denied this motion.2
Townsend asserts that the reduced guideline range for crack‐cocaine offenses
applies to him. U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706. But Townsend was sentenced under the
guidelines for a career offender, not the crack‐cocaine guidelines. The Commission has not
lowered his applicable guidelines range, and, therefore, the district court could not lower
his sentence. See United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 588‐90 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Poole, 550 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
2
The government argues that Townsend’s notice of appeal was untimely but purports
to waive that argument based on its view of Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005).
Townsend, however, asserts that he complied with the prisoner mailbox rule, see United States
v. Craig, 368 F.3d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 2004), compliance with which would undisputedly render
the appeal timely. The prosecutor does not contest Townsend’s sworn statement, so we must
treat it as accurate. On this understanding the appeal is timely, which makes it unnecessary
to decide whether a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.