[Cite as State v. Cooley, 2015-Ohio-3904.]
COURT OF APPEALS
ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
:
CLARENCE COOLEY : Case No. 15-COA-012
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Municipal Court,
Case No. 14-TRC-8044
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: September 23, 2015
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ANDREW N. BUSH MATTHEW J. MALONE
1213 East Main Street 10 East Main Street
Ashland, OH 44805 Ashland, OH 44805
Ashland County, Case No. 15-COA-012 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On August 30, 2014, appellant, Clarence Cooley, was operating a
motorcycle when he lost control and crashed, sustaining serious injuries. He was life-
flighted to Cleveland MetroHealth Hospital. Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper R.
Kluever investigated the incident. After obtaining appellant's blood-alcohol concentration
level via his medical records pursuant to R.C. 2317.02(B), Trooper Kluever charged
appellant with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)
and (f) and failure to control in violation of R.C. 4511.202.
{¶2} On November 25, 2014, appellant filed a motion to suppress, claiming an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment in obtaining his
blood-alcohol concentration level without a warrant via R.C. 2317.02(B) ("Privileged
communications and acts") and R.C. 2317.022 ("Written requests from law enforcement
officers to obtain test results of alcohol, drug, controlled substances, or metabolites of
controlled substances from health care providers"). A hearing was held on January 6,
2014. By judgment entry filed March 3, 2015, the trial court denied the motion, finding
"once the statute was complied with and the veil of privilege lifted as a result, obtaining
the test results was not materially different from obtaining a public record or compelling
production of the records via a subpoena duces tecum. There was simply not a search
here."
{¶3} On March 3, 2015, appellant pled no contest to the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)
charge and the failure to control charge. The R.C. 4511.19(A)1)(f) charged was nolled.
On same date, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to one hundred
Ashland County, Case No. 15-COA-012 3
eighty days in jail, ninety days suspended. A judgment order setting forth the no contest
plea, guilty finding, and sentence was filed on March 27, 2015.
{¶4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS."
I
{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
We disagree.
{¶7} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's findings of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether said
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio
St.3d 19 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486 (4th Dist.1991); State v. Guysinger,
86 Ohio App.3d 592 (4th Dist.1993). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court
failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an
appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. State v.
Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37 (4th Dist.1993). Finally, assuming the trial court's findings
of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has properly identified
the law to be applied, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the
ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of
claim, an appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial
Ashland County, Case No. 15-COA-012 4
court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given
case. State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93 (8th Dist.1994); State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio
App.3d 623 (4th Dist.1993); Guysinger. As the United States Supreme Court held in
Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), "…as a general matter
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo
on appeal."
{¶8} Appellant's motion to suppress was predicated on a constitutional
challenge to R.C. 2317.02(B)(2) and 2317.022, and Trooper Kluever's failure to obtain a
warrant. Appellant argued the obtaining of his blood-alcohol concentration level via his
medical records violated his Fourth Amendment right to unreasonable searches and
seizures. In support of his arguments, appellant relied on the case of State v. Little, 3rd
Dist. Auglaize No. 2-13-28, 2014-Ohio-4871.
{¶9} As noted by the trial court in its judgment order filed March 27, 2015,
appellant did not enter a no contest plea to R.C. 4511.191(A)(1)(f), but to R.C.
4511.191(A)(1)(a), the non-per se statute. The trial court's ruling in denying the motion
to suppress had no bearing on appellant's conviction under R.C. 4511.191(A)(1)(a).
{¶10} By virtue of the two-issue rule, a decision which is supported by one or
more alternate grounds properly submitted is invulnerable to attack on one issue only:
This rule as generally applied is that, where there are two causes of
action, or two defenses, thereby raising separate and distinct issues, and
a general verdict has been returned, and the mental processes of the jury
have not been tested by special interrogatories to indicate which of the
Ashland County, Case No. 15-COA-012 5
issues was resolved in favor of the successful party, it will be presumed
that all issues were so determined; and that, where a single determinative
issue has been tried free from error, error in presenting another issue will
be disregarded.
H.E. Culbertson Co. v. Warden, 123 Ohio St. 297, 303 (1931).
{¶11} Any opinion on the arguments herein would be solely advisory. This court
has made clear its reluctance to engage in the issuance of advisory opinions. See State
v. Brown, 5th Dist. Stark No.1999CA00188, 2000 WL 94084 (Jan. 24, 2000).
{¶12} The sole assignment of error is denied.
{¶13} The judgment of the Municipal Court of Ashland County, Ohio is hereby
affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
SGFsg 828