NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals ForȱtheȱSeventhȱCircuit Chicago,ȱIllinoisȱȱ60604 ArguedȱSeptemberȱ16,ȱ2009 DecidedȱNovemberȱ18,ȱ2009 Before RICHARDȱD.ȱCUDAHY,ȱCircuitȱJudge DIANEȱP.ȱWOOD,ȱCircuitȱJudge DIANEȱS.ȱSYKES,ȱCircuitȱJudge No.ȱ08Ȭ2799 UNITEDȱSTATESȱOFȱAMERICA, AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrict PlaintiffȬAppellee, CourtȱforȱtheȱNorthernȱDistrictȱof Illinois,ȱWesternȱDivision. v. No.ȱ07ȱCRȱ50044Ȭ1 RICHARDȱA.ȱLEE, DefendantȬAppellant. FrederickȱJ.ȱKapala,ȱ Judge. OȱRȱDȱEȱR OnȱJuneȱ15,ȱ2007,ȱofficersȱfromȱtheȱRockford,ȱIllinoisȱPoliceȱDepartmentȱexecutedȱa searchȱwarrantȱatȱaȱhouseȱwhereȱRichardȱA.ȱLeeȱhadȱhiddenȱaȱdigitalȱscaleȱandȱaȱbag containingȱpowderȱandȱcrackȱcocaine.ȱȱTheȱpoliceȱreturnedȱtoȱtheȱhouseȱfiveȱdaysȱlaterȱand arrestedȱLeeȱforȱaȱparoleȱviolation.ȱȱTheȱofficersȱsearchedȱLeeȱincidentȱtoȱtheȱarrestȱand foundȱaȱhandgunȱinȱhisȱpossession.ȱȱLeeȱconfessedȱtoȱowningȱtheȱnarcoticsȱtheȱofficers seizedȱduringȱtheȱJuneȱ15ȱsearch.ȱȱ Leeȱpleadedȱguiltyȱtoȱpossessionȱwithȱintentȱtoȱdistributeȱcrackȱcocaineȱinȱviolation ofȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ841(a)(1)ȱandȱbeingȱaȱfelonȱinȱpossessionȱofȱaȱfirearmȱinȱviolationȱofȱ18ȱU.S.C. §ȱ922(g)(1).ȱȱAsȱpartȱofȱhisȱpleaȱbargain,ȱLeeȱagreedȱthatȱheȱqualifiedȱasȱaȱcareerȱoffender No.ȱ08Ȭ2799 Pageȱ2 underȱU.S.S.G.ȱ§ȱ4B1.1ȱbasedȱonȱaȱ1998ȱfelonyȱconvictionȱforȱpossessionȱwithȱintentȱto distributeȱcocaineȱandȱaȱ2002ȱIllinoisȱconvictionȱforȱsecondȬdegreeȱmurder.ȱȱAtȱsentencing theȱdistrictȱcourtȱadoptedȱtheȱpresentenceȬinvestigationȬreportȱ(“PSR”)ȱfindingȱthatȱLeeȱwas aȱcareerȱoffenderȱunderȱ§ȱ4B1.1;ȱLeeȱdidȱnotȱobject.ȱȱHeȱdidȱargue,ȱhowever,ȱthatȱ§ȱ4B1.1 failedȱtoȱaccountȱforȱtheȱSentencingȱCommission’sȱintentȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱpenaltiesȱforȱcrackȬ cocaineȱoffenses.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱrejectedȱthisȱargumentȱbutȱdidȱnoteȱthatȱtheȱcareerȬ offenderȱguidelinesȱareȱ“strict,”ȱ“harsh,”ȱandȱ“tough.”ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱcorrectly calculatedȱtheȱrelevantȱguidelinesȱrangeȱandȱimposedȱaȱwithinȬguidelinesȱsentenceȱof 198ȱmonths’ȱimprisonment.ȱȱ Leeȱchallengesȱhisȱsentenceȱonȱtwoȱgrounds.ȱȱFirst,ȱheȱarguesȱthatȱweȱmustȱremand hisȱcaseȱforȱresentencingȱinȱlightȱofȱKimbroughȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ128ȱS.ȱCt.ȱ558ȱ(2007),ȱbecause theȱdistrictȱcourtȱfailedȱtoȱgiveȱreasonsȱforȱrejectingȱhisȱargumentȱbasedȱonȱtheȱcrack/powder cocaineȱdisparity.ȱȱSecond,ȱLeeȱcontendsȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱerredȱwhenȱitȱsentencedȱhim asȱaȱcareerȱoffenderȱbecauseȱhisȱIllinoisȱconvictionȱforȱsecondȬdegreeȱmurderȱisȱnotȱaȱcrime ofȱviolence.1ȱȱ OurȱprecedentȱforeclosesȱLee’sȱfirstȱargument.ȱȱInȱKimbroughȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱheld thatȱdistrictȱcourtsȱhaveȱdiscretionȱtoȱdisregardȱtheȱ100ȬtoȬ1ȱcrack/powderȱratioȱwhen fashioningȱsentencesȱunderȱU.S.S.G.ȱ§ȱ2D1.1.ȱȱ128ȱS.ȱCt.ȱatȱ575.ȱȱButȱLeeȱwasȱsentencedȱasȱa careerȱoffenderȱunderȱ§ȱ4B1.1,ȱandȱweȱhaveȱheldȱthatȱ§ȱ4B1.1ȱdoesȱnotȱimplicateȱKimbrough becauseȱtheȱcrack/powderȱdisparityȱinȱtheȱcareerȬoffenderȱguidelineȱ“arisesȱfromȱaȱstatute, notȱtheȱadvisoryȱguidelines.”ȱȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱHarris,ȱ536ȱF.3dȱ798,ȱ813ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2008).ȱȱWe recentlyȱreaffirmedȱHarrisȱinȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱWelton,ȱ583ȱF.3dȱ494,ȱ499ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2009) (defendantsȱsentencedȱasȱcareerȱoffendersȱunderȱ§ȱ4B1.1ȱ“haveȱnoȱsentencingȱchallenge basedȱonȱtheȱseverityȱofȱtheȱcrack/powderȱdisparity”).ȱȱTherefore,ȱtoȱtheȱextentȱLeeȱargues thatȱKimbroughȱnecessitatesȱaȱremandȱforȱresentencing,ȱhisȱargumentȱfails. Inȱhisȱproȱseȱbrief,ȱLeeȱarguesȱthatȱtheȱcareerȬoffenderȱguidelineȱdoesȱnotȱapplyȱto himȱonȱtheȱgroundȱthatȱhisȱIllinoisȱconvictionȱforȱsecondȬdegreeȱmurderȱdoesȱnotȱqualifyȱas aȱcrimeȱofȱviolenceȱbecauseȱitȱisȱnotȱ“purposeful”ȱasȱrequiredȱbyȱBegayȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates, 128ȱS.ȱCt.ȱ1581ȱ(2008).ȱȱLeeȱfailedȱtoȱraiseȱthisȱargumentȱbelow,ȱsoȱourȱreviewȱisȱforȱplain error.ȱȱSeeȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱOlano,ȱ507ȱU.S.ȱ725,ȱ732Ȭ35ȱ(1993);ȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱMyers,ȱ569ȱF.3d 794,ȱ800ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2009).ȱȱAsȱaȱthresholdȱmatter,ȱweȱinterpretȱtheȱcareerȬoffenderȱguidelineȱin theȱsameȱwayȱweȱinterpretȱtheȱArmedȱCareerȱCriminalȱActȱ(“ACCA”),ȱUnitedȱStatesȱv. 1 LeeȱmadeȱtheȱcareerȬoffenderȱargumentȱinȱaȱsupplementalȱproȱseȱbrief.ȱȱInȱthatȱbriefȱheȱalso raisedȱaȱclaimȱofȱineffectiveȱassistanceȱofȱcounsel.ȱȱAlthoughȱweȱaddressȱtheȱcareerȬoffender argumentȱhere,ȱweȱexpressȱnoȱjudgmentȱonȱtheȱineffectiveȬassistanceȱclaim.ȱȱSuchȱclaimsȱareȱbest broughtȱonȱcollateralȱreviewȱinȱaȱpetitionȱforȱhabeasȱcorpusȱunderȱ28ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ2255.ȱȱSeeȱUnitedȱStates v.ȱAllison,ȱ59ȱF.3dȱ625,ȱ629ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ1995).ȱȱ No.ȱ08Ȭ2799 Pageȱ3 Woods,ȱ576ȱF.3dȱ400,ȱ403Ȭ04ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2009),ȱandȱitȱisȱnotȱerrorȱforȱaȱsentencingȱcourtȱtoȱrely onȱanȱunchallengedȱPSRȱwhenȱdeterminingȱwhetherȱqualifyingȱconvictionsȱexistȱfor purposesȱofȱtheȱACCA,ȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱThornton,ȱ463ȱF.3dȱ693,ȱ700Ȭ01ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2006).ȱȱLee didȱnotȱobjectȱtoȱhisȱPSR,ȱwhichȱclassifiedȱhimȱasȱaȱcareerȱoffender,ȱandȱtheȱdistrictȱjudge reliedȱonȱtheȱPSRȱwhenȱheȱsentencedȱLeeȱasȱaȱcareerȱoffender.ȱȱ Furthermore,ȱLeeȱwasȱconvictedȱofȱsecondȬdegreeȱmurder,ȱnotȱ“secondȬdegree manslaughter”ȱasȱheȱargues.ȱȱIndeed,ȱthereȱisȱnoȱcrimeȱinȱIllinoisȱcalledȱ“secondȬdegree manslaughter.”ȱȱSeeȱ720ȱILL.ȱCOMP.ȱSTAT.ȱ5/9Ȭ1ȱtoȱ9Ȭ3ȱ(listingȱIllinois’ȱhomicideȱcrimes).ȱ SecondȬdegreeȱmurderȱobviouslyȱqualifiesȱasȱaȱcrimeȱofȱviolenceȱunderȱeitherȱdefinitionȱof theȱterm;ȱitȱhasȱasȱanȱelementȱtheȱ“useȱofȱphysicalȱforceȱagainstȱtheȱpersonȱofȱanother,” §ȱ4B1.2(a)(1),ȱandȱisȱpurposefulȱconductȱthatȱ“presentsȱaȱseriousȱpotentialȱriskȱofȱphysical injuryȱtoȱanother,“ȱ§ȱ4B1.2(a)(2).ȱȱSeeȱ720ȱILL.ȱCOMP.ȱSTAT.ȱ5/9Ȭ2.ȱȱAccordingly,ȱtheȱdistrict courtȱdidȱnotȱerrȱinȱsentencingȱLeeȱasȱaȱcareerȱoffender. AFFIRMED