IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30310
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ISAAC JEROME HAYES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 96-CR-60031-8
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January 16, 2003
Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Isaac Jerome Hayes appeals from his conviction of conspiring
to distribute crack cocaine and distributing crack cocaine. He
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction, that the district court erroneously admitted evidence
of two arrests in Atlanta several years after the facts
underlying his conviction pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 404(b), and
that the drug quantity relevant to his guideline sentencing range
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-30310
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should have been submitted to the jury pursuant to Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Hayes’s sufficiency contention relies on alleged
inconsistencies in the evidence and attacks on the credibility of
the witnesses against him. Hayes argues that the witnesses
against him either were incompetent to testify or had motivations
to lie. Hayes has not shown that the jury’s credibility findings
should be disturbed. See United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889
F.2d 1417, 1423 (5th Cir. 1989). He has not shown that the
evidence was not sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bell, 678
F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc), aff’d, 462 U.S. 356
(1983). His challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in his
case therefore is unavailing.
The admission of the Atlanta arrests was not an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Peterson, 244 F.3d 385, 392
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 133 (2001). Hayes’s
possession of crack cocaine during the first Atlanta arrest was
probative of his mens rea in his Louisiana transactions. His use
of a false driver’s license and an alias during both Atlanta
arrests, when viewed in the light of testimony that Hayes had
been told about his indictment, indicated that he had
deliberately avoided detection for several years. See United
States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1486 (5th Cir. 1995); FED. R. EVID.
404(b).
No. 02-30310
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Finally, guideline factors that enhance a sentence within
the statutory sentencing range do not implicate Apprendi. United
States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1182 (2001). We are bound by Keith. United States v.
Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1991).
AFFIRMED.