FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 25 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HEATHER F. LUKASHIN; IGOR No. 13-35353
LUKASHIN,
D.C. No. 3:12-cv-05932-RBL
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SUTTELL & HAMMER PS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 21, 2015**
Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Heather F. Lukashin and Igor Lukashin appeal pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging claims under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and state law against the law firm and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument, and denies the Lukashins’ motion for oral argument, filed
on September 20, 2014. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
lawyers representing Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. in a state court debt collection
case relating to Mrs. Lukashins’ unpaid credit card balance. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and may affirm on
any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59
(9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the Lukashins’ FDCPA claim because
the Lukashins failed to allege facts sufficient to show a qualifying debt or
actionable conduct under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (defining debt
under the FDCPA); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (10) (explaining prohibited
practices under the FDCPA); see Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.
2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim).
The district court properly dismissed the Lukashins’ claim under the
Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”) because defendants’ alleged
misconduct was exempt under the WCPA. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables,
Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1986) (setting forth
elements of a WCPA claim); Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (Wash. 1984)
(en banc) (claims related to the “actual practice of law” are exempt under the
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WCPA).
The district court properly dismissed the Lukashins’ claim under the
Washington Collection Agency Act (“WCAA”) because the Lukashins failed to
allege facts sufficient to show that defendant law firm qualified as a debt collection
agency under the WCAA. See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.16.100(4) (defining a
collection agency under the WCAA); see also Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42.
Denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion because amendment
would have been futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (a district court should grant leave to amend unless “the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Lukashins’
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 motion for sanctions because defendants’
Rooker-Feldman argument was neither frivolous nor lacking in support. See
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (setting forth standard
of review).
The Lukashins’ request for judicial notice, filed on April 11, 2014, is granted
only as to the state court superior and appellate dockets, but is otherwise denied as
unnecessary. All other pending motions are denied.
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All pending requests in the Lukashins’ opening brief are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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