MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 29 2015, 9:45 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William A. Russell Gregory F. Zoeller
Pendleton Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana
Pendleton, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William A. Russell, September 29, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
41A04-1504-CR-155
v. Appeal from the Johnson Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable K. Mark Loyd,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
41C01-0511-FB-24
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] William A. Russell (“Russell”), pro se, appeals the trial court’s order denying
his fourth motion to correct erroneous sentence, in which he alleged that the
charging information for the habitual offender allegation was flawed and
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the habitual offender
determination. On appeal, Russell does not argue or show how the trial court’s
denial of his motion was erroneous. Instead, he merely rehashes his arguments
made to the trial court regarding his challenge to his habitual offender
allegation and determination. Because a motion to correct erroneous sentence
is limited to correcting sentencing errors apparent on the face of the judgment
and Russell raises issues outside of this context, we conclude that the trial court
did not err by denying his motion to correct erroneous sentence.
[2] Affirmed.
Issue
Whether the trial court erred by denying Russell’s motion to
correct erroneous sentence.
Facts
[3] The underlying facts of Russell’s case were set forth in our opinion from
Russell’s appeal of the denial of his third motion to correct erroneous sentence:
On November 7, 2005, Russell, with the intent to commit a theft
therein, entered the residence of Christopher Stainbrook.
Stainbrook awoke to find Russell in his bedroom. Stainbrook
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subsequently discovered that Russell had stolen $52.00 from
inside of Stainbrook’s girlfriend’s purse.
On November 9, 2005, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana
(the “State”) charged Russell with Class B felony burglary. The
State also alleged that Russell was a habitual offender. On
November 14, 2006, the trial court found Russell guilty of Class
B felony burglary. The trial court also found that Russell was a
habitual offender. The trial court subsequently sentenced Russell
to a term of twenty years for Class B felony burglary and
enhanced the sentence by an additional twenty-year term by
virtue of Russell’s status as a habitual offender. The trial court’s
sentencing order makes no mention as to whether Russell’s
sentence was to be run consecutive to his prior unrelated
sentence.
On January 11, 2007, Russell filed a notice of appeal. Russell
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was
dismissed with prejudice on June 4, 2007. On October 27, 2008,
Russell filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR
petition”). Russell did not raise any challenge relating to his
sentence in his PCR petition. A hearing was held on Russell’s
PCR petition on August 10, 2009, after which the post-conviction
court denied Russell’s request for post-conviction relief.
On August 4, 2011, Russell, by counsel, filed a motion to correct
erroneous sentence. In this motion, Russell claimed that his
sentence was erroneous pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-
1-15 and the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Breaston v. State,
907 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 2009) because he was on parole for an
unrelated conviction, the sentence for which has also been
enhanced by virtue of his status as a habitual offender, at the time
that he was sentenced in the instant matter. The trial court
subsequently denied Russell’s motion. Russell filed a notice of
appeal on September 16, 2011. On January 30, 2012, Russell
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filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. Russell’s appeal was
thereafter dismissed with prejudice.
On December 13, 2012, Russell, again by counsel, filed a second
motion to correct erroneous sentence. In this motion, Russell
again claimed that his sentence was erroneous under Indiana
Code section 35-38-1-15 and the Indiana Supreme Court’s
opinion in Breaston. Russell attached a document which he
claimed indicated that he was still on parole for his prior
unrelated conviction at the time he was sentenced in the instant
matter. Russell, however, failed to present any proof that the
instant sentence was ordered to run consecutive to the sentence
that was imposed in relation to his prior unrelated conviction.
On January 25, 2013, the trial court denied Russell’s December
13, 2012 motion. Russell subsequently filed a motion to correct
error, which was denied by the trial court on March 13, 2013.
Russell did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to
correct error.
On April 7, 2014, Russell, again by counsel, filed a third motion
to correct erroneous sentence. The April 7, 2014 motion was
identical to the motion filed by Russell on December 13, 2012.
The trial court denied Russell’s third motion to correct an
erroneous sentence on May 30, 2014.
Russell v. State, 2014 WL 6609074, *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2014) (footnotes
omitted). Russell then appealed the denial of his third motion to correct
erroneous sentence. This Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion,
holding that Russell’s third motion to correct erroneous sentence was barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, we held that “the trial court’s previous
rulings on Russell’s repetitious motions, both of which became final judgments,
[were] an absolute bar to Russell again raising the claim at issue in this appeal.”
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Id. at *3. Additionally, we explained that, even if the doctrine of res judicata
did not apply, Russell’s argument on appeal would fail because he did not claim
that his sentence was erroneous on the face of the judgment and required
consideration of materials outside of the judgment. Id. We further explained
that, pursuant to Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004), his
argument was not one that could be adjudicated through a motion to correct
erroneous sentence and should have, instead, been brought in a petition for
post-conviction relief. Id. at *4.
[4] On March 2, 2015, Russell, pro se, filed his fourth motion to correct erroneous
sentence pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15. In his motion, Russell
attacked his habitual offender enhancement and argued that: (1) the State had
used related felonies as the basis of his habitual offender enhancement; and (2)
the charging information for his habitual offender allegation was insufficient
because it did not contain offense and sentencing dates for his prior convictions.
Ten days later, the trial court denied Russell’s motion. Russell now appeals.1
Decision
[5] Russell appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct erroneous
sentence pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15. We review a trial court’s
1
The same day that Russell filed his motion to correct erroneous sentence, he also filed a “Motion for
Change of Venue from Judge” and a “Verified Application for Leave to Prosecute or Defendant [sic] Action
as a Poor Person and for Assignment of Counsel.” (App. 12). The trial court denied these motions on the
same day as it denied Russell’s motion to correct erroneous sentence. Russell does not appeal the denial of
these other motions.
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denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before it. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012).
[6] An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion
to correct the sentence pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15. Neff v. State,
888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250-51 (Ind. 2008). INDIANA CODE § 35-38-1-15 provides:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
[7] A statutory motion to correct erroneous sentence “may only be used to correct
sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the
sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787.
“Such claims may be resolved by considering only the face of the judgment and
the applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or
extrinsic to the record.” Fulkrod v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006). If a claim requires consideration of the proceedings before, during, or
after trial, it may not be presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous
sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Such claims are best addressed on
direct appeal or by way of a petition for post-conviction relief where applicable.
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Id. “Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be narrowly
confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, and the
“facially erroneous” prerequisite should henceforth be strictly applied[.]” Id.
[8] Here, Russell does not allege that his sentence is facially erroneous. Instead, he
challenges his habitual offender determination and enhancement. The errors he
alleges are not clear from the face of the sentencing order and are not
appropriate for a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See Robinson, 805
N.E.2d at 787. Accordingly, because he has failed to show that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his motion, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment. See, e.g., Bauer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to correct erroneous
sentence where the defendant’s claims required consideration of matters in the
record outside the face of the judgment and were, accordingly, not the types of
claims properly presented in a motion to correct erroneous sentence), trans.
denied.
[9] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.
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William A. Russell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion