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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 13-14897
_________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-00464-WHA-WC
KESIA J. PERRY,
VALENCIA AARON,
STACY D. TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
JEFF ROGERS,
Chief, in his individual capacity,
STAN GOOLSBY,
in his individual capacity,
KENNETH DAVIS,
Lt., in his individual capacity,
JEAN TURNER,
in her individual capacity,
ALABAMA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
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__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
__________________________
(September 29, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kesia Perry, Valencia Aaron, and Stacy Taylor brought various claims
against their employer, the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (“ABC
Board”), including claims of race discrimination, race-based hostile work
environment, and retaliation. After conducting a review of the record, the district
court determined that the ABC Board was entitled to summary judgment on all
claims advanced by Appellants. Perry, Aaron, and Taylor now appeal the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the ABC Board on their hostile
work environment claims. Perry also appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the ABC Board on her retaliation claim. Appellants have
abandoned all other claims previously advanced.
Although Perry, Taylor, and Aaron presented instances during which
supervisors allegedly made offensive racial remarks, we find that they have not
presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged harassment was
objectively severe or pervasive enough to establish a racially hostile work
environment. And, because no genuine issue of material fact exists, we affirm the
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district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the ABC Board on these
claims. But we conclude that Perry presented sufficient evidence to preclude the
entry of summary judgment with respect to her retaliation claim. We therefore
vacate the summary judgment against her on this claim.
I.
A. General Background
The ABC Board is an agency of the State of Alabama that controls the sale
of alcoholic beverages through distribution, licensing, and law enforcement. It
operates retail stores that sell liquor, and it also licenses businesses that sell
alcoholic beverages. The ABC Board employs more than 120 sworn law-
enforcement officers and administrative personnel. As an agency of the State of
Alabama, the ABC Board is subject to the rules and regulations of the State
Personnel Department (“SPD”). Both the SPD and the ABC Board have
established policies that prohibit discrimination against any employee based upon
race.
The Administrator, who is the final decision maker for all hiring, firing,
disciplinary, and promotional decisions for ABC Board employees, runs the ABC
Board. During the period relevant to the facts of this case, Emory Folmar, a
Caucasian male, was the Administrator of the ABC Board.
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The ABC Board’s Law Enforcement Division’s command center for
statewide operations is located in Montgomery, Alabama. The Law Enforcement
Division also maintains eleven enforcement district offices across the State of
Alabama. In addition, at times, the Law Enforcement Division operated a Drug
Unit. A “Chief” heads the Law Enforcement Division of the ABC Board, and a
“Captain” reports to the Chief. During the period relevant to this case, Charles
Jeffrey Rogers, a Caucasian male, served as a Chief, and John Richardson, an
African-American male, was a Captain.
B. Kesia Perry
In August 2007, Perry began her employment with the ABC Board as an
Administrative Support Assistant II (“ASA II”) and remained in this position until
January 2012. As an ASA II, Perry was responsible for filing and retrieving
documents, as well as answering the telephone. Perry, who is African-American,
asserts that she was subjected to racially charged remarks by her co-workers,
supervisors, and administrators. Perry also points to incidents of alleged disparate
treatment, which she argues contributed to a racially hostile work environment.
With respect to her retaliation claim, Perry contends that she was retaliated against
for opposing discrimination, filing an internal complaint with the SPD, and filing
an EEOC charge.
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In July 2009 one of Perry’s supervisors, Mark Hatfield, addressed
performance problems with Perry, including criticism that Perry took too many
personal phone calls at work. During the counseling session, Perry became upset
and complained that coworkers “had a racist attitude” towards her and other
African-American employees, though Perry did not specify any particular events or
indicate the individuals whom she believed to be racist. Work appraisals of Perry
during that year indicate that Perry received high performance scores.
In early 2010, Perry’s first-line supervisor, Diane Sullivan, retired, and Perry
expressed interest in being cross-trained for Sullivan’s position. The ABC Board,
however, filled the vacancy with Chief Rogers’s sister-in-law, Summer Childers, a
Caucasian female. Upon hiring Childers, the ABC Board requested that the SPD
match Childers’s salary from her previous job with a bank. In late April 2010,
Perry and another employee, Linda Flores (Caucasian), accessed their coworkers’
salaries online and discovered that Childers’s pay was higher than Perry’s. As a
result, Perry complained to Rogers, Hatfield, and Personnel Director Stan Goolsby
about the pay discrepancy. Goolsby explained to Perry that the difference in pay
was based on the ABC Board’s salary-matching policy. Hatfield later counseled
Perry for reviewing her coworkers’ salaries online. Hatfield also issued a written
warning (the first step of the progressive discipline policy) to Flores for her
participation in the event.
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A few weeks later, in late June 2010, Rogers informed Perry that the ABC
Board had decided to transfer her from its Central Office to District 10. The
transfer was Hatfield’s idea, and he explained that he believed that the transfer
would provide Perry with different work responsibilities, which would offer her a
better opportunity for promotion. Perry objected initially but later indicated that
she would accept the transfer and do her best. Although Rogers stated that Perry’s
transfer was not punitive, a later email indicates that the reason for Perry’s transfer
was due to a “disgruntled/disciplinary issue.”
Sometime in 2010, Perry began dating another African-American ABC
Board employee, Andy Lard. The ABC Board conducted an internal-affairs
investigation of Lard, which resulted in his arrest and indictment for taking seized
money from evidence. As part of the investigation, an ABC Board supervisor
questioned Perry about her relationship with Lard—a process that Perry referred to
as an “interrogation.” During the ABC Board’s investigation of Lard, Rogers sent
an email to the entire Enforcement Division instructing employees not to speak to
Lard. Perry was also asked to sign a document stating that she would not remove
any documents from the ABC Board’s offices. Perry became overwhelmed with
stress due to the incident and took FMLA leave beginning on August 9, 2010.
On the same day that she went out on FMLA leave, Perry filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
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complaining of race discrimination by the ABC Board. In support of her charge,
Perry cited Childers’s higher pay, Perry’s transfer to District 10, and Perry’s
perceived harassment with respect to Lard. Approximately one week later, on
August 18, 2010, Perry filed a complaint with SPD alleging that the ABC Board
had discriminated against her based on her race when it transferred her to District
10.
When Perry returned from FMLA leave in November 2010, the ABC Board
transferred her from District 10 back to the Personnel Division in ABC’s Central
Office. The ABC Board transferred Perry because her doctor indicated that she
could not return to work in District 10 due to stress.
In the Central Office, Goolsby became Perry’s direct supervisor. Soon after
Perry returned to work, newly appointed ABC Administrator Mac Gipson met with
Perry and encouraged her to drop her EEOC charge. According to Perry, Gipson
told her that it would be best if she did not pursue the lawsuit because it was like
suing family members and friends. Gipson told Perry that she “just needed to think
twice about it.”
On June 14, 2011, Perry filed the underlying lawsuit alleging race
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Perry named Goolsby as
an individual plaintiff in the action. About one month after Perry filed suit,
Goolsby assigned another ABC Board employee, Andy Knight, to supervise Perry,
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even though Knight had not supervised anyone for several years. Perry was
Knight’s sole subordinate at the time. Goolsby instructed Knight to keep a close
watch over Perry and to use progressive discipline, if necessary. 1 Knight later
admitted that Goolsby told him that he expected that Perry, because of her
personality, “would either hang herself or she would become so upset that she
would quit.” In fact, Goolsby told Knight on a number of occasions, “maybe she’ll
quit.”
While under Knight’s supervision, Perry was responsible for working the
switchboard and ensuring that it was properly staffed during breaks. According to
Knight, however, problems between Perry and other switchboard operators led to
instances where the switchboard was left unattended. Knight therefore counseled
Perry about punctuality, cooperation with coworkers, and compliance with the
ABC Board’s rules. In response, Perry complained that her coworker, Linda
Caldwell, was difficult to work with and did not cover the switchboard when she
was supposed to. Since Knight was not Caldwell’s supervisor, he spoke with
Caldwell’s supervisor about the issues that Perry brought up.
During the course of her supervision under Goolsby and Knight, Perry
received two disciplinary actions—a written reprimand for tardiness and
insubordination and a suspension for violating leave policies and procedures. The
1
According to Goolsby, he assigned Knight to supervise Perry to provide a “buffer”
between himself and Perry.
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ABC Board alleged that Perry failed to comply with policies, leaving for a period
of several days from December 29, 2011, through January 5, 2012. According to
Perry, however, she called Goolsby, explaining that she would not be able to get to
work on time because she needed to assist her father, who had recently had a heart
attack, in transferring to a new medical facility. Based on Knight’s
recommendation, Perry received a three-day suspension (from January 13, 2012,
through January 17, 2012).
Before Perry left for her suspension, Knight asked Perry to create a staffing
schedule for the switchboard for the days that she would be out. Perry forgot to
draft the schedule. When Perry returned to work on January 18, 2012, Knight
confronted Perry and chided her that she had acted insubordinately. After her
encounter with Knight, Perry returned to her work station, but by mid-morning, she
left the building. When Perry did not return to work after a few days, Goolsby sent
her a letter indicating that her actions constituted job abandonment and voluntary
resignation. The ABC Board terminated Perry on January 24, 2012.
Knight stated that after Perry was fired, Goolsby walked by and said, “Man,
you set her up,” and motioned with a thumbs up. Rogers also congratulated Knight
and told him that he “had done what they had not been able to do.”
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C. Stacy Taylor
In March 2007, Taylor began his employment with the ABC Board as an
Agent in the Law Enforcement Division. 2 Taylor held this position until he
resigned on January 29, 2010. Like Perry, Taylor is African-American and asserts
that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment. Taylor also points to
alleged incidents of disparate treatment, which he contends contributed to a
racially hostile work environment.
Taylor’s first appointment with the ABC Board was to the District 3 office
located in Birmingham, Alabama. At that time, Taylor was the only African-
American in the office. Taylor believed that he was excluded from work and
social activities by other Caucasian agents. After Taylor discussed the situation
with the other agents, however, they began to include him.
In September 2007, Taylor requested a transfer to District 13, the Drug Unit
of the ABC Board in Montgomery. Rogers denied the request, stating that the
ABC Board was not accepting transfers to the Drug Unit at the time. A few weeks
later, Taylor sent a request to be transferred to District 10, also in Montgomery.
Taylor’s request explained that he was involved in divorce proceedings and needed
to be closer to his children. Taylor followed up with his transfer request in
2
Agents have several duties, including (1) investigating illegal activities, such as alcohol
and tobacco violations; (2) completing forms such as incident/offense reports and applications
for search and arrest warrants; and (3) completing ABC license applications. Agents are also
required to complete security details at the ABC Board’s warehouse, located in Montgomery.
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October and again in December. In early January 2008, Taylor received a transfer
to District 10. A few months later, Taylor renewed his request to transfer into the
Drug Unit, but the request was denied.
In December 2008, Lieutenant Dennis Hill assigned Taylor to work at the
ABC Board’s warehouse for a week as discipline for Taylor’s low statistics at
work.3 The job is perceived to be undesirable because it is hot and dirty in the
warehouse. Taylor complained that the warehouse assignment was due to his race,
and Hill forwarded the complaint to the ABC Board’s Central Office. While
working at the warehouse, Taylor was not permitted to use a golf cart to ride
around the warehouse, even though he observed Caucasian agents using the golf
cart on numerous occasions.
On October 23, 2009, Lieutenant Jean Turner replaced Hill as Taylor’s
supervisor in District 10. 4 Approximately one month later, an inspection of the
cars in District 10 revealed that Taylor’s new Dodge Charger had a dent on the
passenger side door. Taylor had not reported the dent in the state-owned vehicle.
Turner issued Taylor a written warning for failing to maintain his car. On the same
3
The ABC Board required its enforcement agents to complete security details at the
warehouse during which the agent ensured that the warehouse workers did not steal any
inventory.
4
Turner had a reputation as being the person who would terminate employees that Chief
Rogers wanted gone.
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date, and as a result of the same inspection, Turner disciplined Gary Humphrey, a
male Caucasian agent, for the condition of his vehicle.
A few months later, Turner met with Taylor and told him that he was not
performing his job correctly and that he would be transferred to Dothan, effective
February 1, 2010. Turner reviewed Taylor’s cases with him, which revealed
unfavorable statistics indicating that Taylor had not been completing cases. Turner
explained to Taylor that a transfer to a smaller division might help Taylor with his
productivity. Taylor objected to the transfer. The day after Taylor met with
Turner, he completed an EEOC intake questionnaire alleging race discrimination.
Two days later, the EEOC sent Goolsby a notice that Taylor had filed the
grievance.
On January 25, 2010, Taylor submitted a letter of resignation but completed
the work week. The letter explained the reason that he was resigning as financial
hardship relating to his pending transfer to Dothan. After his employment ended,
on February 18, 2010, Taylor filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
D. Valencia Aaron
In January 2006, Aaron began her employment with the ABC Board as an
Agent in the Law Enforcement Division. Aaron worked at the ABC Board for
approximately five-and-one-half years before she filed the underlying lawsuit.
Like Perry and Taylor, Aaron is African-American and asserts that she was
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subjected to a racially hostile work environment. In addition, Aaron points to
incidents of disparate treatment, which she claims also contributed to a racially
hostile work environment.
The ABC Board hired Aaron as an Agent in District 3, where her
employment began with a six-month probationary period. Aaron attended a
training academy that the Division conducted for new agents. On April 7, 2006,
Aaron received an evaluation in which Michael Jones, who then commanded
District 3, recommended that Aaron’s probationary status be extended because she
lacked the necessary certification for handling a firearm as an enforcement officer.
According to the ABC Board, it also extended the probationary period of several
Caucasian Agents in similar situations. On October 20, 2006, Aaron completed
her probationary period and became a permanent agent for the ABC Board.
A month after becoming a permanent agent, Aaron requested a transfer from
Jefferson County to the Drug Unit in Montgomery, so she could be closer to her
husband and child. The ABC Board approved the request in March 2007, with
Aaron’s transfer to the Drug Unit becoming effective on April 1, 2007. During her
tenure at the Drug Unit, Aaron performed undercover work. At some point, Aaron
asked her supervisors if she could serve as a trainer. In response, one of the
supervisors, James Collins, an African-American male, told Aaron that no
application process existed for the training task force and explained that trainers
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were simply selected. The other supervisor, Captain Vance Patton, a Caucasian
male, did not respond to Aaron’s inquiry.
In June 2008, while still working in the Drug Unit, Aaron became pregnant
and was unable to perform her undercover duties. Aaron was initially assigned to
light-duty work, and her supervisor kept a close watch over her productivity. On
October 1, 2008, the ABC Board reassigned Aaron from the Drug Unit to District
10, also in the same building in Montgomery. The ABC Board explained to Aaron
that it was transferring her because her undercover position was paid for by a
federal grant which required her to do undercover work. Since Aaron could not
perform undercover work during her pregnancy, Aaron’s salary was no longer
covered by the grant. Because the ABC Board filled her position in the Drug Unit
during her pregnancy, Aaron did not return to her position after her maternity leave
ended.
In October 2009, Lieutenant Jean Turner became Aaron’s supervisor in
District 10 after Dennis Hill was removed from the position. Upon her arrival in
District 10, Turner told Aaron that she was not there to “get” Aaron. During the
same timeframe, Agent Richard Holston, who had also been transferred to District
10, told Aaron that Rogers and another supervisor had instructed him to keep
watch over Aaron.
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On August 9, 2010, while on FMLA leave for knee surgery, Aaron went
with Perry to an EEOC office to fill out an intake questionnaire and a charge of
discrimination. The paperwork indicated that Aaron believed that she had been
denied a promotion based on her race and sex. The following day, Aaron filed a
grievance with the SPD alleging race discrimination. After filing her charge and
while still on FMLA leave, Aaron noticed what she perceived to be several
instances of ABC surveillance in her neighborhood. She also claimed that she saw
an ABC Board agent following her while she was shopping.
During Aaron’s FMLA leave, her supervisor, Lieutenant Davis, completed a
performance review of Aaron. Although the appraisal contained lower scores than
prior evaluations, Davis stated that Aaron was on the high end of “meets
standards.”
Upon her return from FMLA leave for knee surgery, Aaron was twice
assigned to work a detail at a store in Auburn, Alabama, during a football game.
Aaron was unhappy with the assignment for multiple reasons, including the fact
that the detail required Aaron to put strain on her knee. Aaron also claimed that
she had previously completed a similar assignment before her FMLA leave and
contended that another agent, who was Caucasian, had not been assigned to the
detail.
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During the same timeframe, Aaron noticed that Lieutenant Davis began
returning her paperwork with multiple corrections and “red marks.” Davis also
scrutinized the paperwork of another African-American agent, Stephen McKitt. In
contrast, according to Aaron, Davis did not correct or return paperwork to two
Caucasian agents, Jeremy Peterson and Craig Shook, despite multiple errors on
their papers. Davis also instituted new policies that Aaron believed were directed
towards her. For instance, one of the policies included a requirement that all
personnel complete their breakfast by 8:00 a.m. A few days prior to the rule
change, Davis saw Aaron and McKitt having breakfast together in the break room.
Davis told Aaron and McKitt that they would no longer be able to have breakfast
together.
On January 7, 2011, Aaron attended a meeting during which Davis asked
everyone to express their opinions on how District 10 was being run. Aaron
opined that Davis’s actions were retaliatory. The following day, Davis sent an
email to Rogers indicating that he believed that Aaron was disruptive and that her
conduct in the office made other employees uncomfortable. Aaron was
subsequently written up for her actions. Aaron submitted a rebuttal to the
counseling in which she characterized the counseling as further retaliation against
her.
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A few days later, Davis authored an e-mail to all District 10 enforcement
personnel announcing a new physical training policy. Previously, agents were
allowed to use time at the beginning or end of their shifts to work out. According
to Aaron, she and McKitt were the only agents who used the morning and
afternoon time slots for working out. Following the policy change, they could not.
On June 14, 2011, Perry filed her initial Complaint in the underlying matter
and, on June 20, 2011, she amended her Complaint to add Aaron as a plaintiff.
Aaron was still employed by the ABC Board when she filed her complaint.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment drawing
all inferences and reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318
(11th Cir. 2012); Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 964 (11th Cir. 2008). A
district court should grant summary judgment only if the movant establishes the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
III.
A. Perry’s Retaliation Claim
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision states, in relevant part, that it is
unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee “because [s]he has
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opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3; Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). To
establish a claim for retaliation under Title VII, an employee must prove that (1)
she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse
action; and (3) some causal relation exists between the two events. Goldsmith v.
Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006)).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to
the defendant to proffer a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the materially
adverse action. Crawford, 529 F.3d at 976. If the defendant proffers a legitimate
non-retaliatory reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the proffered reason is merely pretext and that the real reason was
retaliatory. Id; see also Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266
(11th Cir. 2001) (setting forth the burden-shifting framework for a retaliation case).
The plaintiff cannot establish pretext by merely pointing to facts that demonstrate
retaliatory animus. Rather, she must respond specifically to each of the
defendant’s explanations and rebut them. Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga., 482
F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007).
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To establish a claim of Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate that the desire to retaliate was the “but-for” cause of the challenged
employment action. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct.
2517, 2528 (June 24, 2013). “This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation
would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of
the employer.” Id. at 2533.
Here, the ABC Board conceded that Perry engaged in protected activity on
May 3, 2010, when she complained to Goolsby about pay disparity; on August 9,
2010, when she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC; on August 18,
2010, when she filed a complaint of discrimination with the SPD; and on June 14,
2011, when she filed the underlying complaint in this case. In analyzing Perry’s
retaliation claims, the district court assumed, without holding, that Perry exhausted
her administrative remedies. But the district court determined that the instances of
retaliation either did not constitute materially adverse actions or were not causally
related to Perry’s protected activity. The district court further found that, even if
the alleged acts of discrimination were sufficient to make out a prima facie case of
retaliation, Perry did not establish that the retaliation would not have occurred “but
for” her involvement with protected activity. We disagree with the district court
on both counts.
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An action is materially adverse if it “might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548
U.S. at 68, S. Ct. at 2415 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A plaintiff can establish causation by demonstrating that the protected
activity and the materially adverse action were not “completely unrelated.”
Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). Close temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the materially adverse action can
satisfy the causation element, “[b]ut mere temporal proximity, without more, must
be very close.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when a
plaintiff relies on temporal proximity alone, a substantial delay between the
protected expression and the materially adverse action will result in the failure of
the retaliation claim. Id. We have previously found that a “three to four month
gap is insufficiently proximate to establish causation.” Id.
Perry asserts that the ABC Board retaliated against her in violation of Title
VII because she opposed discrimination, filed an internal complaint with the SPD,
and filed an EEOC Charge. The specific acts of alleged retaliation to which Perry
points are her transfer to District 10, alleged subtle reprisals against her, written
reprimands, and a three-day suspension after she was transferred to District 10.
While most of the acts do not constitute retaliation, we conclude that Knight’s
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close supervision of her was an act of retaliation. We review each alleged adverse
action in turn.
First, Perry has not shown that her transfer to District 10 was a materially
adverse action. A transfer to a new position can be deemed to be adverse if it
involves a reduction in pay, prestige, or responsibility. Hinson v. Clinch Cty., Ga.
Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, however, Perry was
transferred to a position with similar job duties, and no evidence suggests that
Perry suffered a reduction in pay. Accordingly, Perry has not shown that she
suffered any tangible harm as a result of her transfer to District 10.
We recognize that a transfer that results in a diminished opportunity for
increases in salary constitutes a materially adverse action. See Bass v. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs of Orange, Cty., Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 2001),
overruled in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir.
2008). But here, Perry’s supervisors testified that Perry was placed in a better
position to be promoted after her transfer to District 10. Indeed, Hatfield, stated
that the transfer to District 10 would provide Perry with a greater opportunity to
become an ASA III. The record also shows that the transfer placed Perry closer to
home and her children’s school. Perry simply has not produced any evidence
suggesting that the transfer affected her in a materially adverse way.
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Second, although it is not clear precisely upon which disciplinary acts Perry
relies as evidence of retaliation, it appears that she points to the fact that she
received counseling after complaining about Childers’s pay. This counseling
cannot support a claim for retaliation, however, because it does not constitute a
materially adverse action. Aside from the fact that Perry was unhappy about
receiving the counseling, she has not demonstrated that it negatively impacted her
in a material way. As a result, the counseling was not the type of action that might
have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. The record
further demonstrates that the counseling did not constitute formal discipline under
the ABC Board’s policies. In contrast, the other individual involved in reviewing
Childers’s pay online, Linda Flores, who is Caucasian, received a written warning,
which serves as the first step in the ABC’s Board’s progressive discipline policy.
Perry also appears to point to the fact that she received a written reprimand
by Goolsby for tardiness and insubordination in April 2011 as evidence of
retaliation. Again, Perry has failed to set forth any evidence showing how this
written reprimand negatively affected her in a material way. See Davis v. Town of
Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2001) (although a written
reprimand could constitute a materially adverse action, it must be accompanied by
some tangible harm). Even assuming that the reprimand was a materially adverse
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action, no causal connection exists between it and any protected activity. Perry
engaged in protected activity in May 2010, August 2010, and June 2011. The
reprimand, however, did not occur until April 2011, at least seven months after the
last protected activity. This timeframe is too remote to support an inference of
causation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (“A three to four month disparity
between the statutorily protected expression and the adverse employment action is
not enough”).
Third, Perry points to her suspension in January 2012 as evidence of
retaliation. Because the issue was not raised before the district court, 5 we do not
address the suspension on appeal.6 But, even if Perry had raised the issue of her
suspension previously, no causal connection exists between the suspension and any
protected activity. Perry filed her lawsuit in June 2011, and her suspension
occurred in January 2012. Thus, Perry’s suspension occurred approximately seven
months after Perry’s last protected activity. In view of this timespan, Perry cannot
establish causation based upon temporal proximity. See id. Nor does she point to
any other evidence to establish causation.
5
The district court noted that Perry did not “appear to argue that her three-day suspension
was an act of retaliation.”
6
We generally do not consider on appeal issues which the party failed to raise before the
district court. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir.
2004).
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Finally, Perry contends that her placement under Knight’s supervision and
his subsequent close monitoring and disciplinary decisions constituted an act of
retaliation for filing her lawsuit. Perry filed her lawsuit on June 14, 2011, and
Goolsby assigned Knight as her supervisor the following month—in July 2011—
even though Knight had not supervised anyone for several years. Perry was
Knight’s sole subordinate at the time, and Goolsby instructed Knight to keep a
close watch over Perry and to use progressive discipline, if necessary. Knight
admits that Goolsby told him that as a result of this close supervision and because
of her personality, Perry “would either hang herself or she would become so upset
that she would quit.”
During his tenure as Perry’s supervisor, Knight counseled Perry about
punctuality, cooperation with coworkers, and compliance with the ABC Board’s
rules. Perry also received two disciplinary actions—a written reprimand for
tardiness and insubordination and a suspension for violating leave policies and
procedures. Both of these acts constitute materially adverse actions. And, because
Goolsby placed Perry under Knight’s supervision the month after she filed her
lawsuit, a reasonable jury could find that the causation element is met. See
Higdon, 393 F.3d at 1220. While we recognize that the ABC Board claims that it
decided to have Knight supervise Perry to place a “buffer” between Goolsby—a
person who was named as an individual defendant in the case—and Perry, it is also
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plausible that the ABC Board did so to have Knight further scrutinize Perry’s
actions.
Further, although a jury might find that the ABC Board had legitimate
reasons for disciplining Perry, it might also find that Perry adequately rebutted
these reasons by offering the testimony of Knight. Significantly, Knight stated that
after Perry walked off the job, Goolsby approached him exclaiming, “Man, you set
her up,” while making a thumbs-up gesture. Rogers also congratulated Knight and
told him that he “had done what they had not been able to do.”
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Perry, we find that a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether the ABC retaliated against Perry after she
filed her lawsuit. Based on the close temporal proximity between the filing of
Perry’s complaint and the subsequent disciplinary activity, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Perry would not have been closely watched and then disciplined by
Knight in the absence of her protected activity. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand with respect to Perry’s retaliation claim.
B. Appellants’ Claims of a Racially Hostile Work Environment
To succeed on a claim of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show
that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Adams v. Austal,
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U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993)); Miller v. Kenworth of
Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). An employee wishing to
establish a race-based hostile work environment claim must prove that (1) she
belongs to a protected group; (2) she has been subjected to unwelcome harassment;
(3) the harassment was based on her race; (4) the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) the employer is responsible
for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability. Adams,
754 F.3d at 1248-49 (citation omitted); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d
1283 (11th Cir. 2012).
Here, the district court determined that Appellants failed to meet the fourth
element of their prima facie cases because they presented no evidence that the
conduct complained of was severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work
environment. 7 The inquiry regarding the fourth element—whether the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive—contains both a subjective and objective
component. Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 809 (11th
Cir. 2010) (en banc). “The employee must subjectively perceive the harassment as
7
Because it resolved the motion for summary judgment on the fourth element, the district
court did not address whether the fifth element was met, even though the ABC Board raised it in
support of its motion for summary judgment.
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sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, . .
. [and] the objective severity of the harassment should be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the
circumstances.” Adams, 754 F.3d at 1249 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To be actionable, the behavior must result in both “an
environment ‘that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’ and an
environment that the victim ‘subjectively perceive[s] . . . to be abusive.” Miller,
277 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).
With regard to the objective severity of the alleged harassment, the inquiry is
fact intensive, with the court considering four factors: (1) the frequency of the
conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the
conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job performance. Adams, 754
F.3d at 1250-51 (citing Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir.
1999) (en banc)); McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008). “The
objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’”
Reeves, 594 F.3d at 809 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A plaintiff can prove a hostile work environment by showing severe or
pervasive discrimination “directed against her protected group, even if she herself
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is not individually singled out in the offensive conduct.” Id. at 807. Accordingly,
a plaintiff may have a viable hostile work environment claim even if racial slurs
were not directed at her. Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1522
(11th Cir. 1995). But a plaintiff must have knowledge of the remarks in order for
her claim to have merit. Adams, 754 F.3d at 1250. As we have explained, “The
totality of a plaintiff’s workplace circumstances does not include other employees’
experiences of which the plaintiff is unaware. Courts conduct the objective
assessment from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
knowing what the plaintiff knew.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Edwards, 49
F.3d at 1522 (noting that some of the incidents relied upon by the plaintiff were not
made known to her until after her termination and, thus, they could not have
contributed to her subjective view of a hostile work environment).
In this case, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Appellants,
though, we cannot say that reasonable jurors could conclude that Perry, Taylor, or
Aaron suffered severe or pervasive harassment sufficient to alter the terms and
conditions of their employment. Consequently, we find that the district court did
not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the ABC Board with respect
to their hostile-work-environment claims.
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(1) Perry
Perry bases her hostile work environment claim on what she perceived to be
a “racial attitude” at the ABC Board. In support of her claim, Perry cited to two
specific instances, of which she has personal knowledge, during her four-and-one-
half years employed with the ABC Board.
First, Perry stated that she saw a Confederate flag on the personal vehicle of
an ABC Board employee. But Perry presented no evidence as to when or how
frequently she saw the flag.
Second, Perry recounted a conversation involving a reference to the Ku Klux
Klan. Specifically, during a conversation that she had with ABC Board employees
Bob Martin8 and Stan Goolsby, Perry voiced her opinion that Goolsby, the
Personnel Director, allowed employees to refer to African-American employees as
“niggers” and “nigger bitches.” Perry admitted that she had not heard such
comments, however. During the conversation, Martin allegedly responded, “I am
not going to say that people here don’t go to the dry cleaners and get their white
robes out of the cleaners [but . . .] [t]hose are bad people, but you know, what can
we do?” Martin then told Perry that if she heard anyone using the “n” word or
other racial slurs, she should let him know. This remark alludes to the Ku Klux
Klan and suggests the existence of an unacceptably casual attitude by the ABC
8
Martin was the attorney for the ABC Board.
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Board to its employees’ racial intolerance (“what can we do?”). But, ironically,
the overall gist of the remark appears to have been intended to reassure Perry that
the ABC Board would take action against employees who engaged in racially
intolerant behavior in the workplace. And, in any case, it was an isolated incident,
and Perry has pointed to no evidence of similar conversations.
Significantly, during her deposition, Perry admitted that she never personally
heard any ABC Board employee use the “n-word” or any other racial slurs or
epithets. Rather, she stated that she was aware of rumors that Folmar and Rogers
used racial slurs when referring to African-American employees. Perry also
conceded that she never saw any racist symbols or graffiti at her workplace. Nor
did Perry ever encounter any racially insensitive jokes while employed by the ABC
Board.
In the absence of personal knowledge of race-based conduct, Perry seeks to
rely on the testimony of other ABC Board employees who spoke of instances
where Rogers allegedly used racially derogatory language. But we cannot consider
evidence of the alleged racial harassment of other employees of which Perry was
not aware in determining the viability of Perry’s hostile work environment claim.
See Adams, 754 F.3d at 1250 (district court should not consider evidence of other
employees’ experiences of racial harassment of which the plaintiff is not aware);
see also Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1522. Apart from potential hearsay problems with
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respect to some of the alleged racially charged statements, insufficient information
exists as to when the statements were made, how Perry acquired knowledge of
them, and when Perry learned of them. Perry refers only vaguely to statements
allegedly overheard by co-workers. And other evidence in the record suggests that
Perry acquired the information through only discovery in this matter, not through
her work environment. Id. Of course, Perry’s workplace experience does not
include other employees’ experiences of which Perry was unaware. See Adams,
754 F.3d at 1250. Moreover, contrary to her position on appeal, during her
deposition, Perry testified that she did not encounter any events during her
employment at the ABC Board that created a racially hostile work environment.
In addition to the two instances of racially charged conduct of which she was
aware, Perry identifies what she considers to be discrete acts of disparate treatment
to support her claim that she was exposed to a racially hostile work environment.
Cf. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 807 (disparate treatment can take the form of a hostile
work environment). 9 Because Perry has not demonstrated that any of these
instances were racially motivated, however, she cannot rely on them in support of
her hostile-work-environment claim. See Jones, 683 F.3d at 1297 (only conduct
that is based on a protected category, such as race, may be considered in a hostile-
work-environment analysis). We address each discrete act in turn.
9
We assume without deciding that discrete acts of disparate treatment can be used in
analyzing a hostile work environment claim.
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First, Perry has not come forth with any evidence to suggest that her transfer
to District 10 was racially motivated, except for her own perception that race
played a role in the transfer. The record reveals that it was not uncommon for the
ABC Board to transfer agents. For instance, Caucasian agents Ted Yost, Cindy
Yost, and Darrell Wallace were all transferred as part of a corrective plan.
Next, with respect to Perry’s claim that she received excessive discipline
after her transfer to District 10, the record does not support a finding that the
discipline was due to Perry’s race. While Perry points to the fact that she was
counseled after reviewing Childers’s salary online, the Caucasian employee
involved in the incident, Linda Flores, received more severe discipline—a written
warning (the first step of the ABC Board’s progressive discipline policy).
Similarly, although Perry was told that she could no longer take breaks with Flores
after the incident, this repercussion affected both Perry and Flores equally.
Regarding Perry’s complaint that she was “watched” at work after her
transfer to District 10, Perry did not come forward with any evidence that would
support a finding that this action was taken as a result of racial animus. Indeed, we
rejected a similar claim made by Perry’s co-worker, Steve McKitt last year. See
McKitt v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 571 F. App’x 867 (11th
Cir. 2014).
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Finally, with respect to Perry’s assertion that a “white employee [got] her
[job duties[,]” she refers to the fact that Childers was selected by the ABC Board
when Sullivan retired. Even if Perry could demonstrate any disparate treatment
with respect to the decision, this single event, even when viewed in conjunction
with the two racially motivated events experienced by Perry, would not be enough
to prevent the entry of summary judgment in favor of the ABC Board on Perry’s
hostile-work-environment claim.
In the roughly four-and-one-half years that Perry was employed with the
ABC Board before filing her complaint of discrimination, she experienced two
instances of racial hostility. While unacceptable, this conduct was not frequent
enough to be considered pervasive. Additionally, the conduct was not physically
threatening to Perry and did not unreasonably interfere with her job performance. 10
Under these circumstances, an objective person in Perry’s position would
not perceive the totality of the circumstances as producing a racially hostile work
environment. Because Perry has not shown that a genuine issue of material fact
exists with respect to her hostile-work-environment claim, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the ABC Board. See Adams, 754
F.3d at 1255-56.
10
Perry admitted during her deposition that her knowledge of other ABC Board
employees’ alleged use of racial slurs did not interfere with her ability to do her job.
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(2) Taylor
As with Perry, in addition to discrete acts of alleged racial discrimination,
Taylor points to the use of racial slurs in the workplace to support his hostile-work
environment-claim. The record reflects, however, that the statements upon which
Taylor seeks to rely were made outside of his presence, and Taylor did not acquire
knowledge of the alleged slurs until after his employment with the ABC Board
ended.
During his deposition, Taylor stated that he had never seen any racially
charged symbols or graffiti while employed at the ABC Board. Taylor also
admitted that he had never heard another employee use a racial slur or make a
racially insensitive joke while at the ABC Board. Nor did Taylor observe any
racial symbols or graffiti at the ABC Board. Similarly, Taylor did not witnesses
any Confederate flags displayed in the workplace. Taylor points out only that he
heard a rumor that Folmar used racial slurs.
Although Taylor attempts to rely on the same use of racial slurs that Perry
tried to invoke, Taylor admits that his knowledge of these events came after he
resigned from the ABC Board. Indeed, Taylor conceded that his knowledge of the
alleged use of racial slurs by Folmar and Rogers came from Aaron and Perry, who
had apparently heard rumors in this regard.
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Because Taylor was not aware of the use of racial slurs while he was
employed by the ABC Board, they could not have contributed to any subjective
belief that he was exposed to a hostile work environment. Although a plaintiff
may have a claim for hostile work environment even if racial slurs were not
directed towards him, he cannot support his claim with events that were unknown
to him during his employment. Adams, 754 F.3d at 1250 (district court should not
consider evidence of other employees’ experiences of racial harassment of which
the plaintiff is not aware); Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1522 (noting that some of the
incidents relied upon by the plaintiff were not made known to her until after her
termination and, thus, they could not have contributed to her subjective view of a
hostile work environment).
Because Taylor cannot point to any racial slurs of which he was aware
during his employment with the ABC Board, we do not consider the other discrete
acts upon which Taylor relies for his hostile-work-environment claim. Discrete
acts alone cannot form the basis of a hostile-work-environment claim. See Gowski,
682 F.3d at 1312-13.
(3) Aaron
Although Aaron comes closer to defeating summary judgment with respect
to her hostile-work-environment claim, we nonetheless must conclude that she also
did not set forth sufficient facts to create a genuine issue of material fact as to this
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claim. In contrast to Perry and Taylor, Aaron demonstrated that she had
knowledge of the repeated use of racial slurs by her superiors. Aaron also based
her claim on various discrete acts that she asserts contributed to a racially hostile
work environment. Although Aaron is unable to demonstrate how most of these
discrete acts were racially motivated, we find that a reasonable jury could
determine that two of the discrete acts to which Aaron points evidence racial
animus. Ultimately, however, we conclude that the totality of Aaron’s experiences
is insufficient to support a hostile-work-environment claim. We consider both the
discrete acts upon which Aaron relies and Aaron’s knowledge of the use racial
slurs in the workplace. 11
First, with respect to the extension of her probationary period, Aaron has not
provided any evidence, except her own subjective belief, that this action was
racially motivated. The record demonstrates that Caucasian agents also had their
probationary periods extended while employed by the ABC Board. For instance,
Lieutenant Turner, a Caucasian female, testified that her probationary period was
extended by the ABC Board. Turner also pointed to other Caucasian agents whose
probationary periods were extended, including Rogers’s son, who had his
probationary period extended due to his attendance at the same training academy
11
Again, we assume without deciding that discrete acts of disparate treatment may be
used in analyzing a hostile work environment claim.
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that Aaron went to. Under these circumstances, Aaron has not shown that the
extension of her probationary period demonstrates any discriminatory intent.
Next, the circumstances surrounding Aaron’s transfer from the Drug Unit to
District 10 do not support an inference of racial animus. During her tenure with
the Drug Unit, Aaron became pregnant and was no longer able to perform her
undercover duties. After being placed on light duty, Aaron was transferred to
District 10 because her position in the Drug Unit was paid by a grant that required
her to perform undercover work. Aaron admitted that she was not able to perform
undercover work due to her pregnancy. Although Aaron was transferred to District
10, she was not forced to relocate because District 10 is in the same building as the
Drug Unit. Aside from her suggestion that the transfer was racially motivated,
Aaron has come forward with no evidence that the decision was made due to
racially discriminatory motives. In addition, in her affidavit filed in opposition to
summary judgment, Aaron indicated that she believed that the transfer was “sex
discrimination,” not race discrimination.
Aaron also suggests that the ABC Board’s failure to select her as a trainer is
evidence of disparate treatment based on her race. Aaron asked a sergeant and a
captain at the ABC Board if she could serve as a trainer for other agents. During
the conversation, Aaron informed them that she was a crew leader in the military.
In response to her inquiry, Captain Patton (African-American) explained that no
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formal procedure existed that allowed agents to apply to be trainers. According to
Patton, trainers were merely chosen. Although this conversation may suggest that
discrimination could play a role in selection of trainers, Aaron did not point to any
specific instance in which alleged discrimination took place. Based on these
circumstances, Aaron cannot establish that the failure to be selected as a trainer
was based on her race.
With respect to her 2009-2010 performance appraisal, Aaron asserts that she
received lower scores from her then-supervisor, Lieutenant Davis, while she was
out on FMLA leave. Although Aaron believed that she was deserving of higher
scores, her performance appraisal score of 25 was on the high end of “meets
standards.” Davis scored Aaron only 1.7 points below “exceeds standards.”
Presumably, if Davis desired to discriminate against Aaron based on her race, he
could have rated her work performance as “does not meet standards” or “partially
meets standards,” options that were both available on the performance appraisal
form. Aaron’s belief that she was entitled to a higher score, without more, does
not evidence any racial animus.
Aaron also suggests that the implementation of new workplace rules in
District 10 by Davis evidences race discrimination. Aaron points to a change in
the policies relating to when agents were permitted to take breakfast and work out.
We reject Aaron’s suggestion that the implementation of these policies was
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somehow discriminatory, as the policies applied equally to all District 10 agents,
regardless of race.
On the other hand, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
her, we conclude that Aaron has pointed to two discrete acts that reasonable jurors
could find suggest racial animus on the part of the ABC Board. First, Aaron’s
selection to work store security detail assignments during a college-football game
day when she returned from FMLA leave for knee surgery, may support an
inference of discrimination. Aaron had already volunteered for similar details
before she went out on FMLA leave but was required to work weekends to make
up for the work that she had missed while out on leave. Another Caucasian agent,
Brian Hand, had not worked a football-game detail the entire season. Based on
this evidence, a jury could find that the decision to assign Aaron to this security
assignment was evidence of disparate treatment based on race.
Second, the increased scrutiny of Aaron’s work performance by her
supervisor may evidence the ABC Board’s discriminatory intent. During her
employment, Aaron noticed that Davis began returning her paperwork with
multiple red marks and that he also closely scrutinized another African-American
agent’s reports. Aaron identified two Caucasian agents, Jeremy Peterson and Craig
Shook, to whom Davis did not return paperwork with similar red marks, despite
serious errors on their documents. Davis’s treatment of Aaron and co-worker
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McKitt, in contrast to the Caucasian agents, may support an inference of
discriminatory intent.
Ultimately, we find that Aaron has set forth two discrete acts that could
support her allegation of disparate treatment based on race. In addition to these
discrete acts, Aaron claims that she experienced and knew of the use of racial slurs
and other offensive and racially insensitive conduct. Despite Aaron’s claims of
harassment, she admits that she never saw any racist symbols or graffiti while
employed by the ABC Board. Aaron also testified that, unlike Perry, she never
saw any Confederate flags at work. Similarly, Aaron admitted that she never heard
any employee make a racially insensitive joke, and she could not recall hearing any
references to the KKK. Finally, Aaron conceded that she never heard any
employees use the “n-word.”
Nevertheless, Aaron was allegedly aware of the use of racially charged
language. But, before turning to the racially charged language upon which Aaron
relies to support her claim, we pause to note that we make no finding as to whether
the remarks presented by her were actually uttered. Instead, we merely assume, as
we must, that the facts as presented by Aaron on appeal are true.
First, Aaron testified that she directly heard Administrator Folmar refer to a
warehouse employee, J.C. Caldwell, as “monkey.” More specifically, Aaron stated
that she heard Folmar say, “He’s over there working like a little monkey.” Other
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than this serious instance of unacceptable behavior by no less than the
Administrator of the entire department, Aaron could not recall hearing any other
racially offensive language directly.
Aaron did state, though, that she knew of co-workers who heard racially
insensitive language in the workplace. Some of these employees shared their
experiences with Aaron during her employment, furthering her opinion that the
ABC Board permitted supervisors to openly display their racist attitudes. For
instance, after Aaron filed her charge of discrimination, Lieutenant Hill told Aaron
that Rogers had referred to her in a derogatory manner and had exclaimed that
“niggers were always wanting something for nothing.” The fact that Rogers made
such a declaration is substantiated by other employees and by the fact that Rogers
later sent e-mails stating that “some people want something for nothing.” We
regard this remark as serious and extremely offensive, and it is even more so since
it was allegedly uttered by the Chief.
Additionally, Sergeant Richard Holston informed Aaron that, during the
investigation of a man who allegedly stole alcohol from the ABC warehouse,
Folmar told him that he “wanted the nigger hung from a light pole.” This is
another incredibly offensive and unacceptable remark allegedly made by the man
charged with leading the ABC Board. Aaron was also aware of an incident relayed
to her by co-worker Steve McKitt in which Rogers allegedly used the word
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“nigger” when quoting a line from the movie Full Metal Jacket. The quotation
from the movie was, “There is no racial bigotry here. I do not look down on
niggers, kikes, wops or greasers. Here you are all equally worthless.” Like Perry
and Taylor, Aaron also states that she was aware that Rogers and Folmar were
rumored to use racial slurs.
Aside from these incidents—none of which are acceptable if true, Aaron
also points to additional comments relayed to her by co-workers. But it is not
possible to infer from the record that Aaron knew about these comments prior to
filing suit.
Finally, Aaron seeks to rely on the instances of racism experienced by Perry.
In support of her own hostile-work-environment claim, Aaron points to the fact
that Perry testified that she heard a reference to the Ku Klux Klan and saw a
Confederate flag at work. But once again, the record does not allow us to infer that
Aaron was aware, prior to filing her complaint, of the instances upon which Perry
relied to support her hostile-work-environment claim. Because Aaron has not
sufficiently established that she knew of these events before filing her lawsuit, we
cannot consider this evidence with respect to Aaron’s claim. It bears repeating that
if Aaron was not aware of this racially charged conduct at the time she filed her
Complaint, it could not have contributed to any subjective belief at the time of her
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employment that she was exposed to a hostile work environment. See Adams, 754
F.3d at 1250 and Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1522.
We expressly condemn the reprehensible and serious nature of the remarks
recounted by Aaron. But as despicable as the alleged conduct is—and it certainly
is despicable—taking the evidence in its entirety, we cannot conclude that the
incidents experienced by Aaron could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that she
suffered the type of severe and pervasive sustained harassment over her five-and-
one-half years of employment that rises to the level of a hostile work environment.
See e.g., Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 585-86 (11th Cir. 2000)
overruled on other grounds by Burlington, 548 U.S. at 53, 126 S. Ct. at 2405;
Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247. During her employment, Aaron knew about a total of
six specific instances of racially harassing conduct. That included two discrete acts
that could be considered disparate treatment—the assignment to a store security
detail and receiving papers with multiple red marks on them. And she was aware
of four racially charged remarks but heard only one of these remarks directly.
Without question, this type of disgusting language and sentiment has no
place in any work environment. But other than the one comment that Folmar
allegedly made, Aaron did not hear any racially charged remarks firsthand. And
Aaron was aware of only three other instances where racially charged language
supposedly was used. Although no magic number exists to enable a plaintiff to
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establish the harassment necessary to make out a hostile-work-environment claim,
it is the “repeated incidents of [] harassment that continue despite the employee’s
objections [that] are indicative of a hostile work environment.” Miller, 277 F.3d at
1276 (internal quotations and citations omitted). While we condemn the extremely
offensive nature of these types of incidents, the record does not evidence the type
of concentrated harassment necessary to sustain a hostile-work-environment claim
under our precedent. See e.g., Adams, 754 F.3d at 1255-56.
It does not escape us that nearly all of the instances of racial intolerance and
bigotry were allegedly displayed by supervisors—Administrator Folmar and Chief
Rogers. And, as we noted in Adams, the use of a racial slur by supervisors imparts
with it a greater sense of severity. See Adams, 754 F.3d at 1254 (noting that
although the plaintiff heard a racial slur, “he did not offer evidence that a
supervisor used the word or that anyone directed it toward him”). Where a
plaintiff’s own supervisor engages in racial bigotry, including the use of racial
slurs, the harassment is that much worse. Indeed, these individuals make decisions
that directly affect the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment—hiring,
firing, promotion, and reprimands. Unlike when a plaintiff suffers harassment by a
co-worker, she cannot merely “walk away” from a supervisor to escape the
harassing conduct.
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But here, the relatively infrequent incidents, taken together over the course
of the five-and-a-half-year period of Aaron’s employment with the ABC Board
would not lead fair-minded jurors to conclude that Aaron suffered severe and
pervasive harassment sufficient to alter the terms or conditions of her employment,
as that standard is construed in this Circuit. See e.g., Gupta, 212 F.3d at 585-86;
Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1247. No evidence exists that Aaron felt physically
threatened by the harassment. Likewise, the evidence does not suggest that the
alleged harassment prevented Aaron from performing her job. Ultimately, we
conclude that Aaron has not presented a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the alleged harassment that she faced was objectively severe or pervasive
enough to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of a racially hostile
work environment.
V.
Because we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to
Appellants’ claims of a racially hostile work environment, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the ABC Board on these claims.
But we find that Perry presented sufficient evidence to preclude the entry of
summary judgment with respect to her retaliation claim. We therefore vacate the
summary judgment against her on this claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
45