UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4846
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DELWIN PRIDGEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt,
Senior District Judge. (7:14-cr-00024-BR-1)
Submitted: September 15, 2015 Decided: September 29, 2015
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, P.C., Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Delwin Pridgen appeals the 96-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm and
ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012), and possession of stolen firearms, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (2012). On appeal, Pridgen
raises three claims of procedural sentencing error. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness, applying
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We must first determine whether
the district court committed significant procedural error, such
as improper calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient
consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or
inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed. United States
v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111-12 (4th Cir. 2015).
When considering challenges to the district court’s
Guidelines calculations, we review factual findings for clear
error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Cox, 744
F.3d 305, 308 (4th Cir. 2014). However, we review arguments not
properly preserved in the district court for plain error.
United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2014); see
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013)
(identifying elements of plain error test).
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Pridgen first argues that the district court erred in
imposing a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2014), for use or possession
of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. He
argues that the firearms he possessed could not have facilitated
the North Carolina offense of felony breaking or entering,
because he did not possess the firearms until after he broke
into the victim’s home. Pridgen did not challenge the
enhancement on this basis in the district court, so we review
this claim for plain error. See Zayyad, 741 F.3d at 459.
Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level
enhancement if the defendant “[u]sed or possessed any firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” The
enhancement is designed “to punish more severely a defendant who
commits a separate felony offense that is rendered more
dangerous by the presence of a firearm.” United States v.
Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
A firearm is possessed “in connection with” another offense
“if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential
of facilitating, another felony offense.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt.
n.14(A). The Guidelines specifically provide that the
enhancement is warranted when a defendant, “during the course of
a burglary, finds and takes a firearm, even if the defendant did
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not engage in any other conduct with that firearm during the
course of the burglary . . . because the presence of the firearm
has the potential of facilitating another felony offense.” USSG
§ 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B). Pridgen provides no basis for treating
the North Carolina offense of felony breaking or entering
differently than “burglary” under § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B), and we
find no meaningful basis for drawing such a distinction. See
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (defining
generic burglary); United States v. Carr, 592 F.3d 636, 644 (4th
Cir. 2010) (defining North Carolina felonious breaking or
entering); State v. Watkins, 720 S.E.2d 844, 850 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012) (noting felony breaking or entering is lesser included
offense of burglary). We therefore find no error, plain or
otherwise, in the application of this enhancement to Pridgen.
Pridgen also argues that the district court erred in
imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice,
pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1. Under that provision, a two-level
enhancement is assessed when the defendant “willfully obstructed
or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice with respect to the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction,” and the obstructive conduct related to the offense
of conviction, relevant conduct, or “a closely related offense.”
USSG § 3C1.1.
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Following his arrest, Pridgen placed several telephone
calls to his girlfriend, attempting to establish a false alibi
for the underlying break-in, and to convince his girlfriend to
claim ownership of jewelry taken during the break-in and dispose
of additional jewelry of unknown origin. This conduct related
to the investigation of his offense and was substantially
analogous to the nonexclusive list of obstructive conduct
provided in the Guidelines commentary. See USSG § 3C1.1 cmt.
n.4(A), (B); see also USSG § 1B1.3 (defining relevant conduct);
USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.6 (defining “material”). Accordingly, we
find no clear error in the district court’s finding that Pridgen
obstructed justice, see United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092,
1095 (4th Cir. 1995) (standard of review), and no error in the
imposition of the enhancement.
Finally, Pridgen argues that the court gave an inadequate
explanation of the sentence imposed, considering only a single
§ 3553(a) factor. In announcing a sentence, the district court
“must place on the record an individualized assessment based on
the particular facts of the case before it.” United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This explanation need only provide “some
indication” that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors as
they apply to the defendant and considered any nonfrivolous
arguments raised by the parties at sentencing. United States v.
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Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 2006). The court is
“not required to provide a lengthy explanation or robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,” United States v.
Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 342 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted), nor “issue a comprehensive, detailed opinion,”
so long as the explanation is adequate to permit “meaningful
appellate review,” United States v. Allmendinger, 706 F.3d 330,
343 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
context surrounding a district court’s explanation may imbue it
with enough content for us to evaluate both whether the court
considered the § 3553(a) factors and whether it did so
properly.” Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 381.
Although the district court’s explanation was not lengthy
and specifically identified only a single factor—the need to
protect the public from Pridgen’s future crimes, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)—the court expressly adopted the Government’s
sentencing arguments and demonstrated consideration of
additional sentencing factors as they related to Pridgen. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (directing court to consider “the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant”); § 3553(a)(2)(A) (directing
court to consider need “to promote respect for the law”).
Viewed in context, we conclude the court’s explanation provided
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a reasoned basis for rejecting Pridgen’s arguments in mitigation
and was adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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