MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Sep 30 2015, 8:35 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Benjamin Loheide Gregory F. Zoeller
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Wenston Watson, September 30, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
03A01-1501-CR-15
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable James D. Worton,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
03D01-1307-FC-4042
03D01-1301-FC-2230
03D01-1403-FD-1132
03D01-1404-FD-1688
03D01-1104-CM-3445
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] While on probation for two prior offenses, Wenston Watson was charged with
four felonies and a misdemeanor under three new cause numbers, resulting in a
petition to revoke his probation. Watson and the State entered a plea
agreement that disposed of all five causes. Watson now appeals his sentence,
arguing the trial court abused its discretion by not finding two mitigating
factors: his guilty plea and undue hardship to his dependent children. Finding
the record reflects that Watson pled guilty as part of a plea agreement which
provided adequate benefits to him, and that the record does not reflect an undue
burden on his dependent children, we affirm the trial court’s sentence.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] While Watson was on probation for cause numbers 03D01-1404-FD-1688
(“FD-1688”), and 03D01-1106-CM-3445 (“CM-3445”), he was charged with
five crimes, four of them felonies, in three separate cause numbers, 03D01-
1304-FC-2230 (“FC-2230”), 03D01-1307-FC-4042 (“FC-4042”), and 03D01-
1403-FD-1132 (“FD-1132”). Based on the new charges, the State petitioned to
revoke Watson’s probation. Watson and the State entered a plea agreement
that provided Watson would plead guilty to Class A misdemeanor domestic
battery and Class D felony attempted criminal confinement to be entered as a
Class A misdemeanor under cause number FC-4042; Class D felony failure to
appear under cause number FD-1132; and admit violating his probation in
cause numbers FD-1688 and CM-3445. In exchange, the State agreed to
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dismiss cause number FC-2230, which contained two felony counts. According
to the plea agreement sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court.
[3] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found two aggravating factors—
Watson’s history of criminal and delinquent behavior and that he violated the
terms and conditions of his probation—and no mitigating factors. Tr. p. 90-91.
Although the trial court acknowledged that Watson pled guilty, it found that he
received a benefit from the plea agreement and, therefore, did not consider the
plea to be a mitigating factor. The trial court sentenced Watson as follows:
under cause number FC-4042, to two one-year terms in Bartholomew County
Jail, both suspended to probation; under cause number FD-1132, to two-and-
one-half years at the Indiana Department of Correction, with one of those years
as a direct commitment to Community Corrections to be served consecutively
to the sentence in FC-4042; and to time served for the two probation violations.
[4] Watson now appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
[5] On appeal, Watson contends the trial court abused its discretion by not finding
his guilty plea and the undue hardship on his dependent children to be
mitigating factors.
[6] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.
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2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may
abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including entering a sentencing
statement that omits mitigating factors that are clearly supported by the record.
Id. at 490-91. Watson bears the burden of establishing “that the mitigating
evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 493
(citing Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999)).
[7] We find that Watson has not proven that his proffered mitigating circumstances
are significant and clearly supported by the record. First, Watson points out
that by pleading guilty he “is taking accountability for his actions,” and he
removed five cases from the court’s docket, saving the State considerable time
and resources. Appellant’s Br. p. 4. “A guilty plea is not automatically a
significant mitigating factor,” particularly where the defendant receives
adequate benefits. Cuyler v. State, 798 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied. Here, the State significantly reduced Watson’s exposure at
sentencing by agreeing to dismiss two felony charges under cause number FC-
2230, and by reducing the charges under cause number FC-4042 from Class C
felony attempted criminal confinement to Class D felony attempted criminal
confinement to be entered as a Class A misdemeanor. Appellee’s Br. p. 7.
Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude
Watson received adequate benefits from the plea agreement and to reject his
guilty plea as a mitigating factor.
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[8] Second, the record does not support Watson’s claim that incarceration would
cause undue hardship for his dependent children. “Many persons convicted of
serious crimes have one or more children and, absent special circumstances,
trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue
hardship.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). Watson’s
circumstances, as presented in the record, do not rise to the level of undue
hardship. He has four children, all of whom live with their mothers. None of
the three mothers testified at sentencing that Watson’s incarceration would
create any hardship. There are support orders for three of the children totaling
$200 per week. Tr. p. 43-45. However, Watson was already $16,000 behind in
support payments at the time of sentencing. Id. at 49-50. In short, Watson
failed to establish that the hardship to his dependents is undue. His case is not
distinguishable from the “[m]any persons convicted of serious crimes [who]
have one or more children” and is not a “special circumstance” meriting
additional consideration. See Dowdell, 720 N.E.2d at 1154.
[9] Finding that Watson has failed to prove that the mitigators are both significant
and clearly supported by the record, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Watson.
[10] Affirmed.
[11] Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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