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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12394
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03906-SCJ
GEGE ODION,
individually, and
d.b.a. Siris Property Management, LLC,
d.b.a. Optiworld Vision Center,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GOOGLE INC.,
JAMES P. BLUM, JR.,
CYNTHIA D. WRIGHT,
NANCY H. BAUGHN,
SHARON SILVERMINTZ, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 5, 2015)
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Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal is from the partial final judgment the District Court entered
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 1dismissing, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Greg Odion’s claims alleged against twenty-two
of the thirty defendants named in his pro se complaint. In addition to these
dismissals, Odion’s appeal challenges various other rulings of the District Court as
discussed below.
I.
When its existence is questionable, we are required to inquire into our own
subject-matter jurisdiction. Gilchrist v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 390 F.3d
1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). Generally, an order that adjudicates fewer than all of
the claims against all parties is not final and appealable unless the district court
certifies it as final under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam). Appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a decision certified under
Rule 54(b) is limited to the rulings or orders so certified by the district court. See
Fogade v. ENB Revocable Trust, 263 F.3d 1274, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) (‟Because
1
The decision appealed is the District Court’s order of May 8, 2014. The District Court,
in an order entered on October 31, 2014, certified the May 8 order as a partial final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b).
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no final judgment has been entered disposing of all the claims in this case, our
appellate jurisdiction is confined to the issues made appealable under Rule
54(b).”).
“The timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Green v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 606 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). In a civil case, a party has
thirty days from the entry of the judgment or order appealed from to file a notice of
appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Certification under Rule 54(b) “cures a
premature notice of appeal from a non-final order dismissing claims or parties.”
Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d
1297, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). 2 In addition, certain post-judgment motions toll the
time for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). To appeal a
district court’s order disposing of a post-judgment motion that tolls the thirty-day
deadline, however, a party must file a separate notice of appeal or amend its
original notice in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013); see also
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) (“A party intending to challenge an order disposing
of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A), or a judgment's alteration or amendment
2
A subsequent certification occurred in this case. See supra note 1. Odion filed a notice
of appeal with respect to the District Court’s order of May 8, 2014, on May 27, 2014. Odion’s
notice was premature but cured when the court entered its subsequent order on October 31, 2014.
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upon such a motion, must file a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of
appeal . . . within the time prescribed by this Rule measured from the entry of the
order disposing of the last such remaining motion.”).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Odion’s challenges to the District Court’s
treatment of his post-judgment motions for reconsideration, amendment, and
disqualification of the district-court judge because his initial notice of appeal
encompassed only the order certified for appeal under Rule 54(b), and his amended
notice of appeal was untimely to appeal the issues it designated. See
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(B)(ii); Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633
F.3d at 1306; Weatherly, 728 F.3d at 1271.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting
the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “[a] pleading
that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule
12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint, on its face, does not state a
plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citation
omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements,” and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation[s],” cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. Id.
In making a fraud claim, “a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy the
heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), a complaint must set forth:
(1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral
representations or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and
place of each such statement and the person responsible for making
(or, in the case of omissions, not making) same, and (3) the content of
such statements and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and
(4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation
marks omitted).
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We liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold such pleadings to “a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). However, “this
leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to
rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs.,
Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d
701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010).
We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s refusal to grant leave
to amend, and review de novo the underlying legal conclusion that amendment
would be futile. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334,
1336 (11th Cir. 2010). The district court should freely grant leave to amend a
complaint “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Where a more
carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least
one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action
with prejudice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in
part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that a district court is not required to sua sponte grant
a counseled plaintiff leave to amend when plaintiff never filed a motion to amend
or requested leave to amend before the district court, but declining to address
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whether the rule should apply to pro se litigants). The district court need not allow
amendment “where amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d
1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
The District Court did not err in dismissing Odion’s complaint as to twenty-
two of the thirty defendants because the complaint contained only conclusory
allegations of a conspiracy to commit fraud and a subsequent cover up of that fraud
by thirty defendants, many of whom were unrelated to each other and to Odion.
See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Garfield, 466 F.3d at 1262.
Moreover, the court did not err by failing to sua sponte order Odion to replead his
complaint because Odion’s subsequent filings demonstrated that amendment
would be futile. See Bryant, 252 F.3d at 1163.
III.
We review de novo whether a district court was required to convert a motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at
1336–37. If, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one
for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2002). A district court may, however, take judicial notice of public records.
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See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th
Cir. 1999) (noting that a district court may take judicial notice of public records at
the dismissal stage). In addition, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may
also “consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and
(2) its authenticity is not challenged.” SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at 1337. “When a
party proves through its actions that it has notice of the conversion, any failure to
notify the party is rightly deemed harmless.” Trustmark Ins. Co., 299 F.3d at
1268; cf. Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1371
(11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (treating the defendants’ motions to dismiss as
motions for summary judgment because the plaintiff provided materials called for
on summary judgment, showing that the parties had been given a full and fair
opportunity to present evidence supporting their arguments).
The District Court did not err in failing to convert the motions to dismiss
into motions for summary judgment based on the defendants’ attachment of state-
court records because the court did not rely on those records, the court could have
taken judicial notice of those records, Odion did not challenge the authenticity of
the records, and any error was harmless. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Avado Brands,
Inc., 187 F.3d at 1280; SFM Holdings, 600 F.3d at 1337; Trustmark Ins. Co., 299
F.3d at 1268.
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IV.
We review for abuse of discretion the argument that the District Court
mismanaged its docket and that the mismanagement prejudiced Odion’s case.
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 1997). An
abuse of discretion can include the failure to consider and rule on significant
pretrial motions before issuing dispositive orders. Id. at 1367. When the court’s
mismanagement of a case materially prejudices a litigant’s rights, the district court
has abused its discretion, and we must redress that abuse. Id. “Facial challenges to
the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a claim for relief, should, however, be resolved before discovery
begins.” Id. (footnote omitted).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the defendants’
motions to dismiss before ruling on Odion’s motion for partial summary judgment
because the motions to dismiss challenged the legal sufficiency of the complaint
and therefore had to be resolved before commencing discovery. See id.
V.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on a motion for
sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Massengale
v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Rule 11 sanctions are
properly assessed when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis,
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that is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that
cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law, or that stems
from bad faith or an improper purpose. Id. Bad faith is an objective standard that
is met if the party’s conduct was objectively reckless or outside of the bounds of
acceptable conduct. Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230,
1241 (11th Cir. 2007) (addressing sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Odion’s two
motions for sanctions against one group of defendants because those defendants
did not base their motion to dismiss on an unreasonable factual basis and they did
not act in bad faith. See Massengale, 267 F.3d at 1301; Amlong & Amlong, 500
F.3d at 1241.
AFFIRMED.
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