UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4064
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RICKY DOUGLAS CRAWFORD, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00138-WO-1)
Submitted: September 30, 2015 Decided: October 6, 2015
Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian Michael Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant United States Attorney,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ricky Douglas Crawford, Jr., was convicted of armed bank
robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2012), and carrying and
using, by discharging, a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
Crawford received an aggregate sentence of 382 months. He now
appeals. Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising several claims but
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
Crawford has filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
I
Crawford first contends that his right to a speedy trial
was violated. Because he did not raise this claim below, our
review is for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 732-34 (1993).
The record reflects that the indictment was returned on
April 28, 2014, and trial was scheduled to begin on July 21,
2014. On July 15, defense counsel moved for a continuance until
the September term of court because counsel suffered a ruptured
appendix on July 9. The district court granted the motion upon
the determination that denying the motion “would likely result
in a miscarriage of justice by denying counsel for Defendant
reasonable time” to prepare a defense and “the ends of justice
served by the granting of a continuance . . . outweigh the best
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interests of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial.”
Trial commenced on September 22, 2014.
A defendant has both a statutory and a constitutional right
to a speedy trial. Under the Speedy Trial Act, trial must
commence within 70 days of the date the information or
indictment is filed. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012). Periods of
delay are excludable from the calculation if they result from
the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for a
continuance, provided that the court grants the motion on the
basis “that the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the
defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). A
defendant also has a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
The Supreme Court has identified four factors to consider when
determining if a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial has been violated: the “length of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice
to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
“The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering
mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively
prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other
factors that go into the balance.” Id.
Given the reason for the delay, the relatively short length
of the delay, and the lack of any apparent prejudice to the
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defense caused by the delay, we hold that there was no violation
of either the Speedy Trial Act or Crawford’s constitutional
right to a speedy trial.
II
Counsel claims that the district court erroneously denied
Crawford’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
In a related claim, counsel asserts that the Government violated
Crawford’s rights when it introduced the allegedly perjured
testimony of Crawford’s accomplice, Shiheem Williamson. We find
neither claim to have merit.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 29
motion. United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir.
2015). “[T]he verdict . . . must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
government, to support it.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 630 (4th Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Testimony at trial established that on August 15, 2013, two
men entered a Wells Fargo Bank in Reidsville, North Carolina.
One of the men fired a shot into the ceiling of the bank. The
robbers instructed everyone to get on the floor. Both men wore
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dark clothing, bandanas pulled over their faces, and gloves.
They stole approximately $14,000.
Officers who responded viewed surveillance videos and noted
what the robbers wore. Later that day, a delivery man at a
convenience store glanced into the store’s dumpster and noticed
what clothing strewn inside. He reported this to the store
manager who, in turn, contacted the police. The clothing in the
dumpster matched the description of the clothing the robbers had
worn. DNA samples taken from bandanas that were recovered from
the dumpster matched the DNA of Crawford and his cousin, Shiheem
Williamson.
Williamson testified against Crawford. According to
Williamson, Crawford planned the robbery, instructing Williamson
what to do when they entered the bank and supplying Williamson
with gloves and a bandana to wear during the robbery. When they
entered the bank, Williamson, as instructed, fired into the
ceiling, and Crawford took money from tellers’ drawers. They
left the bank and drove to the convenience store, where they
disposed of their clothing in the dumpster. Williamson
identified the clothing that was recovered and introduced at
trial as the clothing they had worn during the robbery. He also
testified that videos from both the bank and the convenience
store were of him and Crawford during the robbery and the
subsequent disposal of their clothing.
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Finally, Shunta Frazier, who was incarcerated with Crawford
for a brief period, testified that Crawford admitted committing
the robbery. Among other things, Crawford stated that he and
his cousin had thrown clothing worn during the robbery into a
dumpster.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, we hold that the
evidence was sufficient to convict Crawford of both offenses and
that the district court properly denied the Rule 29 motion.
Crawford makes a related claim that the Government erred
when it introduced the allegedly perjured testimony of
Williamson. We review this allegation for plain error because
it was not raised at trial. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. at 732-34. At trial, Williamson admitted that, when he was
first interviewed by the police, he minimized his role in the
offense by stating that it was Crawford who shot into the
ceiling and that his take of the proceeds of the robbery was
around $300 when, in fact, Crawford gave him $5000. Williamson
testified that he lied because he was scared. At trial, defense
counsel cross-examined Williamson extensively about the
discrepancy between his testimony at trial and his initial
statement to the police. The jury had ample opportunity to
determine whether Williamson’s testimony was truthful. We
discern no plain error in the introduction of his testimony.
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III
Counsel next contends that the district court’s
instructions on accomplice and informant testimony were
erroneous. In reviewing jury instructions, we consider
“whether, taken as a whole and in the context of the entire
charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the
controlling law.” United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d 756, 771
(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). We have previously upheld similar accomplice and
informant instructions, and we discern no error in the
instructions in this case. See United States v. Luck, 611 F.3d
183, 186-87 (4th Cir. 2010) (informant testimony); United
States v. Bivins, 104 F. App’x 892, 902 (4th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-4743) (accomplice testimony).
IV
Counsel also maintains that Crawford was incorrectly
sentenced as a career offender. Our review of the record,
however, establishes conclusively that Crawford qualified as a
career offender. He was over 18 when he committed the instant
offenses, the present offenses are crimes of violence, and he
had the requisite two prior felony convictions for crimes of
violence. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a)
(2013). Further, there was no requirement that his career
offender status be charged in the indictment and found by the
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jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
V
In his informal brief, Crawford repeats many of the
arguments raised in the Anders brief. He additionally contends
that an affidavit filed in support of his arrest warrant was
insufficient to establish probable cause. The arrest warrant,
however, states on its face that it was issued pursuant to the
indictment. Accordingly, we find this claim to lack merit.
VI
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Crawford’s convictions and sentence. This
court requires counsel, in writing, to inform Crawford of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Crawford requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the
motion was served on Crawford. We dispense with oral argument
be cause the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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