NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OCT 07 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ANTHONY LEE TAYLOR, No. 13-16944
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:11-cv-02042-BAM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 5, 2015**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, D.W. NELSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Lee Taylor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s order de
novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) provided specific, clear and
convincing reasons to discount Taylor’s testimony regarding the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of his pain, his immobility, and the side effects of
medications. First, the ALJ reasonably determined that Taylor’s allegation that he
was completely disabled as a result of his gout was not supported by the medical
evidence. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
Second, the ALJ also reasonably considered that since filing his application
in October 2008, Taylor received limited treatment for his symptoms and that he
had not been fully compliant with the conservative treatment that he did receive or
that was recommended for his hypertension. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,
751 (9th Cir. 2007); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).
Third, in assessing Taylor’s credibility, the ALJ also reasonably took into
account Taylor’s poor work history. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959
(9th Cir. 2002) (noting that claimant “had an extremely poor work history and has
shown little propensity to work in her lifetime, which negatively affected her
credibility regarding her inability to work”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Taylor nevertheless contends that the ALJ erred in discrediting his testimony
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because two treating physicians certified that he could not return to work.
Although two physicians examined Taylor in connection with his unemployment
insurance claim and certified that he could not return to work for several months,
neither opined that Taylor was permanently disabled. Moreover, although Taylor’s
treating physician noted that he did not foresee him returning to his previous job,
he repeatedly encouraged Taylor to change his job or seek retraining.
Finally, Taylor’s contention that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational
expert was incomplete essentially restates his argument that the ALJ improperly
discredited his testimony regarding the limiting effects of his symptoms. Although
Taylor argues for a different reading of the record, the ALJ’s interpretation of the
evidence was rational and should be upheld. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d
1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
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