Nelson v. Artley

2015 IL 118058

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 118058)

DeSHAW NELSON, Appellee, v. DONALD ARTLEY (Enterprise Leasing
Company of Chicago, Appellant).

Opinion filed October 8, 2015.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 At issue in this case is the extent of a rental car company’s financial
responsibility for a default judgment entered against a driver of one of its vehicles
where, as here, the company chose to comply with our state’s financial
responsibility laws by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance from the Secretary of
State. Adhering to a decision by the appellate court in Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 361 Ill.
App. 3d 792 (2005), the circuit court concluded that the rental car company’s
liability was limited to the same minimum coverage provisions applicable to rental
car companies electing to meeting their financial responsibility obligations through
the purchase of an insurance policy. On review of the circuit court’s judgment, the
appellate court in this case rejected Fellhauer, undertook its own statutory analysis
 and held that the rental car company was liable for the full amount of the default
judgment. 2014 IL App (1st) 121681. We granted the rental car company’s petition
for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We also allowed the
Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and the Truck Renting and Leasing Association
to file friend of the court briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). For the
reasons that follow, we now reverse the appellate court’s judgment and affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Suzanne Haney rented a car from Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago
(Enterprise). While being driven by an individual named Donald Artley, the vehicle
crossed the center line of the roadway and collided with an oncoming car operated
by DeShaw Nelson. Nelson subsequently sued Artley in the circuit court of Cook
County to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident. Artley was
uninsured. When he failed to file an answer or otherwise appear after having been
served with the complaint and summons, Nelson sought and obtained an order of
default against him. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2010). Following a prove-up
hearing, the circuit court found that Nelson had sustained $600,000 in damages and
entered judgment in that amount in his favor and against Artley.

¶4 After obtaining the default judgment, Nelson brought a supplementary action
against Enterprise pursuant to section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 2010)) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277 (eff. Jan. 4,
2013) to determine whether the company held any property from which the
judgment could be satisfied. In response to a citation to discover assets issued by
the circuit court, Enterprise denied that it was in possession of any property of
Artley, the judgment debtor. It also raised three affirmative defenses to the citation
or to any efforts to obtain recovery from it in connection with Nelson’s judgment
against Artley.

¶5 First, Enterprise asserted that Artley was not its customer, was not listed on its
rental agreement with Haney as an authorized user of the vehicle, and did not even
have Haney’s permission to use the vehicle. To the contrary, Haney had reported
the vehicle as stolen. Accordingly, Enterprise argued, it had “no obligation to
extend any financial protection to [Artley] under [the] Motor Vehicle Code or
Illinois public policy or Illinois case law construing same in any amount.”
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¶6 For its second affirmative defense, Enterprise contended in the alternative that
it was self-insured as permitted by Illinois law and that under the appellate court’s
decision in Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d 792 (2005), its total financial
responsibility for the liability of any authorized driver was $100,000 per
occurrence, the same minimum required of rental car companies which elect to
meet their statutory financial responsibility obligations through the purchase of
insurance policies. Enterprise asserted that it had already paid $50,000 to settle
another claim arising from the same accident brought by an individual named
Antoine Ousely, and had tendered an additional $50,000 to the court to allocate
between Nelson and a third injured party named Renardo Page. Because those sums
exhausted the $100,000 per occurrence liability limits claimed by the company,
Enterprise contended that it had already tendered all that it could be required to pay.

¶7 Enterprise’s third and final affirmative defense pertained solely to the separate
but related issue of liability for court costs and postjudgment interest. Enterprise
argued that there was nothing in its rental agreement with Haney nor in the
applicable Illinois statutes that would obligate Enterprise to pay costs or
postjudgment interest in connection with the default judgment. Accordingly,
Enterprise contended, there was no foundation to support recovery of either of
those items.

¶8 Enterprise attached various documents to its written response to the citation.
These included the certificate of self-insurance it had obtained from the Illinois
Department of Insurance and a copy of its rental agreement with Haney. Paragraph
7 of the rental agreement, entitled “Responsibility to Third Parties,” specified that
Enterprise would comply with applicable motor vehicle financial responsibility
laws as a self-insured entity and would not extend any responsibility to the renter,
additional authorized drivers, passengers, or third parties except to the minimum
amount set forth in the relevant financial responsibility laws.

¶9 After Nelson moved unsuccessfully to strike Enterprise’s affirmative defenses,
he filed a petition against the company for a turnover order seeking $600,000, the
entire amount of his default judgment against Artley, plus interest and costs.
Although the circuit court granted relief to Nelson, it ruled that it was obligated to
follow the appellate court’s decision in Fellhauer and that under Fellhauer,
Enterprise’s liability under Illinois’s financial responsibility laws was limited to the
same minimum coverage levels required of rental car companies which elect to
purchase insurance policies, $50,000 per person, $100,000 per occurrence. As
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 previously noted, Enterprise had already paid $50,000 to settle a claim by Ousley
arising out of the accident, and tendered an additional $50,000 to be allocated
between Nelson and Page. Because the court had previously allotted $25,000 to
Page, its final order limited the turnover amount to Nelson to $25,000, the balance
left under the $100,000 per occurrence limit.

¶ 10 Nelson appealed, arguing that Fellhauer was wrongly decided and should not
be followed. The appellate court agreed with Nelson’s position. It rejected
Fellhauer’s construction of the governing financial responsibility laws and
concluded that where, as here, a rental car company elects to meet Illinois’s
mandatory liability insurance requirements by obtaining a certificate of
self-insurance, its financial responsibility is not limited to the same minimum
amounts required when mandatory liability insurance requirements are met through
the purchase of an insurance policy. Rather, the company is obligated to pay the full
amount of judgments entered against the drivers of its vehicles. Accordingly, the
appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded to that
court with directions to enter a turnover order in favor of Nelson in an amount
sufficient to cover the entire $600,000 default judgment entered against Artley.
2014 IL App (1st) 121681, ¶ 37.

¶ 11 Enterprise petitioned this court for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1,
2013). We granted that petition in order to resolve the conflict between Fellhauer
and the appellate court’s decision in this case regarding the extent of a rental car
company’s liability where, as here, the company elected to meet its statutory
financial responsibility obligations by self-insuring. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that the appellate court in this case erred when it rejected the construction
of the law adopted in Fellhauer. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore
reversed and the judgment of the circuit court, which adhered to Fellhauer, is
affirmed.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 In undertaking our review, we begin by noting that the sole basis for
Enterprise’s financial liability in this case is the obligation imposed on it pursuant
to this state’s financial responsibility laws by virtue of its ownership of the vehicle
which collided with Nelson when it was being driven by Artley, who was
uninsured. Enterprise itself committed no wrongdoing. While Enterprise initially
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 contested its financial liability on the grounds that Artley had stolen the vehicle and
was not an authorized driver, it has waived that defense. The company now
concedes that under Illinois law, it must pay some portion of Nelson’s default
judgment against Artley. The only question before us is how much of the judgment
it must pay. Resolution of that question turns solely on the terms of the relevant
financial responsibility statutes, which are set forth in the Illinois Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2010)). Statutory construction presents a question
of law. Our review is therefore de novo. McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises, LLC, 2015
IL 118143, ¶ 11.

¶ 14 Section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law
(625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 2010)) mandates liability insurance coverage for
automobiles and other motor vehicles designed to be used on a public highway.
Under the statute, no person is permitted to operate, register or maintain
registration of such a motor vehicle unless the vehicle is covered by a liability
insurance policy. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 128 (2005). The purpose of this insurance
requirement is to protect the public by securing payment of their damages. Id. at
129. The law does not, however, require that the full amount of any loss be covered.
Rather, it mandates only certain minimum levels of coverage. At the time of the
events giving rise to this litigation, liability insurance policies were required to
provide coverage of not less than $20,000 for the death or bodily injury of any one
person, $40,000 for the death of bodily injury of two or more persons, and $15,000
for property damage occurring in any one motor vehicle accident. See 625 ILCS
5/7-203, 7-601(a) (West 2010); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 395, 402 (2007).

¶ 15 Special financial responsibility provisions have also been enacted for persons
who operate motor vehicles to transport passengers for hire (see 625 ILCS 5/8-101
(West 2010)); persons who operate medical transport vehicles (see 625 ILCS
5/8-101.1 (West 2010)); and owners of for-rent vehicles such as Enterprise (see 625
ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2010)). All are required to provide “proof of financial
responsibility” to the Secretary of State of Illinois. 625 ILCS 5/8-101, 8-101.1,
9-101 (West 2010). The purpose of this requirement is to provide members of the
public with some modicum of protection against negligent drivers of these various
types of vehicles. Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d 792, 797 (2005). As with
the minimum liability insurance required by the Illinois Safety and Family
Financial Responsibility Law, it was not intended to provide full coverage for
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 losses. It simply insures that injured persons have some coverage when otherwise
there would be none. See Fogel v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Chicago, 353 Ill. App.
3d 165, 176 (2004); Insurance Car Rentals, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 225, 232 (1987).

¶ 16 During the period relevant to this case, the general definition section of the
Vehicle Code defined “[p]roof of financial responsibility” as “[p]roof of ability to
respond in damages for any liability thereafter incurred resulting from the
ownership, maintenance, use or operation of a motor vehicle for bodily injury to or
death of any person in the amount of $20,000, and subject to this limit for any one
person injured or killed, in the amount of $40,000 for bodily injury to or death of 2
or more persons in any one accident, and for damage to property in the amount of
$15,000 resulting from any one accident.” 625 ILCS 5/1-164.5 (West 2010). The
minimum coverage specified under the foregoing definition was thus the same as
the minimum coverage required under section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Safety and
Family Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 2010)). Higher
limits, however, were imposed by the General Assembly with respect to persons
who operate motor vehicles to transport passengers for hire, persons who operate
medical transport vehicles, and owners of for-rent vehicles such as Enterprise. See
625 ILCS 5/8-103, 8-104, 8-109, 9-103, 9-105 (West 2010). The specified
categories of owners and operators were subject to these higher limits rather than
the limits set forth in section 1-164.5’s general definition of “[p]roof of financial
responsibility” by virtue of section 1-101 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-101
(West 2010)), which stated that the general definitions of words and phrases
contained in the Code do not apply when “when the context otherwise requires and
except where another definition set forth in another Chapter of this Code and
applicable to that Chapter or a designated part thereof is applicable.” 1

¶ 17 Under the Vehicle Code, car rental companies such as Enterprise have the
option of satisfying the proof of financial responsibility requirement in any one of
three alternate ways. They may file with the Secretary of State (1) a motor vehicle
liability bond as provided in section 9-103 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/9-103
(West 2010)); (2) an insurance policy or other proof of insurance in a form
prescribed by the Secretary as provided in section 9-105 of the Code (625 ILCS

1
We further note that vehicles subject to these heightened requirements have been expressly
exempted from the normal liability insurance policy requirements set forth in section 7-601 of the
Vehicle Code. See 625 ILCS 5/7-601(b) (West 2010).

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 5/9-105 (West 2010)); or (3) a certificate of self-insurance issued by the Director of
the Illinois Department of Insurance. 625 ILCS 5/9-102 (West 2010).

¶ 18 If the insurance policy option is selected, the policy must insure the operator of
the rented vehicle against liability “to a minimum amount of $50,000 because of
bodily injury to, or death of any one person or damage to property and $100,000
because of bodily injury to or death of 2 or more persons in any one motor vehicle
accident.” 625 ILCS 5/9-105 (West 2010). Similarly, if the rental car company
elects to file a motor vehicle bond as proof of financial responsibility, the bond
must cover judgments against the customer and owner of the vehicle and specified
others for damage to property other than the rented vehicle, or for any injury to, or
for the death of any person, including an occupant of the vehicle resulting from the
vehicle’s operation and must be “in the penal sum of $100,000,” the same
minimum upper limit as an insurance policy. 625 ILCS 5/9-103 (West 2010). When
the insurance policy and bond options are chosen, the person seeking to engage in
the business of renting out a motor vehicle must apply for and receive approval of
the policy or bond from the Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/9-108 (West 2010).

¶ 19 In the case before us today, Enterprise elected the third option for proving its
financial responsibility. Rather than purchase an insurance policy or motor vehicle
liability bond, it obtained a certificate of self-insurance from the Director of the
Illinois Department of Insurance. In order to obtain that certificate, Enterprise was
required to satisfy the Illinois Department of Insurance that it was able and will
continue to be able to pay a judgment obtained against it as provided by section
7-502 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/7-502 (West 2010)). 92 Ill. Adm. Code
1090.10 (1973); see Huff v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., Midwest, 307 Ill. App. 3d
773, 778 (1999). The judgment in this case was, of course, against the vehicle’s
driver and not Enterprise itself. As we have previously noted, however, Enterprise
no longer disputes that Nelson may seek redress against it to collect on the default
judgment Nelson obtained against the driver of Enterprise’s rental vehicle. In this,
Enterprise’s position is consistent with the position it has taken in prior litigation,
and we assume, without deciding, that this position is correct. See Huff v.
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., Midwest, 307 Ill. App. 3d 773. In the case before us
today, Enterprise questions only how much of the default judgment it is obligated
to pay.

¶ 20 The provisions of the Vehicle Code authorizing rental car companies to prove
their financial responsibility by obtaining certificates of self-insurance do not
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 specify the magnitude of the companies’ liability exposure under the certificates. In
Fellhauer v. Alhorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d 792, 799 (2005), however, our appellate court
concluded that with respect to the companies’ liability to injured third parties, the
legislature intended no distinction between self-insurers and those companies that
elected to meet their proof of financial responsibility obligations through the other
methods permitted under the law. More precisely, the appellate court interpreted
the law to mean that self-insuring rental car companies are subject to the same
limits on liability that would apply if they elected, instead, to meet their proof of
financial responsibility obligations through the purchase of insurance policies
pursuant to section 9-105 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/9-105 (West 2010)).
The court reached this conclusion based on the relevant statutory provisions
governing proof of financial responsibility, the purposes of those provisions, and
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions applying comparable law in similar
circumstances. Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 797-99.

¶ 21 The appellate court in the case before us acknowledged the existence of
Fellhauer, but accorded it no deference. 2014 IL App (1st) 121681, ¶¶ 22-25.
Rejecting the rationale advanced by the Fellhauer court as well as the authorities
from other jurisdictions on which Fellhauer relied, it undertook its own,
independent interpretation of the applicable Illinois statutes. Emphasizing the
absence of express language limiting liability where proof of financial
responsibility is established through a certificate of self-insurance and purporting to
take into account the statutory scheme as a whole, it concluded that the liability
faced by self-insuring rental car companies was, in effect, unlimited. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.

¶ 22 Enterprise challenges the appellate court’s analysis on several grounds. It
contends that the court’s decision places Illinois law in direct conflict with the
so-called Graves Amendment to the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) (49 U.S.C.
§ 30106 (2006)), federal legislation which generally preempts all state statutory
and common law to the extent such law would hold owners in the business of
renting or leasing motor vehicles vicariously liable for the negligence of drivers,
except when there is negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner
(see Beth Bates Holliday, Validity, Construction, and Application of Graves
Amendment (49 U.S.C.A. § 30106) Governing Rented or Leased Motor Vehicle
Safety and Responsibility, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 223 (2008)). Enterprise further argues
that the appellate court wrongly disregarded the terms of the rental car contract
between Enterprise and Haney, which limited Enterprise’s financial responsibility
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 for judgments against renters or other drivers of its vehicles to the “applicable state
minimum financial responsibility amounts.” Enterprise’s primary argument,
however, is that the appellate court’s judgment is premised on an interpretation of
the governing provisions of Illinois law which contravenes basic rules of statutory
construction.

¶ 23 We believe that Enterprise’s challenge to the appellate court’s construction of
the relevant statutes is meritorious and that the Fellhauer court’s interpretation of
the law was correct. As a preliminary matter, Fellhauer has been in place for a
decade. Until the appellate court is this case ruled as it did, no court had challenged
the soundness of Fellhauer’s determination that rental car companies electing to
meet their proof of financial responsibility obligations under section 9-101 by
self-insuring under section 9-102(3) were subject to the same minimum coverage
provisions applicable to rental car companies electing to meeting their financial
responsibility obligations through the purchase of insurance policies under section
9-102(2). Fellhauer stood unquestioned, and the legislature allowed the relevant
provisions of the Vehicle Code to remain in effect, as written, without change
throughout this period. Where, as here, the legislature chooses not to amend a
statute after a judicial construction, it will be presumed that the legislature
acquiesced in the court’s statement of legislative intent. Zimmerman v. Village of
Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 50 (1998).

¶ 24 We do not rely on this presumption alone. The appellate court’s construction of
the relevant statutory provisions must be rejected for other reasons as well. When
interpreting a statute, courts must “ ‘consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in
mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting
it.’ [Citation.]” People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 32. Although the appellate court
in this case acknowledged the need to consider the relevant provisions of the
Vehicle Code as a whole (2014 IL App (1st) 121681, ¶ 24), it ultimately failed to
recognize that the express, undisputed and overriding purpose of the self-insurance
option, as with the two alternate options available to rental car companies under
section 9-102 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/9-102 (West 2010)), is simply to
establish “proof of financial responsibility.” As we discussed earlier in this opinion,
“proof of financial responsibility” as that term is defined and used in the Vehicle
Code, is not proof of ability to fully satisfy judgments. Rather, it is merely proof of
ability to provide some base level of financial coverage where otherwise there
would be none. That base-level coverage is therefore the standard by which the
self-insurers’ liability must be gauged.
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¶ 25 Imposing unlimited liability on those who elect to self-insure under section
9-102(3) (625 ILCS 5/9-102(3) (West 2010)) is patently incompatible with this
standard. It is the same as saying that anyone who chooses to meet the minimum
financial responsibility requirements through self-insurance will be subject to
maximum financial exposure. That is a deal no rational economic actor would be
likely to take. Under the appellate court’s interpretation of the law, the
self-insurance option would therefore be rendered meaningless. This is
impermissible. Construing a statute in a way that renders part of it a nullity offends
basic principles of statutory interpretation. See Madison Two Associates v. Pappas,
227 Ill. 2d 474, 493 (2008).

¶ 26 The appellate court’s interpretation would also have random and inconsistent
consequences for the motoring public. Under the result reached by the appellate
court, the ability of persons injured in accidents involving rental cars to recover
from the cars’ owners would become a lottery. If a rental company met its proof of
financial responsibility obligations through purchase of an insurance policy or
bond, it could cap its liability at a maximum of $100,000. If it turned out that the
company had elected to self-insure, however, the company’s liability exposure
would be unlimited. Two otherwise identical injured parties could thus face
substantially different recovery prospects based solely on the fortuity of which
option the rental car company had chosen to satisfy our state’s proof of financial
responsibility requirements. This could be a boon for a person injured in an
accident which happened to involve a self-insured rental car. For all other injured
parties, however, the inequity is manifest.

¶ 27 In construing a statute, we presume that the legislature did not intend absurd,
inconvenient, or unjust results (Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 232 (2008)), and
we will not, absent the clearest reasons, interpret a law in a way that would yield
such results (Town of Cicero v. Green, 211 Ill. 241, 244 (1904)). We see no clear
reason why the legislature would have wanted to subject self-insuring car rental
companies to greater liability than all other car rental companies. Indeed, we fail to
see any reason why the legislature would have wanted to single such companies out
for special treatment. For purposes of insuring compliance with this state’s proof of
financial responsibility standards, the distinction would accomplish nothing for
anyone. We therefore reject it, as did the appellate court in Fellhauer.

¶ 28 In the course of its analysis, the court in Fellhauer observed that its conclusion,
i.e., that the legislature did not intend to treat self-insurers differently than their
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 counterparts who elected to be covered by traditional insurance policies and expose
them to unlimited liability, was dictated by common sense. Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App.
3d at 798. The appellate court panel in this case disparaged Fellhauer’s reliance on
common sense, suggesting that it was not an appropriate consideration or, at least,
not sufficient authority to support the court’s conclusions regarding the meaning
and operation of the relevant statutes. 2014 IL App (1st) 121681, ¶¶ 22, 24. These
comments echoed criticism by the dissenting justice in Fellhauer, who complained
that the “court should not rewrite statutes with its own ‘common sense.’ ”
Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 801 (Myerscough, J., dissenting).

¶ 29 With due respect to the appellate court panel in this case and the dissenting
justice in Fellhauer, we do not believe this criticism is valid. For one thing, there is
nothing inherently objectionable about using common sense when deciphering a
statute. To the contrary, our court has specifically cited with approval the
proposition that courts “do not set aside common experience and common sense
when construing statutes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Exelon Corp. v.
Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 282 (2009). Moreover and more
importantly, when the majority in Fellhauer referred to common sense, at no time
did it suggest that its subjective beliefs were in any way a substitute for legal
reasoning and authority. Rather, it used “common sense” as a shorthand for
deductive reasoning based on the language and purposes of the law and the
consequences of a contrary construction. It then proceeded to reference case law
from other jurisdictions to further support its position, there being none directly on
point from Illinois. Fellhauer, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99. The conclusion it reached
was properly followed by the circuit court in this case. It should have been followed
by the appellate court as well. In light of this holding, we need not reach
Enterprise’s additional arguments that the decision by the appellate court in this
case is incompatible with the Grave’s Amendment and wrongly disregarded the
terms of the rental car contract between Enterprise and Haney.

¶ 30 CONCLUSION

¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court was correct when it construed the
relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code to mean that Enterprise’s financial
responsibility was limited to the same minimum coverage provisions applicable to
rental car companies electing to meet their financial responsibility obligations

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 through the purchase of an insurance policy. Under that construction of the law, the
amount Enterprise is obligated to pay Nelson under the turnover order is limited to
$25,000, which it has already tendered. Contrary to the view taken by the appellate
court, Enterprise is not liable for the entire $600,000 default judgment. The
judgment of the appellate court is therefore reversed and the circuit court’s
judgment is affirmed.

¶ 32 Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 33 Circuit court judgment affirmed.

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