In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14‐3591
DEREK J. BURTON,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL DOWNEY, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:11‐CV‐03171 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 8, 2015
____________________
Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐appellee Derek J. Burton
filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
members of the staff at the Jerome Combs Detention Center
(“JCDC”) violated his constitutional rights while he was de‐
tained for eighteen months awaiting trial. The district court
denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling
that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Burton’s serious medical needs—
2 No. 14‐3591
the standard to prove a constitutional violation under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because
it found that triable issues of fact existed as to whether de‐
fendants’ conduct violated Burton’s constitutional rights, the
district court also rejected defendants’ defense of qualified
immunity. Defendants appeal, and for the reasons that fol‐
low, we reverse the district court’s decision denying sum‐
mary judgment.
I. Background
Burton was detained at the JCDC from September 23,
2009 to March 17, 2011, while he awaited trial and sentenc‐
ing for charges of home repair fraud, false impersonation of
a firefighter, and driving on a revoked license. Before his de‐
tention, Burton had been treated by Dr. Zumwalt, a primary
care physician, for numerous health issues, including chron‐
ic back pain, chronic anxiety, acid reflux, herpes simplex,
hyperlipidemia, and depression. In addition to other medi‐
cations, Dr. Zumwalt intermittently prescribed Norco, an
opioid pain medication similar to Vicodin, to help Burton
manage pain associated with these conditions.
In 2008, Dr. Zumwalt diagnosed Burton with avascular
necrosis, which is a loss of blood circulation that causes bone
death, in Burton’s hip. He prescribed Norco for the pain and
recommended that Burton speak to Dr. Verghese, an ortho‐
pedic surgeon, for treatment options.
One week before Burton’s detention, Dr. Verghese per‐
formed a core decompression surgery to treat Burton’s avas‐
cular necrosis and prescribed Ultram, a synthetic opiate also
known as Tramadol, as a pain reliever. In his deposition, Dr.
Verghese explained that he did not like to prescribe narcotic
No. 14‐3591 3
pain medication such as Norco and preferred Ultram for
pain relief because it has less addictive potential. At that
time, Dr. Verghese did not know that Burton was also taking
Norco.
On the day of Burton’s surgery, Dr. Zumwalt refilled Bur‐
ton’s Norco prescription without consulting Dr. Verghese.
Dr. Zumwalt stated in his deposition that he did not intend
for Burton to be taking Norco for long, and that the prescrip‐
tion should have run out on September 29, 2009. Although
Dr. Zumwalt conceded that Norco is addictive, he testified
that the dose prescribed to Burton would not be addictive if
taken over several weeks, and that it could have been
stopped or interrupted without causing serious withdrawal
symptoms or health issues.
On September 23, 2009, Burton was arrested and booked
into the JCDC. Burton had taken a Vicodin pill about an
hour before his arrest. At the time of his detention, all of Bur‐
ton’s prescribed medications, including Lexapro for depres‐
sion, Xanax for anxiety, Zantac for acid reflux, two types of
prescription cream for herples simplex, and Norco, were
confiscated pursuant to JCDC policies and procedures.
Approximately thirty‐five hours later, Physician’s Assis‐
tant Timothy Menard examined Burton. Burton claims that
during his examination, he informed Menard that he was
experiencing severe pain as well as withdrawal symptoms
because he had been taking Norco for the past year, and re‐
quested that Menard contact Dr. Zumwalt. Menard contact‐
ed Dr. Verghese about Burton’s surgery and health issues,
but did not call Dr. Zumwalt or prescribe Norco. Menard in‐
stead prescribed Ultram, Xanax, Zantac, and cholesterol‐
lowering medication. Burton was allowed to take the Zantac
4 No. 14‐3591
and cholesterol medicine back to his cell to self‐dispense, but
the Ultram and Xanax were dispensed by the JCDC staff.
The parties dispute how quickly Burton received Ultram
after this examination. Burton contends that he did not re‐
ceive pain medication until October 1, nine days after he was
detained. He did not raise this argument in his complaint—it
first appears in his response to defendants’ motion for sum‐
mary judgment, which was filed on November 13, 2013. The
only evidence to support his claim is a document from
Riverview Pharmacy showing that an Ultram prescription
was filled on October 1.
Burton’s deposition taken in January 2012 tells a different
story. In that deposition, Burton made several statements in‐
dicating that he began taking Ultram on September 25,
meaning that he was only deprived of pain relief for approx‐
imately thirty‐five to forty‐eight hours from the start of his
detention. Specifically, Burton acknowledged that Nurse
Heather Gill ordered his prescription for Ultram on Septem‐
ber 25 and that he received Ultram after Menard’s September
25 examination. Burton also admitted that when he met with
Dr. Verghese on September 29, less than a week after his de‐
tention, he told Dr. Verghese that he was taking Ultram. Bur‐
ton’s statements are consistent with JCDC medical records
that show that Ultram was dispensed on September 25.
On September 29, 2009, less than a week after he was de‐
tained, Burton saw Dr. Verghese for a follow‐up appoint‐
ment and complained that he was experiencing severe post‐
surgical pain. After conducting a physical examination and
reviewing his X‐rays, Dr. Verghese refilled Burton’s prescrip‐
tion for Ultram for seven to ten days and instructed that he
No. 14‐3591 5
use Tylenol after his Ultram prescription ran out. As before,
Dr. Verghese did not prescribe Norco.
Dr. Verghese saw Burton again on October 27, 2009. Dr.
Verghese stated in his deposition that at this time, Burton
appeared to be recovering well. Dr. Verghese once again re‐
fused to prescribe narcotics, despite Burton’s continued re‐
quests. He instead advised that Burton continue to take Ty‐
lenol for pain relief and begin weaning off of his crutches.
On November 17, 2009, in a hearing for Burton’s pending
criminal case, Burton explained to Illinois Circuit Judge
Clark Erickson that he was not receiving the medications
that he had been prescribed before he was detained and that
he was experiencing severe pain from sleeping on a thin
mattress. The government made no objection to Burton’s oral
motion and no evidence or testimony was taken. At the end
of the hearing, Judge Erickson ordered that the sheriff pro‐
vide Burton with an extra mattress and furnish him with all
medicines that were prescribed for him. But the JCDC did
not provide Burton with an extra mattress, nor did it supply
Burton with any prescriptions written by Dr. Zumwalt be‐
fore Burton’s detention, including Norco.
Burton saw Dr. Verghese again on November 24, 2009. At
this time, Burton complained that he continued to suffer
from severe hip pain and that he was developing pain in his
elbow from the crutches. Dr. Verghese diagnosed Burton
with tennis elbow and recommended physical therapy to
help his recovery progress more quickly. Dr. Verghese stated
in his deposition that he taught Burton some simple stretch‐
ing exercises, but Burton contends that he was unable to un‐
derstand the instructions.
6 No. 14‐3591
Sometime after Burton’s November 24 appointment,
Nurse Gill called Dr. Verghese to inquire about his recom‐
mendation of physical therapy. Dr. Verghese informed her
that Burton could do physical therapy exercises in his cell.
Nurse Gill then gave Burton written instructions on how to
complete physical therapy exercises with a towel and also
provided a towel. The jail did not provide Burton with out‐
side physical therapy. Burton continued to use crutches for
the remainder of his detention.
Dr. Verghese saw Burton for the last time on February 25,
2010. Burton again complained about elbow and hip pain
and admitted he had not been doing the stretches that Dr.
Verghese and Nurse Gill had suggested. Dr. Verghese con‐
cluded that Burton should stretch his muscles surrounding
his hip and elbow and recommended physical therapy, on
the condition that Burton could convince the court that he
should receive it.
During each appointment, Dr. Verghese examined Burton
and determined that his avascular necrosis was improving.
In fact, Dr. Verghese stated in his deposition that as of No‐
vember 24, 2009, he found no evidence of any avascular ne‐
crosis at all. But Burton continued to complain about severe
pain and to request narcotic pain medication, which Dr. Ver‐
ghese refused to prescribe. Dr. Verghese also refused to pre‐
scribe or recommend a thicker mattress despite Burton’s re‐
quests because he did not believe that a second or different
mattress would affect Burton’s underlying medical condi‐
tion.
For these reasons, at a later hearing in Burton’s criminal
case, Illinois Circuit Judge Kathy Bradshaw denied Burton’s
request that the court order the sheriff and the jail to provide
No. 14‐3591 7
him with narcotic medication, a second mattress, and a dif‐
ferent orthopedist. Judge Bradshaw determined that Burton
had no current prescriptions for the medication he was re‐
questing and was being seen by a competent orthopedist, Dr.
Verghese, who had not recommended an additional mattress
or prescribed Norco.
A few months after Burton’s February 25 appointment
with Dr. Verghese, the JCDC offered to make Burton a fol‐
low‐up appointment, but Burton refused to go. In his depo‐
sition, Burton explained that he did not think Dr. Verghese
was helping him get better, and that Dr. Verghese was writ‐
ing prescriptions for physical therapy that the jail was not
going to fill, so he did not want to waste time with another
appointment.
Between June and August of 2010, Menard contacted
other orthopedists in the area to try to schedule an appoint‐
ment for Burton, but his efforts were unsuccessful. In a Janu‐
ary 24, 2011 healthcare review document, Menard and Nurse
Gill noted that all orthopedic doctors in the area refused to
see Burton. The review also noted that Burton had recently
been caught hoarding and selling Xanax, Seroquel, and Ul‐
tram in jail.
Burton continued to complain about his hip and elbow
pain and was seen by the JCDC medical staff several times.
Burton also received medical treatment for other conditions,
including a rash and rectal bleeding, while detained. Burton
does not allege that he was ever denied an appointment with
the medical staff, who saw him twenty‐six times during his
eighteen‐month period of detention.
8 No. 14‐3591
On May 3, 2011, Burton filed a complaint against the
JCDC; Kankakee County Sheriff Timothy Bukowski, Chief of
Corrections Michael Downey, and Assistant Chief of Correc‐
tions Chad Kolitwenzew (the “non‐medical defendants”);
and Menard, Physician’s Assistant Tiniki White, Nurse Gill,
and Nurse Charee Sangster (the “medical defendants”). Bur‐
ton requested monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for al‐
leged violations of his constitutional rights while he was de‐
tained. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dis‐
miss, finding that Burton had stated a claim that defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.1
After the close of discovery, defendants moved for sum‐
mary judgment, arguing that no reasonable jury could find
for Burton and that they were entitled to qualified immunity
because their actions were consistent with clearly established
law. On September 16, 2014, the district court denied de‐
fendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Defendants moved for reconsideration of the district
court’s order on October 6, 2014, arguing that the non‐
medical defendants should be dismissed from the case. The
district court denied the motion, reasoning that it could not
determine the non‐medical defendants’ personal involve‐
ment in the creation and implementation of jail policies that
were responsible for Burton’s alleged constitutional depriva‐
tions. Defendants now appeal.
1 Kankakee County was later added as a necessary party under Carver v.
Sheriff of LaSalle Cnty., 324 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003), but the County is not a
party to this appeal.
No. 14‐3591 9
II. Discussion
On appeal, defendants contend that the district court
erred by denying their motion for summary judgment be‐
cause, even after resolving all factual inferences in favor of
Burton, no reasonable jury could conclude that they were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. De‐
fendants also claim that they were entitled to invoke the de‐
fense of qualified immunity, which shields government offi‐
cials from liability “for actions taken while performing dis‐
cretionary functions, unless their conduct violates clearly es‐
tablished statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea‐
sonable person would have known.” Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty.,
235 F.3d 1000, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000). Like the district court, we
combine our analysis of whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to Burton’s constitutional claim
and whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity,
as the issues are inextricably linked in this case. See Walker v.
Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The district
court blended together its analysis of whether there was a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to Walker’s claim
and whether the defendants were entitled to qualified im‐
munity. Under certain circumstances, such as those present‐
ed here, the two inquiries effectively collapse into one.”).
We review the denial of summary judgment de novo and
resolve all factual disputes in the nonmovant’s favor. See
Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2014). But the exist‐
ence of a factual dispute will not preclude summary judg‐
ment when the dispute does not involve a material fact. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
10 No. 14‐3591
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.”). And “[w]hen opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
As an initial matter, we reject Burton’s argument that the
district court’s decision denying qualified immunity for de‐
fendants was not an appealable final decision. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (“[A] district court’s denial
of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on
an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ … .”). De‐
fendants’ arguments do not turn on factual disputes—
defendants argue that even after drawing all factual infer‐
ences in Burton’s favor, it is evident that their conduct did
not violate his constitutional rights. The case therefore turns
on issues of law, which may be resolved in this appeal.
In determining whether a government official is entitled
to qualified immunity, we make two inquiries: “(1) whether
the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) wheth‐
er that constitutional right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d
749, 758 (7th Cir. 2013). Burton’s constitutional rights as a
pretrial detainee are derived from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits deliberate in‐
difference to his serious medical needs. Pittman v. Cnty. of
Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014). This standard is
essentially the same as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, which applies to
No. 14‐3591 11
convicted prisoners. See Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d 752, 756
(7th Cir. 2013).
To prove a claim for deliberate indifference, Burton must
show that the alleged conditions were objectively serious
enough to amount to a constitutional deprivation and that
defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
See Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001). The
subjective element “requires more than negligence and it
approaches intentional wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has
compared the deliberate indifference standard to that of
criminal recklessness.” Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700
F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
In denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
the district court found that disputed questions of material
fact existed as to whether defendants were deliberately indif‐
ferent to Burton’s serious medical needs. Specifically, the dis‐
trict court held that a reasonable jury could find that the fol‐
lowing conduct violated Burton’s constitutional rights: (1)
stopping Burton’s prescribed medication, including his pain
medication, for over a week after he was detained; (2) refus‐
ing to contact Burton’s primary care physician or prescribe
narcotic pain medication, despite Burton’s supposedly pain‐
ful withdrawal symptoms; (3) refusing to provide Burton
with a second mattress; and (4) refusing to provide Burton
with physical therapy and failing to effectively treat Burton’s
rash and rectal bleeding. We address each of these issues in
turn.
A. Delay in Receiving Medication
When Burton checked into the JCDC, he had nine differ‐
ent prescription medications with him, including Norco.
12 No. 14‐3591
Under JCDC policy, when an inmate is booked into jail, his
medications are confiscated and must be approved by the
jail medical department before they are dispensed. Burton
contends, and the district court accepted, that after Burton’s
booking on September 23, 2009, he did not receive any medi‐
cation until October 1, 2009. But Burton’s own sworn state‐
ments conflict with this version of the facts. In his deposi‐
tion, which took place months before Burton first raised this
argument before the district court, Burton stated that he re‐
ceived Ultram after meeting with Menard on September 25,
that Nurse Gill ordered his Ultram on September 25, and
that he had informed Dr. Verghese that he was taking Ul‐
tram on September 29. These statements are consistent with
JCDC medical records, which show that Ultram was dis‐
pensed on September 25, 2009.
We therefore reject Burton’s belated attempt to claim that
his medications were withheld for nine days. This claim is
“blatantly contradicted” by his deposition testimony, and as
such, the district court should not have accepted this version
of the facts, even when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
In considering whether a two‐day delay in receiving
medication implicates the Constitution, we must keep in
mind that “the infliction of suffering on prisoners can be
found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that inflic‐
tion is either deliberate, or reckless in the criminal law
sense.” Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir.
1985), abrogated on other grounds; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 297 (“[O]nly the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner ad‐
vancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege deliberate
No. 14‐3591 13
indifference to his serious medical needs.” (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted)). “Negligence, gross negli‐
gence, or even ‘recklessness’ as that term is used in tort cas‐
es, is not enough.” Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th
Cir. 1987).
Here, Burton does not claim, or present any evidence that
would support a claim, that defendants deliberately or even
recklessly delayed the distribution of his pain medication.
Although we recognize the importance of prompt medical
aid for a patient’s necessary medical treatment when he is
detained or incarcerated, without evidence that defendants
acted with the requisite bad intent in delaying the dispensa‐
tion of his medication, Burton’s allegations are insufficient to
sustain a deliberate indifference claim. Put simply, a two‐day
delay is not enough, standing alone, to show a culpable
mental state. The delay may or may not have been negligent,
but it did not constitute deliberate indifference for purposes
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Failure to Contact Burton’s Primary Care Physician
or Prescribe Norco
Burton next contends that because the medical staff ig‐
nored his requests for narcotic pain medication and refused
to contact his primary care physician who had previously
prescribed Norco, he suffered extreme post‐surgical pain
and withdrawal symptoms. We agree with defendants that
no reasonable jury could conclude that the failure to pre‐
scribe narcotic pain medication or contact a doctor who
would prescribe it amounted to deliberate indifference. Sure‐
ly Burton would have preferred Vicodin to Ultram, or to
have seen a doctor who would have prescribed narcotics, but
14 No. 14‐3591
detainees are not entitled to receive “unqualified access to
healthcare.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
Moreover, we recognize that “[t]here is not one ‘proper’
way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of
acceptable courses based on prevailing standards in the
field.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). Ac‐
cordingly, to demonstrate that defendants acted with delib‐
erate indifference, Burton must show that the medical de‐
fendants’ refusal to prescribe Norco was “such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible ac‐
tually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id.
(quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Burton presented no such evidence; in fact, the record
suggests that the decision to prescribe non‐narcotic pain
medication was a reasonable one. This was the course of
treatment recommended by Dr. Verghese—Burton’s own or‐
thopedic surgeon—immediately after his surgery. The deci‐
sion to prescribe non‐narcotic pain medication was reaf‐
firmed by Dr. Verghese several times after thorough exami‐
nations, and was supported by a reasonable medical expla‐
nation: synthetic opiates have less addictive potential than
non‐synthetic opiates such as Norco.
Although Dr. Zumwalt followed a different course of
treatment in prescribing Norco, “[m]ere differences of opin‐
ion among medical personnel regarding a patient’s appro‐
priate treatment do not give rise to deliberate indifference.”
Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261 (7th Cir. 1996). In oth‐
er words, evidence that another doctor would have followed
a different course of treatment is insufficient to sustain a de‐
liberate indifference claim.
No. 14‐3591 15
Burton also fails to present any objective evidence that
his painful withdrawal symptoms created a serious medical
need for Norco. Burton’s after‐the‐fact description of his
symptoms is not objective evidence of a serious medical
need for narcotic drugs, especially given that two trained
medical professionals concluded otherwise. Moreover, Bur‐
ton’s own primary care doctor testified that Burton had no
medical need for Norco whatsoever. In his deposition, Dr.
Zumwalt stated that Burton was not prescribed Norco for
long enough to become addicted, and that withholding nar‐
cotic medication would not put Burton at risk of medical
complications. Cf. Wilson v. Hosey, No. 09‐C‐7777, 2012 WL
957488, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2012) (granting summary
judgment for defendant where plaintiff’s only evidence that
he needed medical treatment was his testimony, which was
contradicted by testimony by plaintiff’s doctor).
C. Failure to Provide a Second Mattress
Defendants also dispute that a triable issue of fact exists
as to whether the failure to give Burton a second mattress
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The district
court held that a reasonable jury could conclude that this
conduct deprived Burton of “the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.” But the Supreme Court has clarified that
conditions of confinement of this kind involve “deprivations
of essential food, medical care, or sanitation.” Rhodes v. Chap‐
man, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (emphasis added). Burton pre‐
sents no evidence to support his allegation that sleeping on a
single mattress amounted to a deprivation of this magni‐
tude. Instead, Burton’s treating physician examined his con‐
dition and concluded that a second mattress was unneces‐
sary because it would not affect his condition at all. Without
16 No. 14‐3591
some evidence that defendants’ conduct deprived Burton of
essential medical care, no reasonable jury could conclude
that Burton’s conditions of confinement amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment.2
D. In‐Cell Physical Therapy and Treatment for Burton’s
Rash and Rectal Bleeding
Finally, defendants contend that no reasonable jury could
find that defendants were deliberately indifferent to Burton’s
serious need for physical therapy and treatment for his rash
and rectal bleeding. We agree.
Dr. Verghese twice prescribed physical therapy for Bur‐
ton’s hip and tennis elbow. The JCDC medical staff did not
ignore this advice; soon after Dr. Verghese issued his first
prescription, Nurse Gill called him to discuss it. In this
phone call, Dr. Verghese informed Nurse Gill that in‐cell
therapy would be sufficient, and that outside physical thera‐
py was unnecessary. Accordingly, Nurse Gill provided Bur‐
ton with instructions and a towel to perform in‐cell exercis‐
es. Burton admits that he did not follow these instructions,
supposedly because they were inadequate. When Dr. Ver‐
ghese again prescribed physical therapy several months lat‐
er, he did so on the condition that Burton convince the court
to allow it, which suggests that it was not medically neces‐
sary.
2 Although the district court issued an order in Burton’s criminal case
requesting that the sheriff provide Burton with a second mattress, de‐
fendants’ failure to comply is insufficient in itself to sustain a deliberate
indifference claim, which requires some evidence of a serious medical
need. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
No. 14‐3591 17
Even assuming that Burton had a serious medical need
for outside physical therapy or more thorough instructions
from the JCDC staff, Burton fails to present evidence that the
medical defendants, who contacted Dr. Verghese and fol‐
lowed his recommendations for treatment, acted with the
requisite state of mind for deliberate indifference. On these
facts, it is difficult to even conclude that defendants were
negligent. There is therefore no evidence from which a rea‐
sonable jury could conclude that defendants consciously dis‐
regarded Burton’s serious medical need for physical therapy.
Likewise, we disagree that a reasonable jury could find
that defendants’ treatment of Burton’s rash and rectal bleed‐
ing amounted to deliberate indifference. Burton does not
contend that he was ever denied treatment for these condi‐
tions—instead, the record shows that the medical defendants
promptly responded to Burton’s complaints and prescribed
medication. Burton does not present any evidence that de‐
fendants’ course of treatment fell below prevailing medical
standards, nor does he dispute that his conditions eventually
resolved, which suggests that the chosen course of treatment
was effective.
III. Conclusion
Because no reasonable jury could find that defendants’
conduct violated Burton’s constitutional rights, the medical
and non‐medical defendants were entitled to invoke the de‐
fense of qualified immunity, and the district court’s decision
denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
REVERSED and the case REMANDED for entry of judgment for
the defendants.