Opinions of the United
1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-28-1994
USA v. Bertoli
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 94-5167
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"USA v. Bertoli" (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 172.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 94-5167
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RICHARD O. BERTOLI,
Appellant
_________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal No. 89-00218-3)
_______________
Argued September 20, 1994
BEFORE: GREENBERG, ROTH, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 28, 1994)
______________
Richard W. Levitt
148 East 78th Street
New York, NY 10021
James D. Crawford (argued)
Schnader, Harrison, Segal &
Lewis
1600 Market Street
Suite 3600
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorneys for Appellant
Edna B. Axelrod
Glenn J. Moramarco (argued)
Office of United States Attorney
970 Broad Street
Room 502
Newark, NJ 07102
Attorneys for Appellee
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction
and sentence entered by the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey on March 30, 1994. Richard O. Bertoli,
the appellant, was convicted of obstruction of justice and
conspiracy to obstruct justice, the third and sixth counts of a
six-count indictment. On March 28, 1994, the district court
sentenced Bertoli to a total term of 100 months imprisonment to
be followed by two concurrent three-year terms of supervised
release. In addition, the court imposed a $7 million fine.
Bertoli appeals from both his sentence and his
conviction. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial
because: (1) the district court failed to inquire properly into
whether premature jury deliberations prejudiced him; (2) the
district court's method of conducting ex parte in camera
interviews with certain jurors violated his constitutional and
procedural rights; and (3) the district court improperly supplied
the jury with written transcripts of certain testimony. Bertoli
argues in the alternative that his sentence should be vacated
because: (1) the district court applied the wrong version of the
Sentencing Guidelines Manual, thereby violating his right to be
free from ex post facto punishments; (2) the district court's
calculation of the loss under the fraud guideline is not
supported by the record; (3) the district court erred by upwardly
departing to $7 million from the guidelines range fine of
$125,000. Finally, Bertoli urges that if the case is remanded,
it should be reassigned to a different judge.
For reasons we explain in detail below, we will affirm
the judgment of conviction but we will vacate the sentence. We
decline to order that the case be reassigned to a different
judge, and therefore we will remand the matter to the district
court for resentencing in accordance with this Opinion.
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 1989, a grand jury returned a six-
count superseding indictment, charging Bertoli and two co-
defendants, Richard Cannistraro and Leo Eisenberg, with violating
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et. seq., conspiracy to violate RICO,
conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and three counts of
obstruction of justice. In January 1992, the grand jury returned
a second superseding indictment, adding obstruction of justice
counts against Bertoli and Cannistraro, based on their alleged
continuing efforts to hinder the criminal prosecution. Eisenberg
eventually pled guilty to the RICO count of the first superseding
indictment, and Cannistraro pled guilty to an information
charging him with conspiracy to obstruct justice. Bertoli thus
became the sole remaining defendant.
Much of the substantive conduct described at the trial
is not generally relevant to this appeal. However, certain
evidence is -- evidence of conduct underlying Counts One and Two,
which the district court termed the "stock manipulations
schemes," and of conduct underlying Counts Three and Six, the
counts of conviction.1 Essentially, Bertoli and his co-
conspirators were charged with unlawfully manipulating the prices
of certain stocks. The scheme worked by creating artificial
demand, which in turn artificially raised the price of the
stocks. For example, Bertoli allocated units of certain initial
public offerings of stock ("IPOs") to individuals and entities he
controlled. Those players restricted the purchase and sale of
the stocks in keeping with Bertoli's and Eisenberg's
instructions, thus, essentially setting the price, creating a
demand, and ensuring that the price rose. After the prices rose,
Bertoli and the others sold their shares at a profit.
Additionally, to raise the prices still further, Cannistraro, who
was an analyst at the firm of Wood Gundy, Inc., attracted buyers
by writing favorable reports about the IPOs.2
The third count charged Bertoli with conspiracy to
obstruct several criminal and civil investigations into his
unlawful securities fraud. The count alleged that he conspired
to obstruct: (1) an investigation conducted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), beginning in 1983, of fraudulent
and manipulative trading of two stocks; (2) a civil action
1
. Most of the issues in this appeal involve incidents occurring
at trial, and the trial court's responses. We set forth those
facts as they become pertinent in the analysis.
2
. Count One specifically charged that the defendants violated
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"),
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq., by conducting the affairs of Monarch
Funding Corp., a securities brokerage firm in New York City,
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Count Two charged
the defendants with conspiracy to violate RICO.
brought in 1985 by the SEC against Bertoli and others; (3) a
1985-86 grand jury investigation; (4) a 1987 prosecution against
Cannistraro; and (5) the current action. The conspirators
allegedly achieved their object by causing brokers and others to
conceal evidence from the investigators and the grand jury. The
count alleged 33 overt acts, consisting of telephone calls
between the defendants and others, and false statements by the
defendants. The count alleged that in furtherance of the
conspiracy, the defendants destroyed documents relating to
certain accounts, filed a false financial disclosure form with
the United States Probation Office, transferred funds in the
Cayman Islands, and knowingly submitted false affidavits during
this prosecution. Count Six charged that Bertoli and others
obstructed justice by transferring certain proceeds of
racketeering activity from the Cayman Islands to the Principality
of Andorra in Europe, with the deliberate intent to hide their
criminal activity and unlawful gains from the United States
government.
The case against Bertoli was tried between June 1,
1993, and August 24, 1993. For the first seven weeks of trial,
Bertoli was pro se; thereafter, an attorney entered the case on
his behalf. On August 24, 1993, the jury returned a verdict
finding Bertoli guilty of one count of obstruction of justice
(Count Six) and one count of conspiracy to commit obstruction of
justice (Count Three). But the jury acquitted Bertoli on all
other counts. Bertoli made a timely motion for a new trial,
which the district court denied. On March 28, 1994, after the
district court imposed the sentence, Bertoli timely filed his
notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The district court had jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We will address the trial issues
and the sentencing issues in turn.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Trial Issues
1. Adequacy of court's inquiry into jury misconduct
Bertoli first contends that the trial court failed
adequately to investigate whether premature jury deliberations
prejudiced him. Bertoli moved for a mistrial on the issue; he
also made a post-trial motion for a new trial. Both motions were
denied.
a. Factual background
On August 11, 1993, the court began reading the charge
to the jury. During a recess, Juror Six informed the court that
an alternate juror had engaged her in a premature, improper
discussion about the merits of the case. With counsel present,
the juror was brought before the court, and the following
colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: You mentioned to me as I was walking out
that somebody mentioned to you an opinion about the
case?
THE JUROR: Correct.
THE COURT: I don't want to know what it is. Has that
affected your ability to be fair and impartial?
THE JUROR: I don't think so. In fact, I'm sure it has
not.
App. at 675-76. The trial court procured from Juror Six the
identity of the jurors who engaged her in the premature
conversations. All three of them -- Jurors Thirteen, Fourteen
and Fifteen -- were alternates. One at a time, the court
summoned these alternate jurors to the courtroom for questioning
by the court in the presence of counsel for both Bertoli and the
government. The record reflects the following conversation
between the court and Juror Thirteen:
THE COURT: The juror who was just out here indicated
to me that you mentioned to her something about the
case. I stress I did not ask her what it is, I do not
know what it is, I don't want to know what it is.
I have instructed all the jury not to express or
deliberate in any way in the case.
Have you mentioned anything to anybody else about
the case?
THE JUROR: No, I haven't your Honor.
THE COURT: Again, you can't go into any detail.
I'm going to excuse you from deliberation. . . .
App. at 677-78. The court had nearly identical conversations
with Jurors Fourteen and Fifteen. Both of the jurors denied
discussing the case with any juror other than Juror Six and the
court excused both from their responsibilities as well.
When the court concluded its voir dire, Bertoli moved
for a mistrial or, alternatively, either that the court similarly
question the other jurors or that Juror Six be excused. Stating
that "[s]he has expressed to me her ability to be fair and
impartial and I'm satisfied she can be on that", the court denied
the motions. App. at 680. Bertoli's counsel then requested the
court to probe further into the intra-jury communications. The
court reiterated its belief that the jury remained untainted, but
agreed to "in camera ask each of them what they said and seal it,
so the Circuit has it." App. at 687. During the next recess,
the alternate jurors and Juror Six were called into the judge's
chambers for further interviews. Neither Bertoli nor his
attorney was present for this second round of questioning.
The court first interviewed Juror Thirteen. Because
Bertoli relies heavily on this conversation, we quote the
transcript extensively:
THE COURT: Juror number six, Sheila, Miss Wheil, says
that you mentioned something to her and that's what she
mentioned to me and that's what I asked you about in
court.
You're not a deliberating juror. From what I
know, it's no big deal, but just to satisfy the
attorneys out there, I'm putting it on the record.
Don't be concerned.
A: Okay.
Q: Did you express an opinion as to guilt or
innocence?
A: No.
Q: You didn't?
A: No. That's why I was wondering why I was excused
because --
Q: Everybody would have been excused anyway. We had
all 12 jurors.
Please, don't be upset with me or the process.
A: I'm not.
First of all, let me say something. It's been an
honor and privilege to be here. I realize this is the
process. I have learned a lot, I really have. I
learned a lot. It's been a privilege and I kind of
feel violated about what happened today because --
Q: You know, don't, because from -- you were number
13. From number 13 to 20, you all knew that.
A: I understand that.
Q: You guys did yeomen work. . . .
* * *
Look, Miss Wheil just mentioned to me that you
mentioned something to her about the case and I said,
fine, I'll find out about it.
That's why I asked if you mentioned anything to
anybody else. You said you didn't.
I just want to put it on the record so these
attorneys have their record. It will be sealed.
If they want to use it, the Court of Appeals will
look at it. It's no big deal as far as you're
concerned. I'm just trying to maintain the integrity
of the process.
A: I understand.
Q: Please don't be upset with me.
A: No, but I would like to tell you what happened.
Q: Sure.
A: I pulled in the parking lot this morning, so I
waited for her, to walk in the building together.
She says to me, she says, 'How in the hell does he
think he's going to get away with this?'
I say to her, I says, 'What are you talking about?
Get away with what?'
She says, 'Bertoli.'
I says, 'Bertoli's innocent until he's proven
guilty.'
Q: That's all you said.
A: That's what I said.
Q: It's not a problem.
A: I'm not going to go through the process of
deliberating. But you have to look at all of the
evidence before you can say the man is guilty.
Q: As you heard my instruction out in court, that's
exactly what I told the jury.
A: This is what I told her this morning. I walked in
the building and that's [sic] was it.
Your Honor, we don't even communicate. The only
reason why I waited for her this morning was because I
thought, well, I don't run into her very often, I'll
wait for her just to be polite.
Q: Mr. Bowen, it's no big deal.
A: But, your Honor, I got a lot of questions I want
to ask you.
Q: I told -- as a matter of fact, once the jurors
begin deliberating, I'll bring all the alternates in
and we can talk about the case. That's not a problem.
I told you folks we would do that.
When the jury returns its verdicts, I'll sit down
and chew the fat with them, too.
That's all I want to do right now is just clear
this up. It's no big deal. There is no problem. I
see absolutely no consideration.
A. But there is a problem. There is a problem.
Q: Well --
A: The problem is with her because she's been
expressing opinions all along in the trial. No one has
communicated with her.
Q: Great. That's terrific. That's terrific.
A: She's the only one that has expressed an opinion
and for the three of us to take the weight, this looks
very bad.
Q: No, no, please.
You have to understand, I'm not assessing blame on
anyone and the only reason I'm talking to you right now
is just to have a record for the lawyers.
A: Your Honor, there's a problem.
Q: Please, there is no problem with you and we can --
A: Just forget it?
Q: You have no problem. I really feel bad that
you're upset -- because you have been such -- it's been
fun just having you.
A: It has been fun.
I'm not upset. Don't get me wrong if I'm
expressing myself that way.
Q: Let it drop. It's no big deal and I want to tell
the other two jurors that I feel bad for them, too.
A: It's one of those things.
Q: It's just one of those things.
App. at 689-93.
The in camera examinations of the other two alternate
jurors took much less time. The jurors each denied expressing or
being told a view as to Bertoli's guilt or innocence. The court
then proceeded to question Juror Six:
Q: Have deliberations begun yet?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: . . . Have you prejudged the case?
A: No I have not.
Q: Are you fair and impartial?
A: I believe I am.
Q: And are you ready to begin your deliberations with
the jury?
A: Yes.
Q: From scratch?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. There is nothing that would prevent you
from being fair and impartial in the case?
A: No.
Q: That's it. Don't worry about it.
App. at 694-95.
Following these conversations, the court made factual
findings, outside the presence of the attorneys "for whatever
purpose it may be appropriate, for the circuit, if necessary."
App. at 696-97. The court concluded that Juror Six did not
prejudge the case, that there had been no outside influence of
the jury, and that Juror Thirteen's accusations about Juror Six
arose "more out of pique than out of accuracy." App. at 696.
The court found that no one in the jury room had made any
determination as to guilt or innocence. Rather, "if there's been
any comment, it may have been sporadic comments on individual
witnesses or individual presentation of evidence or the amount of
evidence or the manner of the presentation of the evidence." Id.
He concluded that "I am satisfied upon further reflection that
this jury did exactly what it was supposed to do up to the time
it began deliberations this afternoon." App. at 697.
According to its March 28, 1994 Letter Opinion3
(hereinafter "Opinion") and findings, the court based its
determinations on its evaluation of "the demeanor and credibility
of all four jurors upon questioning and from general observation
of the jury throughout the ten-week trial." App. at 279. It
found Juror Thirteen's accusations against Juror Six incredible,
because "the statement Alternate Juror Thirteen sought to
attribute to Juror Six was wholly out of character for her."
App. at 281. Moreover, it contrasted Juror Six's "cool, calm and
deliberate" responses with Alternate Juror Thirteen's visible
consternation. App. at 281.
While the interviews and fact-findings were
transcribed, the court initially sealed the transcripts. It
released them to the attorneys when the verdicts were returned.
Upon receipt of the transcripts, Bertoli made a renewed motion
for a new trial based on what he characterized as new evidence,
meaning the content of the transcribed conversations.
b. Analysis
Bertoli contends that his Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial before an impartial jury has been violated because the
district court failed adequately to investigate and assess
3
. The district court issued a 629-page letter-opinion after the
sentencing, setting forth the reasons for a variety of its pre-
trial, trial and post-trial decisions.
whether premature communications among the jurors about the
merits of the case prejudiced him. The government argues in
response that the district court thoroughly and adequately
questioned the affected jurors and that the court's findings are
in accord with the evidence in the record.
We review a district court's denial of motions for a
mistrial and a new trial, as well as its investigation of jury
misconduct, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Resko, 3
F.3d 684, 688 (3d Cir. 1993); Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d
436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992); Government of Virgin Islands v. Lima,
774 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1985). That discretion extends to
the court's findings on whether the jury misconduct prejudiced
the defendant. Resko, 3 F.3d at 688.
"It is fundamental that every litigant who is entitled
to trial by jury is entitled to an impartial jury, free to the
furthest extent practicable from extraneous influences that may
subvert the fact-finding process." Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705,
709 (3d Cir. 1993). Partly to ensure that this right is upheld,
"[i]t [has been] a generally accepted principle of trial
administration that jurors must not engage in discussions of a
case before they have heard both the evidence and the court's
legal instructions and have begun formally deliberating as a
collective body." Resko, 3 F.3d at 688; see also United States
v. DiSalvo, No. 93-1442, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23727 at *62 (3d
Cir. August 31, 1994). Premature deliberations present a number
of dangers, all in some manner affecting or touching upon the
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and
impartial jury trial. In Resko, we identified a number of these:
(1) Since premature deliberations are more likely to
occur before the defendant has had an opportunity to
present his or her case, the prosecution has an unfair
influence on the juror's initial impressions;
(2) Once a juror has expressed views on a particular
issue, that juror has a "stake" in the expressed view
and may give undue weight to additional evidence that
supports, rather than undercuts, his or her view;
(3) Individual conversations between selected jurors
thwart the goal of a collective, deliberative process
between the jurors as a group;
(4) Often, the premature deliberations occur before
the jurors are instructed on the reasonable doubt
standard, and hence the jurors may reach a result using
an incorrect, and unconstitutional, standard of proof.
Resko, 3 F.3d at 689-70. Thus, premature deliberations must be
guarded against and responded to appropriately. Id. at 689.4
In this regard, "'[w]e have recognized that 'voir dire'
is the appropriate method for inquiry into possible prejudice or
4
. In Resko, we noted that "the practice has developed that
trial judges admonish juries at the outset of trial not to
discuss the case with anyone before the conclusion of the trial."
Resko, 3 F.3d at 689 (citing cases and commentary).
In this case, the trial court admonished the jurors on
a number of occasions. For example, after the parties'
respective summations, the court instructed the jury:
As I cautioned you yesterday, I indicated you should
not discuss or deliberate [on] this matter. Although
you heard the summations of the attorneys, you've not
had the benefit of my charge and I direct that you
should not begin deliberations in any way until you've
had the benefit of my charge and you're all together in
the juryroom.
App. at 274.
bias on the part of jurors, and that the procedure used must
provide a reasonable assurance for the discovery of prejudice.'"
Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 709 (quoting Government of Virgin Islands v.
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 1987)) (also citing United
States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085, 105
S.Ct. 589 (1984); United States v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034, 102 S.Ct. 574 (1981)).
Nonetheless, "[t]he particular method of conducting
voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the district court."
United States v. DiSalvo, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23727 at *57 n.18.
Thus, in United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1660 (1994), we noted
that where the trial court has conducted an individualized voir
dire, we generally should defer to its handling of the situation.
In that case, "the [district] court conducted a corrective voir
dire and was 'convinced that there was no prejudicial juror
misconduct and . . . that defendants received a fair trial'".
Id. at 667 (quoting Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152) (alteration in
original). Hence, we held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. Id. at 667-68.
There are compelling reasons why the trial court must
be given wide latitude to assess and respond to allegations of
juror misconduct. "The trial court is obviously in a far better
position to observe the impact of premature jury discussions of
guilt, and to make a considered judgment as to the effectiveness
of a cautionary instruction." Pantone, 609 F.2d at 679; see also
Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152 (same). After all, "the trial judge
develops a relationship with the jury during the course of a
trial that places him or her in a far better position than an
appellate court to measure what a given situation requires."
Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137; see
also Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 ("the trial judge has discretion . . .
to decide how to deal with a situation in which there is an
allegation of . . . premature jury deliberations"); United States
v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, ____
U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 483 (1993); United States v. Aiello, 771
F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Phillips,
664 F.2d 971, 998 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965 (1982).
Of course, even though the trial court is entitled to
deference, the reviewing court must satisfy itself that "the
district court meaningfully . . . assess[ed] the nature and
extent of the jurors' premature discussions in order to ascertain
whether there has been any prejudice to the defendants." Resko,
3 F.3d at 690. Consequently, when the district court has failed
adequately to ensure that the defendant has not been prejudiced
by the improper conduct, we have remanded the case for a new
trial. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 20
F.3d 572, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1994) (attorney's failure to request
court to investigate the prejudicial effect of jury exposure to
extra-record newspaper accounts of trial could constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel for habeas corpus purposes);
Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 713 (remanding case for new trial on damages
where district court failed to conduct a "searching inquiry into
the extent and nature of the prejudicial extrajudicial
information that reached the jurors so as to ascertain for itself
whether there was a substantial likelihood of prejudice such that
a new trial was warranted"); Resko, 3 F.3d at 695 (remanding case
for new trial where district court failed to conduct meaningful
inquiry into allegations of prejudicial intra-jury
communications).
This case is not like those, however, and we do not
find that the district court abused its discretion in its
response to the allegations of improper intra-jury
communications. We further conclude that the district court's
finding that the intra-jury communications did not prejudice
Bertoli is supported adequately by the record.
In the first place, intra-jury communications pose a
less serious threat to a defendant's right to an impartial trial
than do extra-jury influences, and therefore district courts are
entitled to even greater deference in their responses to them
than in responses to outside influences. See, e.g., Resko, 3
F.3d at 690 (citing cases). As we said in Resko:
It has long been recognized that when jurors are
influenced by the media and other publicity, or when
they engage in communications with third parties, these
[outside] influences pose a substantial threat to the
fairness of the criminal proceeding because the
extraneous information completely evades the safeguards
of the judicial process. In contrast, when there are
premature deliberations among jurors with no
allegations of external influence on the jury, the
proper process for jury decisionmaking has been
violated, but there is no reason to doubt that the jury
based its ultimate decision only on evidence formally
presented at trial.
Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 (emphasis in original); DiSalvo, 1994 U.S.
LEXIS 23727 at *62 (intra-jury influences less serious than
extra-jury influences). Because extra-jury influences are far
more serious than intra-jury influences, certain extra-jury
influences create a presumption of prejudice that must be
rebutted by the government for the court to uphold the
conviction. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d at 666. But
cases involving impermissible intra-jury contacts do not create
such a presumption. See id. at 666 n.29 (presumption of
prejudice not created in Resko because the case "did not involve
third-party contact with a juror").
The distinction between extra-jury influences and
intra-jury communications is significant, and becomes apparent by
comparing the facts of this case with those in Waldorf. In that
personal injury case, the plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic
as a result of a motor vehicle accident. During the trial, media
reports of a verdict in a similar case, to which the jury was
exposed and which they discussed among themselves, "placed before
the jury the very same type of information the district court had
excluded as inadmissible." Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 707. Thus, the
circumstances posed a serious risk that an extraneous and
inadmissible newspaper article may have vitiated procedural
rulings based on fairness to both sides. In this case, by
contrast, and similarly to most cases involving premature
deliberations, there is no contention that the jury was exposed
to extraneous influences; instead, the concern is that the trial
was tainted because jurors prematurely spoke their views about
the evidence they properly were considering. Thus, we should be
especially wary about second-guessing the district court in this
case.
At any rate, the court did conduct a voir dire of
particular members of the jury, and did make findings that the
premature deliberations did not prejudice Bertoli. As detailed
above, after Juror Six approached the court with her accusations,
the court immediately ascertained the identities of the jurors
who had engaged her in premature conversations. The court then
questioned the four jurors with counsel present, determined that
Juror Six was the only juror with whom they conversed about the
case, and then disqualified the three alternate jurors. The
court also satisfied itself that Juror Six had not prejudged the
case.
While Bertoli argues that Juror Six should have been
disqualified, we cannot say that the court's finding that she was
not tainted by the premature deliberations was clearly erroneous.
Indeed, quite the opposite is true. The court examined her
twice, and relied on her answers to its questions, her demeanor,
her behavior during the trial and the fact that she was the juror
who brought the premature deliberations to the court's attention.
See, e.g., Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152 (trial court's decision to
remove jurors who spoke to a third juror, but not to remove the
third juror, when that juror informed the court about the
conversations, was not clearly erroneous).
Similarly, we cannot say that the court's decision to
believe Juror Six over Juror Thirteen was clearly erroneous. The
trial court had to believe one of the two jurors. And as the
court said in its opinion, despite interviews with three
alternate jurors, only Juror Thirteen identified Juror Six as the
culprit. Moreover, the trial court was entitled to consider the
fact that Juror Six volunteered information to the court, while
Juror Thirteen did not.
Further, we do not find error in the trial court's
denial of counsel's request that it question the other jurors.
Because the court believed Juror Six and disbelieved Juror
Thirteen, there was no need to investigate further, as the court
interviewed all the jurors involved in the misconduct. Of
course, Bertoli could -- and does -- argue that the court at any
rate should have corroborated its impressions by interviewing the
other jurors. But in the first place, "[t]he more speculative or
unsubstantiated the allegation of misconduct, the less the burden
to investigate." United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 998
(11th Cir. 1985). Second, in these type of situations, the trial
court must balance the potential benefits of further
investigation against the possible harm of calling attention to a
relatively minor situation about which the other jurors may have
been unaware:
'[i]n determining whether to [question jurors] . . .,
the court must balance the probable harm resulting from
the emphasis such action would place upon the
misconduct and the disruption involved in conducting a
hearing against the likely extent and gravity of the
prejudice generated by that misconduct. We, as an
appellate tribunal, are in a poor position to evaluate
these competing considerations; we have only an
insentient record before us.'
Thornton, 1 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States v. Chiantese, 582
F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1978) (alterations in original), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 2030 (1979)).5
It is true that in Resko, we remanded the case for a
new trial because the inquiry into the content and effect of
premature jury deliberations had been inadequate. But that case
readily is distinguished. In Resko, the trial court received
information that members of the jury were discussing the case
during recesses and while waiting in the jury room. The court
denied defense counsel's request that the court conduct an
individualized voir dire of the jurors, instead asking each to
fill out a written questionnaire. 3 F.3d at 687-88. The
questionnaire asked the jurors simply: (1) whether he or she had
5
. The trial court refused to ask the four jurors about the
substance of their conversations. Apparently, the trial court
was concerned about violating Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), which
provides that "[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict
or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations
. . . ." See app. at 275. Of course, because the conversations
occurred prior to official deliberations, and because the court
was not inquiring into the validity of a verdict or indictment,
the rule did not apply to the situation in this case. Cf.
DiSalvo, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS at **65-66 (rule applies to prevent
judge from inquiring into alleged statements made during
deliberations). To the contrary, when premature deliberations
have taken place, we have held that it is generally incumbent
upon the district court to inquire into "the nature of the
jurors' discussions." Resko, 3 F.3d at 691 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of
discretion. The court assured itself that the jurors did not
discuss guilt or innocence and had not prejudged the case.
Moreover, the court disqualified the alternate jurors.
discussed the facts of the case with one or more of the other
jurors; and (2) if yes, whether, because of those discussions, he
or she had formed an opinion about the guilt or non-guilt of the
defendants. All the jurors answered "yes" to question 1 and "no"
to question 2.
By using a two-question form, the district court was
unable "to know the nature of the jurors' discussions and whether
these discussions in fact resulted in prejudice to the
defendants." Id. at 690. While the questionnaire told the court
that each of the jurors engaged in premature discussions, "there
[was] no way to know . . . whether they involved merely brief and
inconsequential conversations about minor matters or whether they
involved full-blown discussions of the defendants' guilt or
innocence." Id. at 690-91. In short, the district court -- as
well as the reviewing court -- simply had insufficient
information upon which to evaluate the allegations. There was no
voir dire to review, and there were no reliable findings upon
which we could apply a deferential standard. Accordingly we were
unable to review the district court's findings at all. As we
explained, the need for a remand was "unfortunate" and we limited
our holding to the facts of that case, facts which we thought --
and still think -- unlikely to recur. Id. at 695.
Unlike the arguments in Resko, Bertoli's arguments
are directed to the method and scope of the trial court's
response, rather than to whether a response existed at all. It
is also significant that the trial court's findings are
corroborated by the nature of the verdict itself. It is
difficult to credit Bertoli's accusations, when the allegedly
prejudiced jury acquitted him on most counts of the indictment
including the most serious charges. As we said in an analogous
context, "[w]hen the jury is instructed to base its verdict
solely on the evidence and it acquits the defendant of certain
counts, such factors indicate that the jury was not biased."
DiSalvo, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23727 at *69 (citing United States
v. Thornton, 1 F.3d at 156). See also United States v. Gilsenan,
949 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1991) (where jury "delivered a fractured
verdict . . . among the offenses . . . [w]e cannot conceive in
these circumstances tht the allegedly prejudiced information
could have had an impact on the verdict"), cert. denied,
U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2971 (1992).
In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's handling of the allegations of jury misconduct and its
finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the premature
jury deliberations.
2. Propriety of the Ex Parte interviews
Bertoli next contends that the trial court erred in
conducting ex parte interviews with members of the jury without
his presence or the presence of his counsel. He argues that the
error was exacerbated by the fact that the court did not unseal
the transcript of the ex parte discussions until after the jury
returned its verdict. Bertoli claims that the trial court's
actions violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
and his right to be present during all stages of a trial pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. The government responds that Bertoli
waived his rights under all of these provisions by failing to
object to the in camera interviews when the district court
informed the attorneys of its intention to proceed in that
manner. Alternatively, the government incorporates the arguments
made in the trial court's opinion explaining its decision. As
this issue involves solely questions concerning the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Constitution, our review is plenary. Government of Virgin
Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 626 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 556 (1993).
a. Fifth Amendment
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment grants
criminal defendants the "right to be present at all stages of the
trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the
proceedings. . . . " Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.
15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n.15 (1975); United States v. Gagnon, 470
U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484 (1985); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332 (1934).
This does not mean, however, that the defendant has a
"constitutional right to be present at every interaction between
a judge and a juror." Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at
1484. Rather, "'[t]he mere occurrence of an ex parte
conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not
constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right.'" Id.
(quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125-26, 104 S.Ct. 453,
459 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (alteration
added)). In particular, and in the absence of some special
circumstance, "[i]t is clear that there is no constitutional
right for a defendant to be present at a conference in chambers
concerning dismissal of a juror." United States v. Provenzano,
620 F.2d 985, 997-98 (3d Cir.) (emphasis in original) (citing
cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S.Ct. 267 (1980); see
also United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 986-87 (6th Cir. 1978)
(appellants' asserted right to be present at in-chambers
conference concerning disqualification of juror "was not
constitutionally required"). In fact, as the Supreme Court has
intimated, the presence of a defendant with counsel during such a
conference well may have a counterproductive effect on the
discussion, by impacting on the jurors' willingness to freely
discuss the issues. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 1485;
United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d at 629 (in certain
circumstances, "the trial judge, aided by his personal
observation and appraisal of all persons concerned, may choose a
private inquiry in the more relaxed atmosphere of the robing
room").
In this case, the trial court's interview with the
jurors did not implicate Bertoli's Fifth Amendment rights.
First, the in camera conversations constituted the second round
of jury interviews, and essentially went over the same ground as
the prior voir dire conducted in open court with counsel present.
Second, as detailed above, the allegations involved solely intra-
jury communications, as opposed to extraneous influences, so the
inquiry was not so significant a part of the trial. Rather, the
interviews constituted "a short interlude in a complex trial."
Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 1484; see also Verdin v.
O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1482 (7th Cir. 1992) ("'Only a trial
fundamentally unfair in light of the entire proceedings violates
the open-ended aspect of [this] constitutional protection.'")
(quotation omitted) (alteration in original); United States v.
Brown, 923 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir.) (no constitutional right to
be present at in camera conference between court and jurors),
cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 112 S.Ct. 110 (1991). Finally, we
doubt whether the jurors would have been as comfortable
discussing their conduct had Bertoli been present.6 Thus, we
hold that Bertoli had no Fifth Amendment right to be present
during the in camera interviews.
b. Rule 43
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present
at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every
stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury
and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.
(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further
progress of the trial to and including the return of
the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant
shall be considered to have waived the right to be
present whenever a defendant, initially present,
6
. The government argues that Bertoli waived any Fifth Amendment
right he may have had. Because we find that he had no such right
in this case, there was nothing to waive.
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial is
commenced . . . .
See also Crosby v. United States, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 113 S.Ct.
748, 751 (1993).
In Gagnon, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
address whether Rule 43 guarantees defendants a right to be
present during an in camera conference between the trial court
and a juror. Other courts, however, generally have held that a
conference between the court and a juror concerning the possible
dismissal of a juror does fall within the purview of Rule 43.
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d at 985-87; United
States v. Baca, 494 F.2d 424, 428-29 (10th Cir. 1974). In United
States v. Provenzano, we held that when the relevant facts were
undisputed and therefore the conference between the court and the
juror involved solely a question of law, Rule 43 did not apply.
620 F.2d at 998 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(3), which provides
that "[a] defendant need not be present . . . [a]t a conference
or argument upon a question of law").
Nonetheless, regardless of whether the defendant does
have such a right, a question we need not decide, it is well
settled that the right is subject to both the doctrines of waiver
and harmless error. See, e.g., Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105
S.Ct. at 1486 (right subject to waiver); Provenzano, 620 F.2d at
998 (right subject to harmless error doctrine). Here we find
that Bertoli waived any right he may have had pursuant to Fed. R.
Cr. P. 43.
The trial court's decision to conduct in-camera
interviews of the jurors arose in the following context:
MR. LEVITT [defense counsel]: I'm still a little
concerned about the incident with juror number six and
numbers 13, 14 and 15 . . . .
THE COURT: I understand what you're saying there, but
I'm not inclined, and I'll think about as I go into
chambers, to require them to discuss it and I'm not
giving you or the Government leave to approach the
jurors. I'm specifically telling you you do not. When
I say 'you', I can't look at you both. The collective
you and your agents, do not have the leave to approach
these jurors.
If one of the three jurors were a deliberating
juror, we might have a different situation, but each
fortuitously was an alternate juror. Each said they
did not speak to anybody else and juror number six -- I
wish I knew her last name, I mean no disrespect to her,
I believe her first name is Sheila -- indicated that it
would have no impact on her.
What I will do, I will in camera ask each of them
what they said and seal it, so the Circuit has it.
App. at 686-87. Bertoli's attorney then asked the court to
interview other jurors as well. He made no objection to the
decision to conduct in-camera interviews and he did not request
to be present. Only after receiving the transcript of the in
camera discussion did Bertoli object to the procedure.
The contemporaneous objection rule, that the failure
contemporaneously to assert a right constitutes a waiver of that
right, applies to a criminal defendant's right to be present
under Rule 43. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. at 1486;
United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d at 112 (failure to assert right
under Rule 43 constitutes waiver); United States v. Doe, 964 F.2d
157, 159 (2d Cir.) ("waiver by counsel of a defendant's right to
be present during the proceedings is valid when made in the
presence of the defendant"), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113
S.Ct. 628 (1992); cf. Government of Virgin Islands v. Williams,
892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 1989) (under contemporaneous objection
rule, a party must object contemporaneously "to any matter
believed to be erroneous, at peril of relinquishing the
opportunity to challenge that matter on appeal"), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 949, 110 S.Ct. 2211 (1990).
A defendant need not be warned expressly of his or her
rights under Rule 43, nor must a waiver exist on the record.
Rather, the simple failure to assert the right constitutes a
waiver. In Gagnon itself, the trial court had announced its
intention to proceed with in camera discussions, and called a
recess. The defendants lodged no objections, then or afterwards,
and the Supreme Court held that the failure to assert the right
constituted a waiver. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 523, 529, 105 S.Ct. at
1483, 1486. Similarly, in Provenzano, we held that a defendant's
failure to object contemporaneously to the court's assertion of
an intent to hold an in camera conference without the defendant
present constituted a waiver of any right. 620 F.2d at 998,
cited with approval in Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 528 n.2, 105 S.Ct. at
1485 n.2.
In this case, the trial court announced its intention
to conduct in camera interviews without Bertoli or his counsel
present, and Bertoli failed to assert any right under Rule 43.7
7
. Relying on the transcript that the court ultimately released
to him, Bertoli contends that even if he consented to in camera
Bertoli nonetheless argues that, based on the transcript, the
trial court only stated an intention to interview the alternate
jurors and that he was not appraised of the court's intention to
interview Juror Six. In light of the colloquy quoted in the
text, this argument is without merit. It is clear that the court
was contemplating interviewing all four jurors.8
c. Sixth Amendment
Bertoli also contends that the in camera ex parte
interviews violated his right to effective assistance of counsel,
since the refusal to allow counsel to be present at the
conference constituted a constructive denial of the right to an
attorney. The Sixth Amendment provides every criminal defendant
with the right to the effective assistance of counsel. While it
may have been preferable to have counsel present, see Aiello, 771
F.2d at 630, and while the district court should have released
(..continued)
interviews, he did not consent to the court's method of
conducting the interviews. It is unfortunate that the trial
judge did not release the transcript of the interviews
immediately after the in camera conference. This does not,
however, change our analysis. Our review of the transcript
reveals that the court did what it told counsel it would do.
What occurs at a conference is not preordained; the possibility
of an unforseen revelation always exists. By waiving his right
to be present at the conference, Bertoli took the risk of what
might occur. At any rate, we are satisfied that the record
supports the court's credibility determinations.
8
. At any rate, any error the district court may have committed
was harmless. It is unclear what Bertoli would have gained by
being present, other than the opportunity to request again more
extensive questioning. On the other hand his presence may have
stifled the jurors. Overall, we see no prejudice to Bertoli from
the procedure followed.
the transcript promptly, we cannot say that Bertoli was
prejudiced by the trial court's decision to conduct the
interviews without counsel present. In the first place, the
responsibility of making the credibility determinations rested
with the court, not counsel. See United States v. Marrero, 904
F.2d 251, 261-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1000, 111
S.Ct. 561 (1990). Second, counsel did not ask to be present at
the interviews when the court announced his intention to hold
them. Finally, the interviews were transcribed and the
transcript was made available to counsel -- albeit belatedly --
in time for counsel to move for a new trial before the district
court itself. See Aiello, 771 F.2d at 629-30 (failure of court
to include counsel in in camera discussion with jury constituted
harmless error when court held second hearing with counsel
present).
3. Providing written transcripts to jury
At several points during deliberations, the jury sent
notes to the trial court requesting certain testimony. Each time
the court overruled Bertoli's objection and provided the
transcripts to the jury. It appears that the jury ultimately
asked for and obtained the transcripts of the entire testimony of
12 witnesses.
Bertoli argues that the trial court erred in providing
the jury with these transcripts. He contends that by acceding to
the jury's request, the trial court permitted the risk that the
jury would overvalue the written transcripts at the expense of
the other evidence. He also points to the risks involved should
a jury misread the transcripts or rely on one juror's
interpretation.
Although we never have ruled on the propriety of
providing juries with written transcripts of testimony, we have
held that "[a] trial court has broad discretion in deciding
whether to accede to a jury's request for a reading of
testimony." United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d
Cir. 1984) (emphasis added); United States v. Chrzanowski, 502
F.2d 573, 577 (3d Cir. 1974) (same); United States v. Rabb, 453
F.2d 1012, 1013 (3d Cir. 1971) (same); United States v.
Chicarelli, 445 F.2d 1111, 1114-15 (3d Cir. 1971) (same). The
discretion is limited by two considerations, however: (1) such
requests may slow the trial where the requested testimony is
lengthy; (2) when read only a portion of testimony, the jury may
give undue weight to that portion. Still, unless a trial court's
refusal to read back testimony is supported by one of these two
concerns, "a trial judge abuses his discretion" by denying the
request. Zarintash, 736 F.2d at 70 (citing Rabb, 453 F.2d at
1013-14).
We agree with Bertoli that the providing of written
trial transcripts may pose dangers not present when the trial
court reads portions of the transcripts to the jury. For
example, when the request is to have testimony read back, the
court can ensure that all the jurors are present when the
testimony is read. In the privacy of the jury room, this cannot
be done. But on the other hand, reading back testimony poses
dangers not present when the jury is provided transcripts. For
instance, an inattentive juror may be persuaded unduly by an
attentive juror's version of the read-back testimony. Moreover,
a juror's mishearing of read-back testimony cannot be corrected
by a second look. All in all, we do not believe that the
distinctions between reading testimony to the jury and providing
the jury with copies of written testimony are sufficient so that
we should apply different considerations when reviewing
determinations by the court to supply them.9 Cf. Zarintash, 736
F.2d at 70 (implying that distinction between providing written
transcripts and reading testimony is a distinction of form, not
substance). Therefore, we join the other courts that have
considered this issue and hold that a trial court's decision
whether or not to supply the jury with copies of written
transcripts may be reversed only when it constitutes an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 968 F.2d 1148,
1152 (11th Cir. 1992) ("district court has broad discretion in
determining whether to grant or deny a jury's request to read a
portion of the trial transcript"), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____,
113 S.Ct. 1006 (1993); United States v. Lujan, 936 F.2d 406, 411
(9th Cir. 1991) (trial court's decision to provide trial
transcript to jury reviewed for abuse of discretion); United
States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 175 (6th Cir.) ("the
9
. We are not to be understood to be holding that a court when
presented with a request for written transcripts from a jury is
obliged to require their preparation if they are not otherwise
available. In this case daily transcripts were prepared.
furnishing of transcripts to a jury is generally well within the
district court's discretion"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1013, 108
S.Ct. 1748 (1988); Government of Canal Zone v. Scott, 502 F.2d
566, 570 (5th Cir. 1974) (same). Any other rule would constitute
an unwarranted intrusion into the district court's discretion to
adapt procedures to the situation in the case before it. See,
e.g., United States v. Angelo, 153 F.2d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir.
1946) ("It would be both impossible and undesirable to delimit
strictly the powers of the trial judge and to set detailed
regulations for the conduct of every case.").
Of course, in exercising its discretion to provide
written transcripts of testimony, the trial court must be
cognizant of dangers that may be present in the particular case.
For instance, in their review of a transcript, jurors may seize
upon an answer without focusing on limitations or qualifications
developed during cross-examination. If the request poses such a
danger, the court should give the attorneys an opportunity to
make sure that the transcript incorporates all appropriate and
relevant aspects of the requested testimony. Moreover, although
it did not happen in this case, the district court generally
should accompany the transcripts with a cautionary instruction to
focus on the entire testimony and evidence.
We further hold that in this case, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by providing the jury with the written
transcripts. The jury requested the transcripts of 12 witnesses,
so the danger of giving undue weight to particular testimony was
minimized. Moreover, Bertoli fails to specify a single example
in the procedure the court followed that presented a
particularized danger of prejudice. Further, the district court
adequately informed the jury that it was to consider the entire
body of evidence submitted in the case, and not to emphasize
unduly one piece of evidence over another.10 See app. at 223-24
n.166. See also Betancourt, 838 F.2d at 175 (no abuse of
discretion where "the judge carefully informed the jury, in
standard terms, that all of the evidence was to be weighed, and
no undue credence was to be given to any single part of it").
B. Sentencing Issues
Bertoli raises several issues concerning the propriety
of his sentence which we will address in turn. Initially we
observe that because the obstruction of justice activities that
are the subject of Count Six of the Indictment occurred in 1990,
and because the conspiracy charged in Count Three occurred
between 1983 and 1992, the sentence is governed by the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, which apply to all federal crimes
committed after November 1, 1987. See United States v. Moscony,
10
. The court informed the jury:
All of the evidence, regardless of whether I've
referred to it, regardless of whether counsel referred
to it in their summations, must be considered by you.
It makes no difference whether the evidence was offered
by the [Government] or by [Bertoli]. It was all
evidence and all of it should be considered by you to
the extent it helps you decide the issues in this case.
App. at 224 n.166.
927 F.2d 742, 754 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 111
S.Ct. 2812 (1991).
1. The district court's calculation of the sentence
The district court calculated Bertoli's total offense
level by applying the "grouping" provisions of the 1993
Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d
1289, 1303 (3d Cir. 1991). Section 3D1.1(a) directs the court to
combine various counts of conviction into "distinct Groups of
Closely Related Counts."11 The district court adopted the
government's argument that the conduct charged in the two counts
should be divided into three groups: "Group [One] would consist
of the three conspiracies to obstruct [F]ederal court proceedings
as well as Count [Six]. Group [Two] would consist of the
conspiracy to obstruct the [G]rand [J]ury [I]nvestigation. Group
11
. Although Bertoli was convicted only on two counts, the
guidelines mandate that the court consider a count charging a
conspiracy to commit two crimes as a conspiracy to commit crime A
and a conspiracy to commit crime B. The district court quoted
the example given in the guidelines:
Example: The defendant is convicted of two counts:
conspiring to commit offenses A, B, and C, and
committing offense A. Treat this as if the defendant
was convicted of (1) committing offense A; (2)
conspiracy to commit offense A; (3) conspiracy to
commit offense B; and (4) conspiracy to commit offense
C. Count (1) and count (2) are grouped together under
§3D1.2(b). Group the remaining counts, including the
various acts cited by the conspiracy count that would
constitute behavior of a substantive nature, according
to the rules in this section.
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, Application Note 8.
Three would consist of the conspiracy to obstruct the SEC
Investigation". App. at 412 (quoting government Sentencing
Memorandum at 77) (alterations in original). The grouping
guideline then directed the court to compute the offense level
for each group separately, based on the most serious of the
counts comprising the group.12
Because each group involved obstruction of justice, the
district court applied section 2J1.2, the guideline covering that
crime. That guideline, however, contains a cross-reference, to
be applied when a defendant's activity involved "obstructing the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense." Section
2J1.2(c)(1). In such a case, the court is to sentence the
defendant as an accessory after the fact to the relevant criminal
offenses, if that would result in a greater offense level. In
other words, if A's obstructionist activity consisted of lying
under oath about whether B committed a bank robbery, A should be
sentenced as an accessory after the fact to bank robbery.
Section 2X3.1, the guideline for accessory after the fact,
12
. Section 3D1.3 requires the court to:
Determine the offense level applicable to each of the
Groups as follows:
(a) In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to
§ 3D1.2(a)-(c), the offense level applicable to a Group
is the offense level, determined in accordance with
Chapter Two and Parts A, B, and C of Chapter Three, for
the most serious of the counts comprising the Group,
i.e., the highest offense level of the counts in the
Group.
provides a base offense level of "6 levels lower than the offense
level for the underlying offense."
The court, finding that Bertoli conspired to obstruct
the criminal proceedings against him, applied the cross-reference
provision. Because the underlying crimes involved fraud, the
court was referred first to section 2X3.1 and then to section
2F1.1, the guideline covering fraud and deceit. Under the fraud
guideline, the court began with a base offense level of 6. But,
following the table set forth in section 2F1.1(b)(1), the court
increased the offense level by 14, because it found the loss to
be between $5 and $10 million.13 Applying other subsections of
the fraud guideline, the court increased the offense level still
further.14 The total offense level for Group One was computed to
be 25.
The court similarly computed the offense levels for
Groups Two and Three, also by applying the cross-reference
provision of the obstruction of justice guideline. The offense
levels for each of those groups was 22.
13
. Section 2F1.1(b)(1) provides that "[i]f the loss exceeded
$2,000", the court should increase the offense level as described
in the table. Section (b)(1)(o) requires the court to increase
the level by 14 if the loss was more than $5,000,000 but less
than $10,000,000.
14
. Specifically, because the court found that the offense
involved more than minimal planning, it increased the level by 2,
pursuant to section 2F1.1(b)(2). And, because the court found
that the offense involved a "violation of [a] judicial or
administrative order", it increased the level by an additional 2
points pursuant to subsection (b)(3). See also n.15, infra.
Finally, the court applied section 3D1.4, which
provides the following when separate groups are involved:
[t]he combined offense level is determined by taking
the offense level applicable to the Group with the
highest level and increasing that offense level by the
amount indicated in the following table:
Number of Units Increase in Offense Level
1 none
1 1/2 add 1 level
2 add 2 levels
2 1/2-3 add 3 levels
3 1/2-5 add 4 levels
more than 5 add 5 levels
In determining the number of Units for purposes of this
section:
(a) Count as one Unit the Group with the highest
offense level. Count one additional Unit for each
Group that is equally serious or from 1-4 levels less
serious.
Thus, the court began with the offense level applicable to Group
One, and increased that level by 3, 1 level for Group One itself
and 2 additional levels because the offense levels for Groups Two
and Three were "from 1-4 levels less serious" than Group One.
Accordingly, the district court arrived at a total offense level
of 28.15
15
. In its Opinion, the district court provided the following
explanation of its computation of the Total Offense Level:
Total Offense Level
The total offense level of 28 is calculated as follows:
(1) Group One Base Offense Level
-- Applicable Guideline: § 2J1.2(c), which by cross-
reference to § 2X3.1, requires the offense level to be
calculated as if Bertoli was an accessory after the
fact to the offenses being prosecuted in the Redacted
2. Proper applicable Guidelines Manual
(..continued)
Second Superseding Indictment because he conspired to
obstruct the investigations and prosecutions of those
offenses. This requires the use of § 2F1.1
-- Base Level
§ 2F1.1(a) 6
-- Upward adjustment pursuant to
§ 2F1.1(b)(1)(o) for loss between
$5 and $10 million 14
-- Upward adjustment pursuant to
§2F1.1(b)(2) for more than
minimal planning 2
-- Upward adjustment pursuant to
§2F1.1(b)(3)(B) for violation of
a judicial or administrative order 2
___ __
SUBTOTAL 24
-- Downward adjustment pursuant to
§ 2X3.1 6
_____
BASE OFFENSE LEVEL 18
(2) Upward adjustment pursuant to
§ 2J1.7 for committing an offense
while on pretrial release 3
(3) Upward adjustment pursuant to
§ 3B1.1(a) for having an aggrava-
ting role in the offense 4
_____
GROUP ONE OFFENSE LEVEL 25
(4) Upward adjustment pursuant to
§ 3D1.4 for multiple offenses 3
(taking into account
Groups Two and Three) _____
TOTAL OFFENSE LEVEL 28
App. at 444.
Bertoli first contends that the district court's
application of the cross reference in the 1993 Guideline for
obstruction of justice violated his right to be free from ex post
facto punishments, guaranteed by Article I, § 9 of the United
States Constitution. We exercise plenary review over the
district court's conclusion. United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d
at 754 n.17.
Generally, the sentencing court must apply the
Guidelines Manual in effect at the time of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4),(5); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a). However, sometimes this
rule gives way to constitutional considerations. Specifically,
"where such retroactivity results in harsher penalties, Ex Post
Facto Clause problems arise, and courts must apply the earlier
version." United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir.
1991) (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446
(1987)); see also United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1424
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 90 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 2332 (1993);
United States v. McAllister, 927 F.2d 136, 138 n.2 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 111 (1991). Bertoli
contends that the court should have used the 1989 Guidelines
Manual to calculate the base offense level, because a substantive
change to the commentary to the obstruction of justice guideline,
resulting in more severe penalties, took effect after the crime
of Count Six was completed. We agree.
The district court failed to consider this argument,
because, in determining which Guideline Manual to apply, it
grouped the conduct charged in Counts Three and Six, and treated
it as one course of conduct. Apparently, the district court
believed that if the conduct is grouped together, there is no
need to assess the counts independently to determine whether ex
post facto clause considerations arise. Thus, although finding
that the conduct of Count Six occurred in 1990, the court
nevertheless held that the crimes were completed in 1992, when
the conspiracy's last overt act occurred. The court reasoned
that "the only other Guidelines Manual that could be used [other
than the Manual in effect at the time of sentencing] is the 1
November 1991 Manual . . . , which was the manual in effect on
the date the Second Superseding Indictment was returned and the
conspiracies to obstruct justice described in Count Three
ceased." App. at 405.16 Because there is no substantive
difference between the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines Manuals, the
court applied the 1993 Guidelines Manual.
We expressly have disapproved the practice of combining
different counts of the indictment when determining which
Guidelines Manual applies. See Seligsohn, 981 F.2d at 1424. In
Seligsohn, some of the offenses concluded before November 1,
1989, while others took place after that date. On November 1,
1989, amendments to the guidelines took effect "and provided for
the imposition of heavier penalties than those previously in
16
. On appeal, the government does not endorse the district
court's decision to combine Counts Three and Six for the purpose
of determining which Manual applies. Rather, the government's
sole argument is that the 1989 Manual is not more favorable to
Bertoli than the 1993 Manual.
effect." Id. at 1424. The district court nevertheless applied
the post-1989 Guidelines Manual to all the counts. On appeal,
the government supported the ruling based on a principle set
forth in the Sentencing Guidelines called the one-book rule. The
one-book rule provides that "only one set of Guidelines should be
used in calculating the applicable total 'as a cohesive and
integrated whole.'" Id. (quoting government's Brief). We
rejected the proposition that the one-book rule overrides ex post
facto concerns:
That so-called rule is inconsistent with United States
v. Kopp and other cases in this Court. Focusing on ex
post facto considerations, those cases have prohibited
the application of more stringent penalties than were
authorized at the time of the offense. Consequently,
we expressly disapprove of the 'one book' practice as
in conflict with the Kopp opinion.
Id. The fact that various counts of an indictment are grouped
cannot override ex post facto concerns. Id. Therefore, the
trial court erred by failing independently to analyze which
Guidelines Manual should have applied to the conduct charged in
Count Three. Our independent analysis of the question leads us
to conclude that the 1989 guidelines apply to Bertoli's
sentence.17
17
. A policy statement in the guidelines provides that "[t]he
Guidelines Manual in effect on a particular date shall be applied
in its entirety. The court shall not apply, for example, one
guideline section from one edition of the Guidelines Manual and
another guideline section from a different edition of the
Guidelines Manual." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11. In Seligsohn, we said
that upon remand, "before grouping the various offenses to
determine the score, the district court must first apply the
applicable Guidelines for each offense." 981 F.2d at 1426. We do
not read this language to be in conflict with the policy
statement. Rather, when ex post facto clause issues arise, while
Section 2J1.2, the guideline for obstruction of
justice, provides in both the 1989 and 1993 versions:
§2J1.2. Obstruction of Justice
(a) Base Offense Level: 12
* * *
(c) Cross Reference
(1) If the offense involved
obstructing the investigation or
prosecution of a criminal
offense, apply §2X3.1 (Accessory
After the Fact) in respect to
that criminal offense, if the
resulting offense level is
greater than that determined
above.
The district court found that Bertoli's obstructionist conduct
involved attempting to conceal the predicate offenses to the
racketeering acts with which he was charged. See app. at 423.
The court therefore applied the cross-reference provision of the
guideline, which in turn directed it to the guideline for fraud.
While the guideline provision itself is identical in
both the 1989 and 1993 guidelines, the commentary was amended
(..continued)
the one-book rule cannot apply to compel application of the later
Manual to all counts, it certainly can compel application of the
earlier Manual. Furthermore, in this case the government does
not argue that we should apply a Guideline Manual later than the
1989 Guidelines Manual to either Group 2 or Group 3 if we apply
the 1989 Manual to Group one. See n.16, supra. Therefore the
one-book rule should be applied here and the 1989 Guidelines
Manual used as to all groups. We note that it is possible that
changes in the guidelines after an offense might both help and
hurt the defendant. In such a situation a defendant might not be
able to object to the use of a Guideline Manual adopted after an
offense on ex post facto grounds if overall the amendments
favored him. But we are not concerned with that situation here.
effective November 1, 1991. The "Background" section of the
commentary to the 1989 guidelines stated: "Because the conduct
covered by this guideline is frequently part of an effort to
assist another person to escape punishment for a crime he has
committed, an alternative reference to the guideline for
accessory after the fact is made." (Emphasis added). The amended
commentary mandates application of the cross-reference provision
whenever the defendant obstructed justice as "part of an effort
to avoid punishment for an offense that the defendant has
committed or to assist another person to escape punishment for an
offense." (Emphasis added). Relying on caselaw interpreting the
1989 guideline, Bertoli argues that the sentencing court was
prohibited from using the cross-reference when the defendant's
conduct was directed to avoid punishment to himself. The
government responds that the 1991 revision only clarified the
guideline, and the particular circumstances referred to in the
1989 commentary were not intended to be all-inclusive.
We begin our analysis with several propositions.
First, when a crime is covered by the Sentencing Guidelines, the
sentence is computed based not only on the relevant guidelines,
but also on the Sentencing Commission's policy statements and
commentary. See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, ____ U.S. ____,
____, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1916 (1993); United States v. Hightower, 25
F.3d 182, 184 (3d Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed Aug. 29,
1994. Second, although the principle has been disputed until
only recently, it is now settled that the commentary to the
guidelines is binding on federal courts as controlling law unless
it either (1) violates the Constitution or a federal statute or
(2) "is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [guideline]."
Stinson, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1919 (quoting Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217
(1945)).18 Third, despite the fact that proposed amendments to
the guidelines themselves must be submitted to Congress for
review, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), "[a]mended commentary is binding
on the federal courts even though it is not reviewed by
Congress". Stinson, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1919
(emphasis added). Finally, "prior judicial constructions of a
particular guideline cannot prevent the Commission from adopting
a conflicting interpretation" that is consistent with the
Constitution and federal law and when "the guideline . . . will
bear the construction." Id. at , 113 S.Ct. at 1919.
Applying these principles to the issue before us, it
becomes clear that commentary to the guidelines is to be treated
(except in narrow instances) as law, that is, it must be read in
conjunction with the guideline and policy statements as the law
governing the case. This means that, in the wake of Stinson,
subsequent amendments to the commentary -- while binding on the
court -- may, just like the guidelines themselves, present ex
post facto problems when applied retrospectively. See, e.g.,
United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994)
18
. In Stinson, the Supreme Court, after considering various
analogies, concluded that "the guidelines are the equivalent of
legislative rules adopted by federal agencies." Id. at , 113
S.Ct. at 1919.
(sentence based on commentary enacted after conviction but prior
to sentence may run afoul of ex post facto clause); United States
v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 747 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993) ("in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Stinson . . . , application of an
intervening Guidelines interpretation by commentary promulgated
after the offense could run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause")
(citation omitted), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1234
(1994); United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 216 (11th Cir.
1993) (same).
Of course, an amendment to the commentary does not
necessarily substantively alter the guideline itself -- even when
its application results in a sentence more severe than might
otherwise have been imposed. Rather, "amendments that clarify,
rather than substantively change, the guidelines do not present
ex post facto issues when they are applied retrospectively."
United States v. Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 211 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993)
(quoting United States v. Scarano, 975 F.2d 580, 587 (9th Cir.
1992) (internal citations omitted)); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11
("if a court applies an earlier edition of the Guidelines Manual,
the court shall consider subsequent amendments, to the extent
that such amendments are clarifying rather than substantive
changes"). Because the commentary and the guideline both are
binding, however, we must not be too quick to hold that an
amendment to the commentary is merely a clarification. Rather,
our role is to look at the guidelines manual in effect at the
time the crime was committed and ask whether, as matter of
construction, the guideline and commentary in effect at that time
is really consistent with the amended manual. If the amended
commentary "does not overrule prior constructions of the
Guideline but instead confirms our reading of the Guideline",
there is no ex post facto concern. Diaz, 26 F.3d at 1545 (citing
Carroll, 6 F.3d at 746 n.9). If, though, the amended commentary
does overrule prior judicial constructions of the guideline, ex
post facto clause problems become more serious.
In this case, the 1989 commentary is clear: "Because
the conduct covered by this guideline is frequently part of an
effort to assist another person to escape punishment for a crime
he has committed, an alternative reference to the guideline for
accessory after the fact is made." (Emphasis added). The
government's argument that the commentary simply provides one
example of when the cross-reference can be used is at odds with
the plain meaning of the language. The commentary does not
purport to give an example; it explains how and when the cross-
reference should be applied. Thus, even though the guideline
itself refers only to "obstructing the investigation or
prosecution of a criminal offense", when that language is read in
conjunction with the commentary, the court is told to use the
cross-reference when the defendant's obstructionist activity was
directed at assisting another person to escape punishment for a
crime.
Our reading is consistent with other courts'
interpretations. The several courts that have addressed the
issue under the 1989 guidelines have reached a single conclusion
-- that the cross-reference does not apply when a defendant's
obstructionist activity is intended to protect only himself. For
instance, in United States v. Huppert, 917 F.2d 507 (11th Cir.
1990), the defendant had attempted to persuade two witnesses to
his crimes to identify someone else to the grand jury. The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, after finding that the
obstructionist act "is an act directed at protecting [the
defendant] from being punished", cited the 1989 commentary and
held that use of the cross-reference was improper. Id. at 510-
11. Similarly, in United States v. Berkowitz, 712 F. Supp. 707,
709 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the defendant, while facing mail fraud and
tax fraud charges in the Northern District of Illinois, was
arrested and charged with stealing and destroying documents that
he knew were material to that prosecution. The government sought
to use section 2J1.2's cross-reference, but the court declined.
It reasoned:
Applying §2X3.1 in the instant case would result in
treating Berkowitz as an accessory to his own alleged
tax fraud and mail fraud. The official comments to
§2J1.2 indicate that such an application of §2X3.1 is
not appropriate. Therein, the Commission explains that
§2X3.1 is applied in obstruction of justice cases
[b]ecause the conduct covered by the [obstruction of
justice] guideline is frequently part of the effort to
assist another person to escape punishment for a crime
he committed. Since Berkowitz did not commit
obstruction of justice to assist another person, §2X3.1
is inapplicable.
Id. at 709 (quoting commentary) (alterations in original). See
also United States v. Pierson, 946 F.2d 1044, 1048 (4th Cir.
1991) (applying identical reasoning to section 2J1.3(c), the
guideline for perjury and subornation of perjury); cf. United
States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1059 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
the defendant's argument based on Huppert and Pierson because the
defendant "was clearly trying to protect others, and not himself
. . . "), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 1357 (1993).19
Thus, this is not a case where the commentary is in accord with
prior constructions of the guideline. See Diaz, 26 F.3d at 1545.
These interpretations of the 1989 guideline and
commentary are hardly surprising. After all, use of the cross-
reference in this case (and in others like it) enabled the court
to sentence Bertoli as an accessory after the fact to the crimes
for which he was charged and acquitted as a principal. While the
"real offense" approach of the guidelines certainly permits the
court to consider such facts in computing the sentence, see
United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1989), such an
interpretation is hardly the most obvious reading of the 1989
guideline, particularly in light of the commentary. Moreover, it
is at least anomalous to hold -- in the absence of explicit
direction such as that now provided in the amended commentary --
that the defendant could be convicted as both a principal and an
accessory after the fact to his or her own crime. As the court
reasoned in Huppert:
We agree with the district court's conclusion that a
sentencing court 'is permitted to look beyond the four
corners of the charge to the underlying conduct.' That
19
. In United States v. Jamison, 996 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1993),
the court noted that "[i]n 1991, the Guidelines Commission
amended the commentary on which both the Pierson and Huppert
courts relied in a manner which casts doubt upon the continued
validity of those decisions." Id. at 701 n.3. However, because
the court distinguished those cases, it "reserve[d] for another
day a decision on the impact of the amended commentary on our
precedent." Id.
practice is clearly permissible under the guidelines.
However, under the guidelines, relevant conduct is
incorporated into the base offense level by a
prescribed process. . . . Section 2J1.2(c)(1) provides
a specific method by which a court may consider conduct
outside the offense of conviction. That method is
consistent with our understanding of the law of
principals and accessories.
Huppert, 917 F.2d at 511 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).20
In other words, the amended commentary (while certainly
not violative of the Constitution or federal law) is in accord
neither with the prior case law nor an obvious reading of the
guideline. Therefore, we hold that the 1991 amendment to the
commentary is not a clarifying amendment but, rather, a
substantive change. This means that the district court should
have applied the 1989 Guidelines Manual, and should not have used
20
. The government argues that our interpretation would lead to
absurd results, because "low-level conspirators in this scheme .
. . who assisted Bertoli in hiding his illegal millions, would be
eligible to receive a base offense level as high as 20 . . .
while Bertoli, the mastermind of the scheme, would be limited to
a base offense level of 12." Appellee Br. at 39. Of course, 12
is the base level for obstruction of justice without use of the
cross reference. The government neglects to point out, however,
that Bertoli would be chargeable and answerable for the entire
underlying scheme, whereas the low-level conspirator may not be.
See, e.g., United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir.
1992) (liability of defendant for co-conspirator's conduct
depends "upon the degree of the defendant's involvement in the
conspiracy and, of course, reasonable foreseeability with
respect to the conduct of others within the conspiracy"). The
point of the cross-reference is to say to someone who, for
example, lies for another: we're going to treat you as though
you actually helped that person commit the crime you're now
helping him get away with. In any event the cases and principles
we cite compel our result.
the cross-reference provision of the obstruction of justice
guideline.21
Because by using the 1993 Guidelines Manual, the trial
court imposed a sentence in excess of what would have been
permissible under the 1989 Manual, the sentence imposed violated
Bertoli's right against ex post facto punishment. The sentence
21
. We are aware that the Sentencing Commission has described
the amendment as clarifying. United States Sentencing Commission
1993 Guidelines Manual, app. C, page 233-34, § 401. But this
circumstance does not change our result. In the first place, we
have rejected the proposition that the Sentencing Commission's
description of an amendment as "clarifying" is entitled to
substantial weight. United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 567 (3d
Cir. 1994). Moreover, the Commission's description comes in the
face of a settled interpretation of the guideline and therefore
is entitled to little weight. See United States v. Menon, 24
F.3d at 567 ("[W]e never have held that a 'clarifying' amendment
can be used to interpret an earlier guideline when applying the
amendment would punish the defendant more harshly than he would
have been punished under the court's independent interpretation
of the pre-amendment language." Rather, our own independent
interpretation of the pre-amendment language is controlling.
To analogize, in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 107 S.Ct. 2875 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a person
could not be prosecuted under the mail fraud statute for fraud
that only causes intangible loss, such as depriving the public of
honest government. In 1988, Congress responded to the Court's
decision by passing a statute that defines "scheme or artifice to
defraud" as including "scheme[s] or artifice to deprive another
of the intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
Of course, simply by adopting this language, Congress could not
have the law applied retroactively. Rather, applying the revised
statute to conduct occurring after McNally but prior to the
revision clearly would have violated the ex post facto clause.
See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 418 (2d Cir.
1991). Had Congress described the statute as "clarifying", it
would have been of no moment. That description could not
displace the fact that the Supreme Court had ruled on the meaning
of the pre-revision language. In the instant case, the
Commission's description comes in the face of a settled
interpretation of the guideline provision. The use of the word
"clarifying" cannot change this simple fact.
therefore must be vacated and the matter remanded for re-
sentencing under the 1989 Manual.22
3. Permissibility of the fine
Bertoli next contends that the district court erred in
departing upward from the guideline maximum fine of $125,000 to a
fine of $7 million. The district court arrived at this figure as
the amount necessary to disgorge Bertoli of illegal profits he
keeps hidden in foreign bank accounts. Bertoli argues that the
facts upon which the district court based its decision simply are
not supported by the record.
Generally a defendant must be sentenced within the
applicable guideline range. However, if the court "finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines, that should
result in a sentence different from that described", the court
may depart from the guideline range accordingly. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir.
1990).23 Conversely, if the Sentencing Commission adequately
22
. Because the district court was incorrect in its application
of the cross-reference, the fraud guideline should not have been
applied. Therefore, we need not address Bertoli's argument that
the district court's calculation of the loss under the fraud
guideline was erroneous.
23
. While this case involves a departure from the applicable
fine range rather than the incarceration range, we previously
have held that this is a distinction without a difference.
United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing
United States v. Graham, 946 F.2d 19, 21 (4th Cir. 1991)). Thus,
took all the relevant factors into account in determining the
sentence, the court may not depart.
Our review over a district court's decision to depart
upward is divided into three tiers. First, we exercise plenary
review over the district court's determination that the
Sentencing Guidelines have not adequately taken a particular
factor into account. United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d
Cir. 1989). "Of course, the circumstances relied upon must in
fact exist in the case under consideration" in order to uphold
the departure. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. In reviewing
findings of fact, we employ the clearly erroneous standard of
review. Finally, we must determine whether the sentence imposed
was reasonable, that is, whether the factors on which the court
relied and the degree of the departure, were appropriate. In
this determination, "the district courts are entitled to exercise
a substantial amount of discretion." United States v. Ryan, 866
F.2d at 610; see also Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098 ("[a]t this
stage of the inquiry, our review is deferential"). We will
address these factors in turn.
a. Taken into Consideration by the Sentencing Commission
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing court
"shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant
establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become
(..continued)
we review both types of departures under the same analytical
rubric.
able to pay any fine." U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2; United States v. Demes,
941 F.2d 220, 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 112
S.Ct. 399 (1991). The court is to consider an array of factors,
including evidence of the defendant's ability to pay the fine,24
any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is
obligated to make, and "any other pertinent equitable
considerations." U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d). "The amount of the fine
should always be sufficient to ensure that the fine taken
together with other sanctions imposed, is punitive." U.S.S.G. §
5E1.2(e). The guideline provides a "fine table" which
establishes a minimum and maximum fine based on the defendant's
offense level. For an offense level of 28 -- the offense level
at which the district court arrived in this case -- the minimum
fine is $12,500 and the maximum is $125,000. U.S.S.G. §
5E1.2(c)(3).
The district court found that in establishing the
guideline range, the Sentencing Commission did not adequately
take into account facts fitting the circumstances of this case.
In so holding, the district court relied on the commentary
24
. The court found that Bertoli was able to pay the fine, for
the following reasons: (1) Bertoli did not submit a financial
disclosure form to the probation department; (2) Bertoli's home
conservatively is valued in excess of $1,000,000; (3) in October,
1983, Bertoli stashed millions of dollars in secret bank accounts
in the Cayman Islands and other off-shore accounts; (4) Bertoli
moved millions of dollars out of the Cayman Accounts into
accounts in Andorra; and (5) Bertoli is in control of those funds
in Andorra. App. at 451-52. While Bertoli does challenge the
district court's conclusions as to his control over the Andorra
funds, he seems not specifically to challenge the district
court's finding that he is able to pay the fine.
itself, which expresses the Commission's views on just this
subject:
The Commission envisions that for most defendants, the
maximum of the guideline fine range from subsection (c)
will be at least twice the amount of gain or loss
resulting from the offense. Where, however, two times
either the amount of gain to the defendant or the
amount of loss caused by the offense exceeds the
maximum of the fine guideline, an upward departure from
the fine guideline may be warranted.
The Commission's views are dispositive on this point. See
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1104 ("'In determining whether a
circumstance was adequately taken into consideration [so as to
preclude departure], the court shall consider only the sentencing
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission.'") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b))
(alterations in original). Assuming the district court's
findings are correct, this case involves precisely the type of
situation warranting an upward departure contemplated by the
Sentencing Commission. The Commission contemplated the fine of
$125,000 to be twice the amount of the gain, whereas the court
found that Bertoli illegally profited and controls $7 million.
Thus, the district court was correct in its conclusion that the
facts it found warranted an upward departure.
b. The district court's factual findings
We next address whether the district court's findings
of fact are clearly erroneous. As a preliminary matter, however,
the record compels us to discuss the appropriate evidentiary
standard.
In making its findings, the district court employed a
standard of proof of "at least a preponderance of the evidence."
App. at 372. The court determined that it could consider hearsay
statements it regarded as having "some minimal indicium of
reliability." App. at 372 n.233 (quoting United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102 (quotation omitted)). In the court's
view, two of the documents -- the Cahill Sentencing Affidavit and
the 1993 Cannistraro Plea Allocution -- had "more than a 'minimal
indicium of reliability'; they are strongly reliable sources."
App. at 372 n.233.
Generally, courts may use the preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof in sentencing hearings. McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2419 (1987);
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1099; United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d
285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989). This is because after a jury finds a
defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence no longer applies,
and the protections that form a corollary to that presumption
become less important. See, generally, Kikumura, 918 F.2d at
1099-1100. See also id. at 1100 (federal rules of evidence
inapplicable at sentencing); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d
1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982) (hearsay admissible at sentencing so
long as it bears "some minimal indicium of reliability beyond
mere allegation").
In Kikumura, however, we distinguished between "run-of-
the-mill sentencing cases" and those in which the proposed
departure is so great that the sentencing hearing "functions as
'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.'"
Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1100-01 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88,
106 S.Ct. at 2417). In Kikumura itself, the sentencing court
departed from the guideline maximum of 33 months to 30 years. We
held that in such an extreme context, "a court cannot reflexively
apply the truncated procedures that are perfectly adequate for
all of the more mundane, familiar sentencing determinations."
Id. at 1101. Rather, we held that facts supporting the departure
must be found by clear and convincing evidence. Hearsay, we
said, only may be admitted in such cases when the court examines
the "totality of the circumstances, including other corroborating
evidence, and determines whether the hearsay declarations are
reasonably trustworthy." Id. at 1103.
We recently applied this heightened evidentiary
standard to a district court's upward departure in determining
the amount of a fine. Seale, 20 F.3d at 1288. There, the
district court increased the defendant's fine from the guideline
maximum of $250,000 to the statutory maximum of $1,750,000. We
held that this seven-fold increase was just the sort of "extreme
context" that warranted use of the higher standard of proof.
Such a context, we concluded, "requires that the district court
use a clear and convincing standard of proof when finding
supporting facts." Id. at 1288 (citing Kikumura, 918 F.2d at
1100-1102 and United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365 (8th Cir.
1991)); see also United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 569
n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) ("If the difference between the guideline
range and the departure sentence is great, the trial court should
consider the implications of that disparity in determining the
appropriate standard of proof for the facts considered in
sentencing.").
In this case, the court departed upward by a factor in
excess of 50. This is clearly the type of "extreme context" that
requires more than the bare minimum of procedural protections.
We hold, then, that factual conclusions justifying the departure
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence and that, in
order to be admissible, hearsay declarations must be reasonably
trustworthy in light of the totality of the circumstances,
including other corroborating evidence.
Accordingly we address whether the district court's
findings are clearly erroneous in light of this evidentiary
standard. The court found made the following findings. Bertoli,
Cannistraro and Eisenberg each had companies created for them in
the Cayman Islands by Sidney Coleman of Paget Brown & Co., to
which they transferred profits obtained through the stock
manipulation schemes. In November 1989, the United States
govenment requested from the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands
documents and evidence concerning these accounts for use in the
prosecution against Bertoli. Soon thereafter, Bertoli began
meeting with an Ernest Foster to discuss how to move the money
and documents concerning the three companies from the Cayman
Islands and therefore out of the government's reach. In the wake
of these discussions, Foster and two other persons travelled to
the Principality of Andorra and opened an account with an
Andorran bank in the name of Fosca, S.A. In response to
Bertoli's request, Foster ensured that Andorra had no treaty with
the United States that would enable the latter to have access to
the accounts. Bertoli then met with Eisenberg and the two
decided to move documents concerning the companies to Foster's
control. In 1990, the administration of the companies was
transferred from Coleman to Foster. The total amount of the
funds over which Foster obtained control was $8,700,000. Of that
amount, $5,086,593.94 was from Cannistraro's company,
$3,132,956.09 from Eisenberg's company, and $471,580.61 from
Bertoli's company. Foster arranged to have the funds transferred
to the Fosca account. The next year, at Bertoli's request,
Foster took the relevant documents to Andorra and left them with
an attorney.
The court further found that despite Eisenberg's and
Cannistraro's respective plea agreements to forfeit their
interests in the Andorran companies to the government, the
government to date had collected only $789,083.89. Finally, the
court noted that, according to the presentence report, Bertoli
does not deny having control over substantial funds.25 The court
inferred from these facts that "as demonstrated by the
Government, Bertoli retains control of the millions of dollars,
forfeited to it by Eisenberg and Cannistraro, but removed by
Bertoli to Andorra beyond its reach." App. at 451. Therefore,
25
. Actually, the court's opinion states that Bertoli "takes no
position regarding the Government's claim that 'Bertoli has
access to millions of dollars in foreign bank accounts.'" App.
at 451 (quoting December 1, 1993 letter from Bertoli). According
to the government's brief and the presentence report, however,
Bertoli only declined to deny having access to substantial funds.
the court concluded, "[a]n upward departure is necessary in
calculating the appropriate fine for Bertoli because the fine
indicated by the Guidelines is inadequate to 'disgorge' the gain
of Bertoli's criminal activities." Id.
Our review of the record compels us to conclude that
the court's findings are not supported by the record and
therefore are clearly erroneous. The evidence supporting the
proposition that Bertoli controls the entire millions of dollars
consists solely of Foster's trial testimony. And his testimony
simply cannot be read fairly to confirm the court's findings.
Foster did testify that he received control of the funds, that he
set up an account in Andorra, and even that he ensured that the
United States "didn't have any treaties with or any previous
precedent of going in and obtaining documents or information
concerning bank accounts." App. at 35. But nothing he says
indicates that Bertoli received control of the entire money or
that Bertoli retains control of the funds. While he testified
that his contacts were with Bertoli rather than with Eisenberg or
Cannistraro, he does not even purport to express the view that
Bertoli was acting unilaterally. Apparently, the court to reach
its conclusions extrapolated from the fact that the government
has obtained only partial payments from the two co-conspirators,
and that Bertoli did not deny having control over substantial
sums of money. "A substantial amount of money" is not always
equivalent to many millions, though. And the court's assumption
that because the government only collected part of Eisenberg's
and Cannistraro's profits, Bertoli must control the rest is
completely speculative. While such speculation may have survived
scrutiny under the preponderance of the evidence standard, it
certainly cannot withstand scrutiny under the clear and
convincing evidence standard.26 Accordingly, the district
court's finding is clearly erroneous and must be vacated and the
case must be remanded for recalculation of the fine.27 Because
of this finding, we need not reach the third tier of a review of
an upward departure, whether the extent of the departure was
reasonable.
4. Reassignment to a different judge
Finally, Bertoli argues that in the event of a remand,
the case should be reassigned to a different judge, "because of
the district judge's extreme animus towards Mr. Bertoli."
Appellant Br. at ii. The government argues in response that
Bertoli wants Judge Lechner recused solely because of his
reputation as a "harsh" sentencer, and that "Bertoli's blatant
attempt at judge-shopping should be rejected by this court."
This is not the first time Bertoli has sought Judge
Lechner's recusal. On November 2, 1989, Bertoli filed his first
recusal motion. Judge Lechner denied this motion on March 22,
26
. Although, as noted above, the district court found that the
Cahill sentencing affidavit and the Cannistraro plea allocution
were highly reliable, there is no indication that those documents
were relevant to the district court's finding that Bertoli
controls $7 million.
27
. Of course, since, as detailed above, the district court's
calculation of the offense level was erroneous, the guideline
range for the fine may well be different next time around.
1990, see United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F. Supp. 1137, 1167
(D.N.J. 1990), and denied it again on April 12, 1990, on a motion
for reconsideration, see United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F.
Supp. 1168 (D.N.J. 1990). We then denied Bertoli's petition for
a writ of mandamus on May 18, 1990, seeking Judge Lechner's
disqualification.
On July 26, 1990, Bertoli joined in a recusal motion
made by his co-defendant Cannistraro. Judge Lechner denied the
motion on August 16, 1990, and we dismissed Bertoli's subsequent
appeal. On July 26, 1991, Judge Lechner denied another motion
for recusal filed on March 12, 1991. See United States v.
Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 733 (D.N.J. 1991). Bertoli's
December 17, 1992 recusal motion was denied on January 12, 1993.
On April 23, 1993 we declined to grant Bertoli's petition for a
writ of mandamus. Bertoli's petition for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court was denied on October 4, 1993,
see Bertoli v. United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 77 (1993). Finally,
Bertoli moved to recuse Judge Lechner from the sentencing but
Judge Lechner denied that motion on March 28, 1993.
Our authority to reassign a case on remand stems from
two sources. The first stems from the federal recusal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 455. Second, our statutory authorization pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2106, to "require such further proceedings to be had
as may be just under the circumstances" gives us the "ability to
assign a case to a different judge on remand." Liteky v. United
States, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1156-57 (1994).
Bertoli conflates the two provisions in a single
argument -- that Judge Lechner's apparent repeated hostility to
him renders the judge unable to preside over a fair trial, and at
any rate creates a belief of bias and partiality in the mind of
the objective observer. We will address the bases for recusal
separately.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) a federal judge must
"disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." See Liteky, ____ U.S. at ____,
114 S.Ct. at 1150. Section 455(b)(1) requires disqualification
where the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party." The Supreme Court recently held that subsection (b)'s
"extrajudicial source" doctrine also applies to subsection (a).
Liteky, ____ U.S. at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 1157. Under that
doctrine, bias, in order to form the basis for recusal, must stem
from a source outside of the official proceedings. Because the
focus is on the source of the judge's views and actions,
"judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for
a bias or partiality motion" because they almost never arise from
an extrajudicial source. Id. at , 114 S.Ct. at 1157 (citing
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct.
1698, 1710 (1966)). Similarly, and for the same reason,
"judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical
or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or
their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
challenge." Id. at , 114 S.Ct. at 1157.
Despite finding an extra-judicial source requirement
under section 455(a), the Liteky Court held that opinions formed
during a judicial proceeding may in certain instances give rise
to a duty to recuse. The court reasoned that if during "a
lengthy trial . . . the presiding judge for the first time learns
of an obscure religious sect, and acquires a passionate hatred
for all its adherents," the fact that the beliefs arose through a
judicial proceeding is of no consequence. Id. at , 114 S.Ct.
at 1154. The duty to recuse would arise. This is because the
words "extrajudicial bias" really are intended to convey the
notion of a "wrongful or inappropriate" bias, regardless of
whether the improper bias arises from evidence adduced at trial
or from some extraneous source. "A favorable or unfavorable
predisposition can . . . deserve to be characterized as 'bias' or
'prejudice' because, even though it springs from the facts
adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to
display clear inability to render fair judgment." Id. at ,
114 S.Ct. at 1155. In order for such bias to create a duty to
recuse, however, the court's actions must "reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible." Id. at , 114 S.Ct. at 1157. Of course, section
455(a), by providing for recusal when a judge's impartiality may
"reasonably be questioned" still mandates an objective rather
than a subjective inquiry. See id. at , 114 S.Ct. at 1156
n.2 ("The judge does not have to be subjectively biased or
prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.") (emphasis in
original); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155,
162 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he public's confidence in the judiciary,
which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to proceed
before a judge who appears to be tainted", requires that "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice.") (quoting In re Asbestos
Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Bertoli makes no allegation that Judge Lechner derived
his bias from an extrajudicial source. Rather, all the incidents
he cites in his brief involve rulings and statements made by the
judge during the proceedings. Thus, these incidents will not
support recusal unless, looked at objectively, "they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible."
We previously have commented on the antagonisms between
Judge Lechner and Bertoli and his various attorneys. When
deciding a prior interlocutory appeal on May 7, 1993, we said:
Perhaps understandably, the record in this case hints
at some animus between the court and Bertoli and
Bertoli's counsel. Bertoli has sought recusal on
several occasions. He has called into question the
district judge's ability to adjudicate fairly his
pretrial motions. Some of the exchanges at the
hearings the district court has already held indicate
that this case has been contentious.
United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1025 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 77 (1993). We cautioned counsel
and the court to "strive to avoid even the hint of rancor." Id.
at 1027. It is unfortunate that the rancor nevertheless
continued.
But yet we do not believe the record indicates the type
of bias that would warrant Judge Lechner's recusal from this
case. The essence of Bertoli's argument is that Judge Lechner
took every occasion to express dissatisfaction with him and his
counsel, and increased Bertoli's sentence at every opportunity.
A number of Bertoli's objections involve the judge's legal
rulings and factual findings.28 As noted above, such decisions
rarely form the basis for recusal, especially since such
decisions properly can be reviewed upon appeal. It is true that
Judge Lechner sentenced Bertoli severely. But Bertoli was
accused and convicted of serious crimes. The judge's "knowledge
and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily
acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed
sometimes . . . necessary to completion of the judge's task."
Liteky, U.S. at , 114 S.Ct. at 1155. We do not believe
that a reasonable person, looking at the rulings objectively,
would conclude that the court was partial. Other objections
involve the judge's disposition towards Bertoli.29 However, the
28
. For instance, Bertoli points out that:
-- The judge believed Juror Six over Juror Thirteen;
-- After the verdict, the judge remanded Bertoli rather
than keeping him free on bail;
-- The judge's credibility and legal determinations at
sentencing generally resulted in increases in the offense level;
-- The judge adopted the government's arguments about
how to group the offenses for sentencing purposes.
29
. For instance:
-- The judge criticized Mr. Bertoli in front of the
jury;
judge's comments, while perhaps reflecting impatience and
frustration, appear to have been directed solely at the manner in
which Bertoli tried his case. In fact, "[i]f the judge did not
form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called
trials, he could never render decisions." Id. at , 114 S.Ct.
at 1155 (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d
Cir. 1943)); see also Liteky, U.S. at , 114 S.Ct. at 1157
("A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration -- even
a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom
administration -- remain immune.").
Thus, this case is distinguishable from other occasions
where we have required recusal. In Primerica Holdings, Inc., the
record reflected that the district judge accused the petitioners
(..continued)
-- In denying Bertoli's motion for a mistrial, the
judge described the motion as "ridiculous, absurd and baseless."
He further said
You have been conducting yourself throughout this
trial trying to create error, trying to create a
record. This is another example of it. This is
an absurd motion, it's just another in the line of
your baseless motions. That's denied. Now please
sit down. Mr. Bertoli, your smirks, your
laughing, your rolling your eyes, your sneering
can't be tolerated any more. If you do it again
in front of the jury, I'll have to comment in
front of the jury. You're out of bounds and
unprofessional. You're not conducting yourself
the way you should. You're not acting like an
attorney. Your cross-examination was anything but
an attorney's cross-examination. Now, please stop
it and please sit down and remain there. App. at
670-71.
-- The judge told Bertoli that "[f]rom day one in this
case either you or your attorneys have been taunting me."
themselves of acting in bad faith, and by responding in detail to
a petition for a writ of mandamus, had taken a personal interest
in the case. In Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98
(3d Cir. 1992), statements in a pre-trial opinion by the judge
appeared to pre-judge important and disputed issues in the case;
see also In re Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 778-85 (judge's
attendance at conference at plaintiff's expense constituted
appearance of partiality).
We are all the more wary of reassigning this case,
because the record reflects that Bertoli engaged in a concerted
campaign to have Judge Lechner removed from the case. On
November 2, 1987, Bertoli wrote a letter to Judge Lechner
criticizing the judge's handling of Cannistraro's sentencing in
an earlier case. He threatened that "[i]f you do not resign from
the bench within thirty days, I will refer this matter to the
Judiciary committee and bar association for action." App. at
346. The next day, Bertoli wrote to then-Justice Thurgood
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court purporting to make a
"formal complaint and request to reprimand and take such other
action including impeachment. . . ." App. at 346-47 (quoting
letter). Then, Bertoli boasted to others that he was trying to
antagonize the judge. See app. at 354-55. Moreover, these
actions occurred at a time when "it appear[ed] Bertoli was aware
that he was a subject of a grand jury investigation which also
concerned Eisenberg." Eisenberg, 734 F. Supp. at 1145. We
always should be "keenly aware of the impact [decisions mandating
recusal] might have on the conduct of all disputed matters and
cases that district court judges try." Primerica Holdings, Inc.,
10 F.3d at 166. This principle is especially important in this
case, lest we encourage tactics designed to force recusal.
Nor will we exercise our supervisory powers to reassign
the case upon remand. Although in Liteky, the Supreme Court
declined to address whether the "extrajudicial source" doctrine
applies to a Court of Appeals' supervisory powers to reassign a
case upon remand, we previously have reviewed such requests under
an "appearance of impartiality" standard. Primerica Holdings,
Inc., 10 F.3d at 167; Blasband v. Rales, 979 F.2d 324, 328 (3d
Cir. 1992); Haines, 975 F.2d at 98. We need not address the
extent to which the standards set forth in Liteky apply to this
supervisory power, because we simply do not believe the district
court has exhibited an appearance of partiality.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons detailed above, we will affirm the
judgment of conviction on March 30, 1994. However, we will
vacate the sentence and will remand to the district court for
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
USA v. Bertoli
No. 94-5167
ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join the opinion in Parts I, II.A.1, and 2,
II.B, and III. I concur with the result that the majority
reaches in Part II.A.3. I write separately, however, to express
my concern on the issue of providing written transcripts to the
jury. I recognize that other circuits have afforded trial courts
great discretion in determining whether or not to allow copies of
written transcripts to go to the jury. In view of this
precedent, I agree that the trial court in this case did not
abuse its discretion.
I approve the cautionary language that the
majority suggests to prevent the jury from focusing improperly on
one portion of the testimony contained in a transcript. However,
I would prefer to go further. I would exercise our court's
inherent supervisory power to bar trial courts from permitting
the jury to obtain copies of written transcripts of trial
testimony unless the district judge ensured that: (1) no party
was likely to be unduly prejudiced, and (2) the transcript or
particular portion thereof was not likely to be improperly used
by the jury.30 In this regard, the trial court should afford
30
. Although it is not to be invoked lightly, we have
exercised our supervisory power to resolve various procedural and
counsel for each party the opportunity to express counsel's
opinion as to the likelihood of prejudice and improper use.
The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (1987)
provide support for the limitation that I would propose to place
on a trial court's discretion to send written transcripts to the
jury. In particular, Rule 533 provides that:
"If the jury, after retiring for
deliberations, requests a review of any
evidence, the court, after notice to the
parties, shall recall the jury to the
courtroom. If the jury's request is
reasonable, the court shall have any
requested portion of the testimony read or
played back to the jury and permit the jury
to reexamine any requested exhibit received
in evidence. The court need not submit
evidence to the jury for review beyond that
specifically requested by the jury, but the
court also may have the jury review other
evidence relating to the same factual issue
in order to avoid undue emphasis on the
evidence requested. If it is likely that the
jury cannot otherwise adequately consider any
evidence reviewed, the court may permit the
jury to take the evidence, including any part
of a deposition or of a prepared transcript
or recording of the testimony, to the jury
room if it appears:
(..continued)
substantive matters and to provide guidance to the district
courts. See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772,
786 and n.16 (3d Cir. 1994) (invoking inherent supervisory power
to require a showing of good cause whenever order of
confidentiality is granted); Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc.,
926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991) (invoked supervisory power to
require district courts, when granting motion for directed
verdict, to set forth explanation sufficient to permit this Court
to understand legal premise upon which decision was based); see
also Murray M. Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory Power By the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 506, 510-11
(1982).
(1) no party will be unduly prejudiced;
and
(2) the evidence is not likely to be
improperly used by the jury.
(emphasis added).31
I believe that the exercise of our supervisory
power in this manner would best protect the parties from the the
problems which are inherent in permitting trial transcripts to go
to the jury room. At the same time we would afford a district
court the discretion to provide the jury with transcripts when
31
. It is worthy of note, however, that the American Bar
Association's related Standard 15-4.2 of its Standards for
Criminal Justice (1991) does not make any reference to the
practice of permitting transcripts of testimony to go into the
jury room:
Jury request to review evidence.
(a) If the jury, after retiring for
deliberation, requests a review of certain
testimony or other evidence, they shall be
conducted to the courtroom. Whenever the
jury's request is reasonable, the court,
after notice to the prosecutor and counsel
for the defense, shall have the requested
parts of the testimony read to the jury and
shall permit the jury to reexamine the
requested materials admitted into evidence.
(b) The court need not submit evidence
to the jury for review beyond that
specifically requested by the jury, but in
its discretion the court may also have the
jury review other evidence relating to the
same factual issue so as not to give undue
prominence to the evidence requested.
(emphasis added). I read the failure of this standard to discuss
the practice of sending transcripts to the jury as a reluctance
on the part of the ABA to encourage courts to engage in such a
practice on a regular basis.
the court determines that such a practice is necessary and not
likely to be prejudicial to the parties. Although such a rule
might indeed constitute an "intrusion into the district court's
discretion to adapt procedures to the situation in the case
before it," see Majority Opinion at 35, because of the magnitude
of my concerns, I consider such an intrusion to be warranted.