Opinions of the United
1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-5-1994
O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-1378
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
----------
No. 93-1378
----------
JOHN O'NEILL;
SAMUEL R. GOODMAN, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;
PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY;
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE;
BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF ADJUDICATION
City of Philadelphia, Office of The Director of
Finance and Bureau of Administrative Adjudication,
Appellants
----------
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 91-06759)
----------
Argued October 28, 1993
BEFORE: ROTH, LEWIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
----------
(Opinion filed August 5, 1994)
----------
Judith E. Harris
Michael F. Eichert (Argued)
Office of City Solicitor
1600 Arch Street, 8th Floor
1
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-1628
Attorneys for Appellants City of
Philadelphia, Office of The Director
of Finance, Bureau of Administrative
Administrative Office of Adjudication
Andrew F. Mimnaugh
1420 Locust Street
Suite 15-N
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
Vincent J. Ziccardi (Argued)
1435 South Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19147
Attorneys for Appellees
John O'Neill and Samuel R. Goodman
----------
OPINION OF THE COURT
----------
GARTH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to determine whether the
federal courts must entertain a constitutional challenge to the
City of Philadelphia's parking ticket procedures -- procedures
that resulted in the imposition of a $45 fine against plaintiff-
appellee John O'Neill, which remains unpaid, and a $173 fine
against plaintiff-appellee Samuel Goodman, which was paid. We
hold that the district court should have exercised its discretion
to abstain, rather than to decide the constitutionality of
Philadelphia's ticketing procedures. Thus, we will vacate the
district court's judgment and remand with instructions that the
district court dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint.
2
I
John O'Neill ("O'Neill") and Samuel Goodman ("Goodman")
brought suit in federal district court against the City of
Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Parking Authority, the Office of
the Director of Finance, and the Bureau of Administrative Office
of Adjudication (collectively, the "City"), alleging that the
City's reorganization of its system for adjudicating parking
tickets violated their constitutional rights, and the
constitutional rights of similarly situated plaintiffs. On March
29, 1993, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs on their due process claim, vacating the City's
$45 fine against O'Neill, and entering judgment in the amount of
$173 in favor of Goodman. O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 817
F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Although the district court declined the City's
invitation to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this
action, id at 562 n.8, and despite the City's failure to protest
the district court's abstention determination on appeal, we asked
the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the question
of whether the district court properly should have abstained from
entertaining the plaintiffs' claims under the abstention doctrine
announced by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and its progeny.0
0
Even though the question of Younger abstention was not
raised by the parties on appeal, we may consider it sua sponte.
3
We conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to abstain under Younger and in reaching
the merits of O'Neill and Goodman's due process claim.
II
A.
Prior to June 1, 1989, the "Traffic Court of
Philadelphia" had original jurisdiction to adjudicate parking
violations committed in the City of Philadelphia. 42 Pa. Cons.
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143-44 n.10 (1976); McLaughlin
v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 314 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989); Blake v.
Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 727 (3d Cir. 1979). Cf. Winston v. Children
and Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (3d Cir. 1991)
(declining to address question of abstention where defendants
failed to preserve the issue for appellate review). But see id.
at 1396-98 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing cases holding that
failure to file a cross appeal did not preclude Court of Appeals'
consideration of particular issues).
In addition, we note somewhat surprisingly that we are
not the first federal Court of Appeals to focus on the Younger
problems that arise when parking tickets are challenged in § 1983
actions. In a case similar to the one before us on appeal, the
Seventh Circuit decided that Younger abstention was appropriate
where the federal claimant had initiated a federal action instead
of contesting his numerous parking violations in the available
state forum. Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Mun. Corp., 824
F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Horn v. City of Chicago, 860
F.2d 700, 702 n.5 (7th Cir. 1988) (reversing district court's
holding that parking ticket demand notices issued by the City of
Chicago violated the plaintiffs' due process rights and seriously
questioning district court's conclusion that Younger abstention
was not appropriate); Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that Younger precluded consideration of claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief while state criminal
prosecutions were pending against Ballard on his thirty-six
violations of the City of Houston's overtime parking ordinance);
Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing, but
refusing to decide, Younger issue in action challenging City of
New York's parking regulations).
4
Stat. Ann. §§ 1302 and 1321. Appeals from the traffic court's
decisions were heard by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.
In 1989, the Philadelphia City Council reorganized the
City's system for adjudicating parking tickets by enacting an
ordinance which authorized the Office of the Director of Finance
to assume control over the regulation and disposition of parking
violations in the City of Philadelphia. 12 Phila. City Code
§ 12-2802(1). Under the new framework, a parking ticket is
affixed to the vehicle, id. § 12-2804(3), and the owner of the
ticketed vehicle is sent a notice by first class mail. Id. § 12-
2805(1). The person to whom the ticket is issued has fifteen
days to answer it, either admitting the violation by payment of
the fines, costs, and fees, admitting with explanation, or
denying liability and requesting a hearing. Id. § 12-2806(1). A
failure to answer or to pay the fine will result in a Bureau of
Administrative Adjudication ("BAA")0 hearing examiner's entering
an order by default sustaining the charges, fixing the
appropriate fine, and assessing appropriate costs and fees. Id.
§ 12-2807(3).
When the violation is contested, and a hearing is
requested, a BAA hearing examiner holds a hearing and determines
whether the charges have been established. Id. § 12-2807. Once
the hearing examiner has entered his decision, the violator has
0
Regulations adopted by the Director of Finance created
the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication for the purpose of
exercising the duties and powers enumerated in chapter 12-2800 of
the Philadelphia City Code, the chapter added by the 1989
ordinance.
5
thirty days to file an appeal to the BAA Parking Appeals Panel.
Id. § 12-2808. The BAA's decision, or a default by the ticket
holder, creates a debt owed to the City. Id. § 12-2808(5). The
decision of the Parking Appeals Panel can be appealed to the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, and through the state
judicial system. 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 752.0
The effect of the 1989 reorganization was to change the
nature of parking violations from summary offenses, which were
criminal in nature, to civil violations. In practice, a
defendant before the traffic court was entitled to three rights
not available at a BAA hearing: (1) a disposition could not be
made without the personal appearance of the defendant, (2) the
defendant's guilt had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and
(3) the two-year statute of limitations for summary offenses was
in effect.0
Finally, the new ordinance created a period of dual
jurisdiction during which a person who had received a parking
ticket, citation, or traffic court summons between October 2,
0
Section 752 provides as follows: "Any person aggrieved
by an adjudication of a local agency who has a direct interest in
such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the
court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to
Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure)."
0
O'Neill and Goodman argue that they were
unconstitutionally deprived of rights which were only available
in traffic court. We know of no constitutional right, however,
to a hearing before a tribunal of one's own choosing, see Crane
v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1928); Sill v. Pennsylvania State
University, 462 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1972), or to assert a
defense based upon a given statute of limitations. See Chase
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
6
1987 and May 31, 1989, could choose to proceed either in traffic
court or before the BAA. 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2807(8).
B.
O'Neill and Goodman had received parking tickets both
before and after the effective date of the 1989 ordinance.0
Neither paid their fines. Neither responded to the summons and
periodic payment-notices which were sent to them. In particular,
neither answered "Violation Warning Notice[s]" sent in November
1989 by the Office of the Director of Finance explaining that
they could elect to appear before the traffic court or the BAA
for the purpose of contesting their outstanding tickets. Nor did
they respond to "Order[s] of Default" informing them that their
failure to pay the fines could result in the City's taking
further legal action which might have an adverse effect on their
property rights.0
0
The plaintiffs' claims relate only to the retrospective
application of the reorganized adjudicatory procedures to the
parking tickets they received prior to June 1, 1989. The tickets
which fall into this category were issued on the following dates:
Goodman O'Neill
May 16, 1989 May 1, 1989
December 7, 1988 October 10, 1988
December 11, 1987 November 28, 1987
December 11, 1987
February 26, 1987
0
While we need not reach the merits of the plaintiffs'
constitutional claim, we note that at least one other Court of
Appeals has held that individuals who have received, but
purposefully ignored, timely and repeated notices alerting them
of their right to a hearing at which they could contest parking
violations, are in no position to argue that those notices
deprived them of due process. See Saukstelis v. City of Chicago,
932 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding car owner who ignored ten
7
On March 4, 1991, Goodman requested a hearing before
the BAA to contest a ticket he had received on February 4, 1991.
The hearing examiner held such a hearing on March 18, 1991, at
which it assumed jurisdiction over the February 4 ticket, and
nine additional tickets for which Goodman was responsible. Five
of the tickets dated from before June 1, 1989. Five dated from
after June 1, 1989.
Goodman objected that the BAA lacked jurisdiction to
determine his liability on the pre-June 1, 1989 tickets, and
that, in any event, he had the right to raise the statute of
limitations as a defense in the BAA proceeding. The hearing
examiner overruled Goodman's objections and assessed total fines
of $173.00 for the pre-June 1, 1989 tickets, and $74.10 for the
post-June 1, 1989 tickets. Goodman paid his fines.0
In April 1991, O'Neill attempted to list for
disposition with the traffic court three pre-June 1, 1989 parking
tickets. The traffic court informed him that it no longer heard
parking violation cases. O'Neill then requested a hearing with
the BAA at which he raised the same objections as Goodman. On
August 30, 1991, the BAA hearing examiner rejected O'Neill's
tickets, follow-up notices, and 21-day warning of eligibility for
booting, could not insist that city violated his due process
rights by putting "Denver Boot" on his car). Saukstelis had been
denied a preliminary injunction, giving rise to the appeal.
Despite that posture of the case, the Seventh Circuit remanded
with instructions "to enter judgment for the City without further
ado." Id. at 1174.
0
Even though Goodman has paid his fines, a possible
refund of those fines constitutes a collateral consequence
sufficient to prevent mootness. Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48,
53-54 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992); Nakell v. Attorney Gen., 15 F.3d 319,
322 (4th Cir. 1994).
8
objections but reduced his liability for the outstanding parking
tickets to $45.00. O'Neill has not paid his fine.
On October 30, 1991, O'Neill and Goodman filed a five-
count complaint (later amended) against the City of Philadelphia,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City had violated
their constitutional and state-law rights by denying them a
hearing before the traffic court with respect to the parking
tickets they had received prior to June 1, 1989.0 On October 15,
1992, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification but agreed to consider the action as a test case
for persons similarly situated. The case was submitted on cross
motions for summary judgment.0
0
Count One alleged that the City had violated the
plaintiffs' due process rights by denying them the rights which
had been available in traffic court.
Count Two alleged that the City had violated the
plaintiffs' due process rights, and the Ex Post Facto clause of
the United States Constitution, by failing to obtain the
plaintiffs' consent to its jurisdiction, as required by the City
ordinance, and by applying the laws and regulations governing
hearings under the 1989 ordinance, and not those of the traffic
court.
Count Three alleged that the City exceeded the
authority granted under Pennsylvania law by unlawfully extending
the BAA's subject matter jurisdiction.
Count Four alleged that the BAA violated the U.S. and
Pennsylvania Constitutions by holding hearings on parking
violations that were time barred under Pennsylvania law.
Count Five alleged § 12-2807(4) is an unconstitutional
Bill of Attainder to the extent it subjects the plaintiffs'
vehicles to seizure without a hearing.
0
The City argues that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims. In particular, the
City argues that because the plaintiffs did not appeal the
hearing examiner's determination to the Parking Appeals Panel,
under 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2808(5), the Finance Director's
Office had not reached a final decision as to the plaintiffs'
liability, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs' federal suit was
premature. We disagree. Section 12-2808(5) explicitly provides
9
On March 29, 1993, the district court granted the
City's motion for summary judgment as to four of the five
constitutional claims alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint.0 With
respect to the remaining count ("Count Two"), however, the
district court held that the City's failure to allow the
plaintiffs to challenge their pre-June 1, 1989 tickets in traffic
court, as opposed to the BAA, violated the plaintiffs' due
process rights. Consequently, the district court entered
judgment in favor of Goodman in the amount of $173.00, and
directed the City to vacate its outstanding $45.00 judgment
against O'Neill.
The district court also ordered the parties to submit
memoranda as to the appropriate terms of relief, and procedure to
be adopted by the BAA, with respect to the 2,713,975 persons
similarly situated to O'Neill and Goodman (i.e., persons who had
undisposed of parking violation summonses issued before June 1,
1989). Recognizing the potentially heavy financial burden such
relief might place on the City's resources, the district court
stayed this latter portion of its order pending appeal.
that "in the event that no appeal is taken [to the Parking
Appeals Panel], the order of the Parking Hearing Examiner shall
be the final order [of the Finance Director's Office]."
0
The plaintiffs-appellees have not appealed the district
court's grant of summary judgment against them on the
constitutional claims alleged in Counts One, Four, and Five, nor
its grant of summary judgment with respect to the ex post facto
allegations in Count Two. Because the plaintiffs did not press
for summary judgment on the state claims alleged in Counts Three
and Four of their complaint, the district court deemed them to
have been withdrawn without prejudice. The district court's
judgment is found in its entirety at O'Neill v. City of
Philadelphia, 817 F. Supp. at 570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
10
We have jurisdiction over the City's appeal from the
partial grant of summary judgment in favor of O'Neill and Goodman
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III
The abstention doctrine first announced by the Supreme
Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in the context of
a pending state criminal prosecution, has since been extended to
non-criminal state civil proceedings, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975), and state administrative proceedings,
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, (1982), in which important state interests are implicated,
so long as the federal claimant has an opportunity to raise any
constitutional claims before the administrative agency or in
state-court judicial review of the agency's determination. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
629 (1986).
In Middlesex, the Supreme Court delineated three
requirements which must be satisfied before a federal court may
abstain from hearing a case over which it has jurisdiction: (1)
there must be pending or ongoing state proceedings which are
judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings must implicate
important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings must
afford an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional
11
issues. 457 U.S. at 432; Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d
202, 211 (3d Cir. 1993).0
A.
"We exercise plenary review over the legal
determinations of whether the requirements for abstention have
been met. [Citations omitted.] Once we determine that the
requirements have been met, we review a district court's decision
to abstain under Younger abstention principles for abuse of
discretion." Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township,
970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir. 1992).
1.
We need not belabor the question of whether a BAA
proceeding is "judicial in nature." Clearly, it is. See
Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d 1008, 1020-21 (3d Cir.
1981).0 The more compelling issue is whether, in the present
0
Even if these three elements are satisfied, abstention
is not appropriate where the federal claimant makes a showing of
bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance.
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. We note that, in the present case,
no such extraordinary circumstances exist.
0
Under 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2807, hearings must be
conducted "in a fair and appropriate manner." The defendant may
call witnesses, supplement testimony by affidavits, and interpose
legal arguments. While the technical rules of evidence do not
apply, "all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may
be received." Testimony must be given under oath. A record of
the proceeding must be made. The hearing examiner is authorized
to conduct extensive fact-finding and to compel the production of
any document, paper, or record relevant to the violation charged.
He must issue his decision based on the evidence and arguments
offered.
12
case, there is a "pending" state proceeding inasmuch as O'Neill
and Goodman filed their federal lawsuit in lieu of appealing the
hearing examiner's determination, and in lieu of raising their
constitutional claims in the state forum.
It is a well-settled that, "[f]or Younger purposes, the
State's trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system,
and for a federal court to disrupt its integrity by intervening
in midprocess would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State
as sovereign." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989) ("NOPSI"). Thus, "a
necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party [wishing to
contest in federal court the judgment of a state judicial
tribunal] must exhaust his state appellate remedies before
seeking relief in the District Court." Id., quoting Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
Under 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2808(2), the Parking
Appeals Panel:
shall have the power to review the facts and
the law, and shall have power to affirm the
determination or to reverse or modify any
determination appealed from for error of fact
or law, or to remand for additional
proceedings, or, in appropriate cases, to
hear the matter de novo.
See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 423 (holding state
bar disciplinary proceedings judicial in nature where local
attorney ethics committees act as an arm of the state supreme
court in performing the function of receiving and investigating
complaints and holding hearings). But see New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 369-73
(1989) (holding ratemaking proceeding not judicial in nature
because the setting of future utility rates essentially is a
legislative act).
13
In contrast to Huffman, where the federal claimant had
failed to appeal a state trial court judgment against it, here,
O'Neill and Goodman have failed to seek state-court judicial
review of an order entered in a state administrative proceeding.
We are faced, then, with the question left unanswered by the
Supreme Court in NOPSI: whether a state proceeding is "pending,"
and Younger abstention proper, where the adjudicatory process has
become final as a result of the federal claimant's failure to
pursue state-court judicial review of an unfavorable state
administrative determination? 491 U.S. at 369 & n.4 (1989).
The Courts of Appeals have furnished contradictory
answers to this question. Compare Thomas v. Texas State Bd. of
Med. Exam., 807 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding "mere
availability of state judicial review of state administrative
proceedings does not amount to the pendency of state judicial
proceedings within the meaning of Younger") with Alleghany Corp.
v. Pomeroy, 898 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding district court
should have abstained where Alleghany had filed action in federal
court instead of appealing state administrative decision to North
Dakota state courts).
We have been given no reason why a litigant in a state
administrative proceeding should be permitted to forego state-
court judicial review of the agency's decision in order to apply
for relief in federal court. Rather, we find the grounds offered
by the Supreme Court to support its holding in Huffman -- that
state appellate review of a state court judgment must be
exhausted before federal court intervention is permitted -- are
14
equally persuasive when considered with respect to state-court
judicial review of a state administrative determination.0
First, federal intervention before a state court has
had the opportunity to review an agency's decision is no less an
"aspersion on the capabilities and good-faith of state appellate
courts," and no "less a disruption of the State's efforts to
protect interests which it deems important," 420 U.S. at 608,
than the federal intervention with the state judicial appellate
process explicitly condemned in Huffman. Second, federal
0
We find no inconsistency between our holding and the
principle that administrative remedies need not be exhausted
prior to bringing a § 1983 action in federal court. Patsy v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). As the Supreme
Court stated in Dayton Christian Schools:
The application of Younger principles to
pending state administrative proceedings is
fully consistent with Patsy . . . , which
holds that litigants need not exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to bringing a
§ 1983 suit in federal court. Cf. Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607-11 (1975).
Unlike Patsy, the administrative proceedings
here are coercive rather than remedial, began
before any substantial advancement in the
federal action took place, and involve an
important state interest.
477 U.S. at 627-28 n.2. The critical distinction between Dayton
Christian Schools and Patsy is that Patsy involved a remedial
action brought by the plaintiff to vindicate a wrong which had
been inflicted by the State. In contrast, Dayton Christian
Schools involved an administrative proceedings initiated by the
State, before a state forum, to enforce a violation of state law.
That is, in Dayton Christian Schools, the action taken by the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission was coercive rather than remedial,
just as the action taken by the City of Philadelphia, to enforce
its traffic tickets against O'Neill and Goodman, was coercive
action which the plaintiffs sought to circumvent by filing their
complaint in federal court.
15
intervention which would annul the results of an agency
determination would deprive "the States of a function which quite
legitimately is left to them," i.e., the disposition of
constitutional issues which arise in litigation over which they
have jurisdiction. Id. at 609.
The requirement that litigants pursue state-court
judicial review of state administrative decisions serves two
additional purposes, identified by the Eighth Circuit in Pomeroy,
which go to the very heart of the "comity" concerns upon which
Younger abstention is grounded: (1) "the state courts may
construe state law in a way which renders a constitutional
decision unnecessary," id. 898 F.2d at 1317, citing Penzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (stating that an "important
reason for abstention is to avoid unwarranted determination of
federal constitutional questions"), and (2) "interests of comity
are advanced, and friction reduced, if the courts of a state,
rather than the federal courts, determine that the United States
Constitution requires the state to alter its practices." Pomeroy,
898 F.2d at 1318.
We therefore hold that state proceedings remain
"pending," within the meaning of Younger abstention, in cases
such as the one before us, where a coercive administrative
proceeding has been initiated by the State in a state forum,
where adequate state-court judicial review of the administrative
determination is available to the federal claimants, and where
the claimants have chosen not to pursue their state-court
16
judicial remedies, but have instead sought to invalidate the
State's judgment by filing a federal action.
2.
The second prong of the Middlesex test is whether the
proceedings at issue implicate an important state interest. This
factor goes to the very core of the raison d'etre of Younger
abstention inasmuch as the Supreme Court's holding in Younger
rested primarily on considerations of "comity," a concept which
encompasses "a proper respect for state functions." 401 U.S. at
44.
Accordingly, "when we inquire into the substantiality
of the State's interest in its proceedings we do not look
narrowly to its interest in the outcome of the particular case --
which could arguably be offset by a substantial federal interest
in the opposite outcome. Rather, what we look to is the
importance of the generic proceedings to the State." NOPSI, 491
U.S. at 364-65.
It would well nigh be impossible to overstate the point
that the federal courts have no interest whatsoever in the
underlying subject matter of this litigation -- the City of
Philadelphia's on-street parking regulations. In contrast, the
City of Philadelphia has a vital and critical interest in the
functioning of a regulatory system, such as the one at issue
here, which is intimately associated with the physical and
financial workings of the city in general, and of the municipal
government in particular.
17
Prior Supreme Court decisions have held that the states
have a substantial interest in enforcing criminal laws that bear
a close relationship to criminal proceedings, Huffman, 420 U.S.
at 604, in regulating attorney conduct, Middlesex, 457 U.S. at
434, in administering child custody proceedings, Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415 (1979), in preventing sex discrimination against
employees, Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 628, and in
regulating intrastate utility rates. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365.0
We do not believe that we exaggerate the scope of these
decisions in holding that the City of Philadelphia has a
significant and substantial interest in the regulation of on-
street parking, and in the vindication of the system it has
implemented to adjudicate violations of those regulations.0 The
0
We have held that the states have a substantial
interest in education, Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d
at 1017-18 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that state's interest in
education is not weakened by the fact that, technically, local
school boards press disciplinary charges against teachers, and
not the State), and in regulating securities transactions. Olde
Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d at 212 (3d Cir. 1993). See also
Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359,
361 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding important state interest in
regulating mobile home parks even though rental rates are
regulated by local ordinance rather than statewide law); Federal
Express Corp. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 925 F.2d 962, 969
(6th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's finding important
state interest in regulating intrastate trucking).
0
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he importance
of the state interest may be demonstrated by the fact that the
noncriminal proceedings has a close relationship to proceedings
criminal in nature." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. Until May 31,
1989, of course, parking infractions in the City of Philadelphia
were criminal offenses. Simply because parking violations are
the least threatening of all motor vehicle violations -- and are
now civil offenses in the City of Philadelphia -- does not mean
that the State's overriding interest in enforcing its motor
vehicle laws, many of which remain criminal in nature, has had
its importance diluted.
18
plaintiffs, in fact, have conceded as much in their supplemental
brief. See Appellee's Supp. Br. at 1 ("This case involves the
regulation and administration of on-street parking which, of
course, is an important interest to the State of Pennsylvania and
the City of Philadelphia.").
3.
The third prong of our inquiry is whether the claimant
is afforded an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional
claims in the state forum. The Supreme Court has held that this
third element is satisfied in the context of a state
administrative proceeding when the federal claimant can assert
his constitutional claims during state-court judicial review of
the administrative determination. Dayton Christian Schools, 477
U.S. at 629; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 436. Moreover, "when a
litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in
related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume
that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the
absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary." Penzoil Co.
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. at 15.
In the present case, neither O'Neill nor Goodman
attempted to raise his federal claims in the state proceedings.
Accordingly, we would be well-justified in assuming that, had
they done so, they would have been afforded an adequate remedy.0
0
In Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d 1008 (3d
Cir. 1981), we held that a federal claimant is afforded an
opportunity to assert her constitutional claims in the state
forum where an administrative board is authorized to dismiss the
19
In any event, it is undisputed that O'Neill and Goodman could
have raised their constitutional arguments before the
administrative review board, again in the state-court appellate
process, to and through the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and,
ultimately, before the United States Supreme Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a).0
B.
In sum, we hold that the three-prong test for Younger
abstention is satisfied in the present case. The BAA proceeding
was a judicial proceeding which may be deemed "pending" as a
result of O'Neill's and Goodman's failure to take advantage of
the appellate remedies which were available to them. The
implementation of Philadelphia's procedures for adjudicating
parking tickets implicates important state (and not federal)
charges against the claimant. In this respect, we note that the
BAA Parking Appeals Panel is authorized "to review the facts and
the law, and shall have the power to affirm the [hearing
examiner's] determination or to reverse or modify any
determination appealed from for error of fact or law, or to
remand for additional proceedings, or, in appropriate cases, to
hear the matter de novo." 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2808(2).
0
28 U.S.C. § 1257 provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered
by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where
. . . the validity of a statute of any State
is drawn in question on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States, or
where any title, right, privilege, or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution . . . .
20
interests. Lastly, O'Neill and Goodman could have asserted their
constitutional claims in the state proceedings.
Anxious though we may be "to vindicate and protect
federal rights and federal interests," Younger, 401 U.S. at 44,
considerations of comity demand that we remain sensitive to the
legitimate interests of the states. Since this case does not
involve any of the extraordinary circumstances which would
otherwise make abstention inappropriate, we hold that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to abstain from
hearing O'Neill and Goodman's federal claims in deference to the
overwhelming interest of the City of Philadelphia and the State
of Pennsylvania with respect to their on-street parking
regulations.
IV
Therefore, we will vacate the district court's judgment
of March 29, 1993, and remand this case to the district court
with instructions to abstain under Younger v. Harris, and to
dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint.
Costs will be taxed against O'Neill and Goodman.
21
John O'Neill, et al. v. City of Philadelphia, et al.
No. 93-1378
LEWIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Chief Justice Marshall may well have overstated his
point when, writing for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), he stated: "We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution." Marshall's absolutist view of the
federal courts' duty to exercise the jurisdiction Congress and
the Constitution afford them is frequently quoted, but of course,
it has not been faithfully followed.0 Abstention decisions,
among others, demonstrate that federal courts can and do decline
to hear cases that they have the constitutional and statutory
authority to decide. But see New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) ("NOPSI") (stating that
"federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise
of jurisdiction that has been conferred", and describing
0
Professor Shapiro has pointed out that the circumstances of
Cohens, a case requiring Marshall to assert and defend
the Supreme Court's authority to review state court
decisions, might account for the "frightening" tenor
and content of his pronouncement. David L. Shapiro,
"Jurisdiction and Discretion," 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543,
543-44 (1985). He suggests as well that on at least
one other occasion, in Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 240, 264 (1804), Marshall seemed to
recognize that federal courts did retain a degree of
discretion not to exercise jurisdiction that
undoubtedly existed. Id. at 545 n.12 and accompanying
text.
22
abstention cases as merely restricting the availability and
timing of certain forms of relief). Nonetheless, the ideal
behind Marshall's statement in Cohens remains a meaningful one;
even the decisions disproving its accuracy recognize and come to
terms with the significant degree of truth to its directive. In
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976), for example, where the Supreme Court concluded
that federal jurisdiction should not be exercised, it cautioned
that abstention "represents an extraordinary and narrow exception
to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy
properly before it." Id. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)). This
"obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given them," the Court later emphasized, is "virtually
unflagging." Id. at 817; see also NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (same);
Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (same). Thus, as
we recently reiterated, "[a]bstention is the exception and not
the rule." Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1994);
see also NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (same); Colorado River, 424 U.S.
at 813 (same). "Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can
be justified under this doctrine only in exceptional
circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the
State court would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest." Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting
County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89).
23
In light of these well-established principles, I
believe that the majority's expansion of the Younger abstention
doctrine is clearly unwarranted. This area of the law is no
place for inflexible absolutes. (With all due respect to Chief
Justice Marshall, not even he could convince me that my
colleagues in the majority have committed treason to the
Constitution.) But at the very least, a federal court's reasons
for abdicating its responsibility to decide cases over which it
has jurisdiction should be quite strong. In my view, the reasons
supporting the majority's decision that abstention is mandated
here are not nearly adequate.
I.
The plaintiff-appellees, John O'Neill and Samuel
Goodman, initiated proceedings in Philadelphia's (the City)
Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA) to challenge several
parking tickets they had received. In response to Goodman's and
O'Neill's requests, the BAA scheduled hearings to review their
tickets. In addition, however, the BAA decided that at the same
time, it would adjudicate a group of older tickets that the
plaintiffs had received prior to June, 1989. When the plaintiffs
discovered this, they objected that the BAA did not have the
authority to make rulings on the older tickets. The BAA hearing
examiners who presided over their cases rejected these
arguments.0
0
The BAA does not, and legally cannot, initiate hearings to
review parking tickets. As I discuss below, it is not
a court of record. It has no authority to issue a
summons or a warrant, nor can it enter a civil
24
The City concedes and in fact relies on the point that
in deciding to adjudicate Goodman's and O'Neill's older (pre-
June, 1989) parking tickets, the BAA hearing examiners plainly
failed to follow the local ordinance setting forth the agency's
powers and procedures. See Phila. City Code § 2800 et seq. A
provision of that ordinance states that if a person elects to
contest a parking ticket he received prior to the date the
ordinance became effective, he must consent to the BAA's
jurisdiction to adjudicate that ticket. Phila. City Code
judgment. App. at 404-05. The majority describes the
administrative proceedings that occurred here as
"coercive" action taken by the City. Maj. Op. at 15-16
n.13. In my view, that is not correct. The only
conceivably coercive, proactive conduct the BAA took in
this case was directly prohibited by local ordinance.
The facts of Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986), which the majority views as
describing "coercive" state-initiated action similar to that
which occurred here, are notably different. In Dayton
Christian Schools, a state agency acting within its lawful
authority initiated an administrative action against a
private school by filing a complaint. Id. at 624. While
those administrative proceedings were pending, the school
filed a § 1983 suit in federal district court. Here, in
contrast, Goodman and O'Neill initiated the administrative
process by requesting a hearing. The BAA did not and could
not require them to do so. It is legally incapable of
coercing participation by unwilling individuals. The agency
did act independently and contrary to the plaintiffs' wishes
when it assumed jurisdiction over their older tickets. As
the City points out, however, that action was flatly
prohibited by local ordinance. The City thus describes the
state action challenged here as an unfortunate and legally
indefensible (but not unconstitutional) mistake. In
deciding to adjudicate Goodman's and O'Neill's older
tickets, therefore, the BAA hearing officers were acting
contrary to the state's interests and instructions; they
were not acting in furtherance of the state's valid goals. I
discuss the legal significance of these facts below. For
now, I only mean to set them straight.
25
§ 2807(8). The ordinance went into effect on June 1, 1989. The
plaintiffs did not consent to and, in fact, expressly challenged
the BAA's jurisdiction to adjudicate their older tickets. Thus,
the BAA hearing examiners acted contrary to law in addressing the
infractions that Goodman and O'Neill had been charged with
committing prior to June, 1989.
The fact that the hearing examiners overlooked the
clear requirements of an applicable provision of the City Code is
understandable. Their job is to fairly and efficiently dispose
of challenges to parking tickets, a task that generally does not
require any extensive legal training or research. While the
record does not provide a comprehensive description of the
educational and professional backgrounds of BAA hearing
examiners, I think we can safely assume that they are not
attorneys. Dominic Ceremeli -- who, as a Deputy Director of
Finance in charge of BAA operations, supervises the hearing
examiners, acts as an instructor during their training, and
presides over hearings himself when needed -- testified during
his deposition that he is a high school graduate, has some
college education but no degree, and has not attended law school.
Presumably, at least as a general matter, the hearing examiners
serving under Ceremeli do not possess more advanced legal
credentials.
And given the job that hearing examiners do, they
should not need much specialized training in the law. The
examiners are not expected to evaluate complex legal arguments.
They determine what happened and decide whether that conduct
26
constituted a parking violation. Accordingly, in the chapter of
the Parking Hearing Examiner Manual that covers defenses that
ticket recipients might raise, the subject of federal statutory
or constitutional rights never comes up. Instead, the examiners
learn, for example, that a "Going to the Bathroom" defense should
not succeed; after all, the Manual correctly explains, "This is a
risk all drivers take." App. at 213.0 I do not mean to
trivialize the important and often difficult work that the BAA
and its hearing examiners do in adjudicating challenges to
parking tickets. It is clear, however, that nobody in or outside
City government has ever believed that the people who preside
over this administrative process would possess either the
inclination or ability to evaluate the kind of claims that arise
under the federal civil rights statutes. Quite simply, that is
not the BAA's job. See BAA "Mission Statement", App. at 174
(describing the BAA's purpose and goals, which include fairness
and efficiency but not the protection of federal rights).
Goodman and O'Neill could have initiated an
administrative appeal before the Parking Appeals Panel within
thirty days of the date on which the hearing officers entered
final determinations in their cases. They did not do so. Rather,
0
The tone and content of the Manual further supports my
belief that the BAA hearing examiners are not
attorneys. Otherwise, the Manual would not need to
inform its readers that "[t]he legal system over
hundreds of years has developed very complicated rules
of evidence." App. at 187. Nor, presumably, would it
contain advice like: "It is important that you listen
carefully and pay attention"; or, "In addition to
paying attention, it is important that a Hearing
Examiner does not lose his temper." App. at 184.
27
more than seven months after Goodman's hearing and two months
after O'Neill's, they filed this § 1983 suit in federal district
court, claiming, among other things, that by adjudicating their
older tickets, the City had deprived them of property without due
process of law in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Significantly, then, when Goodman and O'Neill initiated their
suit in federal court, the state administrative process was over.
Nothing was pending before the BAA, and any effort the plaintiffs
might have made to return there to revive and pursue their
administrative proceedings would have been rejected as time-
barred. See City's Supp. Br. at 3 (stating that the plaintiffs
have foregone their opportunity for appellate review, and that
"[i]t is therefore no longer possible for the federal court to
retain jurisdiction while awaiting the outcome of a state
proceeding . . . ."). Thus, there has not been, and there could
not have been, ongoing legal activity at the state level since
prior to the time Goodman and O'Neill brought this case.
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the
City had deprived them of their due process rights and entered
summary judgment in their favor. The City has appealed that
decision.
II.
Like the majority, I recognize that the abstention
question this case presents is an open one. The Supreme Court
has not provided an answer, and the courts of appeals have
reached conflicting results. Compare Allegheny Corp. v. Pomeroy,
898 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the majority) with
28
Thomas v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 807 F.2d 453
(5th Cir. 1987) (agreeing with me). The majority concludes that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to abstain
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the cases
following and extending Younger's rationale. I disagree.
A.
In Younger, supra, the Supreme Court held that absent
extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should abstain from
enjoining ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The decision
rested on several grounds. The first was the "basic doctrine of
equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and
particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution,
when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Younger,
401 U.S. at 43-44. Clearly, this principle has no relevance
here. Goodman and O'Neill have never been subject to anything
resembling a criminal prosecution. Additionally, there is no
ongoing state proceeding to enjoin. And lastly, because the
plaintiffs cannot return to the BAA administrative process, they
have no means of seeking adequate relief for their alleged
constitutional injury through alternative legal avenues.
However, as the Court has recognized in extending
Younger abstention beyond the context of criminal prosecutions,
there is more to this doctrine than "the accepted rule that
equity will not enjoin the prosecution of a crime." Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977). The Younger Court also
"voiced a `more vital consideration,' namely, that in a union
29
where both the States and the Federal Government are sovereign
entities, there are basic concerns of federalism which counsel
against interference by federal courts, through injunction or
otherwise, with legitimate state functions, particularly with the
operation of state courts." Trainor, 431 U.S. at 441 (citation
omitted). These somewhat ill-defined but significant
considerations of comity and federalism are the ones on which the
majority relies in reaching its conclusion. In my view, however,
this case does not implicate such concerns to the extent
necessary to justify a decision mandating abstention under the
Younger doctrine.
The most significant and frequently cited reason
federal courts have articulated for abstaining under Younger has
been the importance of not interfering with state proceedings.
See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (stating that Younger and its
progeny "espouse a strong policy against interference with
pending state judicial proceedings"); Trainor, 431 U.S. at 445-46
(applying Younger abstention to avoid "interrupting [state]
enforcement proceedings pending decision of the federal court"
and the "disruption of suits by the State in its sovereign
capacity"). It is important, we have repeatedly stated, to keep
clear of pending state cases. E.g., Coruzzi v. New Jersey, 705
F.2d 688, 690 (1983) ("The Younger abstention doctrine rests on
the strong federal policy on noninterference with pending state
judicial proceedings.") For this reason, "[a] federal court may
consider Younger abstention when the requested equitable relief
30
would constitute federal interference in state judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings." Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d at 882 (citing
Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 431, and Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1975)). But where such
interference will not occur, "the principles of comity underlying
Younger abstention are not implicated." Id. (quoting Gwynedd
Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1201
(3d Cir. 1992)). As the Supreme Court put it in Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974), "the relevant principles of
equity, comity, and federalism `have little force in the absence
of a pending state proceeding.'" In such circumstances, the
Court explained, a federal court can exercise its given
jurisdiction without creating duplicative legal proceedings or
disrupting the state system; nor could a decision allowing the
federal suit to go forward "be interpreted as reflecting
negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce
constitutional principles." Id.
Here, once again, there was no pending state proceeding
when Goodman and O'Neill initiated their federal suit. Therefore,
there was nothing with which the district court could have
interfered by exercising jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, the
court did exercise its jurisdiction in reaching the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims, and no such interference took place. Because
the BAA process was over, it could not have been disrupted. Even
had the district court made a conscious and determined effort to
hinder the state from pursuing its important interests or
31
demonstrating its ability to recognize and protect federal
rights, it could not have done so.
"Younger does not require federal plaintiffs to exhaust
their appellate remedies unless the relief being sought from the
federal court involves disruption of the state's judicial
process." Marks, 19 F.3d at 884 (emphasis added). No such
disruption is possible here. The majority, nonetheless,
concludes that abstention is not only appropriate, but that by
exercising its jurisdiction, the district court committed an
abuse of discretion.
The Younger doctrine is also said to serve the
interests of comity and federalism by preventing federal courts
from projecting any doubt that state courts can and will protect
federal rights. See, e.g., Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446 (basing
decision to abstain on the desire to avoid disrupting state suits
"combined with the negative reflection on the State's ability to
adjudicate federal claims that occurs whenever a federal court
enjoins a pending state proceeding"). According to the majority,
this consideration supports its conclusion that abstention is
required here. It believes that by exercising jurisdiction over
Goodman and O'Neill's § 1983 suit, the district court did in fact
cast an "aspersion on the capabilities and good-faith" of the
state system. Maj. Op. at 16 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608).
At least, the majority reasons, the insult was just as
disparaging here as it would have been if the plaintiffs had
commenced their federal action after losing in the Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas. Once again, I disagree.
32
Goodman and O'Neill have alleged that the BAA examiners
presiding over their administrative hearings made decisions which
resulted in a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Instead of bringing an appeal before other administrative
officials -- who, like the original examiners, are not attorneys
and are not in the business of adjudicating § 1983 cases -- the
plaintiffs went to federal court. When they did so, they had
never been before a state tribunal, nor had they ever had direct
access to a state tribunal, that was competent to hear their
federal claims. Unlike judges in state trial courts, the
officials who administer BAA proceedings (at both the hearing and
appellate stages) cannot, as a practical or a legal matter,
decide whether the City should be held liable for a deprivation
of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. That is a complicated
question over which Article III judges have disagreed in this
case. State trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
§ 1983 suits, and Pennsylvania's judges are perfectly capable of
handling them. The BAA, in contrast, is not even a court. The
officials presiding over its hearings and appeals are not
attorneys. They do not possess either the training or the
resources to adjudicate § 1983 suits. Even if those limitations
did not exist, the informal, streamlined procedural rules that
govern BAA proceedings would prevent agency officials from
performing this challenging job adequately. Is it really such an
insult to the state system to allow individuals allegedly
deprived of constitutional rights at the first stage of such an
administrative process to bring their § 1983 suit in federal
33
court, rather than first to proceed with an administrative appeal
and then to pursue relief through the state courts?
The majority answers affirmatively. The aspersion cast
by a failure to abstain here, it states, would be equal in
magnitude to that cast by permitting plaintiffs to go forward
with federal actions after losing in state trial court. But by
not abstaining here, the district court did not displace a state
court of appeals. It displaced a BAA parking appeals panel.
Would we actually offend Pennsylvania by allowing § 1983
claimants to prefer a federal district court to the BAA? Would
the State even defend its agency's legal or practical ability to
handle such a case? Of course not. When the plaintiffs suffered
their alleged constitutional injury at their BAA hearings, they
had a choice: they could appeal within the agency or they could
bring suit in federal court. The decision they made, in my view,
does not disparage the good faith or the abilities of either BAA
administrators or the state courts. And I believe that
Pennsylvania would agree; the Commonwealth is not so unrealistic
or over-sensitive as the majority's argument might suggest.
So, in my view, the district court neither interfered
with nor insulted the state system when it exercised its
jurisdiction over this case, and those principal values of comity
and federalism that Younger abstention serves are not
significantly (or, arguably, even remotely) advanced by today's
decision.
The majority, however, lists several additional comity
concerns. It points out that if we failed to require abstention
34
under the circumstances of this case, state courts would not be
able to decide the constitutional issues that arise in disputes
over which they have jurisdiction. State courts would also lose
the opportunity to construe state laws in a way which would make
the resolution of federal constitutional questions unnecessary.
And finally, the majority reasons, it is better to let state
courts determine when the state must alter its practices to
conform to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution; that way,
the "friction" and resentment following federal decisions
announcing such a mandate can be avoided, and the interests of
comity are furthered.
I agree that if district courts exercise their
jurisdiction over § 1983 suits brought after administrative
decisions subject to eventual state judicial review, state courts
would not get the opportunity to make preliminary determinations
of state and (when necessary) federal law.0 However, if these
comity concerns were sufficient to require the abdication of
federal judicial responsibility to hear § 1983 cases, then we
would require plaintiffs to exhaust their available state
remedies before bringing such suits in federal court. Of course,
under the Supreme Court's holdings in Patsy v. Florida Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
0
This case does not involve any difficult and unresolved
issues of state law that, depending on their
resolution, might affect or make unnecessary our
treatment of the federal questions it presents. If it
did, we might properly abstain under Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The majority does
not suggest that Pullman abstention would be
appropriate here.
35
(1961), that is not necessary. Section 1983 plaintiffs may
forego opportunities to seek recourse through state
administrative and judicial processes and elect to bring their
federal claims, in the first instance, in federal court. When
they do so, as is often the case, state courts do not get the
opportunity to decide the state and federal law questions that
these disputes present. The very same comity concerns that the
majority relies on here give way to the overriding federal
interest in adjudicating suits alleging a violation of federally
protected rights. The additional comity concerns the majority
mentions are no more persuasive here than they were in Patsy,
where the Supreme Court looked past them in holding that § 1983
plaintiffs need not exhaust their administrative remedies before
proceeding in federal court. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 532-33
(Powell, J., dissenting) (defending the exhaustion requirement as
promoting the principles of comity recognized in Younger and
criticizing the Court's decision as forsaking such
considerations).
In Marks v. Stinson, we recognized that "Younger
principles must be applied in a manner consistent with [the]
well-established proposition" set forth in Patsy. Marks, 19 F.3d
at 882. Unlike the plaintiff in Patsy, however, Goodman and
O'Neill had already been through one stage of the state
administrative process when they commenced their suit in federal
court. The majority believes that once plaintiffs initiate BAA
proceedings, they cannot be permitted to leave the state system
without exhausting their appellate remedies. I agree that Patsy
36
does not control here. However, today's decision strikes me as
more about exhaustion than abstention. In my view, this case is
far closer to Patsy than it is to Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 457
U.S. 592 (1975), and the other cases requiring Younger
abstention.
In Huffman, supra, the sheriff and prosecuting attorney
of a county in Ohio brought suit under a public nuisance statute
against the owner of a theater that showed pornographic films.
Following trial, the state court ruled in Ohio's favor. It
issued a judgment ordering the theater to close for one year and
authorizing the state to seize and sell property used in the
theater's operation. The next day, rather than filing an appeal,
the theater owner brought suit in federal district court alleging
that Ohio's application of its nuisance law was unconstitutional
and asking for an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the
state trial court's judgment.
The Supreme Court held that the district court should
have abstained under Younger. In reaching that conclusion, it
relied heavily on "the policy of noninterference" with cases that
are pending before state courts. Huffman, 422 U.S. at 599-605.
The theater owner had argued that after the state trial court
entered its judgment, there was no ongoing proceeding to disrupt.
The Supreme Court rejected that position. Huffman, 420 U.S. at
608 ("[A] necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in
appellee's posture must exhaust state appellate remedies before
seeking relief in the District Court . . . ."). Its reasons for
doing so, which are not applicable here, fully convey the
37
differences between Huffman and the case before us. The Court
stated:
Virtually all of the evils at which
Younger is directed would inhere in federal
intervention prior to completion of state
appellate proceedings, just as surely as they
would if such intervention occurred at or
before trial. Intervention at the later
stage is if anything more duplicative, since
an entire trial has already taken place, and
it is also a direct aspersion on the
capabilities and good faith of the state
appellate courts. Nor, in these state-
initiated nuisance proceedings, is federal
intervention at the appellate stage any the
less a disruption of the State's efforts to
protect interests which it deems important.
Indeed, it is likely to be even more
disruptive and offensive because the State
has already won a nisi prius determination
that its valid policies are being violated in
a fashion which justifies judicial abatement.
Federal post-trial intervention, in a
fashion designed to annul the results of a
state trial, also deprives the states of a
function which quite legitimately is left to
them, that of overseeing trial court
dispositions of constitutional issues which
arise in civil litigation over which they
have jurisdiction. We think this
consideration to be of some importance
because it is typically a judicial system's
appellate courts which are by their nature a
litigant's most appropriate forum for the
resolution of constitutional contentions.
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608-09. Again, virtually none of those
justifications for abstention apply here. Federal adjudication
of the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims would not be duplicative of the
BAA hearings; the hearing examiners could not and did not address
the constitutional implications of their decisions. As I have
already explained, displacing a parking appeals panel is entirely
38
different than displacing a state appellate court, and the former
does not cast any aspersion on the good faith or abilities of
state institutions. Unlike Huffman, in this case the district
court did not disrupt a state-initiated proceeding commenced to
protect interests which the state deems important. Rather, it
was Goodman and O'Neill who initiated the BAA process. (The
agency, recall, is powerless to do so itself.) And the state
action giving rise to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims has
not been deemed important to the state but has instead been
characterized as an unfortunate and unlawful mistake committed by
individual administrative officials. Finally, while state
appellate courts might provide the litigant's "most appropriate
forum for the resolution of constitutional contentions", Id. at
609, one could hardly say the same thing about a parking appeals
panel. Such a suggestion, in fact, would reflect a more
insulting view of the state judiciary than any decision declining
to abstain under Younger.
The majority also states that Dayton Christian Schools,
supra, is more applicable here than Patsy. See Maj. Op. at 15-16
n.13. The federal plaintiff in Patsy, it reasons, initiated a
remedial action to vindicate a wrong which had been inflicted by
the State. Dayton Christian Schools is different, in the
majority's view, because like the case before us, it involved
coercive administrative proceedings initiated by the State to
enforce a violation of state law. But Goodman and O'Neill's
§ 1983 suit is remedial -- not, as the majority suggests, purely
defensive. The plaintiffs claim that the BAA hearing examiners
39
violated their due process rights in deciding to adjudicate their
older tickets, and they have sought relief for that wrong in
federal court. True, they could have pursued the same remedy
through an administrative appeal and then through the state court
system. Under the principles of Patsy, however, which I believe
are applicable here, they need not have exhausted their state
administrative and judicial options. Additionally, unlike the
federal plaintiffs in cases like Huffman, Dayton Christian
Schools, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415
(1979), and Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. 423 (1982),
Goodman and O'Neill have never been targets of state-initiated
legal proceedings. While the majority states that the BAA
process was coercive, the fact is that the BAA cannot adjudicate
tickets unless recipients request a hearing. Again, the agency
does not have the legal power to initiate its own process, and it
cannot coercively subject anyone to its authority. Thus, Goodman
and O'Neill have not asked the district court for protection from
the state's independent efforts to enforce its laws through an
administrative proceeding directed against them. Rather, after
allegedly suffering a constitutional injury at the hands of state
officials presiding over an administrative process that the
plaintiffs initiated for their own benefit, they turned to the
federal district court for relief instead of pursuing
administrative and then judicial appeals within the state system.
In these circumstances, it requires only the smallest extension
of Patsy -- as compared to a far greater and less reasonable
40
extrapolation of Huffman, Dayton Christian Schools, and other
decisions requiring Younger abstention -- to permit § 1983
plaintiffs to go forward with their claims in federal court.
Our prior decision in Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1986),
supports this view. Kentucky West involved a dispute between two
gas companies and the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission
("PUC"). The companies initiated an administrative proceeding
before the PUC seeking approval of a proposed rate increase. The
PUC denied their request, and the companies challenged that
determination in state court. Shortly thereafter, they filed
suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The federal complaint alleged that Pennsylvania's
regulatory scheme and the PUC's decision were either preempted by
federal statute or unconstitutional under the commerce and equal
protection clauses. The district court dismissed the companies'
suit under Burford and Younger abstention. We reversed, stating:
"In the typical Younger case, the federal
plaintiff is a defendant in ongoing or
threatened state court proceedings seeking to
enjoin a continuation of those state
proceedings." Crawley v. Hamilton County
Comm'rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1984). In
this case, on the other hand, the federal
plaintiffs -- [the gas companies] -- are also
the state plaintiffs. Moreover, they are not
seeking to enjoin any state judicial
proceeding; instead, they simply desire to
litigate what is admittedly a federal
question in a federal court, having agreed to
dismiss their pending state appeal if the
district court assumes jurisdiction over the
merits of their complaint.
41
Under the circumstances, then, we
believe that the balance of state and federal
interests tips decidedly away from abstention
under Younger. . . . To deny [the gas
companies] access to a federal forum simply
because of their pending state appeal would
be at odds with a fundamental premise of our
federal judicial system: that is, "that where
Congress has granted concurrent jurisdiction,
a plaintiff is free to bring suit in both the
state and federal forums for the same cause
of action." [New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v.
Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 769 (3d Cir. 1978).]
Kentucky West, 791 F.2d at 1117. In Marks v. Stinson, we
recently reaffirmed the principles set forth in Kentucky West in
holding that Younger abstention was not appropriate where the
exercise of federal jurisdiction would not interfere with
parallel state proceedings. Marks, 19 F.3d at 885. The
plaintiffs in this case occupy the same position as the gas
companies in Kentucky West: they have never been defendants in
state administrative or judicial proceedings; rather, after
allegedly suffering a deprivation of their federal rights as a
result of a state administrative decision, they chose to seek
relief in federal court. Indeed, the argument for abstention was
stronger in Kentucky West and Marks than it is here, as this case
does not raise real concerns of interrupting ongoing litigation
in state courts involving the same subject matter giving rise to
the federal suit. Our reasons for not abstaining previously,
therefore, seem even more compelling in this case.
The First Circuit's decision in Kercado-Melendez v.
Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1987), also counsels against
a decision mandating abstention. The plaintiff in that case,
Kercado, worked for the Puerto Rico Department of Public
42
Instruction ("DPI") as a school district superintendent. The
Secretary of the DPI charged Kercado with incompetence and
improper conduct. After Kercado appeared at an informal DPI
hearing at which the charges against her were addressed, she
received an order dismissing her from her employment. She had
the option to appeal her termination within the DPI
administrative appeals process but declined to do so. Instead,
Kercado filed a § 1983 suit in federal court alleging that she
had been fired as a result of her political affiliations in
violation of her First Amendment rights, and further that the
state had deprived her of due process by failing to provide her
with a pre-termination hearing. On appeal, the Secretary of the
DPI argued "that because Kercado could have appealed the
dismissal to the DPI Board of Appeals, the district court should
have abstained and thereby forced Kercado to litigate her claims
in a Puerto Rico forum." Kercado-Melendez, 829 F.2d at 259. "In
effect," the court continued, the Secretary was arguing "that
Kercado should not have been permitted to bring a section 1983
suit in federal court because of the availability of an appeal
within the Puerto Rico administrative and judicial apparatus."
Id. The majority takes precisely the same position here.
The First Circuit rejected the Secretary's argument. It
explained that in Kercado-Melendez, unlike Dayton Christian
Schools,
the administrative proceeding is remedial
rather than coercive. The administrative
appeal process could be triggered only on
Kercado's initiative if she wished to pursue
her remedies within the Puerto Rico
43
administrative framework. Patsy holds that
she was not required to do so.
Id. at 260 (emphasis added). The administrative process here,
like the ones in Kercado-Melendez and Patsy and unlike the one in
Dayton Christian Schools, could be triggered only on the
plaintiffs' initiative. The BAA was powerless to bring Goodman
and O'Neill before it, and it was powerless to compel them to
challenge the hearing examiners' decisions before a parking
appeals panel. Accordingly, I agree with the First Circuit's
conclusion that the principles of Patsy are more applicable than
those of Dayton Christian Schools or other decisions requiring
Younger abstention. As Kercado-Melendez explains, we should not
fail "to recognize that there is a significant difference between
a civil rights plaintiff who seeks to use the federal courts to
stop or nullify an ongoing state proceeding in which she is a
defendant, and a civil rights plaintiff who has an option to
initiate a state proceeding to remedy a constitutional wrong
perpetrated by a state actor." Kercado-Melendez, 829 F.2d at
261.
B.
In reaching its conclusion that Younger abstention is
mandated here, the majority seeks to protect and promote
principles of comity and federalism. I do not agree with its
assessment of the harm those interests would suffer if we
permitted the district court to exercise its jurisdiction.
Additionally, although the majority barely acknowledges this
point, there are other highly significant countervailing
44
interests at stake in suits brought under § 1983 which merit
serious consideration in any discussion of Younger abstention.
The majority's analysis overlooks this second side of the balance
(after overestimating the first). In doing so, it produces a
result with deeply troubling implications.
When it enacted § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
(now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983), "Congress intended to "`throw
open the doors of the United States courts' to individuals who
were threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of
constitutional rights, and to provide these individuals immediate
access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of
state law to the contrary." Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504 (citation
omitted) (quoting legislative history). Thus, as the Court
explained in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972): "The
very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's
federal rights . . . ." In enacting legislation to make the
federal courts "the primary and powerful reliances" for
vindicating federal rights under § 1983, Steffel, 415 U.S. at 464
(emphasis in original), Congress was fully aware of and
undeterred by competing concerns of comity and federalism. As
the Court has stated, "Congress clearly conceived that it was
altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with
respect to the protection of federally created rights." Mitchum,
407 U.S. at 242. It did so, nonetheless, to create "a uniquely
federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of
45
state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of
the Nation." Id. at 239.
Today, the majority holds that individuals allegedly
deprived of constitutional rights during the adjudication of
their claims before a state agency cannot pursue a § 1983 claim
in federal court -- even after the administrative process is no
longer pending, and even when they no longer have any recourse
within the state system.0 Under the majority's ruling, the only
federal forum such plaintiffs will ever stand a chance of
reaching is the United States Supreme Court; and for a number of
easily appreciated reasons, that chance is remote. By so
drastically limiting (if not, for all practical purposes,
foreclosing) access to the federal courts, today's decision runs
directly counter to the purposes Congress sought to achieve in
enacting the civil rights legislation under which the plaintiffs
brought this suit.
Thus, in concluding that the district court committed
an abuse of discretion by exercising its jurisdiction, the
0
I agree with the majority's point that the plaintiffs lost
their opportunity to pursue administrative and then
judicial appeals in the state system as a result of
their own conduct. In my view, however, Younger
abstention is not a device to keep litigants from
choosing a federal forum when we feel their cases are
better suited to the state agencies or courts. Rather,
it is a principle of restraint exercised only where the
exercise of jurisdiction would inflict overriding harm
to competing values of comity and federalism.
Abstention serves to protect state interests and
maintain a strong, respectful relationship between the
governments making up the federal system -- not to
deter prospective plaintiffs from attempting to
vindicate their federal rights in federal court.
46
majority not only overstates the extent to which comity and
federalism concerns are implicated in this case; in addition, and
of potentially greater significance, its analysis fails to take
into account the vital federal and individual interests at stake
in the adjudication of any case brought under § 1983.
III.
Because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to abstain
under Younger, I will comment very briefly on the merits of the
plaintiffs claims. In my view, there are none.
First, the City is the only remaining defendant in the
case, and the plaintiffs have not established that the alleged
violation of their constitutional rights occurred as a result of
an official custom, practice, or policy under the standard for
municipal liability set forth in Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the related line of cases. In
fact, the City adopted an ordinance expressly prohibiting the
decision that gave rise to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
The officials who presided over Goodman's and O'Neill's hearings
overlooked that provision of the City Code, but Philadelphia
cannot be held liable for those mistakes.0
0
The plaintiffs argue that even if the hearing examiners had
complied with the ordinance and refrained from
adjudicating their older tickets, the BAA's utilization
of a "Code 41" mechanism would have required the agency
to make the same determinations of liability. First,
even if Code 41 was relevant to resolving the
substantive issues this case presents, factual disputes
over this mechanism's effect and existence at the time
of Goodman's and O'Neill's hearings would preclude a
grant of summary judgment. Second, and more
47
Second, I believe that the district court erred in
concluding that Goodman and O'Neill were deprived of their
property without due process of law. The City committed such a
violation, it reasoned, by failing to notify the plaintiffs that
if they failed to appear before the Traffic Court prior to a
certain date, their only recourse would be to the BAA.
The BAA is an administrative agency that does not even
have the power to enter a civil judgment. The Traffic Court, in
contrast, rendered decisions determining criminal guilt.
Accordingly, and appropriately, the BAA does not provide ticket
recipients with all of the procedural protections and defenses
that they could have relied upon in the Traffic Court. However,
nobody has suggested that the process the BAA does provide in
adjudicating ticket challenges fails to meet constitutional
standards. Goodman and O'Neill only argue, and the district
court only held, that before the City switched the forum in which
importantly, Code 41 is not important here because the
BAA did not employ it. Goodman and O'Neill are
attempting to establish municipal liability based on a
policy that the City never followed in its dealings
with them. Their belief that the BAA would have made
Code 41 determinations, and that when that occurred,
they would have suffered the same alleged deprivation
of due process, does not give them a viable claim
against the City. The official conduct that resulted
in the constitutional harm the plaintiffs allegedly
suffered was the hearing examiners' erroneous decisions
to rule on their older tickets -- not the Code 41
mechanism. Under justiciability principles and the
standard for municipal liability in § 1983 cases,
Goodman and O'Neill cannot pursue a claim based on a
rule or policy that never affected them.
48
ticket recipients would have to proceed, it was required to
provide notice.
I would not accept that argument (and, I gather,
neither would the majority). The City has replaced one
constitutionally adequate process with another. True, someone
who surely would have escaped criminal liability in Traffic Court
might not prevail at the BAA. But everyone who participates in
BAA proceedings receives at least the process that is due before
the City takes their property. The City did not warn Goodman and
O'Neill that they might lose their access to the Traffic Court;
it did, however, provide them with notice of the parking charges
against them and a meaningful opportunity to respond to those
charges before reaching a decision that they would have to pay
their fines. Given these facts, the plaintiffs have at most
suffered a deprivation of process without due process -- not a
deprivation of property without due process. That does not
constitute a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
Constitution does not require notice and an opportunity to be
heard before all rule changes that might effect an outcome. So
long as the new rules are adequate under due process standards --
and, again, no one has suggested that in this case, they are not
-- the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied. See Sill v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1972)
(rejecting argument that the University violated students' due
process rights by subjecting them to disciplinary proceedings
before a specially constituted panel that employed its own
procedural rules); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1928) ("No
49
one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure; and so
long as a substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided
due process of law is not denied by a legislative
change."(citations omitted)); see also Maj. Op. at 6-7 n.4.0
Thus, in my view, while Goodman and O'Neill may have
derived certain advantages from not paying their parking tickets,
see Marion Wink, Women Who Love Men Who Don't Pay Their Parking
Tickets, Cosmopolitan, April 1993, at 136, a viable § 1983 suit
is not among them. I would therefore reverse the district
court's decision and remand the case so that judgment could be
entered in favor of Philadelphia.
0
The City makes the additional argument that under Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the availability of post-
deprivation opportunities to challenge the hearing
examiners' erroneous decisions provided the plaintiffs
with constitutionally adequate process. Because the
BAA did provide the plaintiffs with all the process
that was due prior to rendering its decisions, however,
Parratt and other cases addressing the sufficiency of
post-deprivation remedies are irrelevant.
50
IV.
Justice Frankfurter believed that "petty cases," even
more than hard cases, are "calculated to make bad law." United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). "The impact of a sordid little case," he explained,
"is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to
which the case gives rise." Id. This easily qualifies as a
petty case. It is a dispute about a few parking tickets.
Collectively, the plaintiffs' financial stake in the outcome is
$218.00. The generalization to which today's decision gives
rise, however, is an important and, in my view, misguided one.
The majority does not and cannot limit its holding to
meritless claims over small stakes. Highly significant
constitutional questions do arise in the context of
administrative proceedings addressing seemingly minor issues of
purely local concern. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886),
is one example that comes to mind. The plaintiffs in Yick Wo
challenged a facially innocuous municipal ordinance that
empowered a committee of city officials to determine who could
and could not operate laundry businesses. The case elicited one
of the Supreme Court's earliest and most significant expositions
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no state shall deny
to any person the equal protection of the laws. Needless to say,
the scope and importance of issues addressed in administrative
proceedings -- and consequently, the significance of the legal
questions that arise from agency decision-making -- has steadily
and dramatically increased during the years since Yick Wo.
51
Even in cases such as the one before us, where the
underlying constitutional claims are not so gripping, the rule
the majority announces today does not reflect an appropriate
balance between concerns of comity and federalism, on the one
hand, and the values served by the federal courts meeting their
responsibility to decide cases over which they have jurisdiction,
on the other -- especially when that jurisdiction has been
conferred by legislation intended to provide plaintiffs alleging
that they have been deprived of federal rights under color of
state law with direct access to a federal forum. Thus, in my
view, the majority's treatment of this petty case misapprehends
even the general principles of "Our Federalism" it purports to
defend.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
52