Opinions of the United
1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-2-1994
Graham v. Lanfong, et al.
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-7676
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"Graham v. Lanfong, et al." (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 34.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/34
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 93-7676
____________
ORLANZO GRAHAM,
Appellee
v.
VICKY LANFONG, Warden; BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS;
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS,
Vicky Lanfong, Warden;
Bureau of Corrections;
Government of the Virgin Isands;
James Aiken,
Appellants
____________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS and ST. JOHN
(D.C. Civ. No. 93-00096)
____________
Argued April 18, 1994
Before: STAPLETON, ALITO, and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Filed June 2, 1994
____________
Pamela Lynn Wood, Esquire (ARGUED)
Assistant Attorney General
Rosalie Simmonds Ballentine, Esquire
Attorney General
Paul L. Gimenez, Esquire
Solicitor General
Darlene C. Grant, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
48B-50C Kronprindsens Gade,
GERS Complex, 2nd Floor
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
United States Virgin Islands 00802
Attorneys for Appellant, Government of the Virgin Islands
1
Stephen A. Brusch, Esquire (ARGUED)
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Thurston T. McKelvin, Esquire
Federal Public Defender
P.O. Box 1327
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
United States Virgin Islands 00804-1327
Attorneys for Appellee, Orlanzo Graham
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, we hold that a prisoner serving a
Virgin Islands sentence in a federal prison is entitled to the
good-time credits provided by federal law rather than those
applicable under a territorial statute. Because the Virgin
Islands Bureau of Corrections failed to reduce the petitioner's
sentence by the amount of federal credits earned, he was entitled
to habeas corpus relief. We will affirm the order of the
district court ordering his immediate release.
On April 8, 1987, the District Court of the Virgin
Islands sentenced petitioner Graham to a five-year term of
imprisonment for violating a federal statute. The federal
sentence was to be served concurrently with an eight-year
sentence for a territorial offense that was imposed a month later
by another judge of the court.
In June 1987, petitioner began serving the concurrent
sentences in a federal prison. He qualified for federal good-
2
time credits and was released from the federal institution after
three years of actual confinement. The Virgin Islands Bureau of
Corrections then took custody of petitioner in June 1990 to serve
the remaining portion of his territorial sentence.
While in the Virgin Islands institution, petitioner
asked that he be given credit against the eight-year territorial
sentence for the five-year sentence completed in the federal
prison. The Virgin Islands Attorney General's Office responded
that petitioner would be given credit only for the three years
actually spent in the federal penitentiary and that he would earn
good-time credit under Virgin Islands law only for the period in
which he was incarcerated in the Virgin Islands institution.
The net result of the Attorney General's ruling was
that petitioner would earn good-time credits under Virgin Islands
law only after June 1990 when he was returned to the Virgin
Islands and became an inmate there. According to the Bureau of
Corrections, petitioner would, therefore, not complete his
sentence until May 29, 1994, assuming that he earned good-time
credits at the Virgin Islands facility.
Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus. The
district court concluded that petitioner had been in
"constructive custody" of the Bureau of Corrections while serving
the concurrent territorial sentence in the federal prison. The
court thus found that petitioner was entitled to good-time
credits under Virgin Islands law against the territorial sentence
for the time spent in the federal prison, as well as for the
period served in the Virgin Islands institution. On that basis,
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the court observed that the petitioner's sentence had already
expired and on September 1, 1993, ordered the immediate release
of petitioner. The Government of the Virgin Islands has
appealed, asserting that the district court erred in releasing
petitioner prematurely.
18 U.S.C. § 5003(a) authorizes the Director of the
United States Bureau of Prisons to contract with appropriate
state and territorial officials for the custody of persons
convicted in state or territorial courts. Section 5003(c) of
that statute provides that "[u]nless otherwise specifically
provided in the contract, [such persons] shall be subject to all
the provisions of law and regulations applicable to persons
committed for violations of laws of the United States not
inconsistent with the sentence imposed." Id. § 5003(c).
Acting pursuant to authority granted by 18 U.S.C.
§ 5003 and by the corresponding Virgin Islands statute, V.I. Code
title 5, § 4503, the Government of the Virgin Islands entered
into a contract with the United States Bureau of Prisons, which
specified that prisoners in the custody of the federal government
would be subject to federal rules and regulations. Therefore, by
virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 5003 and the contract, Virgin Islands
prisoners confined in federal prisons, whether convicted of
federal or territorial offenses, are subject to the statutes
applicable to federal prisoners and regulations of the federal
Bureau of Prisons.
18 U.S.C. § 5003 does not exclude awards of good-time
credits from its scope, and consequently, they would be
4
applicable to prisoners serving territorial as well as federal
sentences. To make a distinction depending on the jurisdiction
that imposed the term of incarceration would create an
undesirable disparity among the inmates, which would in turn lead
to disciplinary problems for prison administrators. Moreover,
allowing federal good-time credits toward a federal sentence, but
not doing so for a concurrent territorial term, would reduce the
incentives for a prisoner to qualify for those benefits and would
thus frustrate the aims of the federal program.
At the time of the petitioner's offense, the federal
good-time credit statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1982) (repealed
1986), provided that a prisoner convicted of a federal offense
was entitled to an allowance of eight days per month for a
sentence of between five and ten years.1 Because petitioner was
subject to federal rules and regulations while serving time in
the federal prison, he was entitled to receive good-time credit
under 18 U.S.C. § 4161 not only for the federal sentence, but for
the territorial sentence as well. For example, if petitioner had
been sentenced to concurrent five-year sentences for both the
federal and territorial crimes, he would have been entitled to be
released after his completion of the federal sentence.
1
This statute was replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which limits
good-time credits for federal offenses to 54 days per year.
Section 3624(b) does not apply to petitioner because his offense
occurred prior to the effective date of the repealer. See
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II,
§235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2031 (repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 4161
effective Nov. 1, 1986).
5
The Bureau of Corrections, therefore, erred in deciding
that the period of time served in the federal institution should
be treated differently for the territorial and federal sentences.
If federal good-time credit had been properly applied to his
concurrent territorial sentence for that period, petitioner would
have had only three remaining years to serve in a Virgin Islands
correctional institution following his transfer from the federal
prison.2
Although we conclude that the Bureau of Corrections
erred in its calculation of the petitioner's release date by
failing to apply federal good-time credit to the territorial
sentence, we must also reject the petitioner's contention that he
was entitled to good-time credit under Virgin Islands law for
that same period.
The Virgin Islands good-time provision is codified at
V.I. Code tit. 5, § 4571 and reads in pertinent part: "Each
prisoner confined in a prison or jail in the Virgin Islands for a
definite term . . . shall be entitled to a deduction from the
term of his sentence . . . as follows: Six days for each month
of time served."
The Government of the Virgin Islands argues correctly,
we believe, that this statutory language limits credits to time
served in a Virgin Islands institution. The language refers to
2
This good-time credit calculation would be the same as that
provided for his federal sentence. The record is unclear as to
how the federal authorities arrived at this calculation.
Nevertheless, we base the petitioner's good-time credit allowance
on the same figure.
6
the place of confinement and does not use the term "custody" or
any such relationship in determining eligibility for the credits.
Consequently, the petitioner's reliance on cases discussing
"constructive custody" such as Ali v. Gibson, 572 F.2d 971 (3d
Cir. 1978), is misplaced.
In Fields v. Keohane, 954 F.2d 945, 948 (3d Cir. 1992),
the petitioners complained that because their District of
Columbia sentences were being served in a federal penitentiary,
they were only being given federal system good-time credits,
rather than the more favorable benefits available to those
confined in District of Columbia facilities. We rejected their
contention that they had a "liberty interest" in being confined
to a District of Columbia institution and recognized the right of
the District of Columbia authorities to limit local good-time
benefits to their own institutions. Id. at 950-51; see also Moss
v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 1989); cf. Jackson v.
Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194, 197-200 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting the
argument that not allowing women prisoners who were housed in
federal prison to receive more favorable good-time credit under
District of Columbia law violated Equal Protection Clause).
Accordingly, we dismiss the petitioner's contention
that during the period of his confinement in the federal
institution, he was entitled to accumulate Virgin Islands good-
time credits. The language of the Virgin Islands Code specifying
the location at which credits may be earned bars such a result.
In any event, our conclusion that petitioner is entitled to
7
federal good-time credits against the territorial sentence leads
to the result he intended when seeking relief.
In sum, petitioner was entitled to full credit for a
five-year term served in the federal institution, and upon his
relocation to the Virgin Islands prison, he was eligible for
Virgin Islands good-time credits for the duration of his stay
there. Specifically, because petitioner was to be considered as
having served five of the eight-year term on his territorial
sentence while in the federal institution, he had a maximum of
three years remaining on his Virgin Islands sentence. He was
then entitled to Virgin Islands good-time credits during those
remaining three years.
According to our calculations, petitioner had completed
both sentences before the date he was released. Therefore, we
will affirm the order of the district court, although we have
followed a different route in coming to that conclusion.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
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