IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-50210
Summary Calendar
SHERMAN WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LIEUTENANT STROUPE; ET AL.,
Defendants,
LIEUTENANT STROUPE; SERGEANT MAREZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. A-00-CV-372-SC
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January 24, 2003
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sherman Wilson appeals the judgment rendered against him after a jury trial on his excessive-
force claim and the summary-judgment dismissal of his claim that he was denied medical care. He
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-50210
-2-
argues that jury Interrogatory No. 1 was improper in light of Lieutenant Stroupe’s stipulation that
no force was necessary. Wilson further asserts that the magistrate judge erred in dismissing his
denial-of-medical-care claim because the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs.
In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992), the Supreme Court “h[e]ld that whenever
prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . : whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” (emphasis added).
The jury interrogatory at issue tracks t his specific language from Hudson. Because the jury
interrogatory contains the “core judicial inquiry” under Hudson for an excessive-force claim, Wilson
fails to demonstrate that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in formulating the jury
interrogatory. See Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 404 (5th Cir.
2000).
The magistrate judge properly dismissed Wilson’s denial-of-medical-care claim based on his
findings that Wilson admitted receiving medical treatment two hours after he experienced the chest
pains; that the medical records indicated that Wilson was offered an EKG but declined the treatment;
and that Wilson failed to describe how he was harmed by the alleged delay in treatment. See Mendoza
v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir.
1991). Wilson does not challenge these findings on appeal and, thus, fails to show that the magistrate
judge erred in dismissing his claim. See id.
Based on the foregoing, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.