Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-22-2003
USA v. Forrest
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 02-2372
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Recommended Citation
"USA v. Forrest" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 538.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/538
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________
02-2372
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALANDA FORREST,
aka EARL FORREST;
aka EARL ORLANDO;
aka EARL HOWARD;
aka ALANSO LAW;
aka LANCE FORREST
Alanda Forrest, Appellant
________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(Dist. Court No. 00-cr-00385-8)
District Judge: Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky
_______________
Argued on February 11, 2003
BEFORE: ALITO and McKEE, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,* Senior
District Judge
(Opinion Filed: May 22, 2003)
MARK W. CATANZARO (ARGUED)
Blason IV - Suite 208
513 S. Lenola Road
*
The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
Moorestown, NJ 08057
Counsel for Appellant Alanda Forrest
CHRISTOPHER J. CHRISTIE
United States Attorney
GEORGE S. LEONE
Chief, Appeal Division
MICHAEL MARTINEZ (ARGUED)
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Office of the United States Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
PER CURIAM:
Alanda Forrest (“Forrest”) pled guilty to two counts of a superseding
indictment charging knowing and intentional use of a telephone to facilitate the distribution
of cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(b) and 843(d)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2. Forrest was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of forty-eight months on
each of the counts, to run consecutively and to be followed by a term of supervised release
of one year. The remaining counts were dismissed.
Counsel for Forrest has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 306
U.S. 738 (1967), representing that a conscientious review of the record failed to disclose
any nonfrivolous issues for review and requesting permission to withdraw.
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Forrest filed a brief pro se raising five issues:
1. He contends that his plea to Count Three lacked a factual basis. That
Count charged him with using a telephone on March 1, 2000, to facilitate the distribution
of cocaine and cocaine base. At his plea hearing, Forrest specifically admitted that on
March 1, 2000, he used a telephone to arrange a meeting for delivery of a quantity of
cocaine base.
2. He contends that his sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000), by making a drug determination on a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Apprendi does not apply because the drug quantity the District Court found—and to which
Forrest stipulated—did not increase the sentence to a degree exceeding the prescribed
statutory maximum of four years for the offense to which he pled.
3. He contends that the District Court’s drug quantity determination was
erroneous. The quantity the District Court determined–more than twenty grams but less
than thirty-five grams of cocaine base–was the quantity to which Forrest stipulated in his
plea agreement. That stipulation is binding on him. See United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d
106, 110 (3d Cir. 1998).
4. He contends that the District Court should have awarded a three-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The sentence the Court imposed—based on an
offense level of twenty-five—included a three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. The appeal is barred, moreover, by Forrest’s waiver of his right to appeal the
District Court’s determination of his offense level if the total offense level determined by
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the District Court did not exceed twenty-five.
5. He contends that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
Because Forrest’s claim does not fall within a narrow exception, the claim is not
appropriately raised on direct appeal. United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d
Cir. 1998).
On this record, we find no nonfrivolous issues. We will grant defense
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment.
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